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John Mac Intire

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THE
COMMENTARIES
OF
CÆSAR,

TRANSLATED into ENGLISH.

To which is prefixed a

DISCOURSE
CONCERNING

The ROMAN ART of WAR.

By WILLIAM DUNCAN,
Professor of Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen.

In Two VOLUMES.

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TO HIS
ROYAL HIGHNESS
G E O R G E
PRINCE of WALES.

S I R,

THOUGH I am far from thinking that any Performance of mine can be intitled to the Honour of Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's Patronage, yet, as the following Work is a Translation of the Memoirs of the greatest General of Antiquity, I hope the Merit of the Original, and the Name of *Gæfar*, will in some measure excuse the Presumption of this Address.

IN these Memoirs Your ROYAL HIGHNESS will see displayed all that is great and most consummate in the Art of War. The ablest Commander of the most warlike People upon Earth entertains You with

A 2 the

D E D I C A T I O N.

the History of his own Campaigns. You are informed of the Motives which determined him in all his Enterprises, of the various Difficulties he had to encounter, and of the Steps by which in the end he was enabled to surmount all Opposition. In a word, Prudence in Counsel, Courage and Intrepidity in the Field, a calm Presence of Mind in the midst of Dangers, and an amazing Dexterity in sudden and unforeseen Emergencies, are here exemplified in the Conduct of a Leader, whom all succeeding Ages have agreed to regard as the most finished Pattern of military Merit.

It is the Observation of one of the wisest of the *Roman* Historians, "that War is in a peculiar manner the Province of a Prince; and that though civil Accomplishments are by no means to be neglected, yet to the Person of the Sovereign more immediately belongs the Merit and Praise of being a great General." And indeed as it is among the principal Duties of a King, to protect his Subjects from foreign Invasions,

D E D I C A T I O N.

sions, to baffle the Attempts of ambitious and aspiring Tyrants, and to guard against the Incroachments of powerful Neighbours, nothing can be more evident, than that a due Institution in the Art of War ought to be considered as an essential Part of the Education of a Prince.

SOME perhaps may be of opinion, that the Maxims of the present Age, which forbid Kings to appear in Person at the head of Armies, and injoin them rather to delegate their Power to others, render military Talents less necessary in the Rulers of Nations. But tho' this be in reality a very wise Policy, and excellently calculated to prevent those unjust Wars, which have no other Foundation but the personal Ambition and Glory of Princes, yet does it by no means dispense with the Obligation of applying to the Study of Arms. The due modelling of the Army, the introducing a proper Discipline among the Troops, and the Disposal of military Preferments, are intirely in the Breast of the Sovereign, who would be but ill qualified for the Exercise of so great a Trust,

D E D I C A T I O N.

if wholly unacquainted with martial Affairs. It is likewise well known, that in dangerous domestic Seditions, to which all States are at times liable, nothing tends more to confirm the well-affected in their Duty, and to check the Machinations of the Factious, than when a King every way qualified to command, appears in Person at the head of his Troops. In general Confederacies too, where many Nations unite to oppose some threatening overgrown Power, it is often impossible to reconcile their various Interests, and preserve the Unanimity necessary to give Force and Vigour to their Operations, unless some Prince of distinguished Reputation, and eminent Quality in the League, charge himself with the Conduct of the War, and employ his whole Authority to prevent those Competitions, Jealousies and mutual Animosities, which are every moment ready to break out in an Army composed of so many separate and divided Bodies.

HENCE it is that Valour and the military Virtues have always been considered
as

D E D I C A T I O N.

as Objects highly worthy the Pursuit of a Prince ; nor do they ever fail to meet with their due Share of Applause, unless where they degenerate into that hurtful Ambition, that immoderate Thirst of Conquest, which prompts Men rather to be the Destroyers than to be the Protectors of Nations. As the Commentaries of *Cæsar* furnish the best Lessons and Precepts of War, so the Example and History of the same *Cæsar* demonstrate, that the greatest Talents, when not directed to laudable Ends, are utterly insufficient, either for present Security, or future Fame. Tho' his Abilities as a General and a Statesman were never perhaps equalled before or since ; yet as he employed them, not to promote the Welfare, but to disturb the Peace of Society ; not to defend, but to overturn the Liberties of his Country ; he could neither escape the Hatred of the Age in which he lived, nor the Reproaches of Posterity. We find him often in Distress, and sometimes in Despair, ready to fly his Country, threatened with being tried and condemned as a public Criminal ; and at last, after a restless Life, full

D E D I C A T I O N.

of Anxiety and Care, cut off by a violent and untimely Death, just as he had established his Tyranny, tho' with it he could not establish his own Happiness. Had he employed his Authority and Address to preserve public Liberty; had he, for this glorious End, exerted his Industry and admirable Talents; how amiable must he have appeared, in what Security might he have lived, and with what Veneration would he have been regarded by all future Ages?

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS is born to govern a People, who have at all times distinguished themselves by their Love of Liberty; a People always obedient to just Laws, but impatient under Oppression, and infinitely jealous of their Privileges. *Tacitus* speaking of them fifteen hundred Years ago says, " that they chear-
" fully complied with the Levies of Men,
" with the Imposition of Tribute, and
" with all the necessary Demands
" of Government, provided they re-
" ceived no illegal Treatment or In-
" fults from their Governors; for those
" they

D E D I C A T I O N.

“ they bore with Impatience : nor did
“ they acknowledge any other Subjection
“ to the *Romans*, than what consisted in
“ an Obedience to just Laws, not the
“ Submission of Slaves.” Such was the
Character of the *British* People at that
time, such has been their Character in all
Ages, and such it remains to this Day.
Princes who observed the Laws always
found them peaceable Subjects, and ready
to comply with their just Demands : but
when Infringements were made upon
the public Liberty, they grew uneasy and
discontented, and the Sovereign, by grasp-
ing at too much, frequently lost all.

INDEED it appears in our History, that
the Design of assuming an Authority in-
dependent of the Laws, was never enter-
tained by any of the best and ablest of our
Princes ; who always esteemed it more
glorious to rule over a free People, than
to command a Nation of Slaves. Among
many remarkable Examples of this, that
of the ever memorable *Henry the Fifth*
seems in a particular manner deserving of
Notice. He was a wise and valiant Prince,
who

D E D I C A T I O N.

who scorned to incroach upon the Liberties of the Subjects, and abhorred the unjustifiable Arts by which they had been impaired. He esteemed their Courage, Strength, and Love, to be his greatest Advantage, Riches, and Glory ; and readily joined with them to extinguish the mischievous Abuses that had been introduced by some of his Predecessors. He aimed at making good his Claim to the Crown of *France*, which he knew was only to be effected by the Bravery of a free and well-satisfied People. Slaves will always be Cowards, and, when they dare declare themselves, Enemies to their Master : by bringing his Subjects into that Condition, he must infallibly have ruined his own Designs, and made them unfit to fight either for him or for themselves. He desired not only that his People should be free during his Time, but that his Successors should not be able to deprive them of so valuable a Blessing. He knew that he did not reign for himself but for his People, and regarding their Safety as the supreme Law of Government, always passed with the utmost Clearfulness such

Laws

D E D I C A T I O N.

Laws as were presented to him in behalf of public Liberty. The Event was such as might be expected. Never Prince was better obeyed and served by his Subjects, more successful and formidable abroad, more beloved at home, or more sincerely lamented after his Death. In fine, History no where furnishes a more perfect Pattern of a wise, valiant, and virtuous King.

IT has been the good Fortune of these Nations for some time past to be blest with a series of such Princes. The excellent Principles of Government adopted by King *William* at the Revolution, have been steadily adhered to by his Successors of your illustrious House. Nor has the Security of domestic Freedom alone employed their Attention. Like that glorious Monarch they have exerted their utmost Influence to preserve the Independency of the other States of *Europe*, and by a Conduct so truly noble merited the greatest of all Titles, that of being *The Patrons of Public Liberty, and The Friends of Mankind.*

YOUR

D E D I C A T I O N.

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS is now at an Age when Examples of this kind make the deepest Impression; and the early good Dispositions You discover, joined to the excellent Institution under which You have the Happiness to be formed, give the justest reason to believe, that they will not fail of having their due effect. The Public beholds with Pleasure the Seeds of your many ripening Virtues, and charmed with the Prospect of the Advantages to be reaped from their Maturity, seems to address You in the Words of *Aeneas* to his Son *Ascanius*, a young Prince of great Expectation, in whose Person were centered the Hopes of a whole People.

-----*Te, Animo repetentem Exempla tuorum,
Et Pater Aeneas, et Avunculus excitet Hector.*

THAT You may improve daily in every laudable and useful Quality, and that when by the Appointment of Providence You are called to the Exercise of the Government, You may long sway the *British* Scepter with uninterrupted Prosperity,

D E D I C A T I O N.

perity, and the intire Love of your Subjects, is the sincere and ardent Prayer
of,

S I R,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS's most humble

most dutiful, and

most obedient Servant,

WILLIAM DUNCAN.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Translation of *Cæsar's Commentaries* was done from the celebrated Edition of the late Dr. Clarke, printed for J. Tonson in 1712. All possible Care has been taken to render it exact, and to preserve the Distinctness and Perspicuity of Expression for which the Original is so justly famous. The Reader will perceive, that the very turn and manner of *Cæsar* has been copied with the utmost Attention; and tho' the Success may not always answer Expectation, yet Candor will induce him to make great Allowances, when he considers the inimitable Beauty of the *Latin*, and the Difficulty of expressing ancient Manners and Transactions in modern Language.

IT was at first intended to accompany the Translation with Notes, explaining what was difficult and obscure in the *Roman Art of War*. But as a few loose scattered Remarks would have contributed little towards giving the Reader

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

Reader a distinct Idea of what was necessary to be known on this Head, there is substituted in their place a Discourse concerning the military Customs of the Ancients, in which all that is curious and most interesting relating to these Matters is fully and copiously explained. Besides the ancient Authors; *Rollin*, *Foland*, *Orrery*, *Feuquiere*, *Machiavel*, *Montesquieu*, and several other Moderns have been consulted, and all such Passages selected, as tended to throw Light upon this Branch of the *Roman* Antiquities. As the Author, by his Situation in Life, is necessarily a Stranger to the practical Part of War, he pretends not to offer any thing of his own upon the Subject. If he has collected with Care from the Writers before-mentioned, and disposed the Materials they furnish in such a manner, as sufficiently to display the Proficiency and Improvements of the Ancients in military Knowledge, he has compassed all he intended, and the Reader will have no cause to complain.

THE ancient Names of Places are retained in the Translation, as well to avoid giving too modern

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

modern a turn to the Author by a contrary Practice, as because they are sufficiently familiar to an *English* Ear, being constantly made use of by all Historians who treat of those Times in our Language. But as the following Work may perhaps fall into the Hands of Persons little acquainted with ancient Geography, and who would therefore be at a loss in comparing *Cæsar's* Descriptions with the present Face of the Country, the Reader will find at the End of the Book a large geographical Index, in which the ancient Names of Places, as near as can be discovered with any Certainty, are explained by the modern.

- It may be just proper to mention, that besides the Seven Books of the *Gallic War*, and the Three of the Civil, written by *Cæsar* himself, the Supplements of *A. Hirtius Pansa* are likewise inserted in the following Translation, consisting of one additional Book to the *Gallic War*, and three Books of the *Alexandrian, African* and *Spanish Wars*.

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A

DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

VOL. I;

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DISCOURSE

CONCERNING THE

ROMAN ART OF WAR.

C H A P. I.

Of the Undertaking and Declaration of War.

I. **T**H E Romans, from small Beginnings and an almost contemptible Original, rose by degrees to be Sovereigns of the World. If we enquire into the Causes of this, we shall find, that nothing so much contributed to it, as the excellence of their military Discipline. War is a Profession of the greatest Importance to Society. The Security of our Lives, Liberties, Properties, and indeed of all that is dear

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. and valuable among Men, depends in a manner entirely on it. Good and wholsom Laws may establish Peace and Unity within, and if executed with vigour, will prevent the Inroads of Vice and Corruption ; but are by no means sufficient to screen a State from powerful Neighbours, or secure it against the Assaults of the Ambitious and Aspiring. Hence in the most peaceful Times, it has ever been esteemed a maxim of sound Policy, to cultivate the Science of Arms with the same Application, as when we are threatened with War and Invasions. For however little we may ourselves be disposed to disturb the Tranquillity of the Nations around us, yet the Experience of all Ages makes it abundantly evident, that the most powerful and prevailing Argument to keep those quiet, from whom we have reason to apprehend any danger, is by letting them see that we are prepared to receive them, and capable of making them repent of their Rashness, should they unjustly seek a pretence of falling upon us. In all wise States therefore, the Profession of a Soldier has ever been held in honour : nor do we read any Part of ancient History with greater pleasure, than that by which we learn, how free Nations have defended themselves against the Attempts of incroaching Tyrants, and when roused to a thorough exertion of their Strength, overthrown in the end that very Power, which once threatened to crush them. It is not indeed

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

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deed to be denied, that the military Virtues of a C H A P.
free People, have not always been confined to I.
Self-defence, and the avenging themselves of
their Enemies. Ambition, and a Conscious-
ness of Superiority, have sometimes prompted
even these to aspire at universal Dominion.
This is remarkably exemplified in the History
of the *Roman* Commonwealth, from whose
Constitution, and Love of Liberty, one would
naturally expect a very different Spirit. Who
more likely to become the great Patrons and
Defenders of the common Rights and Pri-
vileges of Mankind, than a People, whose
prevailing Passion was an Abhorrence of
Slavery; and who in a long series of Strug-
gles with the Nations around them, were
never weary of fighting in defence of that
Liberty, which is the Birthright and Inheri-
tance of every reasonable Creature? And yet
we find, that no sooner were they secure
of their own Freedom, than a thirst of Rule
took possession of their Minds, and they forc-
ibly imposed that Yoke upon others, which
they had disdained to submit to themselves.
The Superiority of their military Discipline
enabled them by degrees to accomplish this
unjust Design. Trained up in a continued
Succession of Wars, and equally attentive to
their own Victories and Defeats, they were
daily improving themselves in the Art of
Conquest, and attained at length to so great
a mastery in it, that no Nation was able to
withstand their Attacks. It cannot therefore

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

C.H.A.P. but be an agreeable, as well as useful In-

I. quiry, to trace out the military Customs of
a People, so renowned for their Knowledge
in the Art of War. And as it is my Design,
to present the Publick with a new Tranlation
of the *Commentaries of Cæsar*, who was con-
fessedly the greatest General *Rome* ever pro-
duced, I imagine a Discourse of this nature
may be not improperly prefixed to that
Work.

II. LET us then take a view of the Con-
duct of the *Romans*, from their first engaging
in a War, through all the different Branches
of its Management, until they at last bring
it to a happy Period. This will naturally lead
us to consider the Ceremonies attending the
Declaration of War; the Manner of levying
Troops, and forming a *Roman Army*; the
Precautions used in Marches and Encamp-
ments; their Order of Battle, Conduct in
Sieges, and the Machines and other Con-
trivances made use of in the Attack and De-
fence of Places. Under these several Heads
may be comprehended every thing that is
material and important upon this Subject.
It is not however my Design, to enter into
Grammatical Niceties, or a minute Detail of
particular Criticisms, but only to give a ge-
neral Idea of the military Customs of the *Ro-
mans*, intermixed with such Remarks, as may
serve to lay open the Wisdom and Policy of their
first Contrivance, and show their natural
Tendency

Tendency to that Superiority and universal CHAP.
Dominion, which they at length procured I.
the Commonwealth.

III. THE Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War were instituted by *Numa Pompilius*, the second King of *Rome*. *Romulus*, the Founder of that Colony, was, during the whole course of his Reign, engaged in perpetual Contests with his Neighbours. The Necessity he was under, at his first setting out, of procuring Wives for his Subjects by the Rape of the *Sabine* Virgins, exasperated all the Nations round about, and begot no small Jealousy of the new Colony, which seemed to be founded on maxims of Violence and Injustice. We are not therefore to wonder, if this drew on him a Series of Wars, which continued almost without intermission to the end of his Life. Thus the *Romans*, who were originally in great measure a Band of Fugitives and Outlaws, improving their natural Fierceness by having their Arms constantly in their Hands, gradually grew to be a brave and warlike People. *Numa*, who succeeded *Romulus*, being a Prince of a pacific Temper, set himself to check this martial Ardor, and form them to Religion, and a Respect for the Gods. In order to stifle that impetuous desire of War, which he found so prevalent among them, he established certain Ceremonies, which were always to precede the commencing of Hostilities,

CHAP. and committed them to the care of a College
I. of Heralds, called *Feciales*. The Chief or
Head of this Society had the Name of *Pater Patratus*: and it was his peculiar Office,
to make Peace, or denounce War. *Livy*,
indeed, seems to consider him as a temporary
Minister: for, in his Account of the Treaty
concluded with the *Albans*, before the triple
Combat of the *Horatii* and *Curiatii*, he makes
one of the *Feciales* choose a *Pater Patratus*,
on purpose to perform that Ceremony. But
as I have no design to enter into a Contro-
versy of this nature, little important in itself,
and not easy to be decided, I shall content
myself with observing, that the Officer here
mentioned, whether constant or temporary,
was one who had a Father and Son both
alive. Hence this Title of *Pater Patratus*,
which may be interpreted to imply a more
perfect kind of Father, as they seem to have
imagined him to be, whose own Father was
still living, after he himself had been a Fa-
ther for some time. Such an one, it was
believed, would be an equitable and moderate
Judge in Affairs of this kind, and not over
forward to plunge his Country into a War,
in which so many Lives that must be dear
to him, would unavoidably be exposed to
hazard.

IV. AND indeed the Ceremonies them-
selves, as instituted by *Numa*, seem peculiarly
calculated to render the *Romans* cautious and
circumspect,

circumspect, in a Matter of so great Importance. For before they entered upon a War with any State, the College of Heralds were to commission the *Pater Patratus*, to go and demand satisfaction in the name of the *Roman* People. Accordingly this Officer, clothed in the Habit of his Order, set forward for the Enemy's Country ; and entering the Frontiers, proclaimed aloud the cause of his Arrival, calling all the Gods to witness that he came to demand satisfaction, and imprecate the Divine Vengeance on himself and Country, if he said any thing contrary to Truth. When he came to the chief City of the Enemy, he again repeated the same Declaration, adding fresh Oaths and Imprecations, and withal desired satisfaction. If his Demands were granted, he returned immediately to *Rome*, and all Thoughts of War were laid aside. But if they required time to consider, he gave them ten Days, and then came again to hear their Resolution. This he did, in some Cases, three times : but if after thirty Days, nothing was done towards an Accommodation, he called Gods and Men to witness the Refusal, and expressly denounced, that the *Romans* would now think themselves sufficiently authorised, to take such Measures as the Case required, in order to do themselves justice. Upon his return to *Rome*, he repaired to the Senate, attended by the whole College of Heralds ; and having there made a report of his Embassy, declared

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP.^{I.} declared the legality of the War. The Af-
fair was then debated among the Fathers :
and if the majority of Voices were for War,
the same Officer was sent back to the En-
emy's Frontiers, where in presence of at least
three Persons he pronounced the usual De-
claration, throwing a Spear at the same time
into their Territories, in Token of defiance.

V. THESE Institutions continued long in force at *Rome*, even during the times of the Commonwealth ; and it must be owned, were admirably well contrived to answer *Numa*'s great Design, of habituating the *Romans* to Peace, and blunting the edge of their martial Fury. For as a certain space of Time was necessarily to intervene, between the Injury received and the commencing of Hostilities ; this left room for Reason and Reflection, and gave them an Opportunity of weighing maturely all the Consequences of the Step they were about to take. The Imprecations too to be denounced by the Herald against himself and Country, if he advanced any thing contrary to Truth, would naturally make them very cautious in their Demands, and extremely attentive to the Equity and Justice of them. Add to all this, the great probability of adjusting Matters amicably, and obtaining a reasonable Satisfaction, which cannot by any means be expected, where the Parties fly immediately to Arms, and by mutual Acts of Hostility exasperate one another.

One

One would think, that a State under the ^{C H A P .}
^{I.} check of so many Restraints against Oppression, could not easily break out into violent or unjust Wars. Accordingly we find, not only the ancient Historians, but even many modern Writers of Name and Reputation, extolling the Moderation and Disinterestedness of the *Romans*; their Faith in Treaties; steady Adherence to their Allies; and care to have Equity on their side in all their Undertakings. It is however, methinks, a sufficiently obvious Reflection, that a People, who by degrees accomplished the Conquest of the Universe, and forced all Nations to submit to their Dominion, must in many Instances have been the Aggressors. For altho' in the first beginnings of their State, they were perhaps often unjustly attacked by their Neighbours, out of Envy and Jealousy; yet it is certain, that their Power at last became so very formidable, that no Nation was willing to enter the Lists with them. We find them notwithstanding still pushing on their Conquests, still engaged in new Wars, and extending the Limits of their Empire. Now both Reason and Experience tell us, that in a Controversy between States of unequal Strength, the weaker will submit to many Insults and Hardships, rather than draw upon themselves a War, which they foresee must end in the subversion of their Liberties. And indeed if we examine narrowly into the Conduct of the *Romans*, we shall find, that their Reputation

CHAP. Reputation of Justice is owing rather to an exact Observance of certain outward Forms, and the Partiality of their Historians, than any steady Adherence to the Principles of Equity. For as their Power and Dominion increased, and they became conscious of their Superiority, they readily gave way to the Dictates of Ambition, and were never at a loss in contriving some ground of Quarrel with those Nations, whom in their Plan of universal Conquest, they had resolved to bring next under subjection. But as all their Attempts of this kind were preceded by Complaints of Injuries received, pretended Grievances, and formal Declarations of War ; this gave a colour of Justice to their Undertakings, and effectually deceived the People ; who, convinced that they had Equity on their side, followed their Generals with an assured Confidence, imagining themselves under the immediate Protection of the Gods. Add to this, that the Historians, partly misled by the same Notions, partly thro' a national and almost unavoidable Partiality, have vied with one another in extolling the Equity and Moderation of the *Romans*, and varnishing over such parts of their Behaviour, as seemed most liable to exception. The Merit of these Writers, and the Veneration paid them by succeeding Ages, have given a kind of Sanc-
tion and Authority to their Opinions. It looks like Presumption to contradict Authors of so established a Reputation : and being ac-
customed

customed to admire them from our Infancy, CHAP.
we are easily led to believe, that we cannot I.
do better than blindly give into their Senti-
ments. It is only upon this Principle I am
able to excuse some late Writers of great
Name, who in treating of the *Roman* Com-
monwealth, have not scrupled to adopt the
Prejudices of the ancient Historians, and re-
present that People as Patterns of Equity and
Justice in all their Proceedings.

VI. As nothing is of greater importance in History, than to form a right Judgment of Events and their Causes, and penetrate into the real Character of States and Nations, I shall take some pains to set this Matter in a true Light; and to that end shall lay before the Reader a short view of the Transactions between the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*. It is well known, that these last were characterized by the *Romans*, as a faithless and perfidious People, regardless of Oaths, and whom no Ties or Treaties could bind. They even went so far as to make *Punick Faith* serve only as another Expression for *Insincerity*. Who would imagine, after such a representation of Things, that in all the *Punick Wars* the *Romans* were the Aggressors; and that, in the two last especially, they forced the *Carthaginians* into them by the most flagrant Acts of Injustice? But let Truth and an impartial Account of Facts determine. The occasion of the first *Punick War* was as follows. A Body

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. I. Body of *Campanian* Soldiers, known in History by the Name of *Mamertines*, and who had served under *Agathocles* Tyrant of *Syracuse*, upon the Death of that Prince retired to *Messina*: where being received as Friends, they treacherously massacred one part of the Inhabitants, expelled the rest, and seizing upon the Lands, Houses, and even Wives of those unfortunate Men, remained sole Masters of that important City. Some time after this, the People of *Rhegium*, to screen themselves from the Insults of the *Carthaginians*, whose Fleets appeared frequently off their Coast, applied to the *Roman* Senate for a Garrison: A Legion of four thousand Men raised in *Campania*, and commanded by *Decius Jubellus*, was appointed to that Service. At first they behaved suitably to the Intention of those who employed them: but at length, tempted by the Wealth of the Place, emboldened by the example of the *Mamertines*, and strengthened by their aid, they acted the same perfidious and cruel Part towards the *Rhegians*, which the other had acted towards the People of *Messina*.

VII. As these two Cities were parted only by the narrow Strait which separates *Italy* from *Sicily*, and were not insensible of the Odium they had brought upon themselves by their Treachery, they entered into a strict Confederacy mutually to support each other in their Usurpations: This Alliance subsisted

for some time. But at length the *Romans*, CHAP.
having disengaged themselves from the many Wars in which they were intangled, turned their Thoughts towards the Punishment of their perfidious Legion. *Rhegium* was invested, and after an obstinate Resistance, taken by Assault. All that remained alive of the Garrison, amounting to about three hundred, were carried to *Rome*, beaten with Rods, and then publickly beheaded in the Forum. The Destruction of this confederate City produced a mighty change in the Affairs of the *Mamertines*. While aided by their Friends at *Rhegium*, they had not only lived fearless of Danger, but had often made Inroads into the Territories of the *Carthaginians* and *Syracuscians*, putting many of their Towns and Villages under Contribution. The Case was now greatly altered: for being attacked by *Hiero* Prætor of *Syracuse*, they were overthrown in Battle, and their Army almost totally cut off. Humbled and reduced by so terrible a Blow, they thought themselves no longer in a condition to defend *Messina*; and differing in Opinion about what Measures to pursue, one Party surrendered the Citadel to the *Carthaginians*, whilst another sent Ambassadors to implore the Protection of the *Romans*.

VIII. THE Affair was debated in the Senate; where being considered in all its Lights, it gave no small perplexity to the Fathers. On the one hand they thought it dishonourable,

CHAP. able, and altogether unworthy of the *Roman*

I. Virtue, to undertake the defence of Traitors, whose Perfidy was exactly the same with that of the *Rbegians*, which they had lately punished with so exemplary a Severity. But then again it was of the utmost Consequence to stop the Progress of the *Cartbaginians*; who, not satisfied with their Conquests in *Africa* and *Spain*, had also made themselves Masters of *Sardinia*, and the adjacent Isles on the Coast of *Italy*; and would certainly get all *Sicily* into their hands, if they should be suffered to possess themselves of *Messina*. From thence, into *Italy*, the Passage was very short; and it was in some measure to invite an Enemy to come over, to leave him that Entrance open. These Reasons, tho' strong, could not prevail with the Senate to declare in favour of the *Mamertines*; and accordingly Motives of Honour and Justice prevailed over those of Interest and Policy. But the People were not so scrupulous. In an Assembly held on this Subject, it was resolved that the *Mamertines* should be assisted; and *Appius Claudius*, one of the Consuls, was ordered to conduct an Army into *Sicily* for that purpose. *Appius*, to learn the true state of Things, went over in person to *Messina*, and conducted himself so happily, as by some means to persuade the *Cartbaginian* Officer to evacuate the Citadel. This so highly offended the People of *Carthage*, that they condemned their Officer to be crucified as a Traitor.

tör and a Coward. At the same time they invested the Place by Sea and Land, and entering into an Alliance with *Hiero* the new King of *Syracuse*, were joined by his Troops. Mean-while *Appias*, having by an artful Stratagem, eluded the Vigilance of the *Carthaginian* Admiral, crossed the Strait with all his Forces, and attacking the *Syracusans* and *Carthaginians* one after another, compelled them to abandon the Siege.

IX. Such was the beginning of the first *Punick War*, in which I think it evidently appears, that the *Romans* were the Aggressors. For they undertook the defence of a traitorous and perfidious set of Men, against a People with whom they were in Alliance and Amity. I deny not that Reasons of State, and the Maxims of Policy, plead strongly in their Behalf on this Occasion. It was certainly not their Interest, to suffer the *Carthaginians* to become too powerful, or get intire possession of an Island that lay so contiguous to *Italy*. But if we examine their Conduct by the Rules of strict Justice, it will be found no easy matter to vindicate it. And in fact we have seen, that the Senate absolutely declared against aiding the *Mamertines*, as inconsistent with Honour, and the Dignity of the *Roman Name*. Whether they acted sincerely upon this Occasion, or only to save Appearances, is not my business to determine. It is enough that the thing itself serves to justify

CHAP. the *Carthaginians*, and exempt them from the Charge of having been the first Aggressors in this War. Nor indeed do the *Roman* Writers throw the Blame of it upon them, but generally allow, that Jealousy, and an apprehension of each other's growing Power, embroiled the two States upon the present Occasion.

X. BUT let us now pass to the second Punick War. Here it is that the Charge of Insincerity seems to lie heaviest against the *Carthaginians*. The *Romans* exasperated by the Losses they received, gave a free vent to their Hatred, and spared no Endeavours to blacken their Adversaries, and lay the whole Blame of the War upon them. And indeed they have contrived to give a specious Colour to this Accusation, by representing the taking of *Saguntum* as the cause of the Quarrel. For to consider only the first appearance of this Step; *Hannibal*, contrary, as they pretend, to the express tenor of Treaties, and without any formal Declaration of War, falls upon a City in alliance with the *Romans*. But as *Polybius* has very judiciously observed, the taking of *Saguntum* is to be looked upon as the beginning, not the cause of the War: and if we trace Matters to their source, we shall find that the *Carthaginians* were provoked to this Step, by a series of the most unjustifiable Injuries on the side of the *Romans*. Soon after the conclusion of the Peace of *Sicily*, the Mercenaries

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

XIX

Mercenaries who had served in the Armies CHAP.
of *Carthage* revolting, brought that State I.
to the very brink of Destruction. The *Sardinians* taking advantage of these Troubles,
shook off the *Carthaginian* Yoke, and expelled
all their Garrisons out of the Island. Things
continued for some time in this situation, 'till
at length the *Carthaginians*, having quelled
the Rebellion in *Africa*, prepared to recover
possession of *Sardinia*. The *Romans*, who
during all the foregoing Troubles of *Carthage*
had behaved with great Justice and Mode-
ration, now seeing that People like to regain
their former Strength, pretended a jealousy
of the new Preparations, and declared War
against them. The *Carthaginians*, unable at
that time to enter the Lists with so powerful
an Adversary, were forced to submit to a
second Treaty, by which they gave up *Sardi-
nia* to the *Romans*, and obliged themselves to
an additional Payment of twelve hundred
Talents.

XI. THIS INJUSTICE of the *Romans* may be
considered as the first and principal Cause of
the second *Punick* War. For *Hamilcar* surnamed *Barcha*, highly exasperated on account
of a Treaty, which Necessity alone had com-
pelled the *Carthaginians* to submit to, resolved
to break with *Rome* the first favourable Op-
portunity; and accordingly directed all his
Views to the success of that Enterprise. How
deeply he resented the Injury of which we

CHAP. speak, appears by his making *Hannibal* swear
upon the Altar at the age of nine Years, that
he would ever be an irreconcileable Enemy
to the *Romans*. During his command in
Spain, he brought the greatest part of that
Country under the power of the *Carthaginians*: but falling in Battle before he had com-
pleted the Conquest of it, *Afdrubal* his Son-
in-Law succeeded him, and continued the
War with success. This alarmed the *Romans*,
who thinking it a necessary piece of Policy to
check the growing Power of a rival State,
obliged *Afdrubal* to enter into a new Treaty,
in which it was stipulated, that he should at-
tempt no Conquest beyond the *Iberus*. How
this may appear to others, I cannot say, but
to me it carries the Idea of a fresh Insult,
as the *Romans* hereby claimed a manifest su-
periority over the *Carthaginians*, and assumed the
power of setting Bounds to their Empire:
a Point upon which they were always so
very nice themselves, that no Excuse can be
offered for their disregarding it in their Con-
duct towards others.

XII. HANNIBAL succeeded *Afdrubal* in the
command of the Army; and having in a very
short time compleated the reduction of *Spain*,
began to think seriously of avenging the many
Wrongs done his Country by the *Romans*. To
that end he contrived a pretence of Quarrel
with the *Saguntines*, that by attacking their
City, he might give occasion to a Rupture
between

between the two States. For though Saguntum lay on this side the Iberus, and therefore was within the Plan of Conquest permitted to the Carthaginians by the Romans; yet these last, as if repenting of the Concession they had made to their Adversaries, concluded an alliance with the Saguntines soon after the signing of the Treaty with *Afdrubal*. Now as by an Article of that Treaty, neither State was to make War upon the Allies of the other, the Romans pretended that Saguntum, though on this side the Iberus, could not be attacked without violating the Peace. On the other hand the Carthaginians maintained, that the very Alliance with the Saguntines was a violation of the Treaty, as being no other than a mean Artifice to wrest the power of making War upon the Saguntines out of their hands, after it had been expressly conceded to them by that Article, which permitted the Conquest of all the Nations of Spain on this side the Iberus. I think it needless to enter into a Discussion of this nice point, because the taking of Saguntum ought to be considered rather as the beginning of the Quarrel, than the Cause of the War. The Carthaginians were determined upon Hostilities: and it appears by the above deduction, that the Romans, by a continued series of Insults and Provocations, had given them but too just ground to come to that Extremity. Polybius himself, a great admirer of the Romans, and who endeavours on all occasions

CHAP. to represent their Conduct in the most favourable Light, though he blames the Attempt upon *Saguntum* as an infraction of the Treaty, is yet forced to acknowledge thus much. " It would be a great mistake, says that judicious Historian, to consider the taking of *Saguntum* by *Hannibal* as the real Cause of the second *Punic War*. It was the beginning, but not the cause of it. The regret of the *Carthaginians* for the loss of *Sicily*; the Violence and Injustice of the *Romans*, in seizing *Sardinia*, and imposing a new Tribute; and lastly, the Success of the *Carthaginian Armies* in *Spain*, which inspired that State with Courage, and alarmed their Adversaries: these were the real Causes of the Rupture. If we consider only the Siege of *Saguntum*, we cannot avoid throwing the whole blame upon the *Carthaginians*, whose attack of that City was a manifest Violation of the Treaty with *Asdrubal*. For though the *Saguntines* were not in alliance with *Rome* at the time of the conclusion of that Treaty, it is evident the *Romans* did not thereby divest themselves of the Liberty of making new Alliances. In this view of things, therefore, the *Carthaginians* would be altogether inexcusable. But if we go back to the Times when *Sardinia* was forcibly seized, and a new Tribute imposed, it must be confessed, adds the Historian, that the Conduct of the *Romans* in these two points cannot be justified."

XIII. Thus we see that *Polybius* throws CHAP.
the whole blame of the second *Punic War* L.
upon the *Romans*; and I believe every thinking Man will be of the same Opinion: which ought to make us cautious of giving too easy Credit to the Representations of their Historians, when they charge their Enemies with Infidelity and Breach of Faith, and bestow such magnificent Elogiums of Justice and Moderation upon their own Commonwealth. For allowing the *Carthaginians* to have been the first in breaking the Peace, it may with reason be asked, whether the notorious Injustice of the *Romans* previously committed, did not justify them in no longer observing a Treaty concluded in all the Forms; and whether it was not a legitimate Reason for entering into a War. I cannot however but observe, that *Polybius* seems to be a little too severe in his Censure of the *Carthaginians* for attacking *Saguntum*. It will surely admit of debate, whether the Article relating to the Allies of both States could be extended any farther than to the Alliance actually subsisting at the time of the signing of the Treaty. If we extend it to all Alliances whatsoever, either made or to be made; this seems mutually to invest them with a Power of prohibiting each other from engaging in any War: because either of them contradicting an Alliance with that People against whom War was intended, rendered them thereby sacred

CHAP. sacred and inviolable. But allowing the Reflection of *Polybius* to be just, that the two States by that Treaty did not absolutely divest themselves of the Liberty of making new Alliances; it seems yet pretty evident that the *Romans* did so, in respect of all the Nations lying on this side the *Iberus*. For by giving up to the *Carthaginians* the entire Conquest of those Countries, they plainly bound themselves not to come under any Engagements inconsistent with that Article. The Alliance therefore with the *Saguntines*, as it tended to divest the *Carthaginians* of a Power expressly conceded to them by the Treaty, ought to be considered as a direct Violation of it: and the *Romans* might with equal justice have contracted Amity with all the other Nations of *Spain* yet unsubdued; and thereby utterly deprived the *Carthaginians* of the Power of making War in that Country.

XIV. BUT it is now time to take a view of the Causes that gave rise to the third *Punic War*; in which, I believe, it will be abundantly manifest, that the *Romans* proceeded without the least appearance of Justice. Among the Conditions of the Peace granted by *Scipio* to the *Carthaginians*, there was one which imported, that they should not make War without the consent of the *Romans*. *Masinissa*, King of *Numidia*, taking advantage of this Article, made daily Incroachments upon their Territories, and dispossessed them
QF

of several Towns and Districts. He was CHAP.
himself in great favour with the *Romans*,
on account of the many Services he had done
them in the second *Punick War*: and being
no Stranger to their Hatred and Jealousy of
the *Carthaginians*, imagined they would not
be displeased at his Attempts to weaken the
Power of a Rival-State. The Event shewed
that he was not mistaken in his Judgment.
The *Carthaginians* not daring to do themselves
justice, applied to the *Romans* for Redress. But
all their Solicitations were to no purpose.
Commissioners indeed set out for *Africa*, to
examine the Pretensions of the two Parties,
and bring Matters to an issue. These finding
Masinissa already possessed of the Territories
in question, chose rather to leave the Affair
undecided, than either oblige the King to
abandon his Conquests, or declare expressly
against the *Carthaginians*. The same Conduct
was observed in two following Deputations:
whence it was generally believed, that the
Commissioners acted in a manner by Order of
the Senate, and had received private Instruc-
tions to favour *Masinissa*, who by this Delay
had an Opportunity of establishing himself in
his Usurpations.

XV. IT was upon occasion of the last of
these Deputations, that the elder *Cato*, who
was one of the Commissioners, observing the
flourishing Condition of *Carthage*, and its
great Power and Riches, notwithstanding the
many

CHAP. many Losses it had sustained, could not help I. considering it as a very dangerous Rival to his Country. Accordingly at his return, he declared in the Senate, that *Rome* could never be safe, so long as *Carthage* should subsist. Nay so deeply had this Apprehension rooted itself in his Mind, that in order to keep alive in his Countrymen a sense of their danger, he never spoke upon publick Affairs, but he always concluded his opinion with this Sentence, *Carthage must be destroy'd.* And indeed the *Romans*, naturally averse to that City, and mindful of the many Calamities they had suffered from it, were easily persuaded to come into this Design. Nor was it long before an Opportunity offered itself. The *Carthaginians* exasperated to the last degree by the continual Incroachments of *Mafnissa*, and seeing no hopes of Redress from the Senate, had recourse to Arms. A Battle was fought, in which they were defeated; their Camp taken, and their whole Army cut to pieces. The *Romans* resolving to take advantage of this Blow, and of the Pretence furnished by the Quarrel with *Mafnissa*, declared War in form. All the Endeavours of the *Carthaginians* to mollify them were without effect. They even made an absolute surrender of their City and Territories; and in obedience to the Orders of the Senate, sent three hundred of their principal Nobility as Hostages, and delivered up, without Fraud, all their Arms. But these Acts of Submission were enjoined

enjoined, only in the view of weakening, CHAP.
and rendering them incapable of Resistance. L
For the *Romans* still peremptorily demanding,
that they should abandon their City, and
give it up to be demolished, compelled them
at last to arm in their own Defence.

XVI. I thought it necessary to be thus particular in my Account of the Wars between these two States, because they best serve to shew what Credit is due to the pompous Accounts we meet with in Historians, of the Sincerity and inviolable Justice of the *Romans*. For here, if any where, we may expect to find Samples of that Equity and Moderation. Here we may look for a Conduct altogether clear and void of Reproach. It is certain that the *Romans* always valued themselves in a particular manner, upon their good Faith, and exact observance of Treaties with the *Carthaginians*. This evidently appears by the advantageous Testimony Cæsar gives of his Countrymen in this respect, in that famous Speech of his in *Salust*, upon occasion of the Conspiracy of *Catiline*. *Bellis Panicis omnibus, cum sæpe Carthaginenses, & in Pace, & per Inducias, multa nefanda Facinora fecissent; nunquam ipsis per occasionem talia fecere: magis quod se dignum foret, quam quod in illis Jure fieri posset, quæreabant.*" "Altho' in all the Punick Wars, the *Carthaginians*, both in Peace, and during Truces, were guilty of many Abuses and Violations

xxviii A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. of their Engagements ; the *Romans*, how
I. inviting soever the Opportunity might be,
could yet never be prevailed upon to retaliate
the like usage. They were more atten-
tive to their own Glory, than to the Revenge
they might have justly taken on such per-
fidious Enemies." We find likewise a
great many Reflections to the same purpose
sprinkled up and down the Writings of
Cicero : from all which it is easy to judge,
how irreproachable they thought their Con-
duct on this head, and what a Pattern of
Justice and Moderation. But if notwithstanding
all these favourable Representations, it
still appears so very liable to Exception ; how
much less can it be justified with regard to
other States ? And, indeed, was I to enter
into a particular Detail, I could easily evince,
that it was no other than a continued train of
Insults and Provocations, designedly calculat-
ed to exasperate such States as were most
obnoxious, and force them to have recourse
to Arms. It will doubtless appear wonder-
ful to the Reader, how amidst such a series
of oppressive Conduct, the *Romans* still found
means to preserve, in some measure, the Re-
putation of Justice and Equity. But this, as
we have before intimated, was chiefly owing
to their observance of certain outward
Forms. They never failed to contrive some
ground of Complaint against those Nations
they intended to attack ; to send Deputies to
demand satisfaction ; and to make formal
Declaration

Declaration of War by a Herald, previous to CHAP.
the commencing of Hostilities. It must indeed be owned, that it required no small Art and Policy, so to involve and intangle themselves with all the Nations of the then known World, that they could at pleasure find some specious Pretence of Quarrel, when their Interest required them to break with any State. This gave a Colour of Justice to all their Undertakings, inspired their Armies with Assurance and Confidence, inviolably attached to them their old Friends, and procured them new Allies at pleasure. And as it seems to have been one of their Master-strokes in Politicks, and the principal Engine by which they pushed on their Conquests, it may not be amiss to give the Reader some little Insight into their artful Conduct in this respect, that he may the better comprehend the Motives and Tendency of it.

XVII. ALTHO' I cannot bring myself to think, with some modern Writers of pretended Depth and Penetration, that *Numa Pompilius* had a political view, in the several religious Regulations he established at *Rome*; yet I am ready enough to allow, that many of his Institutions were afterwards, by the prudent Management of the Senate, converted into Maxims of State, and rendered very serviceable in the administration of the Government. Of this Nature particularly were the Ceremonies relating to the Declaration of War.

Nothing

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. Nothing is of greater consequence to an ambitious Republick, which aims at universal Dominion, and a gradual Subjection of all Nations, than to prevent such a general Confederacy against her, as might not only put a stop to her Conquests, but even threaten her in her turn with Destruction. This the Senate effected by their singular Address and Conduct, in the several Wars in which they were engaged. For they always found means to colour them over with such a specious pretence of Justice, as gave no Umbrage to the neighbouring States, nor begot any Jealousy of a Power, which seemed to have nothing in view but the redressing of its own Wrongs, or those of other Nations in alliance with it. That strong bent towards Religion, and the Worship of the Gods, which *Numa* introduced among the People, and which the Senate carefully cherished for many Generations, helped greatly to forward this Persuasion. Men were not apt to distrust a religious Republick, where Virtue was held in honour, and Vice of every kind discounted. Let me add, that in the early Ages of the State, this was more than mere Pretence. They were really distinguished by their Probity, by a steady adherence to Justice, and a faithful observance of Treaties. Most of their Wars were defensive, or undertaken for the sake of their Allies. And though in after-times, in proportion as their Power increased, they gave way to the Dictates

tates of Ambition; and became less scrupulous in their Conduct: yet as they never departed from those outward Observances, by which the appearance of Justice is maintained; and took care to signalize themselves from time to time, by such particular Instances of Moderation, as could not fail to make a deep Impression; their Reputation for Equity and good Faith continued still the same.

XVIII. OBSERVE, I beseech you, the different Sentiments entertained of the *Romans* and *Carthaginians*, at the time of the Rupture between the two States. The *Romans*, tho' they had gradually subjected all the Nations of *Italy*, and raised themselves to a very formidable Pitch of Greatness, were yet so far from being considered as an ambitious Republick, against which it was necessary for other States to be upon their guard, that the fame of their Virtue and Justice seems at this time to have been at the highest; insomuch that foreign Nations, instead of dreading their Power, courted their Alliance and Amity. It was otherwise with the *Carthaginians*. They had been less careful to conceal their Ambition, or cover their Breach of Treaties under a pretence of Injuries. Hence their Designs became suspected, all their Actions were viewed in the worst Light, and the general Prejudice against them was so strong, that every thing laid to their Charge by their Enemies

CHAP. Enemies found a ready Belief. By this means it happened, that though in the Interval between the first and second *Punick Wars*, the *Romans* acted without the least regard to Justice and the Faith of Treaties, yet very little notice was taken of the Complaints of the *Carthaginians*: and when in consequence of repeated Insults and Provocations, they were at last obliged to have recourse to Arms; the whole blame of the War, though so manifestly flowing from the injurious Behaviour of the *Romans*, was nevertheless charged upon the Perfidy of the *Carthaginians*.

XIX. AFTER the entire Conquest of *Italy*, and the Reduction of the greatest Part of *Sicily* in the first *Punick War*, it required a more refined Policy in the *Romans*, to extend the Limits of their Empire, and at the same time keep up the Reputation of their Integrity. They were not immediately surrounded with those Nations, which it was their Interest to attack; and therefore could not easily provoke them to such Acts of Hostility, as might justify a Declaration of War. And should they upon slight Pretences transport an Army out of their own Territories, to fall upon a distant Prince, the design of Conquest would be visible, and beget a general alarm. Besides, their Power was become so very formidable, that foreign States did not care to contend with them, and therefore industriously avoided giving them any just ground of Complaint.

Complaint. In this Situation they took upon themselves the Title of Patrons and Protectors of all Nations, and by contracting Alliances with weaker States, found means to fall upon the stronger at pleasure, without seeming themselves to have any particular Interest in the Quarrel. It was upon this Principle that they attached themselves to the *Saguntines* and *Aetolians*, which afterwards furnished them with such a plausible colour for the *Carthaginian* and *Macedonian* Wars. To know the full Reach and Value of this Policy, we need only reflect, that though the second *Punick* War was unexceptionably just on the Part of the *Carthaginians*; yet the *Romans*, by diverting the attention of the Publick from the Usurpation of *Sardinia*, and the fixing it upon the Fate of *Saguntum*, threw the whole odium of that War upon their Adversaries, whilst themselves were considered as a humane generous People, actuated meerly by a Concern for their Allies.

XX. AND here it is particularly deserving of our notice, that amongst the many Wars in which they were engaged, after the conclusion of that with *Hannibal*, we hardly meet with any that can be deemed personal. It was always, at least in appearance, to support the Cause of some of their Allies, or prevent their being crushed by a powerful Neighbour. One would be apt to think, that they had it not so much in view to aggran-

A Discourse CONCERNING THE
CHARACTER of the ROMANS
I. to dize themselves, as to prevent the Growth of
any dangerous Power, from which weaker
States might be exposed to suffer. Upon the
conclusion of the first *Macedonian War*, they
proclaimed Liberty to all the States of *Greece*.
This Action, so magnificent in appearance,
was in reality a refined Stroke of Policy.
The *Greeks* were a warlike People, well dis-
ciplined, and capable of bringing great Ar-
mies into the Field. Had they suspected the
Romans of a Design upon their Liberties, and
united in their own defence, they must have
been invincible. But this seeming Grant of
Freedom effectually lulled them asleep, and
by the artful Conduct of the *Romans*, gave
birth to infinite Divisions among them ;
which ending commonly in an Appeal to
Rome, furnished the Senate with frequent
Opportunities of taking part in their Quar-
rels. Thus they insensibly grew to be Rulers
and Dictators over them, and by slow imper-
ceptible Steps accomplished their Subjection.

XXI. THEIR Ambassadors to foreign Princes,
and such as had not yet felt the weight of their
Power, commonly delivered themselves in
such a haughty magisterial way, as could not
fail to draw upon them some Indignity or ill
Treatment; and thereby furnish a sure Pre-
tence of War, when the Interest of the Com-
monwealth rendered such a Step necessary.
If a People at any time had given them Um-
brage, and afterwards repenting of their Rash-
ness,

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. XXXV

ness, surrendered up the principal Offenders; ^{CHAP.} I.
they would often refuse to punish them,
choosing rather to consider the whole Nation
as guilty, and reserve to themselves an useful
Vengeance. When they saw two Nations
engag'd in War, although they were not in
alliance, nor had any Contest with either of
them, they would nevertheless appear upon
the Stage of Action, and affected always to
fide with the weakest. It was an ancient
Custom, says *Dionysius of Halycarnassus*, for
the *Romans* to grant Succour to all who came
to implore it. If Princes of the same Blood
were at variance for the Crown, they seldom
failed to make themselves Parties in the Dis-
pute; and if one of them was a Minor, de-
clared in his favour, proclaiming themselves
his Guardians in quality of Protectors of the
World. When Subjects oppressed and ty-
rannised over by their Sovereigns, were pro-
voked to renounce their Allegiance, they im-
mediately indulged them the Title of Ally,
declaring themselves the professed Enemies
of Tyranny and lawless Power.

XXII. THESE were the Arts and Policies,
by which the *Romans* so intangled themselves
with all Nations, that they could with plea-
sure engage in a War with any State, and
colour it over with such an appearance of
Justice, as not only prevented any general
Confederacy against them, but even warmly
engaged their Allies in the support of their
Usurpations.

CHAP. Usurpations. Nor were they less politick in
the choice of their Wars, and in the manner
of conducting and bringing them to a period.
For as their Power was very formidable, and
they had contrived to draw many Nations
over to their Interest: whatever State took
up Arms against them, found it impossible
to make any long Resistance, and was in the
end forced to accept of such Conditions of
Peace as they thought fit to propose. For
this reason War was seldom declared against
them, but themselves always made it, at a
Season, with a People, and in such manner
as best suited their Interest. If they were
opposed by several Enemies at the same time,
they granted a Truce to the weakest, who
thought themselves happy in obtaining it,
considering it as a great Advantage, that their
Ruin was at least suspended. They never
engaged in far-distant Wars, till they had first
made an Alliance with some Power contiguous
to the Enemy they invaded, who might
unite his Troops to the Army they sent: and
as this was never considerable with regard to
Numbers, they always had another in that
Province which lay nearest the Enemy, and
a third, in *Rome*, ever ready to march at a
Minute's warning. In this manner they hazarded
but a small part of their Forces at
once, and found it easy to repair any Loss
they might sustain, whilst their Enemy was
often ruined by a single Battle. It was this
Consideration that inspired *Hannibal* with the
Resolution

Resolution of attacking them in *Italy* itself, CHAP.
the Center of their Dominions. He was sen- I.
sible that a Blow struck there, must effectually weaken them ; whereas distant Defeats,
so long as the Capital remained unmolested,
and was at liberty to send a fresh Supply of
Troops to recruit the Army, were properly
speaking little other than so many Lessons of
Prudence to their Generals, who soon found
themselves in a condition to renew the War,
with greater Forces, and more Circumspec-
tion. Accordingly we find, that when the
same *Hannibal* afterwards offered his Service
to *Antiochus*, in his intended War against the
Romans, there was no Principle he inculcated
more earnestly, than the Necessity of sending
an Army into *Italy*, and cutting them off
from those continual Resources, by which in
any other method of Attack they found them-
selves invincible.

XXIII. BUT nothing gives us a greater
idea of the Address and Policy of this People,
than the manner in which they terminated
their Wars, when they had at last brought
them to the point they desired. They sent
the Garrisons out of the Strong-holds ; had
the Horses and Elephants delivered up to
them ; and if their Enemies were powerful
at Sea, obliged them to burn their Ships, and
sometimes remove higher up in the Country.
If the Prince they had overcome was possessed
of numerous Armies, and surrounded with

CHAP. warlike Nations, one of the Articles of the
I. Treaty was, that he should not make War
with any of the Allies of the *Romans*, but
submit his Differences to Arbitration. And
as they never refused their Alliance to any
People who bordered on a powerful Prince,
this Condition inserted in a Treaty of Peace,
cut him off from all Opportunities of making
War, or employing his Troops, and thereby
deprived him of a military Power for the
time to come. Nay they even bereaved their
very Allies of this Force. The instant any
Contest broke out amongst them, they sent
Ambassadors who obliged them to conclude a
Peace. It was in this manner they terminated
the Wars between *Attalus* and *Pruſias*; and
whoever is in the least acquainted with their
History, must be sensible, that they all along
adhered strictly to this Policy. The Result
was, that they alone were possessed of warlike
and veteran Armies, whilst those of other
Nations degenerated into a raw unpractised
Rabble. When any State composed too for-
midable a Body from its Situation or Union,
they never failed to divide it. The Repub-
lick of *Achaia* was formed by an Association
of free Cities. The Senate declared, that
every City should be governed by its own
Laws, independent on the general Authority.
Macedonia was surrounded with inaccessible
Mountains. The Senate divided it into four
Parts; declared those free; prohibited them
every kind of Alliance among themselves by
Marriage;

Marriage ; carried off all the Nobles into Italy, ^{CHAP.}
and by that means reduced this Power to no- ^{I.}
thing.

XXIV. THESE Customs of the Romans were not certain particular Incidents which happened by chance ; but so many invariable Principles, from which in a long Course of Years they never deviated. The Maxims they put in practice against the greatest Monarchs, were exactly the same with those they had employed in their infant State, against the little Cities which stood round them. They made *Eumenes* and *Masinissa* contribute to the Subjection of *Pbilip* and *Antiochus*, as they had before employed the *Latines* and *Hernici*, to subdue the *Volscians* and the *Tuscans*. They obliged the *Carthaginians* and the Kings of *Asia* to surrender their Fleets to them, in like manner as they had forced the Citizens of *Antium* to give up their little Vessels. And indeed it is surprising to consider, that during the course of that long and mighty Prosperity which attended the Roman Arms, and in which it is so usual for Mankind to forget themselves, the Senate continued to act all along with the same depth of Judgment, and the same steady Views to the publick Interest. They were not dazzled by their good Fortune, nor moved to precipitate their Enterprises before the proper Season. Observe, I entreat you, the Wisdom and Policy of their Conduct. After the Defeat of *Antiochus*,

they

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. they were possessed of *Africa*, *Asia*, and
I. *Greece*, without having a single City in those
Countries, that could be called immediately
their own. They seemed to conquer with
no other view but to bestow. But then
they obtained so complete a Sovereignty;
that whenever they engaged in War with
any Prince, they oppressed him, as it were,
with the weight of the whole Universe.
The time proper for seizing upon the con-
quered Countries was not yet come. Had
the *Romans* kept the Cities they took from
Philip, the *Greeks* would have seen at once
into their Designs. Had they, after the se-
cond *Punick* War, or that with *Antiochus*,
possessed themselves of Lands in *Africa* and
in *Asia*, they could never have preserved Con-
quests so slightly established. It was the In-
terest of the Senate to wait till all Nations
were accustomed to obey as free and as con-
federate, and to let them blend and lose them-
selves insensibly in the *Roman* Commonwealth,
before they should attempt reducing them to
the Condition of Subjects. After overcoming a
Nation, they contented themselves with weak-
ening it, and imposing such Conditions as con-
sumed it insensibly. If it recovered, they de-
pressed it still more, and it became subject with-
out a possibility of dating the Æra of its Subjec-
tion. This was indeed a slow way of conquer-
ing, but founded in the deepest Policy. *Rome*,
by a steady Adherence to these Maxims, gra-
dually increased in Strength; and having at
length

length got the better of all Opposition, se-C H A P.
curely took possession of the Sovereignty of the Universe. II.

C H A P. II.

*Of the manner of levying Troops, and
forming a Roman Army.*

I. THE Levies, during the times of the Commonwealth, to which Period we chiefly confine ourselves, were commonly made by the Consuls. Every Year they issued out an Edict, commanding all who had reached the military Age, to appear in the Field of *Mars*, or in the Capitol. Two Legions composed a consular Army: and as there were two Consuls, it was usual to raise four Legions yearly. The Age for serving in the Army was from seventeen to forty-five. None but Citizens were admitted: and all of that Rank within the Age prescribed by Law, were obliged to be present on the Day prefixed, under pain of a Fine. To fail in this respect was long criminal during the Commonwealth. The People being assembled, the Consuls began by nominating the military Tribunes, twenty-four in Number, six to every Legion. Of these fourteen were chosen out of the Body of the Knights, and the rest from among the People. The first were required to have served at least five Years, and the

CHAP. the others ten. They were divided to the
II. four Legions in this manner. Of the fourteen youngest Tribunes, four were assigned to the first Legion, three to the second, four to the third, and three to the last. Of the ten eldest, two to the first and third Legions, and three to the second and last.

II. THE four and twenty Tribunes thus chosen and appointed, every Tribe was called out by Lot, and ordered to divide into its proper Centuries. Four Men, as much alike in all circumstances as could be found, being presented out of the Century on whom the Lot fell; the Tribunes of the first Legion chose one, then the Tribunes of the second another; the Tribunes of the third Legion a third, and the remaining Person fell to the Tribunes of the fourth. After this four more were drawn out. And now the right of choosing first belonged to the Tribunes of the second Legion: in the next four to the Tribunes of the third Legion: then to the Tribunes of the fourth Legion: and so continually, those always choosing last in every turn, who chose first the time before. From this manner of choosing the Soldiers one by one, the several large Bodies into which they were formed, obtained the Name of Legions, from the Latin Word *legere*, to choose; and the Levy itself was called *Delectus, Choice*. No Soldier was admitted under the height of five Roman Feet and ten Inches, except in an extreme want of

of Troops, which would not allow of choosing. It is observed, that the Men of the first Cohorts of each Legion were not under six Feet high, which amounts to five Feet ten Inches of our measure, the *Roman* Foot making eleven Inches and six hundred and four decimal Parts of an Inch *English*.

III. THE Horse were chosen out of the Body of the *Equites*, into which Order, after the institution of the *Census* by *Servius Tullius*, all were admitted who were worth four hundred *Sestertia*. They had a Horse and Ring given them at the publick Charge, and formed a third and middle Order between the Senate and the People. They are known in History under the Name of *Roman Knights*, and were obliged to appear on horseback, as often as the State had occasion for their Service. Thus there was always a sufficient Number of Cavalry in readiness, and it belonged to the Censors to review them, and furnish what was necessary to complete the Legions. It is indeed hard to conceive, that all the *Roman* Horse in the Army should be Knights; and therefore many learned Men are of opinion, that after the Siege of *Veii*, there were two sorts of Cavalry in the *Roman* Armies: one, whom the Publick supplied with Horses, and who were said to serve *Equo publico*: the other, who furnished themselves, and served *Equo privato*. The former they allow to have been of the Order of Knights, the latter not,

But

CHAP. But *Grævius* has abundantly demonstrated by
II. the Course of History, that from the begin-
ning of the *Roman State*, till the time of *Ma-*
rius, no other Horse entered the Legions but
the true and proper Knights, except in the
midst of publick Confusion, when Order and
Discipline were neglected. After that Period,
the military Affairs being new modelled, the
Knights thought not fit to expose themselves
abroad in the Legions, as they had formerly
done, but generally kept at home to enjoy
their Estates, and to have a hand in the Tran-
sactions of the City, leaving their Places in
the Army to be supplied by foreign Horse.
Or if they ever made Campaigns themselves,
they held some Post of Honour and Com-
mand. Hence under the Emperors, a Man
might be a Knight, and have the Honour of
a publick Horse, without ever engaging in
the publick Cause, or so much as touching
Arms: which Consideration made some
Princes lay aside the Custom of allowing the
Knights a Horse, and leave them only the
gold Ring to distinguish their Order, as *Pliny*
the elder affirms to have been done in his
time.

IV. WHEN the Levies were compleated,
the Tribunes of every Legion obliged the
Soldiers one by one to take the military
Oath. The Form in this case was, to choose
out a Soldier, who repeated the Oath aloud.
By this Oath he engaged to hazard his Life
for

for the Commonwealth, to obey his General, CHAP.
and not to quit the Army without Leave. In II.
pronouncing it he held up his right Hand,
raising the Thumb of it upright; after which
all the Soldiers of each Legion declared that
they swore the same thing, but without repeat-
ing the Form. This was not a mere Cere-
mony, but a very solemn Act of Religion,
and so essential to the military State, that no
Man was deemed a Soldier, nor allowed to
strike or kill an Enemy, if he had not taken
the customary Oath. We have a remarkable
Example of this in the Behaviour of *Cato* the
Censor. A Legion, in which the Son of
that illustrious Senator served, being dismissed
by the Consul who commanded in *Mace-
donia*, young *Cato* chose to continue with
the Army. His Father thereupon wrote
immediately to the Consul, to desire, if he
thought fit to suffer his Son to remain in the
Service, that he would make him take a new
Oath, because being discharged from the
former, he had no longer any right to join in
Battle against the Enemy. We find likewise,
that among the *Greeks* the military Oath was
accounted inseparable from the State of a
Soldier. And *Xenophon*, in his History of
Cyrus the Great, informs us, that that Prince
exceedingly applauded the Action of an
Officer, who having raised his Arm to strike
an Enemy, upon hearing the Retreat sounded,
stopt short, regarding that Signal, as an order
to proceed no farther.

CHAP V. AFTER administering the military Oath,
the next care of the Tribunes was, to form
the Troops into Legions. The exact Number
of Soldiers in such a Battalion was not
always the same. *Romulus* fixed it at three
thousand Foot, and three hundred Horse. It
afterwards rose to four, five, and six thousand.
Under the Consuls it was commonly four
thousand two hundred Foot, and three hu-
dred Horse. This was the Number in the
time of *Polybius*, and here I shall fix it. In
order thoroughly to comprehend the Nature
of the Legion, so famous in History, we must
begin with observing, that the whole Infantry
of which it was composed, was divided into
four Orders, the *Velites*, *Hastati*, *Principes*,
and *Triarii*. The *Velites* were young, active
Soldiers, and formed the light-armed Troops
of the *Roman* Commonwealth. They had
their Name *a volando*, or *a velocitate*, from
their Swiftness and Expedition. They were
not divided into Companies, nor had any fixed
Post assigned them in a Day of Battle, but
hovered in loose order before the Army, or
were disposed among the Cavalry and heavy-
armed Troops, as occasion required. The
Hastati were so called, because they used in
ancient times to fight with Spears, which
were afterwards laid aside as incommodious.
These were taken out the next in Age to
the *Velites*, and formed the first Line in a
Day of Battle. The *Principes* were generally
Men

Men of middle Age, in the prime and vigour of Life, whence probably they took their Name. Their Post in an Engagement was the second Line. The *Triarii* were old Soldiers of distinguished Valour, who had served long, and acquired great Experience. They had their Name from their Post in the Field of Battle, forming the third Line or Reserve. They are likewise sometimes called *Pilani*, from their Weapon the *Pilum*.

VI. THESE several Divisions formed twelve hundred Men apiece in the three first Orders, and six hundred in the last, amounting in all to four thousand two hundred, the intire Infantry of a Legion. Each Body, the *Velites* excepted, was subdivided into ten Parts or *Maniples*, consisting of an hundred and twenty in the *Hastati* and *Principes*, and of sixty in the *Triarii*. Every *Maniple* made two Centuries or Companies. Anciently, and at its first Institution by *Romulus*, the Century had an hundred Men, from which it took its Name. But afterwards, it consisted only of sixty in the *Hastati* and *Principes*, and of thirty in the *Triarii*. Three *Maniples*, one of the *Hastati*, another of the *Principes*; and a third of the *Triarii*, composed a *Cohort*. Every Legion, therefore, consisted of ten Cohorts, besides the twelve hundred *Velites*, who, as we have already observed; were not divided into distinct Companies. The Number of Legions kept on foot was different, according to the different Exigences

CHAP. II. gances of the State. During the Commonwealth, four Legions were usually levied every Year, and divided between the two Consuls. But in case of Necessity, the Number was augmented, and we sometimes meet with eighteen in *Livy*.

VII. We have observed that every *Maniple* was divided into two Centuries or Companies. Over each of these presided an Officer called a Centurion. To determine the Point of Priority between them, they were created at two different Elections. Those of the first Election, as the most honourable, alway took the Precedency of their Fellows, and therefore commanded the right hand Orders, as the others did the left. He who commanded the first Century of the first *Maniple* of the *Triarii*, called also *Pilani*, was the most considerable of all the Centurions, and had a Place in the Council of War with the Consul and principal Officers. He bore the Name of *Primipilus*, or *Primipili Centurio*; and was called likewise *Primipilus prior*, to distinguish him from the Centurion who commanded the second Century of the same *Maniple* who had the Title of *Primipilus posterior*. This Distinction of *prior* and *posterior* had place also in all the other *Maniples*. The Centurion who commanded the first Century of the second *Maniple* of the *Triarii*, was called *secundi Pili Centurio*; and so on to the tenth, who was called *decimi Pili Centurio*. The same order was observed among the *Hastati* and

and *Principes*. The first Centurion of the CHAP.
Principes was called *primus Princeps*, or *primi Principis Centurio*. The second, *secundus Princeps, &c.* and so on to the last. So likewise among the *Hastati*, *primus Hastatus*, or *primi Hastati Centurio, secundus Hastatus, &c.* through all the different Orders. As it belonged to the military Tribunes to appoint the Centurions, so these last chose *Vexillarii* or Ensigns, two to every *Maniple*. They had likewise Officers under them called *Succenturiones* or *Optiones*, and who were in the nature of our Lieutenants. *Polybius* mentions them under the Name of *Tergiductors*, their Post being in the Rear of the Company.

VIII. THE Cavalry required to a Legion was three hundred. They were divided into ten *Turmae*, or Troops, thirty to a Troop. Every Troop consisted of three *Decuriae*, or Bodies of ten Men. Over each of these was a Captain, called *Decurio*. He that was first elected commanded the whole Troop, and had the Title of *Praefectus*. The Decurions had every one his *Optio*, or Deputy, under him, who in like manner as in the Foot, were called *Tergiductors*. These Squadrons often occur in History under the Name of *Ale*, because they always formed the Wings of the Legion. At the time the *Romans* warred against the lesser Nations of *Italy*, their Horse was incomparably superior to that of their Enemies, for which Reason they were

A Discourse CONCERNING

CHAP. composed of none but the most considerable

II.

among the Citizens, being, as we have observed, selected wholly out of the Order of the Knights. When they alighted, no Infantry was more formidable, and they very often turned the Scale of Victory. It must be owned, however, that their Cavalry were but few in proportion to their Foot; and though they served well enough for their *Italian* Wars, yet they became fully sensible of this Inconvenience when they had to do with *Hannibal*. It was chiefly by the Superiority of his Cavalry, and his manner of using it, that he gained so many Victories over them. Accordingly they applied themselves seriously to the improvement of this Part of their Strength, not only by intermixing Platoons of Foot with their Cavalry, and training them particularly to that Service, but likewise by taking foreign Horse into their pay, *Numidians*, *Gauls*, and *Germans*.

IX. BESIDES the Troops already mentioned, there were always in the *Roman* Armies a Number of Soldiers of a more eminent degree, known by the Title of *Evocati*. They were such as had served out the legal time, and been distinguished by particular Marks of Favour, as a Reward of their Valour. It was usual for the Consuls, especially in important Wars, to invite a great Number of these into the Service, by circular Letters dispatched for that purpose. The Reputation of a General

General was what chiefly induced them to CHAP.
grant their attendance, and therefore it was ^{II.} conſidered as a particular mark of Honour.
In the Field they usually guarded the chief Standard, being excused from all the military Drudgery of standing on the Watch, labouring in the Works, or other servile Employments. They had likewise the privilege of using the *Kitis* or Rod, which was the badge of the Centurion's Office, and indeed were in all respects rather superior to the Centurions. It was very common, when any General of an established Reputation, and who had long distinguished himself in the service of his Country, was appointed to the management of a difficult War, to see great Numbers of these flock to his Standard, and offer themselves anew to Dangers and Fatigues, in hopes of gaining fresh Laurels under the auspices of a Commander, who had often in their youth led them to Honour and Victory. Thus it happened to *Paulus Aemilius*, when he was charged with the Conduct of the *Macedonian War*. And thus also to the younger *Scipio Africanus*, when after a series of Disgraces before *Numantia*, the *Romans* cast their Eyes upon him, as alone capable of restoring the Reputation of their Arms.

X. BUT to return to the Legions. The Officers next in dignity to the Centurions were the military Tribunes, of whom we have already given some account. They

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. owed their Name and Institution to *Romulus*,
II. who having divided the whole Body of the
Citizens into three Tribes, appointed an Officer
over each, with the Title of Tribune. The
Number afterwards increased to six in every
Legion. During the Infancy of the Com-
monwealth they were nominated by the
Consuls; and afterwards, partly by the Con-
suls, partly by the People. Their Busines
was to decide all Controversies in the Army;
to give the Word to the Watch; to see that
the Soldiers observed Discipline, obeyed Or-
ders, and did their Duty; and to take care
of the Works and Camp. None could attain
this Dignity, who had not served in the Army
five Years; and of the twenty-four that were
annually chosen, ten at least must have served
ten Years. Care was also taken to distribute
them in such manner, that in each Legion the
most experienced were united with those who
were younger, in order to instruct and form
them for commanding. By this means the
Legions were always provided with able
Officers, which could not fail of having an ex-
cellent Effect upon the Troops, as it naturally
tended to inspire them with Valour, and be-
get an Esteem and Confidence in their Com-
manders. During the Campaign, which lasted
six Months, they commanded the Legion by
turns, two at a time, for two Months together.
The order in which they were to command
was decided by Lot.

XI. THE Troops we have hitherto been CHAP.
describing, may properly be termed the na- II.
tural Forces of the Republick, as consisting
wholly of her own Citizens. They were
indeed the original Armies of *Rome*, and all
along constituted her main Strength. But
this political Commonwealth, when she be-
gan to extend her Dominion over *Italy*, instead
of reducing the vanquished Nations to Slavery,
indulged them the Title of Allies, and the
free enjoyment of their own Laws, upon Con-
dition of supplying her in her Wars with a
certain proportion of Men. These were cal-
led the allied Troops, and as to Number,
were equal to the natural Forces in Foot,
and double in Horse. The manner of levying
them was thus. The Consuls, while they
were employed in completing the Legions
at *Rome*, gave notice to the allied States what
Number of Forces they would have occasion
for, and appointed a time and place of Rendez-
vous. The States accordingly convened
their Men, and choosing out the desired
Number, gave them an Oath, and assigned
them a Commander in Chief, and a Pay-
master-general. When they arrived in the
Camp, they were divided into two great Bodies,
termed *Alæ*, or *Cornua*, from their position
in the Army. For the *Romans* always reserved
the Center to themselves, placing the Con-
federates, half on the right, and half on the
left Wings. And because they were more

CHAP. numerous than the natural Forces, Care was
II. taken farther to separate them, by selecting a
third part of the Horse, and a fifth of the
Foot, and posting them near the Consul's
Person, under the Name of *Extraordinarii*.
It is not certainly known how the smaller
Bodies of the Confederate Forces were com-
manded. Most probably the *Romans* mar-
shalled them according to their own Discipline,
and assigned them Officers of the same nature
with those of the Legions. This seems to
follow from the manner in which they
fought, it appearing evidently by the Course
of History, that both as to their Arms, and
order of Battle, they differed in nothing from
the Troops of the Republick. We are assur-
ed, however, that the two *Aleæ*, or great Di-
visions of the Allies, had each a *Præfect* ap-
pointed them by the *Roman* Consul, who
governed in the same manner as the legionary
Tribunes. In after-times, all the States of
Italy were admitted to share the Freedom of
the City, and their Forces incorporated with
those of the Republick. From this Period,
threfore, the Name of the Allies ceased, and
in their stead the auxiliary Troops were pro-
cured. These were sent by foreign States
and Princes, at the Desire of the *Roman* Senate,
or Generals, and were allowed a set Pay from
the Republick; whereas the Allies received
no Consideration for their Service, but a Di-
stribution of Corn.

XII. OVER these Armies of the *Roman* C H A P.
People, the two Consuls presided, who were ^{II.} ~~the~~ standing Generals of the Republick. They were created yearly, and in the Field possessed an unlimited Authority; the Senate referring to themselves only the Power of making Peace, and decreeing War, unless upon extraordinary Occasions. The annual Change of Generals was doubtless in some Cases an Obstacle to the Advancement of Affairs: but the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, by continuing the same Man longer in the Command of all the Forces of the State, obliged them to overlook this inconvenience, from the apprehension of a much greater. The Necessity of Affairs, the Distance of Places, and other Reasons, reduced the *Romans* at length to continue their Generals in the Command, for several Years together, under the Name of Proconsuls or Proprætors. And as these Generals had often a great Extent of Country to defend, and were obliged to employ different Bodies of Troops in different Places, they found it necessary to have Officers under them, of a more extensive Authority than the military Tribunes. This gave rise to the Institution of the *Legati*, who commanded in chief under the General, and managed all Affairs by his Permission. We find them sometimes at the head of one

CHAP. Legion, sometimes of three or four, and sometimes of only part of a Legion. Their Office was accounted very honourable, info much that the greatest Men of the State, and even such as had been Consuls and Dictators, did not disdain to accept of it. The great *Fabius*, as is well known, was his Son's Lieutenant; and *Scipio Africanus* served in the same Capacity under the Consul his Brother. The Number was according to the General's pleasure, on whom alone the Choice depended: and it appears, that they commanded under him, and received his Orders, as Lieutenant-Generals in our Armies serve under the Generalissimo. In the absence of the Consul or Proconsul, they had the honour of using the *Fasces*, and were intrusted with the same Charge as the Officer whom they represented.

XIII. HAVING thus sufficiently explained how the Armies of the *Roman* People were formed, and the different Degrees of Rank and military Service that prevailed in them; it is time to consider a little more particularly wherein their Strength consisted, and to what they were indebted for that Superiority, which rendered them victorious over the Troops of all other Nations. The first thing that offers itself to our Observation here is, the Nature and Form of the Legion; whose contrivance was so admirable, that *Vegetius* thinks

thinks nothing less than a God could inspire the Idea of it. The Soldiers of which it was composed, were armed with Weapons of a heavier and stronger kind than those of other Nations, as we shall have occasion to show more at large in the next Chapter. But because some things must be done in War, which a heavy Body is not able to execute, it was therefore made to include within itself a Band of light Forces, which might issue from it in order to provoke the Enemy to Battle, or draw back into it in case of Necessity. It was likewise strengthened with Cavalry, and with Spearmen and Slingers, to pursue those who fled, and compleat the Victory. The Troops were all of different experience and standing in the Service, and so mixed together in the Cohorts, that no Party of *Roman* Forces was without a sufficient Number of Veterans, to give Life and Vigour to its Operations. The Number of Men in a Legion seems likewise to have been the effect of a wise Policy. For these amounting to four thousand five hundred, formed a considerable Body of Troops, animated by one and the same Spirit, and who from their mutual Relation among themselves, would take a near Interest in each others Preservation. They were in effect Men of the same Regiment, and had all that Zeal and Concern for one another, which is usual among those lesser Divisions of our Troops.

CHAP. XIV. The Marquis de Feuquieres in his
II. Memoirs observes, that the Regiments of
which modern Armies consist, are not suffi-
ciently strong in the Number of Men. He
thinks it might do well to form them of se-
veral Battalions: because such a Multitude of
different Bodies, without any immediate Tie
among themselves, seems directly contrary to
that Union and Subordination, which consti-
tutes the great beauty of military Discipline.
It is certain that Troops always exert them-
selves more, in behalf of those of the same
Regiment, than where the Party for which
they are engaged belongs to a different Divi-
sion. This the Romans were fully sensible of,
and had an Eye to it particularly in the Con-
stitution of their Legion. It was doubtless
of great Advantage to them in a Day of
Battle, that their Lines were made up of a few
large Bodies, linked together by the strongest
military Ties, and nearly interested in each
others Preservation. Nor did the Number of
Men in these Bodies render them unwieldy or
unmanageable: because being judiciously dis-
posed into Cohorts, they could be commanded
with the same ease, and were no less nimble
in their Operations, than if they had formed
so many independent Battalions. And here
it is worthy of notice, that in drawing up the
Army, the Troops were so disposed, as tended
wonderfully to their mutual Support and En-
couragement. For as the Romans commonly
fought

fought in three Lines, so in every one of those CHAP.
Lines, the Soldiers were always so posted, as ^{II.} to be sustained by others of the same Legion. This was owing to the manner of forming the Lines, not by intire Legions, but by the different military Orders that composed the Legions. The *Hastati* were placed in the first Line, the *Principes* in the second, and the *Triarii* in the third. By this means the *Hastati* of every Legion were supported by the *Principes* of the same Legion, and these again by the *Triarii*. What Spirit and Confidence this must add to the Troops, and how effectually it would tend to preserve them from Slaughter, when any particular Line was broken, will be evident upon the least Reflection. It is found by experience, that Soldiers never fight better, nor exert a greater share of Courage, than when they know themselves to be well supported; and if at last they are obliged to give way, yet still the Retreat is managed with less Terror and Confusion. The *Romans*, in case of a Repulse, retired through the Intervals of the Lines behind them: and these consisting of Men of the same Legion, advanced immediately to their Relief, and doubtless would do every thing in their Power to preserve their Fellows. This kept up the Spirits of those that fled, prevented their throwing away their Arms, and encouraged them to rally and renew the Charge.

CHAP. XV. THERE was also another Advantage
II. in the Constitution of the Legion, arising from
the several military Orders of which it was
composed, with their Division into *Maniples*
and Companies. For these being very nu-
merous, and differing in point of Rank and
Superiority, opened a large Field for Prefer-
ment, and thereby excited an incredible Ar-
dor and Emulation among the Troops. A
private Soldier, after passing through the dif-
ferent military Orders, came to be a Centu-
rion among the *Haftati*; and rising from one
Maniple to another, was at length promoted
into the Rank of the *Principes*. Thence by
a like Gradation he reached the Order of the
Triarii, and in time attained the Dignity of
Primipilus. Nor was he even obliged to stop
here. For as military Merit was every thing
at *Rome*, it seldom failed to raise those who
possessed it in any eminent Degree, to the
first Dignities of the State. The manner too
in which Promotions were made, seems won-
derfully calculated for the advancement of
true Bravery. Every higher order of Officers
created those next below them, and so in
train continually, through all the different
Steps of the Service. As therefore the Per-
sons on whom the Choice depended, had the
best Opportunities of knowing the Merit of
the several Competitors, and were likely to
be determined by that alone, in a matter that
so nearly concerned their own Honour and
Safety;

Safety ; it is natural to suppose, that every CHAP.
one would endeavour to recommend himself II:
by such Qualifications, as rendered him truly
worthy of the Place to which he aspired.
This progressive Choice of Officers, which
established so just a Subordination in the Ar-
my, and gave a great ascendant to the princi-
pal Commanders, contributed more than any
thing to the Perfection of military Discipline.
It is worth while to observe how gradually
the *Romans* proceeded herein. The People
or State elected the two Consuls. The Con-
suls chose the military Tribunes : the mili-
tary Tribunes the Centurions : and the Centu-
rions their *Vexillarii* and *Tergiductors*. This
method opened the fairest Prospect to Valour,
and tended to beget that Spirit among the
Troops, which is of all others the happiest
that can be raised in an Army, an Emulation
to surpass each other in deserving Honours.

XVI. WHAT we have hitherto said regards
chiefly the Form and Structure of the Legion.
Let us now consider the Quality of the
Troops of which it was composed. None
but Citizens were admitted into this Body :
and of all these the Tribunes had their Choice,
from seventeen to forty-five Years of Age.
We are to observe, however, that it was not
every Citizen whom they judged worthy of
this Honour. By the Institution of the *Cen-*
sus, the whole *Roman* People were divided in-
to distinct Classes, founded on a valuation of
their

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. their Estates. Those of the sixth and lowest
H. Clas, consisting of the poorer Citizens, use-
ful only by stocking the Commonwealth with
Children, were not allowed to serve in the
Army. The *Romans* were for having Soldiers,
whose real Interest in the Preservation of the
State, would prompt them to act with Zeal in
its Defence. They had every one their por-
tion of Land, and for the most part lived in
the Country, to improve and cultivate it with
their own Hands. Thus accustomed to the
Toils of Husbandry; to endure Sun, Rain,
and Hail; to handle heavy Instruments, dig
Trenches, and carry Burdens; when they en-
tered the Service they only changed their
Arms and Tools, and came with Bodies inured
to Labour, and seasoned to all the Fatigues of
the Field. Besides, as War was the proper
Profession of this People, and what they were
all obliged to engage in, as soon as they reach-
ed the Age for bearing Arms, military Exer-
cises made an essential part of their Education.
They were trained up in them from their In-
fancy, and had a space of Ground within the
City, called the *Campus Martius*, where, as
if actually in the Field, they formed them-
selves to all the Branches of the Service. Af-
ter their Fatigues they plunged into the *Tiber*,
to accustom themselves to swimming, and
cleanse away the Dust and Sweat. Hence
the *Romans* were never obliged, on any sud-
den Emergency, to commit the Honour or
Safety of the State to a raw undisciplined Mul-
titude.

titude. They had always a sufficient Number of Men in readiness, trained and habituated to War, for the forming and recruiting their Armies.

CHAP.
II.

XVII. In reading the History of ancient Commonwealths, we can hardly forbear fancying, that we peruse the Annals of a set of Men, altogether different from ourselves. The prodigious Fortune to which the *Romanis* attained, seems incredible to us. We are amazed to see that Republick, from an obscure inconsiderable Village, rising insensibly to Power, extending her Dominion over *Italy*, and at last rendering herself Mistress of the Universe: to behold her Citizens, even those of weight and authority in the Administration, serving as private Men in her Armies: and to find that Soldiers, who in our Days are the Dregs of every Nation, were in that Commonwealth made up of the very same People, who at home, in times of Peace, created Magistrates, enacted Laws, and obliged the Senate itself to submit to their Decisions. Nor is it less a matter of wonder when we consider the number and greatness of her Armies. It is evident by experience with respect to modern times, that a *European* Prince who has a Million of Subjects, cannot, without destroying himself, keep up and maintain above ten thousand Men. But when we look into the Affairs of ancient States, especially those of *Sparta*, *Athens*, and *Rome*, the case appears

CHAP. II. pears to be quite otherwise. We there find, that this proportion between the Soldiers and the rest of the People, which is now as one to an hundred, could not in them be less than as one to eight. *Rome* was yet confined within very narrow Bounds, when the *Latins* having refused to succour her with the Troops which had been stipulated, ten Legions were presently raised in the City only. And if we examine the Histories of *Athens* and *Sparta*, we shall there meet with Instances no less surprising, of powerful and numerous Armies, when compared with the Extent of their Territories.

XVIII. To account in some measure for so wonderful a Revolution in the course of human Affairs, it behoves us to call to mind, that the Founders of ancient Commonwealths had taken care to make an equal Distribution of Lands, and that the several Portions were allotted to Individuals, upon Condition of serving the State in her Wars. This Circumstance alone raised a Nation to Power, gave Strength to its Armies, and made it a well-regulated Society. By this it became equally the Interest of every Member of the Commonwealth, and that a very great Interest too, to exert himself in defence of his Country. *Romulus*, after assigning one Part of the *Roman* Territory to the Expences of religious Worship, and another to the uses of the State, divided the remainder into thirty Portions, to answer

answer to the thirty *Curia*. Under the Commonwealth, in proportion as the publick Domain increased, it was the constant practice of the Senate for several Ages, to allot part of the conquered Lands to the use of the poor Citizens, and share it equally among them. This was what at first enabled *Rome* to soar above its humble Condition; and the People were strongly sensible of it even in their corrupted State. We find them constantly struggling for an *Agrarian Law*, and contriving means to check the Artifices of those who endeavoured to elude it. The avowed Patrons of Liberty considered this Law as the main Bulwark of the State, and were ever sounding in the Ears of the Senate, the Mischiefs to which they exposed themselves by the violation of it. Tell me, would *Tiberius Gracchus* say to the Nobles, which is the most valuable Character, that of a Citizen, or of a perpetual Slave? Who is most useful, a Soldier, or a Man entirely unfit for War? Will you, merely for the sake of enjoying a few more Acres of Land than your Fellow-citizens, quite lay aside the hopes of conquering the rest of the World, or be exposed to see yourselves dispossessed by the Enemy of those very Lands which you refuse us?

XIX. AND in fact we find, that in proportion as the *Romans* deviated from this great and original Principle of Government, Affairs began to wear the very same face, under

CHAP. which they appear in our Days. The Avail-
rice of some, and the lavish Profuseness of
others, occasioned the Lands to become the
Property of a few. Immediately Arts were
introduced, to supply the reciprocal Wants of
the rich and poor; by which means but very
few Soldiers or Citizens were to be seen. For
the Revenues of the Lands, that had before
been employed to support the latter, were
now wholly bestowed on Slaves and Artificers,
who administered to the Luxury of the new
Proprietors. But it was impossible that Peo-
ple of this cast should be good Soldiers, they
being cowardly and abject, already corrupted
by the Luxury of Cities, and often by the
very Art they professed. Besides, as they
might reap the fruits of their Industry in every
Clime, and could not properly call any Coun-
try their own, they had no sufficient Tie to
bind them to its Defence. Nor was this Re-
volution peculiar to the Republick of *Rome*.
Sparta before her had experienced the like vicis-
tude. *Lycurgus* left no less than thirty thou-
sand Citizens behind him, who in the time of
Agis and *Cleomenes*, were reduced to seven
hundred, scarce an eighth Part of whom was
possessed of Lands. The rest were no more
than a cowardly Populace. These two Kings
undertook to revive the ancient Laws on this
occasion, and from that time *Lacedæmonia* re-
covered its former Power, and again became
formidable to all the States of *Greece*. Had
Tiberius and *Caius Gracchus* equally succeeded
in

in their Design of reforming the *Roman* Com-
monwealth, the loss of Liberty, and all the
Miseries consequent upon it, might have been
prevented. But their untimely fate discourag-
ing others from engaging in the same Causē,
Rome soon after, instead of being defended by,
became a Prey to her own Legions. Nor
ought we to wonder, if Men who had no
Property in the State, and might hope more
from its Overthrow than Preservation, were
easily induced to conspire its Ruin.

XX. BUT the equal Distribution of Lands,
was not that alone, which gave Strength to
the Armies of *Rome*. There were other Cir-
cumstances peculiar to the Times and Consti-
tution of that Republick, which contributed
not a little to its Grandeur. The Trade of a
Soldier was not then, as in our Days, a Slave-
ry for Life, attended with infinite Fatigue,
and scarce any Profit. As the Art of exactly
fortifying Places was little known, and less
practised; national Quarrels were decided by
Battle, and one gained often put an end to the
War. Hence the Service was properly speak-
ing little other than so many Summer Cam-
paigns. The Armies were renewed yearly,
and for several Ages never kept the Field du-
ring the Winter. A Battle was commonly at-
tended with the Conquest of an entire Province
or Kingdom; and the Pillage got in over-run-
ning the Enemy's Country, was often not only
sufficient to enrich the Conquerors, but some-

CHAP. times even served to aggrandise their Posterity.
II. At the close of the Campaign, the Soldiers were dismissed, every one to his own home, to look after his domestick Affairs, and cultivate his Inheritance. Thus there were many Inducements to a military Life: the short Duration of the Service: the Prospect of Wealth and Affluence, to which it often conducted: the Necessity of defending their own Possessions: and the Hope of acquiring new ones from the Enemy. For, as we have already observed, it was the constant Practice of the Senate for several Ages, to assign part of the conquered Lands to the use of the poor Citizens; either dividing it among those who had no Patrimony of their own, or granting an additional Allowance to such whose Inheritance was but scanty. In our times the condition of a Soldier is very different. National Quarrels are not now decided by Battles, but most commonly by Sieges, which spins out the War to an immoderate length, and occasions an infinite loss of Men. Towns are seldom taken by Storm, or abandoned to be plundered, but given up by Capitulation, and the Inhabitants left in the quiet Possession of their Properties. A Country exposed to Pillage redeems itself by Contributions, no Part of which comes into the Hands of the private Men, whose Pay at the same time is so small, that the meanest Occupation yields a far greater Income. Thus the Miseries of Hunger, Heat, and Cold,
which

which are inseparable from a military Life,<sup>C H A P
II.</sup> the certainty of Blows, and the uncertainty of Plunder, renders the usual Parts of War full of Sufferings and Dangers, and of little or no Profit to the Soldiers.

XXI. INDEED in the latter times of the Commonwealth, War began to partake of those Inconveniences, with which it is attended in the present Age. But then the Encouragements they had to face the Dangers of the Service, and the high Honours to which it paved the way, made all Difficulties vanish and disappear. For as the *Romans* devoted themselves entirely to the Profession of Arms, and considered it as the only Study worthy their Care, they omitted no methods to recommend and place it in Esteem. Innumerable Rewards and Distinctions were invented, suited to the different Stations of Men, and the several kinds of Valour in which they might render themselves conspicuous. Magistracies and Dignities were almost always conferred, according to the Reputation of the Candidate for Bravery in War. And at the same time that military Merit never failed to promote the Person in whom it was lodged, no one was capable of civil Employment in the Commonwealth, who had not served in the Army at least ten Years. We are not therefore to wonder, that amidst so many Incentives, which rendered the Life of a Soldier not only honourable, but in some measure

CHAP. necessary, Multitudes flocked to the Service,
II. and strove with Emulation to be admitted into
the Legions. Interest and Ambition are the
two ruling Principles of human Life; and as
both conspired to urge the *Romans* to War,
it was easy for them to find Armies, and to
increase and multiply them at pleasure. But
in our Days, none of those motives operate
upon the Minds of Men. The Condition of
a common Soldier is of all others the most
despicable: and even with regard to Officers
of the first Rank, long Service is so far from
being a Recommendation to State-Preferment,
that they are on that very account, in the
Judgment of many, the less fit for civil Em-
ployments.

XXII. BUT what chiefly contributed to
the Strength and Greatness of the *Roman* Ar-
mies, was the Custom established by *Romulus*,
of incorporating the vanquished Nations, and
admitting them to the Privileges of Citizens.
Without this it would have been impossible
for *Rome*, to raise herself to that height of
Grandeur, to which in time she attained.
The Spirit of her Citizens, the Bravery of
her Troops, and the admirable Discipline of
her Armies, might have enabled her to subject
the Nations around her, and extend her Sway
over a considerable Part of *Italy*: but in pro-
portion as she advanced in Conquest, she
would have become sensible of her own Weak-
ness; and the difficulty of maintaining herself
in

in her new Territories, when they grew large enough to employ the whole natural Forces of the Commonwealth, would have either made her drop all Thoughts of farther Empire, or forced her to have recourse to mercenary Troops, which have always in the end proved the ruin of those States, who were imprudent enough to venture upon so dangerous an expedient. This is remarkably exemplified in the History of *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Cartilage*. The two first of these Cities acquired considerable Dominion and Authority in *Greece*, and for some time maintained themselves in the Possession of that Power, to which their Valour and Abilities in War had raised them. But as the Number of Citizens in either State seldom exceeded thirty thousand, and they were unacquainted with the Policy of incorporating the vanquished Nations, it was impossible for them to enlarge their Territories in any extensive Degree. For great Conquests require great Armies to maintain them, which Cities so constituted as *Athens* and *Sparta*, were not able to furnish. Accordingly we find, that when Ambition prompted them to Undertakings beyond their Strength, they were so far from being able to increase their Dominions, that their very Conquests proved their Ruin, and they sunk under the weight of their own Greatness. For the Countries they had brought under Subjection, not considering themselves as Parts of the State, but rather as Tributaries

CHAP.ries and Slaves, were glad of an Opportunity
II. of shaking off the Yoke; and therefore sel-
dom failed to revolt, when they saw them
engaged in any difficult War. By this means
they were not only deprived of a considerable
Part of the Revenues, at a time when they
stood most in need of Money and Supplies;
but obliged likewise to divide their Forces:
which was a great Check upon their Designs,
and in the end so weakened them, that they
were no longer able to maintain themselves in
that Grandeur and Reputation they had ac-
quired,

XXIII. THE case of *Carthage* was indeed
somewhat different. That Commonwealth,
by its Riches and Commerce, was able to set
great Armies on foot, and make extensive
Conquests. But as the Genius of the Citizens
was turned more to Traffick than War, and
as they never admitted the conquered Nations
to the Privileges of natural Subjects, they were
under a Necessity of employing mercenary
Troops, both for enlarging their Territories,
and holding the vanquished Countries in
Obedience. Hence the many Shocks and
Convulsions to which that State was liable.
For as her Armies had no other Tie to the Re-
publick, but that of their Pay, they were easily
induced to throw off their Allegiance, when
any more advantageous Prospect offered itself.
Their Revolt more than once brought *Carthage*
to the very brink of Destruction. Instead of
contributing

contributing to secure the Tranquillity of the CHAP.
tributary Countries, they often spirited them up II.
to Rebellion ; and, which is indeed a necessary
Consequence of employing mercenary Troops,
upon any sudden reverse of Fortune, they
were ever ready to abandon the Service. Thus
the *Carthaginians*, though absolute Masters at
Sea, possessed of immense Territories, and able
to set on foot numerous Armies, were in reality
rather a rich than a powerful Republick.
They were successful indeed for a time against
a Number of barbarous States and Nations,
without Discipline or Experience in War : but
when they came to enter the Lists with a brave
and a military People, their Undertakings
almost always miscarried. Witness their many
Attempts upon *Syracuse*; the Extremity to
which they were reduced by *Agathocles*; and
the ease with which they were in a manner
totally driven out of *Sicily* by *Pyrrhus*. Indeed
in their first and second War with the *Romans*,
they make a very considerable figure in History,
whether we regard the greatness of their Vic-
tories, or the strength of their Armies. But
the merit of that seems rather owing to the
Abilities of their Generals, than to the intrin-
sick Power of the Commonwealth itself. Ac-
cordingly, in the third *Punick* War, when
they had neither a *Hamilcar* nor a *Hannibal*
at the head of their Troops, they in a very
short time fell a Prey to their Enemies.

CHAP. XXIV. BUT now the *Romans*, by the admirable Policy of incorporating the vanquished Nations, avoided all the Inconveniences to which the above-mention'd Cities were liable, and built their greatness upon a sure Foundation. The Forces of the State increased with their Territories, insomuch that it is amazing to consider, in how short a time from small beginnings, they rose to an incredible multitude of Citizens. The conquered Provinces were so far from being an Incumbrance upon them, by exhausting their Strength in Guards and Garrisons, that, on the contrary, they became real Parts of the Commonwealth, and contributed greatly to her Power, by augmenting her Revenues, and adding to the Number of her Subjects. Thus in proportion as *Rome* grew in greatness, and stood in need of mighty Armies to support the weight of her Enterprises, she found within herself an inexhaustible Stock of Men and Riches, and without having recourse to mercenary Troops, could furnish more than sufficient to answer all the Demands of the State. *Polybius*, when he comes to speak of the War with the *Italick Gauls*, takes occasion to describe the mighty Preparations made by the *Romans*, to oppose that formidable Enemy. We there find, that the Forces of the Commonwealth at that time, amounted to about seven hundred thousand Foot, and seventy thousand Horse. Compare this Account with the Histories of

Athens

Athens and *Sparta*, and it will soon appear, C H A P II.
what a disadvantage these two States lay under, for want of such an Institution as that of *Romulus*. For as they never admitted the vanquished Nations to the right of Citizens, but always reduced them to the Condition of Tributaries, the multitude of their Conquests served only to enlarge their Territories, without adding to the number of their natural Subjects. Hence even in the most flourishing Period of their greatness, they could seldom bring into the Field above thirty thousand Men. *Rome* on the other hand, by a contrary Policy, increased daily in the multitude of her Citizens, and in time was enabled to furnish out Armies, adequate to the Conquest of the Universe.

C H A P. III.

Of the Arms and Discipline of the Romans.

I. **I**T is generally allowed among the Writers upon the Art of War, that as in many other things, so particularly in their Arms, the *Romans* excelled all other Nations. I shall not here confine myself to the usual Distinction into offensive and defensive, but rather

CHAP. rather describe them according to the several
III. military Orders of which the Legions were
composed. By the *Velites* we are to understand all the light-armed Troops of the Commonwealth, of whatever Rank and Denomination. They were equipped with *Bows*, *Slings*, *Javelins*, a *Spanish Sword*, a *Buckler*, and a *Helmet*. The *Bow* is of very remote Antiquity, and has been used by almost all Nations. *Crete* in particular was famous for its excellent Archers. It does not seem to have been much regarded by the *Romans* in the earliest times of the Republick, and when it was afterwards introduced, was confined chiefly to the auxiliary Troops. We find however, in the Description of Battles, frequent mention made of the *Sagittarii*; and it appears, that they sometimes contributed not a little to the Victory. The *Sling* was also an Instrument of War much used by many Nations. The *Baleareans* especially, who inhabited the Islands now called *Majorca* and *Minorca*, are beyond all others celebrated for their Expertness at this Weapon. They were so attentive in exercising their Youth in the use of it, that they did not give them their Food in a Morning till they hit a Mark. These *Baleareans* were much employed in the Armies of the *Carthaginians* and *Romans*, and greatly contributed to the gaining of Victories. *Livy* mentions some Cities of *Achaia*, particularly *Egium*, *Patræ*, and *Dymæ*, whose Inhabitants were still more dexterous

dexterous at the Sling than the *Baleareans*. C H A P. III.
They threw Stones farther, and with greater Force and Certainty, never failing to hit what Part of the Face they pleased. Their Slings discharged Stones with so much Force, that neither Buckler nor Head-piece could resist their Impetuosity. Instead of Stones, they sometimes charged the Sling with Balls of Lead, which it carried much farther, and with greater Impetuosity. The *Javelin*, or *Hasta*, was the proper missive Weapon of the *Velites*. It was a kind of Dart not unlike an Arrow, the Wood of which was generally three Foot long, and one Inch thick. The Point was four Inches long, and tapered to so fine an end, that it bent at the first Stroke in such a manner, as to be useless to the Enemy. Every Man carried seven of them to Battle. The *Spanish Sword* was for a close Encounter. The Romans judged this Weapon the fittest for execution, as having both Edge and Point. It was short, of excellent temper, and in shape not unlike a *Turkish Scimetar*, only sharper at the Point. *Livy* tells us, that though it was principally intended for stabbing, it would yet serve likewise to cut off Arms, Legs, and Heads at a Blow. The *Buckler*, or *Parma*, was of a round form, about three Foot in Diameter, and made of Wood covered with Leather. The *Helmet*, called *Galea*, or *Galerus*, was a light Cask for the Head, generally made of the Skin of some wild Beast, to appear the more terrible.

CHAP. II. THE ARMS OF THE *Hastati*, *Principes*,
III. and *Triarii*, were in a great measure the same ;
for which reason we shall not divide them in
our Description, but speak of them all together.
Those most deserving our Notice are the
Sword, the *Scutum*, the *Pilum*, the *Galea*,
and the *Lorica*. The *Sword* was the same as
that of the *Velites*, and therefore requires not
any particular Description here. It was usual
with the *Romans* to wear it on the right side,
that they might be the more at liberty to manage
their Shields. In ancient Monuments how-
ever we sometimes meet with it on the left.
The *Scutum* was a Buckler of Wood, oblong,
and bending inward like a half Cylinder. Its
Parts were joined together with little Plates
of Iron, and the whole was covered with a
Bull's Hide. An Iron Ring went round it
without, to keep off Blows ; and another
within, to hinder it from taking any Damage
by lying on the Ground. In the middle was
an Iron Boss, or *Umbo*, jutting out, very ser-
viceable to glance off Stones and Darts, and
sometimes to press violently upon the Enemy,
and drive all before them. It appears that
these Bucklers were large enough to cover
almost the whole Body. *Polybius* makes them
four Foot long, and two and a half broad.
And in *Livy* we meet with Soldiers who stood
on the Guard, sometimes sleeping with their
Head laid on their Shield, having fixed the
other Part of it on the Earth. Some make
the

the *Scutum* the same with the *Clypeus*: but C H A P .
this is evidently a mistake; since in the In- III.
stitution of the *Census* by *Servius Tullius*, we
find the *Clypeus* given to those of the first Class,
and the *Scutum* to those of the second. In
fact, the *Scutum* was long and square, and
came at last to be the only Shield of the heavy-
armed Troops. The *Clypeus* was of a smaller
size, and quite round, belonging more properly
to other Nations, though for some time used
by the *Romans*.

III. THE *Pilum* was a missive Weapon,
which, in a Charge, they darted at the En-
emy. It was commonly four square, but some-
times round; composed of a Piece of Wood
about three Cubits long, and a Slip of Iron of
the same length, hooked and jagged at the
end. They took abundance of care in joining
the two Parts together, and did it so artificially,
that it would sooner break in the Iron itself,
than in the Joint. Every Man had two of
these *Pila*, which they discharged at the En-
emy before they came to close Fight. When
they had neither time nor room they threw
it upon the Ground, and charged the Enemy
Sword in Hand. *Marius*, in the *Cimbrian*
War, contrived these *Pila* after a new Fashion.
For whereas before, the Head was fastened to
the Wood with two Iron Pins; he suffered
one of them to remain as it was, and pulling
out the other, put a weak wooden Peg in its
Place. By this means, when it stuck in the
Enemy's

C H A P. III. Enemy's Shield it did not stand outright as formerly: but the wooden Peg breaking, the Javelin hung down, and sticking fast by its crooked Point, drew after it the Shield. Next to the *Pilum* we mentioned the *Galea*. This was a Head-piece, or Morrion, coming down to the Shoulders. It was either of Iron or Brass, open before, and leaving the Face uncovered. Some of them were so contrived, that they might be let down, on occasion, to cover the Face. Upon the top was the *Crista*, or Crest, in adorning of which the Soldiers took great Pride. In the time of *Polybius* they wore Plumes of Feathers, dyed of various Colours, to render them beautiful to their Friends, and terrible to their Enemies. The Officers in particular were extremely curious and splendid in their Crests, which were usually worked in Gold and Silver, and so contrived as to represent Animals of various kinds, Lions, Leopards, Tigers, and Griffins. If we might speak of those of foreign Commanders, the Crest of King *Pyrrhus*, as very singular, would deserve our notice. It was made, according to *Plutarch's* Description, of two Goats Horns. *Alexander the great*, as he is represented on ancient Medals, wore a Crest of the same Nature.

IV. We come now to the *Lorica*, which was a defensive Armour for the Body, as the *Galea* was for the Head and Neck. In our Language it is called the *Cuirass*, and was generally

generally made of Leather, covered with C H A P
Plates of Iron in the form of Scales, or Iron III.
Rings twisted within one another in the form
of Chains. These are what we call Coats
of Mail, in Latin, *Lorica Hamis conserta*, or
Hamata. Sometimes the Cuirass consisted of
Thongs, with which the Soldier was girt
from the Armpits to the Waste, and whence
probably it took the Name of *Lorica*, from
Lorum, a Thong or Strap of Leather. We
find likewise that it was oftentimes a sort of
Linen Cassock, made with many Folds, which
resisted, or very much broke the Force of
Blows. Among the Greeks this Piece of Ar-
mour had the Name of *Thorax*, and was made
either of Iron or Brass, in two Pieces which
were fastened upon the Sides by Buckles.
Alexander left the Cuirass only the two Pieces
which covered the Breast, that the fear of
being wounded on the Back, which had no
defence, might prevent the Soldiers from fly-
ing. Some of these Cuirasses were of so hard
a Metal, as to be absolutely proof against
Weapons. *Zoilus*, an excellent Artist in this
way, offered two of them to *Demetrius Po-*
liocertes. To show the excellency of them,
he caused a Dart to be discharged from a
Catapulta, at the distance of only twenty-six
Paces; which though it struck the Cuirass
with the utmost Violence, yet made no Im-
pression, and scarce left the least Mark behind
it. After all it must be owned, that the
Thorax of the Greeks was much less capable

C H A P. of Motion, Agility, and Force ; whereas the
III. Girts of Leather, successively covering each other, left the *Roman* Soldier entire Liberty of Action ; and fitting him like a Vest, defended him against Darts. The poorer Soldiers, who were rated under a thousand Drachms, instead of the *Lorica*, wore a *Pectorale*, or Breast-Plate of thin Brads, about twelve Inches square : and this, with what has been already described, and Greaves and Gantlets upon their Legs and Arms, which were common likewise to the rest, rendered them compleatly armed.

V. WHAT we have hitherto said regards only the Foot. It is now time to speak of the Cavalry, who at first were but very indifferently armed, either for Offence or Defence. They used only a round Shield, with a Helmet on their Head, and a couple of Javelins in their Hand, great part of the Body being left without defence. But as soon as they found the many inconveniences to which they were hereby exposed, they began to arm themselves like the *Grecian* Horse, or much in the manner of their own Foot, only their Shield was a little shorter and squarer, and their Lance or Javelin thicker, with spikes at each end, that if one miscarried, the other might be serviceable. It is remarkable, and what indeed we are hardly able to comprehend, that amongst the Ancients, the Horse had neither Stirrups nor Saddle. Education, Exercise,
and

and Habit, had accustomed them not to want CHAP.
those aids, and even not to perceive that there III.
was any occasion for them. There were
some Horsemen, such as the *Numidians*, who
did not know so much as the use of Bridles
to guide their Horses: and who, notwithstanding,
by their Voice only, or the use of
the Heel or Spur, made them advance, fall
back, stop, turn to the right or left; in a
word, perform all the Evolutions of the best
disciplined Cavalry. Sometimes, having two
Horses, they leaped from one to the other
even in the heat of Battle, to ease the first
when fatigued. These *Numidians*, as well
as the *Parthians*, were never more terrible
than when they seemed to fly thro' Fear and
Cowardice. For then, facing suddenly about,
they discharged their Darts or Arrows upon
the Enemy, and often put them to flight with
great slaughter. The *Romans* were more
than once surprised by these unexpected At-
tacks, and on some occasions suffered con-
siderably. But they at last found out a method
of securing themselves, by holding their Tar-
gets over their Heads, and forming what Hi-
storians call the *Tortudo*. It was to this Inven-
tion that *Marc Antony* owed the preserva-
tion of his Army, when miscarrying in his
Expedition against the *Parthians*, he found
himself obliged to retreat into *Syria* before
a great Body of their Horse.

CHAP. VI. THESE were the Arms with which the
III. *Romans* conquered the World: and I believe
it will be readily owned, that they were admirably well calculated both for defending themselves, and offending their Enemies. *Polybius*, in more Places than one, gives them the advantage in this respect over all other Nations, and expressly affirms, that the many Victories they obtained over the *Gauls*, was owing entirely to the superiority of their Arms. It is true, the cutting Swords of that People terrified them greatly at first, and was the cause of a fatal Overthrow. But they soon learnt from Experience, what a contemptible Weapon that was, when employed in close fight, against Troops substantially armed for defence. For the *Gauls*, to give force and vigour to their Blows, were obliged to avoid too near an approach to the Enemy, that they might have room to wield their Swords. Their first Ranks therefore only could do execution, because the *Romans* knowing their safety to lie in close fight, advanced continually under cover of their Shields, and crowded upon them in such manner, that they left them not sufficient space for the free use of their Weapons. It is besides observed, that the Swords of the *Gauls* were of so ill a temper, as after two or three strokes to stand bent in their Hands, and thereby become wholly useless to them, if they had not time to straighten them on the Ground with their Foot. This was not to be expected in the heat

heat of fight, against an Enemy that pressed hard ; so that the *Romans* closing in with them, stabbed them in the Face and Breast with their pointed Swords, and made terrible slaughter. CHAP. III.
The Chevalier *Folard* is astonished, that under all these Disadvantages, his Countrymen should obtain so many Victories over the *Romans*. He can hardly forbear fancying, that had they so far improved by their Defeats, as to change the fashion of their Weapons, and arm themselves after the manner of their Adversaries, we should not have heard so much of the boasted Exploits and Conquests of that People. Be that as it will, it is certain the *Gauls* wanted neither Bravery nor military Conduct, and if we except the single Article of their Arms, shewed themselves on many occasions no way inferior to the *Romans*.

VII. BUT let us now compare their Arms with those of the *Greeks*. Here, it must be owned, the Advantage does not appear so manifest. Many are rather of opinion, that the *Greeks* excelled the *Romans* in this respect. The Earl of *Orrery* particularly, in his *Treatise of the Art of War*, wonders much that the *Romans*, who borrowed most of their Weapons whether offensive or defensive from the *Greeks*, did not also follow their example in furnishing some of their Infantry with long Pikes, which he observes are the best offensive Arms, either to charge or defend, and of excellent use against Horse. It is well known

CHAP. that the *Macedonian Phalanx*, to which *Philip III.* and *Alexander* were indebted for most of their Victories, fought always with this Weapon. One would therefore be apt to think, that an Experience so much in its favour, could not have failed of recommending it powerfully to the *Romans*. And yet it is certain, that after making tryal of it for some time, they laid it aside as incommodious, ordering the *Hastati*, who at first were equipped with it, and thence took their Name, to arm themselves after the fashion of the rest of the legionary Foot. This could not arise from any scrupulous attachment to their own Customs, or dislike of foreign Manners; because no People were ever less tenacious in this respect, or shewed a greater readiness to adopt the Institutions of other Nations, when they saw any real Benefit likely to accrue from them. The principal Reason seems to have been, that they found the use of the Weapon incompatible with that of the Shield. For as it necessarily required to be managed with both Hands, those who fought with it were obliged to lay aside the Buckler; which piece of Armour appeared to the *Romans* of greater consequence than the Pike, because this last was in some measure supplied by the Sword and Javelin. If we might judge of things by the Event, the *Romans* reasoned very justly on this occasion; since without the assistance of the Pike, they not only gained greater and more numerous Victories than the *Macedonian Phalanx*, but even

even beat that very Phalanx itself, so formidable by the use of this Weapon. As this is a very curious and interesting Subject, and capable of furnishing many useful Reflections in relation to the ancient Art of War, it will not, I believe, be disagreeable to the Reader, if we enlarge a little upon it.

VIII. THE *Macedonian* Phalanx was a Body of sixteen thousand Men, armed with Pikes four and twenty foot long, which Historians describe under the Name of *Sarissæ*. This Corps was generally divided into ten Battalions, each consisting of sixteen hundred Men, an hundred in front, and sixteen deep. To form some idea of their strength and order of Battle, we need only reflect upon what passed a few Centuries ago in *Europe*, when *Italy* was a continual Theatre of War, by reason of the different Pretensions of *France*, *Spain*, and the *Emperor*. The Battalions of *Switzerland* were then in great Reputation, and generally looked upon as the best Infantry in the World, chiefly on account of the many Victories they had gained by the Pike. They were forced at first to have recourse to this Weapon, in order to secure themselves against the Ambition of the *German* Princes, who were daily making Attempts upon their Liberty. For these Princes being rich, and able to bring into the Field a numerous Cavalry, the *Switzers*, whose whole Strength on the contrary lay in their Foot, saw them-

Ixxxviii A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. selves under a necessity of contriving Arms,
III. that might defend them against the Enemy's
Horse. None appeared so proper for this pur-
pose as the Pike; and so successful were they,
by the Perfection they attained to in the use
of it, and their admirable Orders and Disci-
pline, that with fifteen or twenty thousand
Foot, they would often venture to attack a
vast Body of Horse, and generally came off
victorious. From that time the Pike became
famous, and was introduced into all the Ar-
mies of *Europe*. We find that they usually
had one half of their Infantry Shot, and the
other half Pikes; and it is particularly de-
serving of our notice, that for several Ages,
the chief Dependence of the General in a
Day of Battle seems to have been upon the
Pikes. By degrees the Musket began to pre-
vail over the Pike; yet gained ground so very
slowly, that it is not much above half a Cen-
tury, since we find one third of the Infantry
still Pikes.

IX. BUT tho' the Pike was found to be of
admirable service in Engagements with Horse,
Experience constantly made it appear, that it
was by no means sufficient against a resolute
and well-armed Infantry. For as this Wea-
pon required to be managed with both Hands,
and therefore necessarily excluded the use of
the Target, those who carried it were left al-
together without defence, if in the course of
an Engagement, the Enemy should chance to
get

get within their Pikes. Hence the Generals CHAP.
who were acquainted with this Weakness in III.
the *Swiss* Battalions, and could bring their
Troops to press the Charge vigorously, seldom
failed of defeating them with great slaughter.
We have a remarkable Example of it in the
case of Count *Carmignola*, General to *Philip*
Vicconti Duke of *Milan*. That brave Officer
being sent against a Body of eighteen thousand
Switzers, with only six thousand Horse, and
a few Foot, advanced boldly to the Encoun-
ter : but tho' the Attack was resolute and well
conducted, he was repulsed with considerable
loss. *Carmignola* quickly perceived the ad-
vantage which the Enemy had in their Foot
over his Horse. As he was a Man of deter-
mined Courage, and rather roused than dispi-
rited by the Check he had lately received, he
soon rallied his Men, and led them on again
to the Charge. When he came within a
certain distance, he ordered his Cavalry to
dismount ; and engaging the *Switzers* smartly
in that Posture, put them all to the rout, and
most of them to the Sword. Only three
thousand were left, who finding themselves
past remedy, threw down their Arms. It
will be proper to take notice on this Occasion,
that the Cavalry led by *Carmignola* were all
Men at Arms, and therefore compleatly pro-
vided both for Offence and Defence. Now such
a Body of Troops was well enough able to
deal with the *Switzers*, if they but once got
close up with them, and came to use their
Swords.

CHAP. Swords. For then the Enemy being without
III. defensive Arms, and deriving no assistance
from their Pikes, whose very length rendered
them unserviceable, were exposed to unavoid-
able slaughter. Considering therefore the
Advantages and Disadvantages on both sides,
it will appear, that they who have no defen-
sive Arms are without Remedy, if the Ene-
my charges but home, and passes their Pikes.
This cannot miss to happen in an Engage-
ment with resolute Troops: because Battles
always advancing, and the Parties on each
side pressing on perpetually, they must of ne-
cessity come so near at last, as to reach one
another with their Swords; and tho' some-
few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down
by the Pikes, yet those that are behind still
pressing on, are sufficient to carry the Victo-
ry.

X. FROM these Reasons it will be easy to
conceive, why *Carmignola* overcame with so
great a slaughter of the *Switzers*, and so little
of his own Army. Nor is this Example sin-
gular in its kind. We meet with many others
in History, all tending to demonstrate, that
an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers,
have great advantages over the Pike. When
Gonsalvo was besieged in *Barletta* by the
French, a detachment of *Spanish* Foot was sent
out of *Sicily*, and landed in the Kingdom of
Naples, with Orders to march to his Relief.
Monsieur *d'Aubigny* had notice of their Ap-
proach,

proach, and went to meet them with his Men, CHAP.
at Arms, and a Body of about four thousand
Switzers. These last press'd upon them with
their Pikes, and at first put them into some
disorder; but the *Spaniards*, by the help of
their Bucklers, and the agility of their Bodies,
having at length got under the Pikes of the
Switzers, and so near as that they could come at
them with their Swords, defeated them with
great slaughter, and very little loss on their
own side. Every one knows what terrible
havock was made of the *Switzers* at the Battle
of *Ravenna*, and all upon the same account,
the *Spanish* Foot having got to them with their
Swords: nay, it is certain they must have
been all cut to pieces, had they not been hap-
pily rescued by the *French* Horse: and yet
the *Spaniards*, drawing themselves into close
order, bravely sustained the Assaults of the
Cavalry, and retired without loss. It appears
therefore, that tho' the Pike be excellent
against Horse, it is yet insufficient in an En-
counter with Foot; whereas an Army judici-
ously armed for Offence and Defence, at the
same time that it can very well deal with Ca-
valry, is likewise an overmatch for a Body of
Pikes.

XI. AND hence it was that the *Macedo-*
nian Phalanx, which seems to have been just
such an order of Battle as the Battalions of
Switzerland, experienced likewise the same
Fate, when it came to encounter the warlike
and

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. and well-armed Troops of the *Romans*. Hi-
III. storians ascribe the defeat of it to several
Causes: the advantageous disposition of the
Roman Troops, who fought in separate Bo-
dies, yet so drawn up, that they could unite
and join upon occasion: the artful Conduct
of the Generals, in drawing it into rugged
and uneven Places, where it could not pre-
serve itself entire, but became disjointed and
broken: the opportunity this gave of charg-
ing it in the openings and void spaces, where-
by it was totally disunited, and being attacked
in front and rear, fell an easy Prey to its Ene-
mies. These things doubtless contributed in
part to the Overthrow of which we speak:
but the principal defect of the Phalanx lay in
its disadvantageous Armour and order of
Battle. In reality, the Pikes of the two first
Ranks only were serviceable in an Engage-
ment: those of the rest scarce availed any
thing. The Men of the third Rank could
not see what passed in the front, nor had any
command of their long Pikes, which were
intangled and locked up between the Files,
without a possibility of moving them to the
right or left. Hence the *Romans* found no
great difficulty in surmounting an Obstacle,
formidable indeed in appearance, but at bot-
tom very trifling. They had only to gain
upon the Pikes of the two first Ranks, that
they might join the Enemy, and fight hand
to hand. This they were enabled to do by
the help of their large Bucklers, with which
they

they bore up the Pikes of the *Macedonians*, and forcing their way under, reached them with their Swords. All resistance was then at an end. The Phalanx, unprovided for defence, and rather embarrassed than aided by their Pikes, could no longer stand the furious Charge of the *Romans*, who made dreadful havock with their pointed Swords. We find at the Battle of *Pydna*, where *Paulus Aemilius* gained so compleat a Victory over *Perseus*, that no less than twenty thousand *Macedonians* were slain, with the loss of only a hundred Men on the side of the *Romans*. This agrees so exactly with what we have above related of the *Switzers*, that it is impossible not to ascribe it to the same Cause, namely, the insufficiency of the Pike, when opposed to an Infantry armed with Swords and Bucklers.

XII. WE come now to speak of the military Discipline of the *Romans*, to which, no less than to their Arms, they were indebted for their many Victories and Conquests. If we compare this with other Nations, we do not find that they surpassed the *Gauls* in Number or Boldness, the *Germans* in Stature, the *Spaniards* in Strength of Body, the *Africans* in Stratagem, or the *Greeks* in Learning and the Arts of civil Life. Nay it is evident from History, that they were inferior in all these Respects. But as to what regards the use and exercise of Arms, the choice of Soldiers, and the training them up in all the Duties of War;

CHAP. here indeed lay their chief Excellence, and
III. by this they were enabled to baffle all the Ad-
vantages of their Enemies, whether derived
from Nature or Education. We have alre-
ady observed, that none were admitted into
the Legions 'till they had reached their seven-
teenth Year. But tho' this was the age for
entering the Service, it was not that when
they began to learn. For as War was the
darling Study of the *Romans*, they habituated
their Youth to it from their Infancy, and
carefully instructed them in all its Branches,
having set apart the Field of *Mars* for this
purpose, which was a kind of military School
within the City. We are not however to ima-
gine, that they looked upon this early Institu-
tion as sufficient, or were less affiduous in ex-
ercising their Men, after they were admitted
into the Service. They knew that constant
Practice alone makes Troops expert, and
brings them to the habit of applying their
Knowledge with readiness upon all occasions.
Hence not only among the young Soldiers,
but even among those of oldest standing in the
Army, the military Exercises were continued
without intermission. These Exercises had a
threefold Tendency : to inure the Men to
Labour, and render them robust and active :
to instruct them in the use of their Arms :
and lastly, to teach them the necessary Evo-
lutions, and how to preserve their Ranks and
Orders, in Marches, Battles, and Incamp-
ments.

XIII. As to the first, the *Romans* took great CHAP.
pains to form their Youth to be nimble in running, active to leap, strong to throw the Bar and to wrestle, which are all necessary Qualifications in a Soldier. For running and nimbleness fits them to get possession of a Place before the Enemy, to fall upon them on a sudden in their Quarters, and to pursue them with more execution in a Rout. Activity enables them with greater ease to avoid Blows, leap a Ditch, or climb a Bank. And Strength makes them carry their Arms better, strike better, and endure the Shock better. Swimming was likewise considered as an essential part of a military Education. Armies are not sure of Bridges wherever they come, nor are Boats always to be had; so that if Men cannot swim, they will necessarily be deprived of several Conveniences, and lose many fair Opportunitias of Action. One principal Reason why the *Romans* made choice of the *Campus Martius* to exercise their Youth in was, its nearness to the *Tiber*, into which they plunged after their Fatigues, to accustom themselves to Swimming, and cleanse away the Dust and Sweat. But of all their Exercises of this kind, none was pursued with greater attention, than the inuring the Troops to the military Pace; that is, to walk twenty miles, and sometimes four and twenty, in five Hours. This habituated the Soldiers to a certain stated and regular Progres in their Marches, taught them to keep close together, and prevented their

CHAP. their exposing themselves scattered and dispersed to the Enemy. They were obliged likewise on these Occasions, to carry Burdens of threescore Pound weight, which not only accustomed them to bear Fatigue; but was found serviceable in many other respects. For whether it might be necessary in an Expedition to take along with them several Days Provisions, or to carry a certain quantity of Water thro' a desert and sandy Country, or to provide a number of Stakes for the Execution of any particular Enterprize; against all these Exigencies they had prepared themselves by the Practice of which we speak: and hence great Dangers were many times avoided, and great Victories many times obtained.

XIV. THE second Particular we mentioned in the *Roman Exercises* was, the instructing the Men in the use of their Arms. Here also we meet with many Proofs of the Industry and Sagacity of that People. They set up a great Post about fix Foot high, suitable to the stature of a Man, and fastened it so strongly, that no Blows might be able to batter or shake it. This the Soldiers were wont to assail with all the Instruments of War, as if it had been indeed a real Enemy. Sometimes they would aim their Blows at the Head, sometimes strike it on the Face, then on the Sides, Legs, before and behind, now retreating, and then advancing again; during all which

which they were taught to proceed with so C H A P.
much Caution, that in directing their We- ^{III.}
pon against their Adversary, they should not
mean-while lay themseves open to Wounds.
By this Contrivance they learnt how to place
their Blows aright, and became dexterous
and nimble, both at defending themselves,
and offending their Enemies. They were in-
structed rather to thrust than to cut with their
Swords : because Thrusts are more mortal,
harder to be defended, and he that makes
them is not so easily discovered, and is readier
to double his Thrust than his Blow. We
must not here forget, that in these Exercises
they made use of Helmets, Shields, and
Swords, double the weight of common Wea-
pons. This made them ready and alert in
Battle, which they found so far from being
attended with any unforeseen Incumbrances,
that it was rather an ease from the fatigue of
ordinary Duty. Nor let any one wonder,
that the *Romans* were so extremely attentive
to these little things, since according to the
manner of fighting then used, in which the
Troops encountered hand to hand, every
small Advantage was of great Importance.
They were besides sensible, that Experience
in this kind makes Men bold and courage-
ous ; for no one fears to do that which he
thinks he understands. A Soldier who had
often made trial of himself in these imaginary
Combats, grew impatient to come to action
in good earnest, that he might the better

CHAP. judge of his own Proficiency, and have an
III. opportunity of putting that in practice, which
he had so well learnt in Theory. Hence
Battles were not what they dreaded, but what
they desired: and Generals often found it
more difficult to restrain their Men from
fighting, and check the Ardor of their Cou-
rage, where Prudence obliged them to decline
the Onset; than to prevail upon them to face
the Enemy, when they judged it necessary
to come to an Engagement.

XV. BUT it is not sufficient to inure Men
to Labour, to make them strong, swift, and
expert at the use of their Weapons: they
must learn likewise to keep their Ranks well,
to obey Orders, and follow the Directions
and Signals of their Commanders. This was
the third Branch of the *Roman Exercises*,
about which they were no less solicitous, than
about the other two. I shall not here enter
into a minute Detail of the common Evolu-
tions, the opening and closing of the Files,
doubling their Ranks, turning to the right
and left, Marchings, Wheelings, &c. because
they differed but a little from the Practice of
the present Age. Their manner of forming
too in order of Battle, their Conduct in an
Attack or Repulse, with the general dispo-
sition of their Marches, will come in more
properly under other Heads of this Discourse.
Let it suffice for the present to observe, that
they exercised their Men without intermission

in all these different Branches of the Service, C H A P. and by the force of constant Habit, brought III. them to that degree of Expertness, that they could practise without Hurry and Confusion in the heat of Fight, what they had been so thoroughly trained to in the Field. Above all it was their particular Care, to accustom the Troops to rally and recover their Order readily when broken. To this end, besides distinguishing the several Companies by peculiar Ensigns, every Man had his fixed and invariable Post in the Battalion, and was taught by long Practice, to know in a manner habitually, the number of his File, his Place in that File, his right and left-hand Man where he belonged to the front Rank, and both these and his File-Leader where he belonged to the other Ranks. Nay so very curious were the *Romans* in this Point, that to imprint these things the deeper upon the Minds of the Soldiers, they caused them to be engraven in great Characters upon their Helmets and Bucklers.

XVI. NOR were they less careful in training up the Cavalry, whom they taught particularly to ride well, and sit fast when they came to a Charge. To this end they had Horses of Wood upon which they were exercised, vaulting upon them, sometimes with their Arms, and sometimes without, very neatly and exactly, without any assistance; so that upon a Signal from their Captain they were

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c A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. immediately on horse-back, and upon another
III. Signal as soon upon the Ground. As they
fought in Squadrons, like the Cavalry of our
time, their Evolutions were much the same
with those in use at present, allowing only the
difference of Armour ; and among the Horse,
as well as the Foot, were carried on without
intermission. Indeed there is nothing more
admirable in the whole *Roman* Discipline,
than the continual Exercise to which the
Troops were kept, either within or without
the Camp ; insomuch that they were never
idle, and had scarce any respite from Duty.
The new raised Soldiers performed their Ex-
ercises regularly twice a Day, and the old
ones once : for it was not, in the Opinion of
this People, length of Service that constituted
warlike and veteran Troops, but the uninter-
rupted Habit and Practice of Arms ; nor did
they consider an unexercised Soldier, after what
number of Campaigns you will, as any other
than a Novice in the Profession. Accordingly
they were constant and indefatigable in training
their Men to all the different Operations of
the Field. They obliged them to make hasty
Marches of a considerable length, laden with
their Arms and several Palisades, and that
often in steep and craggy Countries. They
habituated them always to keep their Ranks,
even in the midst of Disorder and Confusion,
and never to lose sight of their Standards.
They made them charge each other in mock
Battles, of which the Officers, Generals, and
even

THE R O M A N ART OF WAR.

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even the Consul himself were Witnesses, and in C H A P. III.
which they thought it for their Glory to ~~share~~
share in person. When they had no Enemy
in the Field, the Troops were employed in
considerable Works, as well to keep them in
Exercise, as for the publick Utility. Such in
particular were the Highways, called for that
reason *Viae militares*, which still subsist, and
are the fruits of that wise and salutary Custom.

XVII. How much the *Romans* relied upon
this manner of training and employing their
Troops, appears evidently from the Conduct
of their Senate and Generals, during a course
of several Ages. For in all their Difficulties
and Straits, this was that to which they had im-
mediate recourse, as their surest Refuge, and
the only means by which they could hope to
extricate themselves. Did they think them-
selves exposed to any Danger, or were they
desirous to repair some Loss? It was a constant
Practice among them, to invigorate and give
new Life to their military Discipline. Are
they engaged in a War with the *Latines*, a
People no less martial than themselves? *Manlius* reflects upon the best Method of
strengthening the Command in the Field, and
puts to death his own Son, for conquering
without his Orders. Are they defeated before
Numantia? *Scipio Aemilianus* immediately re-
moves the several Blandishments which had
enervated them. Have the *Roman Legions*
passed under the Yoke in *Numidia*? *Metellus*

CHAP. wipes away the Ignominy, the Instant he has. III. obliged them to resume their ancient Institutions. *Marius*, that he may be enabled to vanquish the *Cimbri* and the *Teutones*, begins by diverting the course of Rivers: and *Sylla* employs in such hard Labour his Soldiers, who were terrified at the War which was carrying on against *Mithridates*, that they sue for Battle, to put an end to their Hardships. *Publius Nasica* made the *Romans* build a Fleet of Ships at a time when they had no occasion for such a Force. In a word, Industry, Diligence, and a Perseverance in all kind of military Toils, was the very Characteristick of this People: they dreaded Idleness more than an Enemy.

XVIII. THESE Men thus inured were generally healthy and vigorous. We do not find by Historians, that the *Roman Armies*, which waged War in so great a variety of Climates, fell often a prey to Diseases; whereas in the present Age, we daily see Armies, without once engaging, perish and melt away, if I may use the Expression, in a single Campaign: Nor can I forbear taking notice, that the Dexterity and Address the Soldiers attained, by means of their continual Exercises, served not only to render them skilful and active in the Duties of the Field, but inspired them likewise with Boldness and Intrepidity. In the Battles fought in our Age, every single Soldier has very little Security and Confidence, except

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

cii

III.

except in the Multitude : but among the *Romans*, every Individual, more robust and of greater Experience in War, as well as more inured to the Fatigues of it than his Enemy, relied upon himself only. He was naturally endued with Courage, or in other Words, with that Virtue which a sensibility of our own Strength inspires. To the same admirable Discipline too were they indebted, for a certain Haughtiness and Opinion of Superiority, which made them rank themselves above the Troops of all other Nations, and despise the service of any foreign Prince or State, compared with that of their own Country. Diversions are very common among us for this Reason, because the Soldiers are the dregs of every Nation, and not one of them possesses, or thinks himself possessed of a certain Advantage, which renders his Condition preferable to that of his Adversaries. But among the *Romans* they were less frequent; it being scarce possible that Soldiers, raised from among a People naturally so imperious and aspiring, and so sure of commanding over others, should demean themselves to such a degree as to cease to be *Romans*. We may likewise observe, as a necessary Consequence of their being so carefully trained, that 'twas next to impossible in a Battle, how unfortunate soever, but some Troops must rally in one Part or other of it, or the Enemy be defeated in some quarter of the Field ; either of which was often sufficient to secure the Victory. And indeed we

find

CHAP. find every where in History, that whenever
III. the Romans happened to be overpowered in
the beginning, whether by numbers or the
fierceness of the Onset, they seldom failed at
last to wrest the Victory out of the Enemy's
hands.

XIX. THERE are still many other Particulars that might be mentioned to the advantage of the *Roman* Discipline: their strict Regulations with regard to all the different Branches of the Service: their admirable Policy in making Motives of Honour and Shame operate strongly upon the Troops: their steady adherence to the received Maxims of War, so as never on any occasion to abate of the rigor of military Severity, where the Soldiers were found to have neglected their Duty, abandoned their Post, thrown away their Arms, or surrendered themselves to the Enemy. History abounds with Examples of his kind. As their Armies were for the most part but small, the Commander had a better Opportunity of knowing the several Individuals, and could more easily perceive the various Faults and Misdemeanors committed by the Soldiery, against which care was taken to provide immediately. Nor were they so tenacious of their own Customs, as not to pay a due attention to those of other Nations, which they adopted without hesitation, wherever they appeared attended with any real Benefit. In their War with *Pyrrhus*, they improved

improved themselves in the knowledge of CHAP.
Ports and Incampments: in that with *Hannibal* they learnt the true use of Cavalry, and how to apply Address and Stratagem in the conduct of a Campaign. If any Nation boasted, either from Nature or its Institution, any peculiar Advantage, the *Romans* immediately made use of it. They employed their utmost Endeavours to procure Horses from *Numidia*, Bowmen from *Crete*, Slingers from the *Balearean Isles*, and Ships from the *Rhodians*: so that it may with justice be said of them, that no Nation in the World ever prepared for War with so much Wisdom, and carried it on with so much Intrepidity.

XX. THUS have we endeavoured to give some account of the Arms and Discipline of the *Romans*, and to point out their excellency over those of other Nations. How much they were indebted to them for their Grandeur and Successes, appears evidently from this: that so long as their Armies adhered strictly to these primitive Institutions, they were invincible; but in proportion as they deviated from them, became like other Men. When they began to look upon their Armour as too weighty and cumbersome, and their Discipline as attended with too many Restraints, and of course to relax in these two important Articles, they gradually sunk to a level with the Troops of their Enemies, and at last so totally degenerated, that we find not

in

CHAP. in their Behaviour the least traces of their original Bravery. I know it is a Maxim of long standing, that *Money is the Sinews of War.* How far this may suit the Constitution of the present Age, I will not pretend to say; but it seems by no means to agree with Antiquity. I am sure the whole current of History is against it. Had this been the case, *Cyrus* could never have prevailed against *Crœsus*, nor the *Greeks* against the *Perians*, nor the *Romans* against the *Carthaginians*. It is true Money is requisite for the carrying on of a War, but not principally and in the first place. Good Soldiers and good Discipline are of infinitely greater avail. Where these are, it will be easy to find Money; but Money is not always sufficient to procure them. Had not the *Romans* done more in their Wars with their Iron than their Gold, the Treasures of the whole World would not have been sufficient for them; considering their great Enterprizes abroad, and their no less Difficulties at home. But having good and well disciplined Troops, they were never in want of Money; for those who were afraid of their Armies, strove with Emulation to supply them. Nay it is remarkable, that their most celebrated Victories, and those which required the greatest exertion of Strength, were gained during the period of their Poverty. It was then that they subdued the *Samnites*, forced *Pyrrhus* to quit *Italy*, and cut in pieces the mighty Armies of the *Carthaginians*.

thaginians. After they became possessed of the Treasures of the Universe, they had for the most part only weak and effeminate Nations to deal with, and were so far from increasing in real Power, that by the concurrent Testimony of all Historians, they are to be considered from that time as upon the decline. *Livy*, in that famous Question relating to the *Greeks* and *Romans*, where he endeavours to determine what would have been the Event, had *Alexander the Great* turned his Arms against *Italy*, observes that in War there are three things fundamentally necessary; good Soldiers, good Officers, and good Fortune; and then arguing whether *Alexander* or the *Romans* were more considerable in these three Points, concludes without the least mention of Money. It is well known that the *Spartans*, so long as they adhered to their primitive Institutions and Poverty, were the most powerful People of all *Greece*, and never proved unsuccessful in their Wars, till they became possessed of great Riches and Revenues. I conclude therefore, that it was by the Bravery of their Troops, the Advantage of their Arms, and the Excellence of their Discipline, that the *Romans* rendered themselves victorious over all Nations: and accordingly we find, that when they ceased to have the superiority in these, the Revenues of the whole World were not sufficient to defend them.

C H A P. IV.

*Of the Spirit and Bravery of the
Roman Troops.*

I. **A**LTHO' military Discipline, and the continual Exercise of Arms, naturally conduce to make a People bold, daring, and intrepid; yet there is something so peculiar in the Spirit and Character of the *Romans*, that I flatter myself it will not be unacceptable to the Reader, to offer a few Reflections on this Subject, and give him some insight in to those Institutions and Maxims of Conduct, which chiefly contributed to exalt their Courage, and animate their Bravery. Two things here naturally present themselves to our consideration. First, the admirable Principles upon which the Commonwealth was founded. Secondly, the Succession of great Men that for several Ages prevailed in it, and who supported, invigorated, and from time to time gave new Life to these Principles. Among the Principles of the *Roman Polity*, none seems to have taken deeper root, than the fear of the Gods, and a veneration for Religion. This perhaps, at first sight, may not be thought so immediately to

to concern a martial People : but if we examine the effect of it upon their Armies, and the many valuable Purposes it was made to serve in War, we shall have reason to conclude, that of all their Institutions, not one contributed more to the Grandeur of the State. For hence in particular it was, that the military Oath was held so sacred among the Troops, and became an inviolable bond of Fidelity and Subjection. The Soldiers, however displeased and enraged, did not dare to quit their Generals, so long as this Tie was supposed to remain in force ; nay so very tender and scrupulous were they, that even in their greatest Impatience to be discharged, they would yet never admit of any Interpretation, that carried in it the least strain or appearance of Deceit. We have a remarkable Example of this, in their Behavior to *Quinctius Cincinnatus*, after the defeat of *Appius Herdonius*. That *Sabine* had seized the Capitol with four thousand Men. The Danger was imminent, and required speedy redress : but the Tribunes, who were then pushing the *Teren-tian Law* ; in order to force the Senate to a compliance, opposed the Levies. The People however, partly by Promises, partly by remonstrating the danger of the City, were at length prevailed upon to take an Oath of Fidelity to the Consuls ; and marching against *Herdonius*, soon recovered possession of the Capitol. *Publius Valerius*, to whom the charge of the Attack fell, chancing to be slain, *Quinctius Cincinnatus*

C H A P.
IV.

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. *cinnatus* was immediately chosen in his room ;
IV. who to keep the Troops employed, and leave
them no room to think of their Law *Terentilla*,
ordered them out upon an Expedition against
the *Volsci*, alledging, that the Oath they had
taken to the late Consul obliged them to follow
him. The Tribunes, to evade the Engage-
ment, pretended that the Oath bound them
only to the person of *Valerius*, and so was
buried with him in his Tomb. But the
People, more sincere and plain-hearted, could
not resolve to shelter themselves under so
frivolous a Distinction, and therefore pre-
pared every Man to take Arms, tho' very
unwillingly. *Nondum* (says *Livy*) *hac*, quæ
nunc tenet seculum, *negligentia Deum venerat*,
nec interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum, &
leges aptas faciebat. “ That neglect of the
“ Gods, which so much dishonours the pre-
“ sent Age, was not known in those Days,
“ nor had Men learnt the pernicious Art
“ of interpreting the Laws of Religion ac-
“ cording to their own Purposes.”

II. I could produce many Instances of the
like nature, all tending to shew, how ser-
viceable Religion was, to the governing of
Armies, the uniting of the People, and the
keeping them in due subjection to their Of-
ficers and Magistrates : insomuch that should
it fall into dispute, whether *Rome* was more
indebted to *Romulus* or *Numa*, I am clearly
of Opinion that *Numa* would have the pre-
ference.

ference. For where Religion is once fixed, military Discipline may be easily introduced; but where Religion is wanting, Discipline is not brought in without great difficulty; and never can be carried to perfection. If we enquire into the nature of the Religion professed by the *Romans*, we find that it ran much upon the Answers of Oracles, Divinations, Soothsaying, Sacrifices, and innumerable other Ceremonies, that argue more of Superstition, than any just knowledge of the Deity. But absurd as this Religion may appear, it had nevertheless a wonderful Influence upon the Minds of Men, and was often made use of with success, to inspire Courage in Battles and Dangers. It is well known that all their military Expeditions were preceded by the Auguries and Auspices; and according to the Omens that offered on these Occasions, did the People judge of the issue. Hence their wisest and best Generals, by a strict Regard to these Observances, and accommodating the Ceremonies of Religion to their own Designs, generally found means to give a favourable turn to the Omens; which greatly contributed to exalt the Courage of their Troops, and made them face the Enemy with Confidence. On the contrary, it is observed, that where the usual Forms were neglected, and Generals affected to act in Contempt of the Auspices, they seldom succeeded in their Designs. This may well enough be accounted for, without allowing any real Influence to these Ceremonies;

or

CHAP. or supposing that the flight and chirping of
IV. Birds could in the least affect future Events.
Nothing in truth can be more trifling, than
the pretended Presages of which we speak : but
as they were firmly believed by the bulk of the
Army ; where at any time they appeared un-
favourable, it could not fail of casting a great
damp upon the Spirits of the Soldiers. And
yet this does not seem to me to have been the
principal cause of those Miscarriages, that
were usually observed to follow a neglect of
the Auspices. The Ignorance and Incapacity
of the Generals will much better account for
them ; nor need we a stronger Proof of
this Incapacity, than the Contempt with
which they affected to treat Religion. War
is necessarily attended with so much Un-
certainty, and requires such a multitude of
different Attentions, that a prudent General
will be far from neglecting any Advantages,
which he sees may be drawn from the es-
tablished Prejudices of those under his command ;
much less will he turn these very Prejudices
to his own hurt, by an ill-judged Contempt :
and the General who is so indiscreet as to
act in this manner, plainly discovers himself
unfit for the conduct of any great Enterprize.
I know it is asserted by some, that Religion
checks the natural Fierceness and Obstinacy of
Men, and renders them poor-spirited and
abject : but whoever talks in this manner,
shews himself little conversant in the History
of Mankind. Consider the *Romans* in the best
times

times of the Republick, the *English* under C H A P.
Queen *Elizabeth* and *Oliver Cromwell*, the IV.
French in the Age of *Henry* the fourth, the
United Provinces in that of *Philip* the second,
and the *Suedes* under *Gustavus Vasa*, and then
tell me, whether the most flourishing and
formidable periods of Nations, be not those
when a Spirit of Religion has strongly taken
possession of the Minds of the People.

III. NEXT to a veneration for Religion,
love of their Country was the prevailing
Characteristick of the *Romans*. This Virtue
naturally rouses Men to great Designs, and
begets Vigour and Perseverance in the exe-
cution of them; and as it had taken a deeper
root among the People of whom we speak,
than in any other Nation mentioned in Histo-
ry, no wonder we here meet with so many
Instances of Magnanimity, publick Spirit,
Fortitude, and all the Virtues that tend to
form a race of Heroes. It is certain that the
Constitution of the *Roman* Commonwealth
was peculiarly fitted to nourish this Spirit.
The People had many Ties and Obligations to
the State, many endearing Connections to in-
spire the love of it. They chose the Senators
by whose Counsels the Republick was govern-
ed, the Magistrates by whom Justice was ad-
ministered, and the Generals who conducted
and terminated their Wars; so that the pub-
lick Successes were in a manner their own
Work. Hence the Principle of which we

CHAP. speak became so strong in them, that they
IV. were ready to sacrifice every other Consideration to it, whether of Interest or Ambition. No Hazards, no Sufferings appeared great, where their Country stood in need of their Assistance. We find even in the Disputes between the different Orders of the State, where the Passions of Men are wont most strongly to be engaged, and where particular Animosities are but too apt to get the better of Reason, that the Consideration of the publick Safety was always sufficient to calm their Resentments, and bring them to Temper and Moderation. How violent soever the Contest might be, however much the Parties appeared exasperated against one another, they were yet sure to unite, when any Danger from without threatened the Commonwealth. This is evident thro' the whole course of the *Roman History*, and requires not to be illustrated by particular Examples. I shall therefore only add, that a Principle so powerful and universally diffused, as it could not fail of having many desirable Effects upon the People, so did it in a particular manner tend to render them brave and resolute: for Courage being of indispensable necessity to the defence of our Country, wherever the love of that predominates, there we are sure to find the other likewise.

IV. BUT if the *Romans* are remarkable for the love they bore their Country, they are

no

no less so when we consider how passionately C H A P.
fond they were of Liberty. This Spirit sub- IV.
sisted from the very foundation of the State.
Tho' *Rome* was at first governed by Kings,
these Kings were far from being absolute :
for besides the Authority enjoyed by the
Senate, the People too had a considerable
share in the Administration ; since to their
Assemblies were committed the creation of
Magistrates, the enacting of Laws, and the
resolving upon Peace or War. Indeed under
Tarquin the Proud, the Government dege-
nerated into a real Tyranny : but this, instead
of extinguishing, served only to rouse the
love of Liberty ; and the Behaviour of *Brutus*,
who put his own Sons to death, for attempt-
ing to restore the royal Authority, made so
strong an Impression upon the Minds of the
People, that they henceforward considered
Slavery as the greatest of Evils, and bent all
their Thoughts to the preserving and enlarg-
ing the Freedom they had acquired. I need
not here say, how much Liberty tends to
ennoble the Mind, and how necessary it is to
the Prosperity and Greatness of a State. It is
well known that *Athens*, so long as it con-
tinued under the Tyranny of *Pisistratus* and
his Descendents, made scarce any figure in
Greece ; and whereas soon after their Expulsion,
it rose to so astonishing a pitch of Grandeur,
as not only to baffle all the Efforts of the
Perians, but even to render itself formidable
to that mighty Empire. And if we look

CHAP. into the History of the *Roman* Common-
IV. wealth, we find, that in proportion as Liberty
increased, and the People got from under the
dominion of the Nobles, they became inspired
with a more elevated Courage, a more un-
wearied Fortitude, and pushed their Conquests
with greater rapidity. Nay in the very in-
fancy of their Freedom, when *Tarquin* was
endeavouring to recover his lost Authority,
they gave manifest indications of that Spirit,
for which they are so justly admired by suc-
ceeding Ages. It is upon this Occasion
that we read of the astonishing Valour of
Horatius Cocles, the intrepid Firmness of
Scævola, and the masculine Boldness of *Clelia* ;
insomuch that *Porsenna* King of the *Clusians*,
who had undertaken the reinstating of *Tarquin*,
admiring their Bravery, would not any longer
disturb them in the enjoyment of a Liberty,
to which their Merit gave them so just a title,
and which he found them so resolutely bent
to defend.

V. AND here I cannot but observe, that
this passionate desire of Freedom gave rise to
a peculiar Circumstance in the *Roman* Con-
stitution, which tho' seemingly inconsistent
with the Prosperity of the State, was yet in
reality one of the principal causes of its Gran-
deur, as it more than any thing contributed
to exalt the Character of the People, and pro-
duce among them the most finished Models
in every Species of Merit. What I mean is,
those

those continual Dissentions between the Nobles C H A P .
and Commons, of which we meet with so IV.
frequent mention in the early Ages of the
Commonwealth. Two Bodies at *Rome* divided
the whole Authority: the Senate and the
People. A mutual Jealousy, founded on the
one side upon a desire of governing, on the
other upon that of keeping themselves free
and independent, raised between them Con-
tentions and Quarrels, which ended not but
with the Republick itself. These Contests,
tho' attended with many Inconveniences, pro-
cured notwithstanding a considerable Advan-
tage to the State, in forming a number of Per-
sons of distinguished Merit, and perpetuating
a succession of them in the Commonwealth.
The Patricians, who were obstinately bent
to keep to themselves alone the Commands, the
Honours, the Magistracies; as they could not
obtain them but by the Suffrages of the Plebe-
ians, were obliged to use their utmost Endeav-
ours to prove themselves worthy by superior
Qualities, by real and repeated Services, by
illustrious Actions, of which their Adversaries
themselves were Witnesses, and to which they
could not refuse their Esteem and Applause.
This necessity of depending on the Judgment
of the People for admission to Posts, obliged
the young Patricians to acquire all the Merit
capable of gaining the Suffrages of Judges,
who examined them rigorously, and were
not inclined to have a remiss Indulgence for
the Candidates, as well out of love to the

CHAP. Honour and Welfare of the State, as out of
IV. an hereditary Jealousy of the Patrician Order. The Plebeians on their side, in aspiring to the highest Dignities of the State, were forced to prepare themselves so as to convince their Brethren, that they had all the Qualities necessary to fill them with Honour. Proofs were to be given of a distinguished Valour, of a wise and prudent Conduct, of a Capacity to discharge all the Functions of Government, and to pass with Reputation thro' the several Offices, which led by degrees to the highest. It was needful to have not only the military Virtues, and Ability to conduct an Army; but the Talent of haranguing the Senate and People, of reporting the great Affairs of State, of answering foreign Ambassadors, and entering with them into the nicest and most important Negotiations. By all these Obligations, imposed by Ambition on the Plebeians, to qualify them for the Posts to which they aspired, they were under necessity of making proof of an accomplished Merit, at least equal to that of the Patricians.

VI. THESE were some of the Advantages arising from the sharp Contests between the Senate and People, from whence resulted a lively Emulation between the two Orders, and a happy Necessity of displaying Talents, which perhaps by a continual Concord and Peace would have lain dormant and fruitless: just as, if I may use the Comparison, from a Steel

Steel struck with a Flint, Sparks of Fire fly out, which without that Violence would remain for ever concealed. This is not all. It was by means of these Contests that the publick Liberty was improved and settled, without which the Commonwealth would never have become great and flourishing. By the Revolution which expelled *Tarquin the Proud*, the Commons of *Rome* were delivered from a Tyrant, but not from Tyranny. The Patri-cians still held them under subjection: and tho' while their Fears of *Tarquin's* return were alive and strong, they behaved with great Lenity and Moderation, yet no sooner were they informed of that Prince's death, than the weight of Oppression was renewed, and fell as heavy upon the People as ever. The *Valerian Law*, to permit Appeals from the Sentence of the Magistrates to the People assembled, was not sufficient to protect the Plebeians from Injustice and Cruelty. They found it necessary to have Magistrates of their own Body, to screen them from the Tyranny of the Great, and therefore extorted from the Senate a consent to the establishment of the Tribunitian power. The institution of the *Comitia Tributa*, and the practice of bringing into Judgment, before those Assemblies, the most exalted of the Nobles, upon Accusations of Treason against the People, was another Bulwark against the overflowings of Ambition. The publication of the Laws of the twelve Tables, gave some Check to the abuse

CHAP. IV. abuse of that Prerogative, which the Patricians tenaciously kept, of being the sole Judges in civil Causes : and on many other Occasions we find, that the Commons, urged by Oppression to Fury, exerted their natural Strength in such manner as proclaimed them sovereign Masters of the Administration, and gradually extended their Privileges.

VII. BUT the Commonwealth of *Rome* was never truly a free State, 'till after the publication of the *Licinian Laws*, those Laws which, in their Consequences, made Merit alone the ordinary Scale whereby to ascend to the highest Offices ; and which, by admitting the Plebeians to a reasonable share of what was purchased with their Blood, delivered them from that servile subjection to the wealthy Nobles, in which their Indigence had so long detained them. From this Period, the *Roman People*, when they made Laws, or elected Magistrates for the execution of them, were generally speaking free from all undue Influence ; not overawed, as before, by the Rich and the Great, nor constrained by any Force, but that of Reason and natural Justice, in the most absolute subjection to which is the most perfect Freedom. No Citizen, who had shewed superior Talents, and Virtue, stood excluded, on account of the low degree of his Birth, from the Dignities of the State : and hence proceeded an Emulation among the Individuals to surpass each other in deserving

Honours

Honours. Indeed the haughty Patricians, as, when vanquished by the Plebeians, they had given ground with an angry Reluctance, and retired fighting, so they afterwards, from time to time, shewed a strong Disposition to renew the War, in order to regain their unrighteous Sovereignty: but their Efforts were faint and ineffectual: and at length acquiescing in what they could not undo, there ensued domestic Peace and Union, and an established Liberty. Union at home gave new strength to the State; and Liberty seems to have inspired the People with a nobler Spirit, a more exalted Courage, and a greater Ardor to enlarge the Bounds of their Empire. For whereas before, during the space of four hundred Years, they had not pushed their Conquests beyond a few Leagues round the City; we find that from this period, in the course of seventy Years, they by a series of Victories made themselves masters of all *Italy*. And tho' destitute of naval Strength and naval Skill, their next Enterprise was against a rival Republick beyond the Continent; a Republick that with greater Riches, and more ample Territories than theirs, had possession of the absolute Dominion of the Sea. The Boldness of the Undertaking, and the amazing Constancy with which they supported it, in spite of the most terrible Adversities, are not to be paralleled in the History of any other Nation: but the *Roman* Legions were, at that time, Legions of free Citizens, whose predominant Passion was

Glory,

CHAP. Glory, and who placed the highest Glory in
IV. facing every Danger, and surmounting every
Difficulty, to preserve their Liberty, and extend
their Empire.

VIII. THE love of Glory is indeed a natural Consequence of Liberty, and if to this we join that remarkable disregard of Wealth, which prevailed for so many Ages among this People, we shall have reason to conclude, that these likewise contributed not a little, towards forming in them that firm and intrepid Bravery, which makes & distinguishing part of their Character. For the love of Glory pushes Men on to great Actions, and a disregard of Wealth prevents their being biased by meati fardid Views, or shaken by the low Considerations of Self-Interest. It is certain that Glory was the main Spring of all those noble and illustrious Undertakings, which have rendered the *Romans* so famous. By this Motive, the Republick, after Liberty prevailed, made an incredible progress in a short time. The frequent Examples of Patriotism, and of an inviolable attachment to the publick Good, of which *Rome* was witness in those critical times, and which she rewarded in so eminent a manner, kindled not only in the Patricians, but likewise among the Plebeians, that noble Fire of Emulation and Glory, which dares all things, and influenced all along the whole Nation. Greedy of Praise, they reckoned Money as nothing, and valued it only

to

to disperse it. They were content with moderate Fortunes, says *Sallust*, but desired Glory without measure. Accordingly we find, that for four hundred Years after the building of *Rome*, the City was in very great Poverty : and of this the probable Cause seems to be, that Poverty was no impediment to Preferment. Virtue was the only thing required in the election of Magistrates, and the distribution of Offices ; and wherever it was found, let the Person, or Family be ever so poor, he was sure to be advanced. *Quinctius Cincinnatus* was taken from the Plough, and raised to the Office of Dictator, tho' his Estate did not exceed four Acres of Land. *Fabricius* and *Attilius Regulus* are likewise Examples of this kind ; and indeed the *Roman History* every where abounds with them.

IX. THE Thirst of Glory usually produces that of Dominion. It appears noble to be Masters, to command others, to compose Laws, to be feared and obeyed. This Passion, natural to Mankind, was more strong and active in the *Romans*, than in any other People. One would think, at seeing the air of Authority that they very early assume, that they already believed themselves destined to become one day Lords of the Universe. Nay it appears from many Indications in their History, that this Notion subsisted from the Foundation of the State. The Answers and Interpretations of the Augurs frequently glanced this way.

A

CHAP. A Head was found in digging for the Foundations of the Capitol. This was given out to imply the eternity of their Empire, and that the City to which that Temple belonged, was to become the head of the Universe. We see likewise in the Speech of *Coriolanus* to the Deputies of the Senate, upon occasion of his investing *Rome* with an Army of *Volscians*, that the Conceit of universal Dominion not only strongly prevailed in his time, but was carefully cherished among the People. Nor was it without reason that the Senate contrived to raise and propagate this Persuasion, as it tended wonderfully to exalt the Courage of the Citizens, and not only animated them in the pursuit of Conquest, but kept them firm and steady under the severest Strokes of Adversity. Thus at the same time that Poverty and a disregard of Wealth rendered them modest, the love of Glory and Dominion inspired them with Magnanimity. When put into Command, and placed at the head of Armies, Kings appeared but little before them ; nor was any Danger, Difficulty, or Opposition able to dismay them : but when their Commissions expired, and they returned to a private Station ; none so frugal, none so humble, none so laborious, so obedient to the Magistrates, or respectful to their Superiors as they ; insomuch that one would think it impossible the same Minds should be capable of such strange Alterations.

X. FROM these distinguishing Characte-CHAP.
ristics of the *Roman* People, it will be easy IV.

to perceive, how Courage and a sense of Honour came to be so prevalent in their Armies. And here I cannot but observe, that the military Rewards were wonderfully calculated to promote this Spirit; since without being considerable for their intrinsick Value, they were yet extremely coveted by the Troops, because Glory, so precious to that warlike People, was annexed to them. A very small Crown of Gold, and generally a Crown of Laurel or Oak-Leaves, became inestimable to the Soldiers, who knew not any Marks more excellent than those of Virtue, nor any Distinction more noble, than that which flows from glorious Actions. These Monuments of Renown were to them real Patents of Nobility, and descended to their Posterity as a precious Inheritance. They were besides sure Titles to rise to Places of Honour and Advantage, which were granted only to Merit, and not procured by Intrigue and Cabal. We have already had occasion to take notice of the large Field there lay for promotion in the *Roman* Armies, and that such as distinguished themselves by their Valour had reason to hope for every thing. What an agreeable prospect for an inferior Officer, to behold at a distance the chief Dignities of the State and Army, as so many Rewards to which he could aspire.

CHAP. XI. AND indeed if any thing be capable
IV. of inspiring Men with Bravery and a martial
Ardor; to pass thro' a succession of different
Honours, and to be entitled to a number of
military Rewards, which were all considered
as so many standing Monuments of Renown,
seems to bid fairest for it. I cannot better
represent the Effect this had upon the Troops,
than by the following Relation, from which
the Reader may form some Idea of what a
Roman Soldier was. When the War against
Perseus, the last King of *Macedonia*, was re-
solved upon at *Rome*; amongst the other Mea-
sures taken for the success of it, the Senate
decreed, that the Consul charged with that
Expedition, should raise as many Centurions
and veteran Soldiers as he pleased, out of
those who did not exceed fifty Years of Age.
Twenty-three Centurions, who had been *Pri-
mipili*, refused to take Arms, unless the same
Rank was granted them, which they had in
preceding Campaigns. As it was impossible
to gratify them all, and they persisted obsti-
nately in their refusal, the Affair was brought
before the People. After *Pepilius*, who had
been Consul two Years before, had pleaded
the Cause of the Centurions, and the Consul
his own, one of the Centurions, who had
appealed to the People, having obtained per-
mission to speak, expressed himself to this
effect.

XII. " I am called *Spurius Ligustinus*, of
" the *Crustumine* Tribe, descended from the
" *Sabines*.

“ *Sabines.* My Father left me a small Field C H A P.
“ and Cottage, where I was born, brought IV.
“ up, and now live. As soon as I was at age
“ to marry, he gave me his Brother’s Daugh-
“ ter to Wife. She brought me no Portion,
“ but Liberty, Chastity, and a Fruitfulness
“ sufficient for the richest Houses. We
“ have six Sons, and two Daughters, both
“ married. Of my Sons four have taken the
“ Robe of Manhood, the other two are still
“ Infants. I began to bear Arms in the Con-
“ fulship of *P. Sulpicius* and *C. Aurelius*, and
“ served two Years as a private Soldier in the
“ Army sent into *Macedonia* against King
“ *Philip*. The third Year *T. Quintius Flam-
“ minus*, to reward me for my Services, made
“ me Captain of a Century in the
“ tenth Maniple of the *Hastati*. I served
“ afterwards as a Volunteer in *Spain* under
“ *Cato*; and that General, who is so excel-
“ lent a Judge of Merit, made me first Cen-
“ turion of the first Maniple of the *Hastati*.
“ In the War against the *Aetolians* and King
“ *Antiochus*, I rose to the same Rank amongst
“ the *Principes*. I afterwards made several
“ Campaigns, and in a very few Years have
“ been four times *Primipilus*: I have been
“ four and thirty times rewarded by the Ge-
“ nerals, have received six Civic Crowns,
“ have served two and twenty Campaigns,
“ and am above fifty Years old. Tho’ I had
“ not completed the number of Years re-
“ quired by the Law, and my Age did not
“ discharge

CHAP. IV. discharge me, substituting four of my Children in my place, I should deserve to be exempt from the necessity of serving. But by all I have said, I only intend to shew the justice of my Cause. For the rest, as long as those who levy the Troops shall judge me capable of bearing Arms, I shall not refuse the Service. The Tribunes may rank me as they please, that is their Busines: mine is to act, that none be ranked above me for Valour; as all the Generals under whom I have had the honour to serve, and all my Comrades can witness for me, I have hitherto never failed to do. For you, Centurions, notwithstanding your Appeal; as even during your Youth you have never done any thing contrary to the Authority of the Magistrates and Senate, in my Opinion, it would become your Age, to shew yourselves submissive to the Senate and Consuls, and to think every Station honourable, that gives you opportunity to serve the Republick."

XIII. IT is easy to discern in this Speech, the Spirit and Magnanimity of a true *Roman*; and particularly a certain Boldness and Confidence, derived from a sense of his many Services, and the Rewards and Honours with which they had been attended. And if this be so conspicuous in the inferior Officers, what may we not expect in those of a more eminent degree? If Civic and Mural Crowns, Collars,

Collars, Chains, Bracelets, and such like, were sufficient to rouse these Sentiments of Heroism among the lower Order of Troops, what would not the prospect of a Triumph effect in the Mind of the General? This Honour was granted only to Dictators, Consuls, and Praetors. After the General had distributed a part of the Spoils to the Soldiers, and performed some other Ceremonies, the Procession began, and entered the City thro' the Triumphal Port, to ascend to the Capitol. At the head of it were the players upon musical Instruments, who made the Air resound with their Harmony. They were followed by the Beasts that were to be sacrificed, adorned with Fillets, and Flowers, many of them having their Horns gilt. After them came the whole Booty, and all the Spoils, either displayed upon Carriages, or born upon the Shoulders of young Men in magnificent Habits. The Names of the Nations conquered were written in great Characters, and the Cities that had been taken represented. Sometimes they added to the Pomp extraordinary Animals, brought from the Countries subjected, as Bears, Panthers, Lions, and Elephants. But what most attracted the Attention and Curiosity of the Spectators, were the illustrious Captives, who walked in Chains before the Victor's Chariot: great Officers of State, Generals of Armies, Princes, Kings, with their Wives and Children. The Consul followed upon a magnificent Chariot, drawn by four Horses,

CHAP. Horses, and robed with the august Habit of
IV. Triumph, his Head incircled with a Crown
of Laurel, holding also a Branch of the same
Tree in his Hand, and sometimes accompa-
nied with his young Children sitting by him.
Behind the Chariot marched the whole Army,
the Cavalry first, then the Infantry. All
the Soldiers were crowned with Laurel, and
those who had received particular Crowns,
and other Marks of Honour, did not fail to
shew them on so great a Solemnity. They
emulated each other in celebrating the Praises
of their General, and sometimes threw in
Expresions, sufficiently offensive, of Raillery
and Satire against him, which favoured of
the military Freedom; but the Joy of the
Ceremony entirely blunted their Edge, and
abated their Bitterness. When the Proceſſion
arrived at the Capitol, the Consul immediately
upon his entering the Temple, made this
very remarkable Prayer to the God. " Filled
" with Gratitude and with Joy, I return you
" thanks, O most good and most great Ju-
" piter, and you Queen Juno, and all the
" other Gods, the Guardians and Inhabitants
" of this Citadel, that to this Day and Hour
" you have vouchſafed by my Hands, to pre-
" ſerve and guide the *Roman Republick* hap-
" pily. Continue always, I implore you, to
" preserve, guide, protect, and favour it in
" all things." This Prayer was followed by
sacrificing the Victims, and a magnificent
Feast, given in the Capitol, ſometimes by the
Publick,

Publick, and sometimes by the Person him-self who triumphed. It must be allowed, that this was a glorious Day for a General of an Army; and it is not surprising that all possible Endeavours should be used to deserve so grateful a Distinction, and so splendid an Honour. *Rome* had not any thing more majestick and magnificent than this pompous Ceremony, which seemed to raise the Person in favour of whom it was granted, above the Condition of Mortals.

XIV. THE *Romans*, in War, knew how to make use of Punishments, as well as Rewards. The steddiness of a Dictator with respect to his General of Horse, who could not be saved from death but by the Intreaties and urgent Prayers of all the People: the inexorable Severity of the Consul *Manlius* to his own Son, whom he unmercifully put to Death, tho' victorious, for fighting contrary to his Orders: these Examples made a terrible Impression of Fear upon the People, which became for ever the firm Bond of military Discipline. Wherefore never was it observed in any Nation so inviolably as among the *Romans*, nor did any thing contribute so much to render them victorious over all their Enemies. How should they have been otherwise than victorious with Troops formed as we have seen, and above all guided in their Operations by Principles the most proper to make Conquerors? One of which was, not

CHAP. to know any other end of War but Victory,
IV. and for its sake to surmount by an indefatigable Perseverance, all the Obstacles and all the Dangers by which it can be retarded. The greatest Misfortunes, the most desperate Losses, were incapable of daunting their Courage, or making them accept a base and dis honourable Peace. To grant nothing by compulsion, was a fundamental Law of the *Roman* Policy, from which the Senate never departed; and in the most melancholy Junctures, weak Counsels, instead of prevailing, were not so much as heard. As far back as *Coriolanus*, the Senate declared, that no Agreement could be made with the *Volsci*, so long as they remained on the *Roman* Territory. They proceeded in the same manner with *Pyrrhus*. After the bloody Battle of *Cannæ*, wherein above fifty thousand of the *Romans* lay dead on the Field, it was resolved no Proposal of Peace should be listened to. The Consul *Varro*, who had been the Occasion of the Defeat, was received at *Rome* as if he had been victorious, because in so great a Misfortune he had not despaired of the *Roman* Affairs. Thus, instead of disheartening the People by an unseasonable Instance of Severity, these generous Senators taught them by their Example, to bear up against ill Fortune, and assume in Adversity the Haughtiness with which others are inspired by Prosperity.

XV. ONE thing indeed has been generally considered, as tending greatly to obstruct the Conquests of the *Roman* People : I mean the too limited space of the Consulship, which often afforded not the General time to finish a War he had begun, a good part of the Year being sometimes spent in Preparations. This Inconvenience was afterwards remedied, as far as possible, by prolonging the Command to the General as Proconsul, and sometimes continuing him in the Consulship itself. But this was practised sparingly in the wiser Ages of the Republick ; the danger of infringing the publick Liberty, making the frequent change of General appear necessary to the safety of the State. If the Generals had been long continued at the head of the Armies, they might have been able to usurp all the Authority, and become masters of the Government, as happened under *Cæsar* in the latter end of the Commonwealth. We are likewise to call to mind, that these annual Commands were well enough suited to the earlier times of *Rome*, when Wars seldom lasted above one Campaign ; and though perhaps they might not be without their Inconveniences afterwards, yet they had this one manifest Advantage attending them, that thereby a number of great Generals was formed in the State, and the *Romans* were not often reduced to the necessity of placing all their Hopes in the Abilities of a single Person. For this quick circulation of Authority, by

CHAP. raising many in their turns to the highest
IV. Offices of the Republick, excited an incred-
ible Emulation among Individuals, to qualify
themselves for the conduct of Armies; and
at the same time furnished them with fre-
quent Opportunities of acquiring Experience
in supreme Command, which is one of the
most requisite Accomplishments in a great
General.

XVI. Thus every thing at *Rome* led to
great Conquests: the Constitution of the Go-
vernment; the admirable political Principles
on which it was founded; the nature of the
Troops; the ability of the Generals; and
above all, the steadiness of the Senate, in an
attachment to the ancient Maxims of the State.
This last Particular leads me to the second
thing I mentioned, as the cause of that noble
Spirit which we so much admire in the *Rom-
an* Armies, namely the succession of great
Men that for several Ages prevailed in the
Commonwealth, and who supported, invigo-
rated, and from time to time gave new Life
to the fundamental Principles of the Constitu-
tion. Happy is the State that is blessed
with this Privilege! and it was the good
Fortune of the *Romans* to enjoy it in a su-
preme degree. It were endless to recount all
the Names that History furnishes on this Sub-
ject. I shall therefore content myself with
mentioning only two; *Marius Torquatus*,
and *Valerius Corvinus*; the one famed for his
Severity,

Severity, the other for his Clemency. *Manlius* commanded with Rigor, excused his Soldiers from no Labour, and never remitted any Punishment. *Valerius*, on the other side, used them with as much Gentleness and Familiarity. *Manlius*, to support the Vigour of military Discipline, executed his own Son. *Valerius* acted upon Principles so different, that he is said never to have offended any Man. Yet in this great diversity of Conduct, the Effects were the same, both as to the Enemy, the Commonwealth, and themselves. For none of their Soldiers ever declined fighting, none of them rebelled, none so much as disputed their Orders, tho' the Discipline of *Manlius* was so severe, that afterwards all excessive and arbitrary Commands were from him called *Manliana Imperia*. If *Manlius* be considered as he is represented by Historians, we find him to have been very valiant, pious to his Father and Country, and submissive to his Superiors. This appears by his defence of his Father, at the hazard of his own Life, against a Tribune who accused him; by his readiness to offer himself to single Combat with a *Gaul*, where he thought the Honour of his Country concerned; and by his first applying to the Consul for Leave, before he would accept the Challenge. Now when a Man of this Constitution arrives at Command, he desires that all Men may be as punctual as himself; and being naturally brave, he commands brave things, and when they are once commanded,

CHAP. commanded, requires that they be executed
IV. exactly ; this being a certain Rule, that where
great Things are commanded, strict Obe-
dience must be exacted ; in which Case Mild-
ness and Gentleness will not always prevail.
But where a Man has not this Greatness and
Magnificence of Mind, he is by no means to
command extraordinary Things, and may
therefore safely exercise the Virtue of Clemency,
with which ordinary Punishments are com-
patible enough, because they are not imputed
to the Prince, but to the Laws and Customs
of the Place. *Manlius* then was a severe
Man, and kept up the *Roman Discipline* ex-
actly ; prompted first by his own nature, and
then by a strong desire to have that obeyed,
which his own Inclination had constrained
him to command. *Valerius Corvinus*, on the
other hand, might exercise his Gentleness
without Inconvenience, because he command-
ed nothing extraordinary, or contrary to the
Customs of the *Romans* at that time. For,
as those Customs were good, and not very
troublesome to observe, he was seldom neces-
itated to punish Offenders, because there
were but few of that sort ; and where they
were, their Punishment was imputed to the
Laws, and not to his Cruelty. Hence *Vale-
rius* had an Opportunity by his Gentleness,
to gain both Affection and Authority in the Ar-
my ; which was the Cause, that the Soldiers
being equally obedient to the one as the other,
tho' their Tempers and Discipline were so
very

very different, they could yet do the same CHAP.
things, and their Actions have the same IV.
effects. I shall only add, that could a State be
so happy, as to have always Persons succeeding
one another within a reasonable time, who
however different in Inclination and Temper,
would yet by their Examples renew the Laws,
restrain Vice, and remove every thing that
tended to its Ruin or Corruption, that State
must be immortal.

XVII. In thus ascribing the Bravery and Successes of the *Romans*, to the excellent Principles of their Constitution, and the great Men by whom these Principles were supported, I do no more than follow the Opinion of their own Writers upon this Subject. *Salust* tells us, "that after much Reading and Reflexion, upon the Causes of the Growth and Grandeur of the *Romans*, he found reason to conclude, that the distinguished Virtue of a few Citizens had effected all that mighty run of Prosperity." *Cicero* too, in his Reflexion upon that Verse of the Poet *Ennius*,

Moribus antiquis r̄es stat Romana, virisque,

makes the same Observation. "It is, says he, the union of these two Advantages, which has produced all the Grandeur of *Rome*: on the one hand, the good Manners, the wise political Principles established from "the

CHAP. " the beginning : on the other, a succession
IV. " of great Men formed upon these Princi-
" ples, and employed by a State in the ad-
" ministration of Affairs. Before our times,
" that happy Union was always the same,
" and theie two Advantages ever existed to-
" gether ; otherwise a Republick so power-
" ful and extensive as ours could not have
" subsisted so long with Honour, nor so con-
" stantly kept up its Reputation amongst all
" Nations." I omit the Complaints *Cicero*
subjoins to the degeneracy of the Age in which
he lived, and of the total decay of ancient
Manners. Every one knows, that these soon
after occasioned the ruin of the Republick.
Mean-while it may not be improper to observe,
that these two Advantages were not only the
chief Causes of the *Roman* Greatness, but
likewise produced that slow and gradual in-
crease of Power, so necessary to lay a solid
Foundation of Strength, and support the
weight of their many and extensive Conquests.

XVIII. FOR there never was an Empire,
either more flourishing, or more extensive
than the *Roman*. From the *Euphrates* and
Tigris to *Hercules's Pillars*, and the *Atlantick*
Ocean, all the Lands, and all the Seas, were
under their Obedience. It is astonishing to
consider, that the Nations which at present
make Kingdoms so considerable, all *Gaul*, all
Spain, almost the whole Island of *Great-Britain*,
Illyrie to the *Danube*, *Germany* to the *Elbe*,
Africa

Africa to the frightful and impassable Deserts, *Greece, Thrace, Syria, Egypt*, all the Kingdoms of *Aisa Minor*, and those between the *Euxine* and *Caspian Seas*, with many others, became *Roman Provinces*, almost all before the end of the Republick. I have often wondered to observe in Historians a certain Affectation of ascribing the Successes of the *Romans* to Fortune, as if that, rather than Valour and Wisdom, had been the Occasion of their Prosperity. To me it evidently appears, thro' the whole course of their History, that the unusual pitch of Grandeur to which they arrived, was the necessary result of the Talents and Accomplishments of which they were possessed, whether they are considered with regard to moral Virtues, or to a political Government, or to martial Merit and the Art of War. For, as *Livy* observes in the Preface to his History, there never was a Republick more religious, or more abounding in good Examples, or where Avarice and Luxury gained ground so late, or where Simplicity and Poverty were so much and so long held in honour. All the Debates and Transactions of the Senate, shew to a Demonstration, how much wisdom of Counsel, love of the Publick, Steddingess to the Maxims of the State, Lenity and Moderation with regard to the conquered Nations, prevailed in that august Assembly. Courage, Boldness, Intrepidity in the midst of the greatest Dangers, an invincible Patience in the hardest Labours, an inexorable

CHAP. orable Firmness to maintain the military Discipline in its utmost Rigor, a settled Resolution to conquer or die, a greatness of Soul, and a Constancy proof against all Misfortunes, have at all times constituted the Character of the *Romans*, and rendered them in the end victorious over all other Nations. *Cyrus* and *Alexander*, it is true, founded great Empires : but the Qualities proper for the execution of such a Design, being confined to the persons of these two illustrious Conquerors, and not inherited by their Descendants ; the Grandeur to which they gave a beginning, did not support itself long with any Reputation. It was very different with the *Romans*. Their Empire was not founded, nor raised to the state of Grandeur it attained, by the rare Endowments, or rapid Conquests of a single Person. The *Roman* People themselves, the Body of the State, formed that Empire by slow degrees, and at several times. The great Men that helped, each in their time, to establish, enlarge, and preserve it, had all different Characters, tho' in the main they followed all the same Principles : and hence the Empire itself, was both more extensive, and of longer duration, than any that had ever gone before it.

C H A P. V.

Of Marches.

I. **W**HAT we have hitherto seen, relating to the raising of Troops, their Divisions and Subdivisions, Armour, Discipline, and Exercises, is in a manner only the Mechanism of War. There are other still more important Cares, which constitute what is called the higher detail of the Service, and depend more immediately upon the General's Ability and Experience. To him it belongs to settle the general disposition of Marches ; to encamp the Troops advantageously ; to draw them up in order of Battle, provide against the Exigencies of the Field, pursue with Caution, or retreat with Judgment ; and lastly, in conducting an Attack or Defence, to put in practice all the Arts, Stratagems, and Address, that long Experience in the Service, and a consummate Knowledge in all the parts of War, are jointly able to suggest. I shall offer some Reflexions upon the Practice of the *Roman* Generals in all these great Points of military Conduct, and begin with that which follows immediately after the rendezvous of the Troops, I mean the marching of an Army. This Subject naturally divides itself into three Branches : the general Order of

CHAP. of Marches in advancing against an Enemy ;
V. the Knowledge and Choice of Posts ; and
lastly, the Disposition and Conduct of a Re-
treat. We shall speak of each in order.

II. THE marching against an Enemy sup-
poses many preliminary Cares in the General,
and many previous Steps taken, in order to
his own Safety, and the success of his Designs.
I shall suppose the Plan of the War settled,
as likewise the manner of acting, and Measures
concerted accordingly. Yet still it is incum-
bent upon a wise Commander, before he puts
his Troops in motion, to provide every thing
necessary for their Accommodation and Sub-
sistence ; to acquire an exact knowledge of
the Country thro' which he marches ; to in-
form himself of the Number and Quality of
the Enemy's Forces ; to penetrate, if possible,
into his Designs ; to study the Character of
the Generals employed against him ; and by
a wise Fore-sight to be prepared for all the
Events and Contingencies that may happen
in the course of a Campaign. Now tho' these
things come not so properly under fixed Rules,
but depend in a great measure upon the
Ability and Prudence of the Commander in
chief ; yet we find every where in History,
that the *Romans* had many Regulations about
them, and always treated them with particular
Attention. To begin with the care of Pro-
visions, which is of principal account in an
Army ; it appears to have been the constant
Practice,

Practice, to furnish the Soldiers with a certain proportion of Corn, which they were obliged to carry along with them in their Marches. This on extraordinary Occasions amounted to four Bushels, or a Month's Allowance, and seldom was less than what might serve for fifteen or twenty Days. They chose rather to give them Corn than Bread, because it was lighter, and might therefore be carried with greater ease. Indeed this put them to the trouble of grinding and baking it themselves ; but then they were used to it, and could upon occasion make it into I know not what variety of Dishes. Besides the common Bread, they made a kind of soft boiled Food of it, very agreeable to the Troops : they mingled it with Milk, Roots, and Herbs, and made Pancakes of it, upon a small Plate laid over the Fire, or upon hot Ashes, as was anciently the manner of regaling Guests, and is still practised throughout the East, where these kind of thin Cakes are much preferred to our best Bread. Their Drink was answerable to this Diet, being no more than a mixture of Vinegar and Water. It was called *Posea*, could at all times be easily procured, and was particularly serviceable to quench the Thirst immediately.

III. I have heard it observed, that nothing gives greater Difficulty to military Men, in the reading of ancient History, than the Article of Provisions. *Cato's Maxim*, that the War feeds the War, holds good in plentiful

CHAP. ful Countries, and with regard to small
V. Armies : yet still it is more generally true,
that the War does not furnish Provisions upon
command, or at a fixed time. They must
be provided both for the present and the future.
We do not however find, that either the
Greeks or *Romans* had the precaution to pro-
vide Magazines of Forage, to lay up Pro-
visions, to have a Commissary-General of
Stores, or to be followed by a great number
of Carriages. But then we are to consider,
that in the Wars of the *Greeks* against each
other, their Troops were little numerous, and
accustomed to a sober Life : that they did not
remove far from their own Country, and al-
most always returned regularly every Win-
ter : so that it is plain, it was not difficult for
them to have Provisions in abundance, espe-
cially the *Athenians*, who were masters at Sea.
The same may be said of the *Romans*. The
care of subsisting the Troops was infinitely
less weighty with them, than it is at present
with most of the Nations of *Europe*. Their
Armies were much less numerous, and they
had a much smaller number of Cavalry. A
Consular Army consisted of near seventeen
thousand Foot, to which they had not above
eighteen hundred Horse. In our Days, to
seventeen thousand Foot, we have often more
than six thousand Horse. What a vast dif-
ference must this make in the consumption
of Forage and Provisions ! Let me add, that
the sober manner of Life in the Army, con-
fined to mere Necessaries, spared them an in-
finite

finite multitude of Servants, Horses, and CHAP.
Baggage, which now exhaust our Magazines,
starve our Armies, retard the execution of
Enterprises, and often render them imprac-
ticable. Nor was this the manner of living
only of the Soldiers, but likewise of the
Officers and Generals. Not only Consuls and
Dictators in the early Ages of the Common-
wealth, but even Emperors themselves ; *Tra-
jan, Adrian, Pescennius, Severus, Probus,*
Julian, and many others, not only lived with-
out Luxury, but contented themselves with
boiled Flour or Beans, a piece of Cheese or
Bacon, and made it their Glory to level them-
selves, in this respect, with the meanest of
the Soldiers. It is easy to conceive how
much this must contribute to diminish the
Train of an Army, to support the Taste of
Frugality and Simplicity amongst the Troops,
and banish all Luxury and idle Shew from the
Camp.

IV. BUT tho' the care of Provisions was
less burdensom to the Ancients, we find that
both it, and all other Accommodations proper
for the march of an Army, were not less at-
tended to by their Generals. *Xenophon*, who
was himself a Soldier, and whose Writings
abound with Maxims of War, is frequent
in his Reflexions upon this Article. One of
the principal Instructions he makes *Cambyses*
King of *Perſia* give his Son *Cyrus*, who after-
wards became so glorious, was not to embark

CHAP. in any Expedition, 'till he had first informed
V. himself, whether Subsistence were provided for
the Troops. In his Account of the Behaviour of
the same *Cyrus*, after his arrival in the Camp of
his Uncle *Cyaxares*, he enters into an immense
Detail, with respect to all the Necessaries of
an Army. That Prince was to march fifteen
Days thro' Countries that had been destroyed,
and in which there were neither Provisions
nor Forage. He ordered enough of both for
twenty Days to be carried, and that the Soldiers,
instead of loading themselves with Baggage,
should exchange that Burden for an equal
one of Provisions, without troubling them-
selves about Beds and Coverlets for sleeping,
the want of which their Fatigues would sup-
ply. They were accustomed to drink Wine;
and as a sudden and total disuse of it might
be attended with ill Consequences, he order-
ed them to carry a certain quantity with
them, and to use themselves by degrees to do
without it, and be contented with Water.
He advised them also to carry salt Provisions
along with them, Hand-mills for grinding
Corn, and Medicines for the sick: to put into
every Carriage a Sickle and a Mattock, and
upon every Beast of burden an Ax and a
Scythe: and to take care to provide them-
selves with a thousand other Necessaries. He
carried also along with him Smiths, Shoe-
makers and other Workmen, with all man-
ner of Tools used in their Trades. For the
rest, he declared publickly, that whoever
would

would charge himself with the care of sending Provisions to the Camp, should be honoured and rewarded by himself and his Friends, and even supplied with Money for that Service, provided they would give Security, and engage to follow the Army.

V. THE Reader will here be pleased to observe, that as I am now entered upon the higher Detail of War, I shall not so intirely confine myself to the *Romans*, as not from time to time to mention the Practices of other Nations, where they any way tend to illustrate the Point in hand. For as the *Roman* Writers upon this Subject are but few, and have not entered very circumstantially into Matters, we are often at a loss with regard to some of the most important parts of their Discipline. This however we may be certain of, that as they excelled particularly in the Art of War, and readily adopted the Improvements of other Nations; the more we know of the Progress and Attainments of the Ancients in this respect, the better we shall be able to judge of the uncommon Proficiency of the *Romans*. We have already seen some of their wise Precautions with regard to the Subsistence and Accommodation of the Troops, for which they provided no less by fixed and general Regulations, than *Cyrus* does in the particular Instance recorded by *Xenophon*. I shall only add, that History abounds with Examples of this prudent Care and Foresight in their Generals.

CHAP. *Paulus Aemilius* would not set out for *Macedonia*,
V. 'till he had fully settled every thing relating to
Provisions. *Cæsar*, in all his Wars, was extremely
attentive to the safety of his Convoys, and
the keeping up a free communication with
those Countries, whence he received his Sup-
plies. We find that he regularly distributed
Corn to the Army, and always took care, be-
fore the time for a new Distribution arrived,
to have it brought to the Camp by means of
his Allies: or if he chanced to be disappoint-
ed here, so contrived his March, as to pass by
some great Town, where he could readily
be furnished with whatever he stood in need
of.

VI. BUT besides the care of Provisions, it
is further incumbent upon a wise General, to
acquaint himself thoroughly with the nature
of the Country thro' which he is to march.
I take it for granted that the *Romans* omitted
none of the usual and obvious Methods for
this Purpose: that they furnished themselves
with Guides; interrogated the Natives; and,
where such were to be had, procured exact
Maps of the Country, delineating the Towns,
their number and distance, the Roads and
Mountains, the Rivers, the Fords; and the
nature and qualities of them all. But what
particularly deserves our Notice in the *Roman*
Policy; they scarce ever entered into a War
with any distant State, 'till they had first con-
tracted an Alliance with some contiguous
Power,

Power, who might unite his Forces to their CHAP.
in the intended Invasion. This Practice was
attended with numberless Advantages. They
had hereby timely Notice of the Enemy's
Designs: they were made acquainted with the
number and quality of his Forces: and when
they approached with their Army, were not
only plentifully supplied with all kind of mi-
litary Stores, but joined by a considerable
Body of Troops perfectly acquainted with
the Country, and able to inform them where
they might make their Impression with
greatest probability of Success. Thus when
they invaded *Philip* King of *Macedon*, they
took care to secure the Friendship of the
Aetolians, whose Troops were of unspeakable
Service to them in that War.. In their Ex-
pedition against *Antiochus* they made use of
the same Policy, having previously contracted
Amity with several of the petty Princes and
States of *Asia Minor*. Every one knows what
use *Cæsar* made of the pretended Alliance
with the *Aeduans*, and that it was one of the
principal Engines by which he compleated
the reduction of *Gaul*. Indeed nothing can
fall out more fortunately for an Army, about
to invade a Country to which they are
strangers, than to act in conjunction with
Troops contiguous to the Territories they
attack: because as by this means they make
War with all the Advantages of Natives, they
are not only the better enabled to guard
against Ambuscades and Surprises, but can in

A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. their turn make use of all those Stratagems
V. and favourable Opportunities of Action,
which the particular nature of the Country
furnishes. Whoever therefore considers the
artful Conduct of the *Romans* in this respect,
will find himself necessitated to own, that De-
signs concerted with so much Wisdom and
Foresight merited all the Success with which
they were for the most part attended.

VII. THESE preliminary Cares settled, it is
now time to put the Troops in motion. The
Romans were very exact in the Order of their
Marches. In the Morning, at the first sound-
ing of the Trumpet, every one took down
his Tent, and began to make up his
Baggage: at the second sounding, every one
loaded his Baggage; and at the third, the
Legions moved out of their Quarters, and
put themselves in the form and order they
were that Day to march in. But none were
to take down their Tents, 'till the Consul and
military Tribunes had first taken down theirs;
whether for the greater Respect, or because
their Tents and Baggage being larger than the
rest, it was necessary they should be the first
at work, that their Baggage might be in a
readiness to march at the third sound of the
Trumpet, as well as that of the private Sol-
dier. For Commanders, who give Rules to
all the rest, ought to be very exact in observ-
ing them themselves; since, if they break
their own Orders, they encourage others to do
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THE R O M A N ART OF WAR.

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the like ; Example always operating more CHAP.
strongly than Precept. Hence that constant V.
care in the *Roman* Generals, to be themselves
Patterns to the Troops, with regard to all the
Duties of the Service ; nor do we meet with
any thing in their whole Discipline, more truly
deserving of imitation, or better calculated to
promote Submission and Obedience in the
Army. For when Soldiers find the General
keeps strictly to the Rules he gives, they are
the more careful to observe them likewise,
concluding, that as he therein grants no In-
dulgence to himself, he certainly will not do
it to others : nay they implicitly believe such
Orders good and necessary, because he that
gave them is so punctual an observer of them.

VIII. As to the particular Form and Dis-
position of the *Roman* March, we meet with
very little on that Subject in ancient Authors.
In the general it appears, that whether they
marched in a Friend's or Enemy's Country,
whether they believed the Enemy near or
far off, they proceeded with the same Care
and Circumspection : and this certainly was a
very wise Policy. For a General may be
mistaken in his Intelligence or Intelligencers ;
nay, may think those Friends, who want but
an advantageous Opportunity of declaring
themselves Foes : so that all imaginable Cau-
tion ought to be observed, in all Times, and
in all Places. To which let me add, that
were there nothing else as a Motive to it, but

CHAP. the keeping up exactly the military Discipline,
V. yet for that Reason singly, it ought constantly
to be done. The Method followed most
commonly by the *Romans* in their Marches
seems to have been this. They had always
some Troops of Horse scouting abroad in or-
der to discover the Roads. After them fol-
lowed the right Wing, with all its Carriages
immediately in the Rear. Then came a Le-
gion with its Carriages ; after that another ;
and so a third, a fourth, &c. in order. Last
of all came the left Wing and its Baggage,
with a Party of Horse in their rear. If, dur-
ing the March, the Army happened to be
assaulted in the front, or in the rear, they
caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the
right Wing or the left, as they found it con-
venient, and most agreeable to the nature of
the Place : and then, when they were cleared
and disincumbered of their Baggage, all of
them unanimously made head against the
Enemy. If they were assaulted in the flank,
they drew their Carriages on that side where
they were like to be most safe, and then ad-
dressed themselves to the Fight.

IX. THIS, I say, was the most common
order of their Marches : for as to any fixed
and standing Rule, none could possibly be
established ; because the Form must vary, ac-
cording to the Country you are in, and the
Enemy you have to do with. *Julius Cæsar*,
when he marched against the *Nervians*, so
long

long as he thought the Enemy at a distance,^{C H A P.}
proceeded exactly according to the Disposition,^{V.}
here described. But upon a nearer approach
he changed it entirely. For then all the Ca-
valry were sent before. After them followed
six Legions without Baggage : and last of all
the Carriages, guarded by two new raised Le-
gions. This was an excellent Method, as he
was sure the Enemy could only attempt him
in the van ; but might be of ill Consequence,
where the rear of the Army was liable to be
attacked. One thing the *Romans* particularly
attended to, and that was, that the Troops did
not straggle or march unequally, some too fast,
others too slow, which very much weakens
an Army, and exposes it to great Disorder.
Hence their Care, in training up their Men,
to inure them to the *military Pace* ; that is,
to the walking over a certain stated space of
Ground within a fixed and limited time.
This, as we have already observed, amounted
to twenty miles in five Hours, which made
the usual Day's March of a *Roman* Army.
To accustom the Soldiers to it, three times a
Month, the Foot as well as Horse were oblig-
ed to take this March. Upon extraordinary
occasions they were wont to march four and
twenty Miles in the same space of time. By
an exact Calculation of what *Cæsar* relates of
a sudden March, which he made at the time
he besieged *Gergovia*, we find that in four
and twenty Hours he marched fifty Miles.
This he did with the utmost expedition. In
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A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. reducing it to less than half, it makes the
V. usual rate of an extraordinary Day's March.

X. It is remarkable with regard to modern Wars, that they not only impoverish the Princes that are overcome, but even the Conquerors themselves : for as one loses his Country, so the other loses his Money. In ancient times the case was otherwise ; it appearing that the Conqueror always enriched himself by the War. The reason of this difference seems to be, that in our times no publick account is taken of the Plunder ; or indeed rather, that the barbarous Custom of pillaging the conquered Countries, is not now so much practised as formerly. Amongst the *Romans*, all the Spoil was delivered in and appropriated to the Publick, which afterwards distributed it as it saw cause : To this purpose they had their *Quæstors*, in whose hands all the Pillage and Taxes were deposited, of which the General disposed as he thought good, for the payment of his Soldiers, the curing of the wounded or sick, and discharging the other Necessities of the Army. 'Tis true the Consul had power to give the Plunder of a Town to his Soldiers, and he frequently did it ; but that Liberty never bred any Disorder. For when a Town was taken, or an Army defeated, all the Spoil was brought into a publick Place, and distributed Man by Man, according to every one's Merit. This Custom made the Soldiers more intent upon Victory than

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

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than Plunder. The Practice of the *Roman* CHAP.
Legions was, to break and disorder an En- V.
emy, but not to pursue; for they never went
out of their Ranks upon any occasion what-
ever. Only the Horse, the light-armed
Troops, and what other Soldiers were not of
the Legions, followed the Chace. But had
the Plunder of the Field belonged to who-
ever could catch it, it would have been nei-
ther reasonable nor possible to have kept the
Legions to their Ranks, or to have exposed
them to so many Dangers. Hence it was,
that upon a Victory, the Publick was always
enriched. For when a Consul entered in
triumph, he brought with him great Riches
into the Treasury of *Rome*, consisting of Taxes,
Contributions, Ransoms and Plunder. The
Romans had likewise another Custom well con-
trived for the preservation of Discipline; and
that was, to deposit a third part of every Sol-
dier's pay, with the Ensigns of their respec-
tive Companies, who never restored it 'till the
War was at an end. This served two very
excellent Purposes: First, every Soldier had
a Stock of his own, which without this Pre-
caution would have been squandered away,
as they were most of them young and pro-
fuse. Secondly, knowing their Stocks to be
in their Ensign's hands, they were the more
careful to defend and keep by him, whether
in the Camp, in the Field of Battle, or upon
a March. This Custom contributed much
to their Valour, and is necessary to be ob-
served

CHAP. served by any General, who would reduce his
V. Soldiers to the Discipline of the *Romans*.

XI. AMONG the various orders of the *Roman* Marches, one particularly deserves our Notice, which is frequently mentioned by Historians, and which they term forming the Army *itineri & prælio*. It was, when the Line of March was so contrived, as to correspond exactly with the Line of Battle ; or, to express myself a little more clearly, when the Columns of Horse and Foot were disposed in such a manner, that upon the sudden appearance of an Enemy they could fall immediately into an order proper for fighting. There is not perhaps any thing in the Science of Arms more subtle and useful than this, and the *Romans* seem to have made it their particular study. I do not at present recollect in any of their Historians, a minute and circumstantial Account of a March of this kind, where the disposition of the Columns is exactly marked, and the manner in which they formed in order of Battle, upon the approach of the Enemy. What most readily occurs to my Memory is, the fine March of *Hamilcar* against *Spendius*, which has been so judiciously explained by the Chevalier *Fokard*, in his admirable Comment upon *Polybius*. As the whole *Art of War* furnishes nothing more compleat in its kind, whether we regard the boldness of the Attempt, or the well-concerted Motions by which it was accomplished,

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THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

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I am satisfied I shall do the Reader a particu- C H A P.
lar Pleasure, in laying a full and distinct Ac- V.
count of it before him.

XII. UPON the conclusion of the first *Punic* War, the *Carthaginian* Mercenaries revolting, chose *Matho* and *Spendius* for their Leaders. *Hanno* was sent against them with an Army ; but receiving a considerable Check, the Rebels blocked up *Carthage* on every side; and possessed themselves of all the Passes leading to the Peninsula on which it stood. In this Exigence the *Carthaginians* had recourse to *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*, who had given eminent proof of his Abilities when he commanded their Armies in *Sicily*. Accordingly he took the Field with ten thousand Men, and seventy Elephants ; but was for some time at a loss how to meet with the Enemy upon equal Ground. For besides the other Places of Advantage which the Mercenaries had seized, *Hanno* had suffered them to get possession of the only Bridge by which the River *Bagradas* was passable to those who were to travel from *Carthage* into the Continent. This River had not many Fords, and the few it had were so well watched, that it was not easy for even a single Man to get over without being seen. As for the Bridge itself, the Enemy guarded it with the utmost Care, and had built a Town close by it, for the more commodious lodging of the Troops that were appointed to that Service. *Hamil-*
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CHAP. car having in vain tried all means possible to
V. force a Passage, at length bethought himself
of an Expedient to gain one by stealth. He
had observed, that upon the blowing of certain
Winds, the Mouth of the *Bagradas* used to
be choaked up with Sand and Gravel,
which formed a kind of Bar across it, and
rendered it fordable. Remaining therefore in
his Camp between the Sea and the Mountains.
he waited the Opportunity of these Winds ;
which no sooner arrived, than marching sud-
denly in the Night, he passed the Stream un-
perceived, and the next morning appeared in
the Plain, to the great Astonishment both of
the *Carthaginians* and the Enemy.

XIII. HAMILCAR by this Step put all to
the hazard. Had he failed in his Attempt
against *Spendius*, his whole Army must in-
evitably have been destroyed, for a Retreat
was now become impossible. But neither
was the Danger less great to his Country by
continuing inactive : and therefore he wisely
considered, that in such an Extremity, it was
better to try some way where Fortune and his
own ability in War offered a prospect of Suc-
cess, than by a timorous diffident Conduct ex-
pose himself to the same Ruin, without a
single Effort to evade it. He was now upon
the other side the *Bagradas*. The Plains
were favourable to him, because he had a
considerable Body of Horse. The River it-
self too was of no small Advantage, as it

served to secure his Baggage, and cover one of his Flanks. *Spendius* was advancing to meet him at the head of ten thousand Men. Besides these, he understood that a Detachment of fifteen thousand was marching with all diligence from *Utica*; and as it was their business to come upon his flank and rear, rather than to join *Spendius*, he made no doubt of their proceeding accordingly. Upon these Considerations he regulated his order of Battle, and the disposition of his March. To make head against *Spendius*, he placed his Elephants in the first Line, and immediately behind them his Cavalry, intermixed with Platoons of light-armed Foot. The heavy-armed Infantry formed the third Line, in order to oppose the Detachment he expected upon his rear from *Utica*. By this Disposition he was enabled to make head on all sides. For as he made no doubt but his first Line of Elephants, of which *Spendius* was totally unprovided, would be sufficient to break the Body he commanded; and that the Cavalry, aided by the light-armed Foot, falling in immediately, would serve to compleat the Rout: so his third Line consisting of the flower of his *African* Infantry, he thought himself strong enough likewise to deal with the Rebels from *Utica*.

XIV. EACH of these Lines marched in four Columns, the Columns of Cavalry following immediately behind the Elephants, and those of

CHAP.of the Infantry immediately behind the Cavalry. The distance between the Columns was equal to the space they were to occupy in the Line of Battle. By this Disposition, upon the first appearance of the Enemy, the Army could form in an Instant. For the Columns being commanded to halt, and wheel at once into their place in the Line, were in order of Battle presently. *Hamilcar* continuing his March, perceived, as the Enemy approached, that the Detachment from *Utica*, instead of coming in upon his rear, had actually joined *Spendius*, and formed a second Line of Foot behind that he commanded. As he had foreseen that this might happen, his order of March was contrived to furnish a speedy Remedy. It now became necessary to change his whole Disposition, and oppose a strong front of Infantry to the Enemy, with the Elephants at the head of all, according to the usual Custom. To that end the Columns were ordered to halt, and the Elephants forming in front, the Cavalry mean-while fell back between the intervals of the Foot, ranging themselves in two Divisions behind the two extremities of the Line of Infantry, which was formed in an instant by the wheeling of the Columns. The Rebels deceived by this artful Motion, and mistaking the Retreat of the Cavalry for a real Flight, advanced briskly to the Attack, broke thro' the Elephants, and charged the *Carthaginian* Foot. Mean-while the Cavalry, which,

we have already observed, had ranged itself CHAP.
in two Columns behind the two Wings of the V..
Infantry, wheeling to the right and left from
the Rear, appeared all on a sudden in the
same Line with the Foot, covering the Flanks
of the *Carthaginian* Army, and considerably
overwinging the Enemy. The Rebels asto-
nished at this extraordinary Motion, quickly
fell into Disorder, and at last betook them-
selves to Flight. *Hamilcar* pursued them with
his Horse and Elephants, and following them
quite to the Town and Bridge, easily got pos-
session of that important Pass.

XV. FROM this Recital it appears, to what
a degree of Perfection the Ancients had ar-
rived in the Science of Marches, which is a
capital Article in the grand operations of War.
And tho' the Instance here given be of an
African Commander, and therefore does not
so immediately regard the *Roman* People, yet
if we consider, that these last are allowed to
have excelled all Nations in the knowledge of
Arms, and that they often regulated their
Marches upon this Plan, it seems reasonable
to believe, that had their Historians entered
into particular Details of this kind, we should
have met with many Examples of military
Conduct in their Generals, no less surprising
than that now before us. Indeed as it fre-
quently happens in War, that the Enemy,
tho' not actually in sight, is yet hourly ex-
pected, this way of ordering an Army seems

VOL. I. 1 very

CHAP. very necessary; and the General who excels
V. in it, and is at the same time sufficiently on
his guard against Surprises, will seldom or
ever be worsted. I have often admired,
in reading *Cæsar's Commentaries*, the con-
summate Prudence and Circumspection of that
great Man, especially in relation to Surprises.
Tho' he was the ablest General of his time,
and commanded the finest Army that perhaps
ever appeared in the World, yet he always
proceeded with the utmost Caution, and was
extremely careful of believing any thing too
easily, that was not reasonably to be supposed.
If a great number of the Enemy was beaten
and pursued by a few of his Men, if a few
of them attacked a greater Party of his, if
they ran unexpectedly, and without any visi-
ble Cause, on these occasions he was always
very much upon his Guard, and never fancied
his Enemy so weak, as not to understand his
own Business. It seems in the general a good
Rule, the weaker and more careleis an En-
emy appears to be, the more to apprehend
and dread him. In Cases of this kind, an
experienced Commander will comport him-
self in two different manners. He will fear
the Enemy in his own Thoughts, and order
his Affairs accordingly; but in his Words
and outward Behaviour, he will affect to de-
spise him. This last way gives courage to
the Soldiers, and makes them confident of
Victory. The other keeps the General upon
his guard, and renders him less liable to be
circumvented:

circumvented: for to march thro' an Enemy's Country is more dangerous, and requires greater Address and Foresight, than to fight a pitched Battle.

V.

XVI. We proceed now to the second Particular mentioned on the head of Marches, namely, the knowledge and choice of Posts. As this will again fall under our notice in the next Chapter concerning Incampments, we need say the less of it here. It has however a strict and necessary Connection with the marching of an Army. For whether we are to retreat or advance, or which way soever our Rout lies, it often happens, that the safety of the Army depends upon seizing some advantageous Posts that command the Country thro' which we march. The Romans applied themselves with particular Attention to this part of War, and we meet with several very early traces of it in their History. *Livy* relates an Example of this kind in the Person of *Publius Decius*, who being a military Tribune in the Army which the Consul *Cornelius* commanded against the *Samnites*, and finding the Consul and Army falling by accident into a Vale, where they might have been encompassed and cut off by the Enemy: "Do you see, (said he to *Cornelius*,) that Eminence which commands the Enemy's Camp? there lies our Hope. It is a Post that may serve to extricate us out of our present Danger, if we are careful only to

CHAP. " seize it quickly, and avail ourselves of the
V. " blindness of the *Sannites*, who have ne-
" glected it." The Historian had before in-
formed us, that *Decius* observed a Hill over
the Enemy's Camp, not easily to be ascended
by those who were compleatly armed, but to
those lightly armed, acceſſible enough. The
Consul ordered him to take poſſeſſion of it
with three thouſand Men. He obeyed the
Order, ſecured the *Roman Army*, and deſign-
ing to march away in the Night, and ſave
both himſelf and his Party, addreſſed himſelf
in theſe Words to ſome of his Companions :
" Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, that whilſt
" we have yet Light, we may explore
" where the Enemy keeps his Guards, and
" which way we may make our Retreat."
Accordingly he went out in Perfon upon this
Deſign, and habited like a Soldier, that the
Enemy might not know his rank in the Army,
took an exact view of the Ground, and the
ſituation of their Camp. Whoever atten-
tively conſiders this Relation, will find
how uſeful and neceſſary it is for a Com-
mander, to be acquainted with the nature of
Coasts and Countries, and that not only in a
general, but in an exquifeite and more parti-
cular way. Had not *Decius* underſtood thoſe
things very well, he could not ſo ſuddenly
have diſcerned the advanſage of that Hill,
and of what importance it would be to the
preſervation of the *Roman Army*. Neither
could he have juſged at that diſtance, whe-
ther it was acceſſible or not : and when he
had

had possessed himself of it, and was to draw off afterwards; as the Enemy environed him on every side, he could never have found out the best way for his Retreat, nor have guessed so well where the Enemy kept his Guards. *Fabius Maximus* is another Example of a consummate knowledge this way. He commanded the *Roman Army* six Months against *Hannibal*, and by a series of well-concerted Motions, and a judicious choice of Posts, conducted himself so happily, that during all that time he never suffered any considerable Disaster, nor could be compelled to fight against his Will, tho' the artful *Carthaginian* left no Stratagem untried, to draw him to an Engagement, or intangle him in an Ambuscade. But of all the *Roman Generals*, none seems to have been a greater master in this part of War than *Julius Cæsar*. We meet with many Instances of it in his Commentaries, particularly in that famous Campaign in *Spain*, where by a happy choice of Posts, and an exquisite Address in improving the Advantages the nature of the Country afforded, he compelled a veteran Army to surrender themselves Prisoners of War without striking a Blow.

XVII. THE third and last Particular we mentioned in relation to Marches, was the Disposition and Conduct of a Retreat. This is, without dispute, the nicest Point in the whole Business of War. For besides all the

CHAP

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Attentions requisite in ordinary Marches, you are under the Disadvantage of being continually pressed by an Enemy, commonly superior in Force, and flushed with Success. The finest Retreat we meet with in ancient History, is that of the ten thousand *Greeks* under the conduct of *Xenophon*, who has left us a particular Account of that famous Expedition. We there see that the hollow Square, which was invented purposely for a Retreat, is very incommodious when the Enemy is directly in your Rear. *Xenophon* says so in express terms, and that the *Greeks* were obliged to discontinue that Order, and march in two Columns, with a Body of Reserve of six hundred Men, who were not confined to the space between the Columns, so as to compleat the figure of the Square, but formed sometimes the Van, sometimes the Rear, filed off by the two Flanks where the Columns were obliged to approach, or posted themselves in the interval when they extended to the Right and Left; in a word, without being tied down to any fixed Post, ran wherever their assistance was wanted. What surprises most in this Retreat is, that upon a computation of the way made by the Troops, which *Xenophon* regularly sets down, we find their Day's Marches one with another, to fall but little short of twenty-four Miles. Our Armies seldom advance half the way, even when they have no Enemy upon their hands, nor any of those other Disadvantages

vantages the Greeks laboured under. We find CHAP. likewise in the *Roman History*, several Examples of well conducted Retreats, in which their Generals have happily extricated themselves out of Dangers that seemed to threaten their Armies with unavoidable Destruction. *Quintus Lutatius* having the *Cimbri* upon his Heels, and being arrived at a River; that the Enemy might give him time to pass, pretended a resolution to fight them, pitched his Camp, intrenched himself, set up his Standard, and sent out parties of Horse to provide Forage. The *Cimbri* believing he meant to incamp there, came and encamped by him, and divided themselves into several Parties, to go in quest of Provisions. *Lutatius* having notice of this, seized the opportunity so favourable to his Design, and throwing Bridges over the River, passed it before the Enemy could have time to disturb him. *Lucius Minucius* a *Roman Consul* was in *Liguria* with an Army, and shut up by the Enemy between two Mountains, insomuch that he could not disengage himself. Being sensible of the danger he was in, he sent certain *Numidians* which he had in his Army, upon small ill-conditioned Horses, towards the places where the Enemy had their Guard. At first sight they put themselves into a posture to defend the Passes: but when they observed the *Numidians* in ill order, and ill mounted in respect of themselves, they began to despise them, and to be more remiss in their Guard;

which

CHAP. which was no sooner perceived by the *Nemians*, than clapping Spurs to their Horses, and charging them suddenly, they passed on in spite of all opposition, and by the Mischief and Devastation they made every where in the Country, constrained the Eaemy to give free passage to the whole Army. I shall mention only one Instance more, and that is the Retreat of *Marc Antony*, when he was pursued into *Syria* by a great Body of *Parthian* Horse. He observed that every Morning by break of Day they were upon his back as soon as he moved, and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorough his March. In order to deceive them, and obtain some respite, he resolved not to remove before Noon; which the *Parthians* observing, concluded he could not stir that Day, and returned to their Posts, insomuch that he had opportunity of marching all the rest of the Day without interruption. But this was only a temporary Expedient, calculated for present Relief; and therefore to screen himself from the Arrows of the *Parthians*, with which the Army was greatly incommoded, he made use of the following Device, practised often by the *Romans* on other occasions. He ordered the Soldiers, when the Enemy came near them, to cast themselves into the figure of the *Testudo*, so that their Targets should close altogether above their Heads, and defend them from the misive Weapons discharged at them. In this case the first Rank

Rank stood upright on their Feet, and the rest stooped lower and lower by degrees, till the last Rank kneeled down upon their Knees; so that every Rank covering with their Targets the Heads of all in the Rank before them, they represented a Tortoise-shell, or a sort of Pent-house. By this Contrivance he made good his Retreat, and arrived in *Syria* without considerable loss.

V.

XVIII. BEFORE I conclude this Chapter, it will naturally be expected I should explain what was the Practice and Discipline of the *Romans*, when they had finished the Day's March, and were arrived near the place of Incampment. In this case the military Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that Service, advanced before all the rest, diligently to view and consider the situation of the Place. When they had chosen the Ground, they began by marking the General's Quarter with a White Flag or Streamer, and distinctly set out its Boundaries. Then the Quarters of the several Tribunes were appointed, and afterwads those of the Legions, all with distinct Flags of several Colours. Every Legion, as well of the Allies as of the *Romans*, had their portion of Ground assigned and marked out, for drawing the Line round the Camp, which was set about immediately, part of the Troops continuing mean-while under Arms, to defend those that were at work upon the Intrenchment, in case of any sudden Surprise.

All

CHAP. All this was finished in a very short space,
VI. ~~the Romans~~ being remarkably expert in it by
constant Practice; for they never altered the
figure of their Camp, nor omitted to fortify
it in all the forms, tho' but for one Night's
continuance. But this naturally leads me to
the subject of the next Chapter.

C H A P. VI.

Of INCAMPMENTS.

I. ONE of the most necessary and beneficial Parts of the military Art is, to know how to incamp well, and to practise it constantly. No wonder therefore that the *Romans*, among whom military Discipline was carried to such a degree of Perfection, and who exacted the most rigorous Submission to all the Laws and Rules of it, were particularly attentive to this Article. And indeed the Armies of that People, tho' still in the Territory of *Rome*, and tho' they had only one Night to pass in a place, incamped nevertheless in all the forms, with no other difference than that the Camp was less fortified there perhaps than in the Enemy's Country. It was always of a square form, contrary to the custom of the *Greeks*, who made theirs round. The Ditch and Rampart, which consisted of four equal sides, was equally distributed to

to be raised by the two *Roman Legions*, and CHAP.
the two Legions of the Allies, who perfected VI.
it without intermission. If the Enemy were
near, part of the Troops continued under
Arms, whilst the rest were employed in
throwing up the Intrenchments. They be-
gan by digging Trenches of greater or less
depth, according to the occasion. They
were at least eight Foot broad by six deep:
but we often find them twelve Foot in breadth,
sometimes more, to fifteen or twenty. Of
the Earth dug out of the Trenches, and
thrown up on the side of the Camp, they
formed the Rampart; and to make it the
firmer, mingled it with Turf cut in a certain
size and form. Sometimes they drove double
rows of Stakes into the Earth, leaving so
much of the length above Ground, as the
height of the Work was to be of ; and then
interweaving them with Twigs, in the man-
ner of Basket-work, filled the space between
with the Earth rising out of the Ditch.
This was an expeditious and safe way of
forming the Line, and appears to have been
always practised, when they incamped in
places where these Materials were to be found.
Upon the brow of the Rampart the Palisades
were planted. *Polybius*, speaking of the Or-
der given by Q; *Flamininus* to his Troops, to
cut Stakes against there should be occasion for
them, offers several very curious Remarks
upon this subject: and as that judicious Hi-
storian, who was himself an expert Warrior,
seems

clxxii A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP. seems to lay great stress upon the Conduct
VI. of the *Romans* in this Point, I shall beg leave
to lay some of his Observations before the
Reader.

II. THIS Custom says *Polybius*, which is easy to put in practice amongst the *Romans*, passes for impossible with the *Greeks*. They can hardly support their own weight upon their Marches, whilst the *Romans*, notwithstanding the Buckler which hangs at their Shoulders, and the Javelins which they carry in their Hands, load themselves also with Stakes or Palisades, which are very different from those of the *Greeks*. With the latter those are best, which have many strong Branches about the Trunk. The *Romans*, on the contrary, leave but three or four at most upon it, and that only on one side. In this manner a Man can carry two or three bound together, and much more use may be made of them. Those of the *Greeks* are more easily pulled up. If the Stake be fixed by itself; as its Branches are strong, and in great number, two or three Soldiers will easily pull it away, and thereby make an opening for the Enemy, without reckoning that the neighbouring Stakes will be loosened, because their Branches are too short to be interwoven with each other. But this is not the case with the *Romans*. The Branches of their Palisades are so strongly inserted into each other, that it is hard to distinguish the Stake they belong

long to : and it is as little practicable to thrust the Hand thro' these Branches to pull up the Palisades ; because being well fastened and twisted together, they leave no opening, and are carefully sharpened at their ends. Even tho' they could be taken hold of, it would not be easy to pull them out of the Ground, and that for two Reasons. The first is, because they are driven in so deep, that they cannot be moved : and the second, because their Branches are interwoven with each other in such a manner, that one cannot be stirred without several more. Two or three Men might unite their strength in vain to draw one of them out, which however if they effected, by drawing it a great while to and fro 'till it was loose, the opening it would leave would be almost imperceptible. These Stakes therefore have three Advantages. They are every where to be had ; they are easy to carry ; and are a secure Barrier to a Camp, because very difficult to break thorough. In my Opinion, adds the Historian, there is nothing practised by the *Romans* in War, more worthy of being imitated.

III. THE form and distribution of the several parts of the *Roman* Camp, admits of great Difficulties, and has occasioned many Disputes amongst the learned. The following Description is taken chiefly from *Polybius*, who of all the Ancients is the most full and explicit upon this Article. He speaks of a con-

CHAP.
VI.
sular Army, which in his time consisted of
two *Roman* Legions, and two Legions of the
Allies. A *Roman* Legion contained four
thousand two hundred Foot, and three hun-
dred Horse. A Legion of the Allies was
equal to the number of Infantry, and gene-
rally double in Cavalry. All together there-
fore, *Romans* and Allies, they made eighteen
thousand six hundred Men. After the place
for the Camp was marked out, which was
always chosen for its convenience in respect
to Water and Forage, a part of it was allotted
for the General's Tent, called otherwise the
Prætorium, because the ancient *Latins* stiled
all their Commanders *Prætores*. The Ground
pitched upon for this purpose was generally
higher than the rest of the Camp, that he
might with the greater ease see all that passed,
and dispatch the necessary Orders. A Flag
was planted upon it, and round that a square
space marked out in such manner, that the
four sides were an hundred Feet distant from
the Flag, and the Ground occupied by the
Consul about four Acres. Near this Tent
were erected the Altar on which Sacrifices
were offered, and the Tribunal for dispensing
Justice. The two *Roman* Legions had each
six Tribunes, which made twelve in all.
Their Tents were placed in a right Line
parallel to the front of the *Prætorium*, at the
distance of fifty Foot. In this space of fifty
Foot were the Horses, Beasts of burden, and
the whole Equipage of the Tribunes. Their
Tents

Tents were pitched in such a manner, that ^{C H A P.} VI. they had the *Prætorium* in the rear, and in the front all the rest of the Camp. The Tents of the Tribunes, at equal distance from each other, took up the whole breadth of the Ground upon which the two *Roman Legions* were incamped.

IV. BETWEEN the Tents of the Legions and Tribunes, a space of an hundred Foot in breadth was left, which formed a large Street called *Principia*, that ran across the whole Camp, and divided it into two parts, the upper and the lower. Beyond this Street were placed the Tents of the Legions. The space which they occupied was divided in the midst into two equal parts by a Street of fifty Foot broad, which extended the whole length of the Camp. On each side of this Street, in so many several Lines, were the Quarters of the *Horse*, the *Triarii*, the *Principes* and the *Hastati*. The *Velites* had no distinct Quarters, but were variously mingled with the rest of the Foot, four hundred and eighty of them being joined to the *Hastati*, a like number to the *Principes*, and two hundred and forty to the *Triarii*. To form a distinct idea of the *Roman Camp*, we must call to mind, that the Cavalry of each Legion was divided into ten Troops, thirty Men to a Troop; and that the *Triarii*, *Principes*, and *Hastati*, were likewise severally divided into ten Maniples of an hundred and twenty Men each, except those

CHAP. those of the *Triarii*, which consisted only of
VI. half that number. In conformity to this
distribution, the Lines on which these several
Bodies incamped, were each divided into ten
Squares, extended length-wise from the Tents
of the Tribunes. These Squares were an
hundred Foot every way, except in the Lines
of *Triarii*, where, because of the smaller
number of Troops, they were only fifty Foot
broad by an hundred long, and may there-
fore more properly be termed half Squares.
Across the middle of these Lodgments, be-
tween the fifth and sixth Squares, ran a Street
of fifty Foot broad, cutting the Lines at right
Angles, and extending from one side of the
Camp to the other. It was called *Quintana*,
because it opened beyond the fifth Maniple.

V. THE order and disposition of the several
Lines was as follows. On each side the mid-
dle Street, that ran according to the length
of the Camp, the Cavalry of the two Legions
were quartered facing each other, and sepa-
rated by the whole breadth of the Street. As
there were ten Squares on each side, and
every Square lodged thirty Horse, the twenty
together contained just six hundred, which
made the intire Cavalry of two Legions. Ad-
joining to the Cavalry the *Triarii* were quar-
tered, a Maniple behind a Troop of Horse,
both in the same form. They joined as to the
Ground, but faced differently, the *Triarii*
turning their Backs upon the Horse. And
here,

Here, as we have already observed, because CHAP.
the *Triarii* were less in number than the VI.
other Troops, the Ground assigned to each
Maniple was only half as broad as long. Front-
ing the *Triarii* on each side, was a Street
of fifty Foot broad, running parallel to that
between the Quarters of the Horse. On the
opposite side of this Street was the Line of
Lodgments belonging to the *Principes*. Be-
hind the *Principes* the *Hastati* were quarter-
ed, joining as to the Ground, but fronting the
other way.

VI. THUS far we have described the Quar-
ters of the two *Roman* Legions. It remains
that we dispose of the Allies. Their Infantry
equalled that of the *Romans*, and their Cavalry
was twice the number. In removing for the
Extraordinarii a fifth part of the Foot, or
sixteen hundred and eighty Men, and a
third of the Horse, or four hundred Men,
there remained in the whole seven thousand
five hundred and twenty Men, Horse and
Foot, to quarter. These were disposed upon
the two Wings of the Legions, being separat-
ed from the *Hastati* on each side, by a Street
of fifty Foot. The Cavalry were directly
opposite to the *Hastati*, upon a breadth of an
hundred and thirty-three Foot, and some-
thing more. Behind them, and on the same
Line, the Infantry were incamped, upon a
breadth of two hundred Foot. The *Praefecti*
were lodged at the sides of the Tribunes,

CHAP. over-against their respective Wings. At the
VI. head of every Troop and Maniple, were
the Tents of the Captains of Horse and
Centurions. On the right side of the *Prætorium* stood the *Quæstorium*, assigned to the
Quæstor, or Treasurer of the Army, and
hard by the *Forum*. This last served not
only for the sale of Commodities, but also for
the meeting of Councils, and giving audience
to Ambassadors. On the other side of the
Prætorium were lodged the *Legati*, or Lieu-
tenant-Generals. On the right and left, still
in the same Line with the *Prætorium*, and
directly behind the *Præfects* of the Allies,
were the Quarters of the extraordinary Ca-
valry *Evolutorum*, and of the other volunteer
Roman Horse, *Selectorum*. All this Cavalry
faced on one side towards the *Forum* and
place of the *Quæstor*, and on the other to-
wards the Lodgments of the *Legati*. They
not only incamped near the Consul's Person,
but commonly attended him upon Marches,
that they might be at hand to execute his
Orders. The extraordinary and volunteer
Roman Foot adjoined to the Horse last spoken
of, forming the extremities of the Line to-
wards the two sides of the Camp. Above
this Line was a Street of an hundred Foot
broad, extending the whole breadth of the
Camp, and beyond that the Quarters of the
extraordinary Horse of the Allies, facing the
Prætorium, Treasury, and the Tents of the
Legati. The extraordinary Foot of the Allies
were

were directly behind their Horse, fronting CHAP.
the Intrenchment and upper extremity of the VI.
Camp. The void spaces that remained on
both sides were allotted to Strangers and
Allies, who came later than the rest.

VII. BETWEEN the Rampart and the Tents, there was an open Place or Street of two hundred Foot in breadth, which was continued all along the four equal sides of the Camp. This Interval was of very great use, either for the entrance or departure of the Legions. For each Body of Troops advanced into that Space by the Street before it, so that marching thither different ways, they were in no danger of crowding and breaking each other's Ranks. Besides which, the Cattle, and whatever was taken from the Enemy, was placed there, where a Guard was kept during the night. Another considerable Advantage of it was, that in the Attacks by night, neither Fire nor Dart could do any great execution in the Camp ; the Soldiers being at so great a distance, and under cover of their Tents. But the principal Intention of it seems to have been, for the drawing up of the Troops who were to defend the Line, and to leave sufficient room for the Cavalry to scour it. My Lord Orrery however is of opinion, that it was rather too narrow to answer both these Services. If it was only designed for the Foot, they lost the benefit of their Horse, which experience teaches us to be of singular use on

CHAP. such Occasions. For whatever Foot storm
VI. a Line, must enter it in great Confusion and
Disorder, and can very hardly indeed resist
small Squadrons of Horse, who are ready
to receive them, and charge them all along
the inside of the Line. For these Reasons he
considers the narrowness of this Space as a
defect in the *Roman* method of incamping, and
thinks that a breadth of three hundred Foot
at least ought to have been allowed for the
~~the~~ defence and scouring of the Line. It is
probable the *Romans* would have done so, had
they not found the other sufficient; and we
have this to say in their favour, that tho' their
Camps were frequently attacked, we meet with
but few Instances in History of their being
forced.

VIII. THE Gates were only four in number, one to each side. *Livy* says so in express Terms. *Ad quatuor Portas exercitum instruxit, ut, signo dato, ex omnibus Portibus eruptionem facerent.* “ He drew up his Men “ facing the four Gates, that, upon a signal “ given, the Army might sally from all the “ several Gates at once.” These are afterwards called by the same Author, *the Extraordinary, the right Principal, the left Principal, and the Quæstorian.* They have also other Names, about which it is not a little difficult to reconcile Authors. It is believed that the *Extraordinary* Gate was so called, because near the Place where the *extraordinary*

nary Troops incamped; and that it was the same as the *Prætorian*, which took its Name from its nearness to the *Prætorium*. The Gate opposite to this, at the other extremity of the Camp, was called *Porta Decumana*, because near the ten Maniples of each Legion; and without doubt is the same with the *Quæstorian*, mentioned by *Livy* in the Place above cited. As to the *right* and *left Principals*, they had their Name from being on the *right* and *left* of the Camp, fronting the Street called *Principia*. I shall conclude this Description of the *Roman Camp* with observing, that when a Consular Army consisted of more than four Legions, they were lodged still in the same order, only the figure of the Camp was a long Square, in proportion to the additional Forces which were to be contained in it. When both the Consular Armies were united, they took up the Ground of two such perfect Squares.

IX. A wonderful Order was observed Night and Day throughout the Camp, in respect to the Watch-word, Centinels, and Guards; and it was in this its Security and Quiet consisted. To render the Guard more regular and less fatiguing, the Night was divided into four Parts or Watches, and the Day into four Stations. There seems to have been assigned one Company of Foot, and one Troop of Horse, to each of the four Gates every Day. The *Roman Discipline*

CHAP. was extremely strict in this particular, pu-
VI. nishing with an exemplary Severity such as de-
serted their Post, or abandoned their Corps
of Guard. *Polybius* takes notice of the excel-
lent Effects of this Discipline, upon occasion
of the Siege of *Agrigentum* in *Sicily*, during
the first *Punick War*. The *Roman Guards*
had dispersed themselves a little too far in
quest of Forage. The *Carthaginians* laying
hold of the Opportunity, made a vigorous
Sally from the Town, and had well nigh
forced the Camp; when the Soldiers, sensible
of the extreme Penalty they had incurred by
neglecting their Duty, resolved to repair the
Fault by some remarkable Behaviour; and
accordingly rallying together, they not only
sustained the Shock of the Enemy, to whom
they were far inferior in number, but in the
end made so great a slaughter among them, as
compelled them to retreat into the Town, tho'
they were upon the very point of carrying the
Roman Lines. The Night-Guards were four
out of every *Manipulus*, who continued on
Duty three Hours, and were then relieved by
those next in turn. To keep the Soldiers
alert, they had the *Circuitio Vigilum*, or Pa-
trols, performed commonly four times in the
Night by some of the Horse. Upon extraordi-
nary Occasions, the Tribunes and Lieutenant-
Generals, and sometimes the General himself
made these Circuits in person, and took a
strict view of the Watch in every part of the
Camp.

X. WHAT we have hitherto said regards CHAP.
only the Plan, Disposition, and well order- VI.
ing of the *Roman Camp*. But there are many
other Particulars to be taken into considera-
tion, in incamping an Army to advantage:
the choice of the Ground; the convenience
of Provision and Forage; the security of
Convoys; and the Precautions needful to pre-
vent Surprise, or the being taken at a Disad-
vantage. We cannot however here enter into a
particular Detail of the *Roman Practice*, with
relation to these several Articles; because not
being subject to any fixed and invariable Rules;
they depend in a manner intirely upon the
Prudence and Discretion of the General, who
must therein be guided by the nature of the
Country, the posture of the Enemy, and his
own Strength. Two things in particular
they were more than ordinarily attentive to;
Health, and Safety. The first they endeavoured
to secure, by avoiding all Morasses
and fenny Places, or where the Wind was
cold and unwholsom; which Unwholsomnes
they did not so much compute from the situ-
ation of the Place, as from the Appearance
and Complexion of the Inhabitants. Exer-
cise contributes greatly to Health, and there-
fore the *Romans* took care to keep their
Troops always employed, either in casting up
new Works round the Camp, or in hunting
after Provision and Forage, or in performing
those several Exercises, that tend to render
the Body robust and active. It is observed in

CHAP. our Days, that the immoderate Labour Sol-
VI. diers are obliged to undergo, destroys our
Armed Armies : and yet it was by incredible Labour
that the *Romans* preserved themselves. The
reason of the difference I take to be this :
their Fatigues were continual and without
respite ; whereas our Men are perpetually
shifting from the extremes of Labour to the
extremes of Idleness, than which nothing
can be more destructive. Who could believe,
that there was nothing, even to Cleanliness,
of which particular care was not taken in the
Roman Camp. As the great Street situated
in the front of the *Prætorium* was much fre-
quented by the Officers and Soldiers, who
passed through it to receive and carry Orders,
and upon their other Occasions ; a number
of Men were appointed to sweep and clean it
every Day in Winter, and to water it in Sum-
mer to prevent the Dust.

XI. BUT besides Health, Safety was like-
wise another important Consideration with the
Romans. To this end, in choosing a place of
Incampment, they always had a particular
eye to the convenience of Water, Provisions,
and Forage. We see evidently in *Cæsar's*
Commentaries, that there was nothing about
which he was more solicitous, than the con-
triving his Marches in such manner, as to have
his Camp seated near some navigable River,
and a Country behind him, whence he could
be easily, and at a reasonable rate, supplied
with

with every thing necessary for the subsistence CHAP.
of his Army. Other Inconveniences may VI.
find a remedy in time, but Hunger, the
longer it lasts, the more infallibly it destroys.
And hence it was, that where the above-men-
tioned Advantages could not be obtained,
the *Romans* made it their first Care, after for-
tifying their Camp, to lay in such a quantity
of all necessary Stores, as might be sufficient
for the time of their continuance in it. Nor
were they less attentive to the strength of
their Camp, and the Precautions necessary
for its defence. This is a part of the *Art of
War* in which they incontestibly excelled all
Nations. Constant Practice made them ex-
pert in it; for they never quartered their
Troops in Towns and open Villages, but al-
ways in standing Camps, which were carefully
intrenched and fortified, in proportion to the
Danger to which they fancied themselves ex-
posed. And here we may observe, that
whereas the *Greeks* chose always to incamp
where there was some River, or Wood, or
Bank, or other natural Rampart to defend
them; the *Romans*, on the contrary, stood not
so much on the strength of Situation, as on
their own ways of fortifying. Hence the
Grecian Camps were often without Intrench-
ments, and varied in their form, according to
the nature of the Place; but among the *Ro-
mans* one constant Method was inviolably ob-
served, nor would they ever lodge in a Camp,
that

clxxxvi A DISCOURSE CONCERNING
C H A P. that was not surrounded with a Ditch and a
VI. Rampart.

XII. THIS Practice of intrenched and fortified Camps was attended with many solid and desireable Advantages. The Army was hereby kept safe, and freed from the Danger of having any of its Quarters beat up, by Surprise or a sudden Attack. It was eased of the trouble of keeping many and great Guards, since a few serves the turn for all, when all are at hand in case of an Attempt. It could never be compelled to fight against its will, than which no greater Misfortune can befall an Army. In fine, as the success of Arms is uncertain, it had always a secure Retreat in case of the worst. These things considered, it will not appear wonderful, that the *Romans* were so strict in this Article, and considered the Custom of fortifying Camps regularly, as one of the most essential parts of military Discipline. In the War with the *Gauls*, the Commanders of the *Roman* Army were reproached with having omitted this wise Precaution, and the loss of the Battle of *Allia* was in part attributed to it. Hence it was, that to avoid the like Misfortune for the time to come, it became in a manner an established Law amongst them, never to hazard a Battle 'till they had finished their Camp. *Paulus Æmilius*, in the second *Macedonian* War, suspended and arrested the Ardor of his whole Army to attack *Perseus*, for no other

other Reason, but because they had not formed their Camp. The fortified Camp, in case of a Disaster, put a stop to the Enemy's Victory, received the Troops that retired in safety, enabled them to renew the Battle with more Success, and prevented their being intirely routed; whereas without the refuge of a Camp, an Army, tho' composed of good Troops, was exposed to a final Defeat, and to being inevitably cut in pieces. I may add to all these Advantages, that an intrenched Camp, by reason of the open Air, the healthliness of its Situation, which always must be minded, and the cleanliness which may and ought to be kept in it, is exceedingly less subject to Infection and Sicknes, than Villages and strong Towns; insomuch that some great Captains have concluded, an Army will be likelier preserved, and kept sound and untainted three Months in a well seated and regulated Camp, than three Weeks in the ordinary Villages and Country Towns.

XIII. I have the longer and more particularly insisted on this Practice of intrenched Camps, because it appears evident from History, that the *Romans* owed as many of their Victories to their Ability in this part of War, as to their other excellent military Discipline and Valour. It would be almost endless to enumerate, what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obedience by their standing Camps; and how often they warded off Dangers,

clxxxviii A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHA P. Dangers, and brought their Wars to a fortunate issue by the same Proceeding. For having first wearied out their Enemies by safe and beneficial Delays, they would on some great Advantage give them Battle and defeat them ; which artful Method of making War they neither could have effected nor rationally attempted, but by their thoroughly knowing how to incamp advantageously, by constantly practising it, and by a timely providing of Food and Forage. *Vegetius* observes, that one of the principal Causes of the ruin of the *Roman* Empire was, that they had lost the Art of fortifying their Camp ; by which Negligence they were easily overwhelmed by the Barbarian Horse. And indeed when under the Emperors, they had ascertained the Limits of their Dominion, resolving to extend their Conquests no farther, but to rest satisfied with maintaining the possession of what they had acquired ; it is well known, that they effectually accomplished this design by means of the standing Camps, which they kept upon the *Euphrates*, the *Danube*, and the *Rhine*. And so long as this Method was followed, the bordering Nations found it impossible to break through the *Roman* Barriers, or hurt the Tranquillity of their Empire. But when in process of time, the military Discipline began to decline, and the *Art of incamping*, in particular, was lost, or grew into disuse ; the *Romans*, by abandoning the Banks of these several Rivers, opened a free passage

passage to the Barbarians, who meeting now ^{CHAP.} VI.
with no resistance, poured in upon them like a Torrent, and easily overwhelmed a feeble
race of Men, whom Luxury, and an undi-
sturbed Peace of many Ages, had rendered
utterly unfit for War.

XIV. AND here, as it falls so naturally in my way, and has a strict Connexion with my Subject, I cannot forbear observing, that in the last Age, the *French*, who had many excellent Commanders, if not the most of any one Nation, and to whom the *Art of War* owes much of its present Improvement, began to revive, and with great Benefit to themselves, this almost obsolete part of it. For when the Prince of *Orange*, the *Imperialists* under the Count *de Souches*, and the *Flemish* Forces were united ; the Prince of *Conde*, one of the greatest Captains that any Age has produced, being sent to oppose them, would not give them Battle, but incamped himself advantageously on the *French* Frontiers, so that they were justly afraid to enter them, and leave him at their Backs. By this Management he kept them long at bay, and when he found his Opportunity, gave them at *Seneff* so considerable a Blow, that the *French*, from having been on the defensive, became afterwards the Assaulters, and closed that Campaign with taking some of the Enemy's Towns. The Marshal *de Turenne* also, who was sent General to the War in *Germany*, and who in the military Art had

CHA Phad hardly a superior, having there to do with
VI. the Count *de Montecuculi*, one of the greatest
Captains of his time ; would still by intrenched
Camps, when the *Germans* were the strongest,
preserve himself and Army, spin out the War,
and cover those Territories and Places he had
won, while he himself had been the most
powerful.

XV. AND here it is particularly worthy of notice, that when upon the Marshal *de Turenne*'s death, the *French* King sent the Prince of *Conde* to command in his stead, he also by intrenched Incampments weathered that Storm, which in itself was so threatening, not only by the sudden loss of so great a Captain, but also by the *Germans* being led by the Count *de Montecuculi*, and the Duke of *Lorain*, two Persons as considerable as the very Forces they headed. I say it particularly deserves our observation, that two such justly celebrated Commanders, as the Prince of *Conde*, and Monsieur *Turenne*, should observe the very same Methods, in managing the same War ; whereas usually when one General succeeds another, in heading the same Army, and ordering the same War, the last comer judges it a kind of diminution to his own Skill, to tread in the very Paths of his Predecessor. But as the Prince of *Conde* observed a quite different Conduct on this occasion, we may thence naturally gather the three following Particulars. *First*, that he judged himself so justly secure in his own Reputation,

putation, that it could receive no diminution, by C H A P. his following the Steps of the dead General, VI. more especially as he had done the like before, and successfully, in *Flanders*. Secondly, that a wise and great Captain will rather, by imitating his Predecessor, confirm that Course to be the best which he knows to be so in itself, than try new Methods of War, whereby out of a mere Hope to do the like thing by a different way, he may hazard his Reputation, his Army, and the Country he is to cover and protect. Thirdly, what two such Generals have practised, all Circumstances considered, amounts to little less than a Demonstration, that by Camps intrenched and well posted, a Country may be best secured, an invading Enemy best resisted, and in time, all Advantages being judiciously taken, defeated or made to retire.

XVI. THESE Examples ancient and modern, sufficiently evince the Benefit of this Practice, and with what Judgment the *Romans* made it an essential part of their military Discipline. I shall only add, as an indisputable Argument in its favour, that the great *Cæsar* himself has given his sanction to it, by constantly following it in his Wars with the *Gauls*. He had to do with a brave and a warlike Nation, passionately fond of Liberty, and therefore extremely averse to the *Roman* Yoke. To keep them in awe, he established standing Camps in different parts of the Country, where the Soldiers were quartered in large Bodies,

CHAP. VII. Bodies, and surrounded with strong Intrenchments. This he thought the likeliest Method to prevent Insurrections, or suppress them speedily when they should happen, as the Troops would be always in a readiness to march, and in condition to act. It was likewise the best security against Treachery and Surprise. Accordingly we find, that all the Efforts of the *Gauls* to recover their Liberty were without effect, the *Roman* Camps standing as so many Bulwarks, against which tho' they made frequent Attacks, they were yet never able to prevail.

C H A P. VII.

Of BATTLES.

I. HAVING raised our Troops, armed and disciplined them, put them upon the March, and lodged them in a Camp; it is now time to draw them out into the Field, that we may see how they acquitted themselves on a Day of Battle. It is in this view military Merit appears in all its extent. To know whether a General were worthy of that Name, the *Romans* examined the Conduct he observed on this critical Occasion. They did not expect Success from the number of Troops, which is often a Disadvantage, but from his Prudence

Prudence and Valour, the Cause and Assurance of Victory. They considered him as the Soul of his Army, that directs all its Motions, whose Dictates every thing obeys, and upon whose good or bad Conduct the issue of the Battle depends. The first Consideration, and that which demands the greatest force of Judgment is, to examine whether it be proper or no to come to an Engagement, and to balance exactly the Advantages with the Disadvantages. The blind Temerity of *Varro*, notwithstanding his Colleague's Remonstrances, and the Advice of *Fabius*, drew upon the Republick the unfortunate Battle of *Cannæ*; whereas a delay of a few Weeks, would probably have ruined *Hannibal* for ever. *Perseus*, on the contrary, let slip the Occasion of fighting the *Romans*, in not taking the advantage of the Ardor of his Army, and attacking them instantly after the defeat of their Horse, which had thrown their Troops into Disorder and Consternation. *Cæsar* had been lost after the Battle of *Dyrrbachium*, if *Pompey* had known how to improve his Advantage. Great Enterprises have their decisive Moments. The important Point lies, in wisely resolving what to choose, and in seizing the present Occasion, which never returns when once neglected.

II. BUT not to insist any longer upon this, which rests intirely in the Breast of the General; we shall suppose the Resolution to fight taken, and proceed to examine, what Precau-

C H A P. tions the *Romans* made use of, in order to
VII. secure the Victory. These may in the general
be reduced to two. *First*, the inspiring their
Troops with Courage and Confidence. *Se-
condly*, the ranging them judiciously in order
of Battle. To inspire their Troops with Con-
fidence, they began by consulting the Gods,
and endeavouring to incline them in their
favour. They consulted them either by the
flight or singing of Birds, by the inspection of
the Entrails of Victims, by the manner in
which the sacred Chickens pecked their Corn,
and by things of the like nature. They la-
boured to render them propitious by Sacrifices,
Vows, and Prayers. Many of the Generals,
especially in the earlier times, discharged these
Duties with great Solemnity and Sentiments
of Religion ; and would never hazard an En-
gagement, until by some favourable Omens
they had brought the Troops to believe that
the Gods were on their side. *Paulus Æmilius*,
before he gave *Perseus* Battle, sacrificed twenty
Oxen successively to *Hercules*, without finding
any favourable Sign in all those Victims. It
was not 'till the one and twentieth, that he
believed he saw something which promised
him the Victory. This attention to Religion
was highly necessary among a People strongly
addicted to Superstition, and over whom the
Omens of which we speak, however trifling
in themselves, had yet a powerful Influence.
Hence the Generals who neglected this Pre-
caution, had often but too just cause to repent
of

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR.

EXC^{VII}

of their Folly; as it tended greatly to dispirit CHAP.
the Troops, and begot an ill Opinion of their
Conduct; insomuch that we seldom find them
successful in their Undertakings. The wisest
and best Commanders chose always to comply
with the Prejudices of the Vulgar, and even
where they despised these Ceremonies in their
Hearts, affected yet a greater Veneration for
them in publick.

III. AFTER having paid these Duties to the Gods, they applied themselves to Men, and the General exhorted his Soldiers. It seems to have been an established Custom with all Nations among the Ancients, to harangue their Troops before a Battle; nor can we deny that the Custom was very reasonable in itself, and might contribute greatly to the Victory. When an Army is upon the point of engaging an Enemy, what can be more proper, than to oppose the fear of a seemingly approaching Death with the most powerful Reasons, and such as, if not capable of totally extinguishing it, may yet in some measure allay and overcome it. Such Reasons are the Love of our Country, the Obligation to defend it at the price of our Blood, the remembrance of past Victories, the necessity of supporting the Glory of our Nation, the Injustice of a violent and cruel Enemy, the Dangers to which the Fathers, Mothers, Wives, and Children of the Soldiers are exposed: these Motives, I say, and many of the like nature, represented from the

CHAP. Mouth of a General, beloved and respected by
VII. his Troops, may make a very strong Impression
upon their Minds. Not, as *Cyrus* in *Xenophon*
observes, that such Discourses can in an In-
stant change the Disposition of the Soldiers,
and from timorous and abject as they might
be, make them immediately bold and intrepid:
but they awaken, they rouse the Courage
Nature had before given them, and add a new
Force and Vivacity to it. To judge rightly
of this Custom of haranguing the Troops, as
constantly practised among the *Romans*, we
must go back to the Ages wherein they lived,
and consider their Manners with particular
Attention. Their Armies were composed of
the same Citizens, to whom, in the City, and
in time of Peace, it was customary to com-
municate all the Affairs of the State. The
General did no more in the Camp, or in the
Field of Battle, than he would have been oblig-
ed to do in the Rostrum or Tribunal of Ha-
rangues. He did his Troops Honour, and
attracted their Confidence and Affection in im-
parting to them his Designs, Motives, and
Measures. Add to this, that the sight of the
Generals, Officers, and Soldiers assembled,
communicated a reciprocal Courage and Ardor
to them all. Every one piqued himself at
that time upon the goodness of his Aspect
and Appearance, and obliged his Neighbour
to do the same. The Fear of some was abated
or intirely banished by the Valour of others.
The Disposition of particular Persons became
that

IV. LET me observe here, that there were many Occasions besides Battles, when it was necessary to excite the Good-will and Zeal of the Soldier: if, for instance, a difficult and hasty March was to be made, to extricate the Army out of a dangerous situation, or obtain one more commodious: if Courage, Patience, and Constancy were required, for supporting Famine, and other Distresses, painful to Nature: if some difficult, dangerous, but very important Enterprise was to be undertaken: if it was necessary to console, encourage, and reanimate the Troops after a Defeat: if an hazardous Retreat was to be made in view of the Enemy, in a Country he was master of: in fine, if only a generous Effort was wanting to terminate a War, or some important Undertaking. Upon these and the like Occasions, the Generals never failed to speak in publick to the Army, in order to sound their Dispositions by their Acclamations more or less strong; to inform them of their Reasons for such and such Conduct, and conciliate them to it; to dispel the false Reports, which exaggerated Difficulties, and discouraged them; to let them see the Remedies preparing for the Distresses they were under, and the Success to be expected from them; to explain the Precautions it was necessary to take, and the Motives for taking them. It was the General's

CHAP. Interest to flatter the Soldier, in making him
VII. the Confidant of his Designs, Fears and Ex-
pedients, in order to engage him to share in
them, and act in concert, and from the same
Motives with himself. The General in the
midst of Soldiers, who, as well as himself,
were all not only Members of the State, but
had a share in the Authority of the Govern-
ment, was considered as a Father in the midst
of his Family.

V. It may not be easy to conceive how he could make himself heard by the Troops : but if we call to mind, that the Armies of the *Roman* People were not very numerous, that Difficulty will in a great measure vanish. Besides, I pretend not to say that the Generals were heard distinctly, or in any other manner than the Orators in the publick Assemblies. All People did not hear : yet the whole People were informed, the whole People deliberated and decided, and none of them complained of not having heard. It sufficed that the most ancient, the most considerable, the principals of Companies and Quarters were present at the Harangue, of which they afterwards gave an account to the rest. On the Column of *Trajan*, the Emperor is seen haranguing the Troops from a Tribunal of Turf, raised higher than the Soldiers Heads, with the principal Officers around him upon the Platform, and the Multitude forming a Circle at a distance. The great Men at *Rome* accustomed themselves from

from their youth to speak upon occasion with a strong and clear Voice ; and as these Harangues were made in the Camp to the Soldiers quiet and unarmed, it is not easy to conceive in how little room a great number of them could stand upright, when they pressed close to each other. I insist the longer upon this, because many blame the Historians of Antiquity, for the supposititious Harangues, as they call them, which they have inserted in their Works. It must indeed be owned, that the Discourses made by Generals on the occasions of which we speak, were not always exactly the same as Historians have repeated them. For most Authors, writing in the time when the Art of Eloquence was highly in esteem, have endeavoured, in adorning and inlarging the Harangues they record, to leave Proofs to Posterity, that they were not less excellent Orators than Historians. But the Fact itself, that Generals frequently spoke in publick to their Troops, is evident beyond dispute. *Cæsar*, whose Commentaries are a plain and naked relation of what he himself performed at the head of his Army, furnishes many Examples of this kind. When he marched against *Ariovistus*, a sudden Consternation seizing the Soldiers, which was like to be attended with very disagreeable Effects, he assembled them, reprehended them in a long and severe Speech, and thereby put a stop to the growing Evil. In like manner, upon occasion of a considerable Check received before

CHAP. *Gergovia*, owing to the too forward Valour of
VII. the Troops, and their neglect of his Inju-
ctions, he judged it necessary to call them to-
gether, expostulate with them upon their ill-
timed Bravery, and fortify them against any
Damp their late Disaster might have thrown
upon their Spirits. I could easily produce
other Instances of the same kind, but these
are abundantly sufficient to evince the Point in
question.

VI. WHEN the Armies were numerous,
and upon the point of giving Battle, the An-
cients had a very simple and natural way of
haranguing the Men. The General on
horseback rode thro' the Ranks, and spoke
something to the several Bodies of Troops in
order to animate them. Where he had to do
with different Nations, as very often happened,
he addressed those of his own Language in
person, and made known his Views and De-
signs to the rest by Interpreters. *Hannibal*
acted in this manner at the Battle of *Zama* in
Africa. He thought it incumbent on him to
exhort his Troops: and as every thing was
different among them, Language, Customs,
Laws, Arms, Habits, and Interests, so he
made use of different Motives to animate
them. To the auxiliary Troops, he proposed
an immediate Reward, and an augmentation
of their Pay out of the Booty that should be
taken. He inflamed the peculiar and natural
Hatred of the *Gauls* against the *Romans*. As
for

for the *Ligurians*, who inhabited a moun-^{CHAP.}
tainous and barren Country, he set before ^{VII.}
them the fertile Valleys of *Italy*, as the fruit
of their Victory. He represented to the
Moors and *Numidians*, the cruel and violent
Government of *Mafinissa*, to which they
would be subjected, if overcome. In this
manner he animated these different Nations,
by the different views of Hope and Fear. As
to the *Carthaginians*, he omitted nothing that
might excite their Valour, and addressed him-
self to them in the warmest and most pathet-
ic Terms. He put them in mind of their
Country, their household Gods, the Tombs
of their Ancestors, the Terror and Conster-
nation of their Fathers and Mothers, their
Wives and Children; in fine, that the
Fate of *Carthage* depended upon that Battle,
the Event of which would either ruin and re-
duce her into perpetual Slavery, or render her
Mistress of the Universe, every thing being
extreme which she had either to hope or fear.
This is a very fine Discourse; but how did he
make these different Nations understand it?
Livy informs us: He spoke to the *Carthagi-*
nians himself, and ordered the Commanders
of each Nation to repeat to their respective
Troops what he had said. In this manner
the General sometimes assembled the Officers
of his Army, and after having explained
what he desired the Troops might be told,
he sent them back to their several Brigades or
Companies, in order to report what they had
heard,

CHAP. heard, and animate them for the Battle. *Ar-*
VII. *rian observes this particular of Alexander the*
Great, before the famous Battle of Arbela.

VII. AFTER inspiring the Troops with Resolution and Confidence, and disposing them to act courageously against the Enemy, the next care of the General was, to range them judiciously in order of Battle. The manner of drawing up the Infantry in three Lines, continued long in use among the *Romans*, and with uniformity enough. The *Hastati* were placed in the front, in thick and firm Ranks; the *Principes* behind them, but not altogether so close; and after them the *Triarii* in so wide and loose an order, that upon occasion, they could receive both the *Principes* and *Hastati* into their Body in any Distress. The *Velites*, and in latter times the Bowmen and Slingers, were not drawn up in this regular manner, but disposed of either before the front of the *Hastati*, or scattered up and down among the void spaces of the same *Hastati*, or sometimes placed in two Bodies in the Wings: but wherever they were fixed, these light Soldiers began the Combat, skirmishing in flying Parties with the first Troops of the Enemy. If they prevailed, which very seldom happened, they prosecuted the Victory; but upon a repulse, they fell back by the flanks of the Army, and rallied again in the Rear. When they were retired, the *Hastati* advanced against the Enemy;

Enemy; and in case they found themselves overpowered, retiring softly towards the *Principes*, fell into the intervals of their Ranks, and, together with them, renewed the Fight. But if the *Principes* and *Hastati* thus joined were too weak to sustain the fury of the Battle, they all fell back into the wider intervals of the *Triarii*, and then all together being united into a firm mass, they made another Effort, much more impetuous than any before. If this Assault proved ineffectual, the Day was intirely lost as to the Foot, there being no farther reserves. This way of marshalling the Foot, was exactly like the order of Trees, which Gardeners call the *Quincunx*; as appears from the beautiful comparison between them in *Virgil's second Georgick*. And as the reason of that position of the Trees, is not only for Beauty and Figure, but that every particular Tree may have room to spread its Roots and Boughs, without intangling and hindering the rest; so in this ranking of the Men, the Army was not only set out to the best advantage, and made the greatest show, but every particular Soldier had free room to use his Weapons, and to withdraw himself between the void spaces behind him, without occasioning any Confusion or Disturbance.

VIII. THE Stratagem of rallying thus three times, has been reckoned almost the whole Art and Secret of the *Roman Discipline*; and

CHAP. and 'twas almost impossible it should prove
VII. unsuccessful, if duly observed. For Fortune,
in every Engagement, must have failed them
three several times, before they could be
routed ; and the Enemy must have had the
Strength and Resolution to overcome them
in three several Encounters, for the decision
of one Battle : whereas most other Nations,
and even the *Grecians* themselves, drawing
up their whole Army as it were in one front,
trusted themselves and fortunes to the success
of a single Charge. The *Roman* Cavalry was
posted at the two Corners of the Army, like
the Wings on a Body ; and fought sometimes
on foot, sometimes on horseback, as occasion
required, in the same manner as our Dragoons.
The confederate or auxiliary Forces composed
the two Points of the Battle, and covered the
whole Body of the *Romans*. As to the Sta-
tions of the Commanders, the General com-
monly took up his Post near the middle of
the Army, between the *Principes* and the
Triarii, as the fittest place to give orders
equally to all the Troops. The *Legati* and
Tribunes were usually posted by him ;
unless the former were ordered to command
the Wings, or the others some particular Part
of the Army. The Centurions stood every
Man at the head of his Century, to lead them
up ; tho' sometimes, out of Courage and Ho-
nour, they exposed themselves in the van of
the Army, or were placed there for particular
Reasons by the General : as *Salust* reports of
Catiline,

Catiline, that he posted all his choice Centurions, with the *Evocati*, and the flower of the common Soldiers, in the front of the Battle. But the *Primi pili*, or chief Centurions, had the Honour to stand with the Tribunes near the General's person. The common Soldiers were placed in several Ranks, at the discretion of the Centurions, according to their Age, Strength, and Experience, every Man having three Foot square allowed him to manage his Arms in ; and it was religiously observed in their Discipline, never to abandon their Ranks, or break their Order upon any account.

IX. BUT besides the common Methods of drawing up a *Roman* Army, which are sufficiently explained by every Historian of any note; there were several other very singular Methods of forming their Battle into odd Shapes, according to the nature of the Body they were to oppose. Of this kind was the *Cuneus*, when the Army was ranged in the figure of a Wedge, the most proper to pierce and break the Order of the Enemy. This was otherwise called *Caput Porcinum*, which it in some measure resembled. And here I beg leave to observe; that this last Name seems to confirm the Conjecture of the Chevalier *Folard*, who maintains that the *Cuneus* was no other than the *Column*, or a Battalion drawn up with a small front and great depth. The triangular Order he looks upon

CHAP. upon as childish and absurd, and such as
VII. never was nor could be practised with Success,
because of the extreme weakness of the
Angles. The Authors, however, who give
that form to the *Cuneus*, have invented ano-
ther order of Battle in opposition to it, which
they term the *Farfex*. This was when the
Army was drawn up in the figure of a Pair
of Sheers, as it were on purpose to receive
the *Cuneus*, in case the Enemy should make
use of that Disposition. For while he en-
deavoured to open, and as it were to cleave
their Squadrons with his Wedge, by keeping
their Troops extended like the Sheers, and re-
ceiving him in the middle, they not only hin-
dered the Damage designed to their own Men,
but commonly cut the adverse Body in pieces.
The *Globus* was when the Soldiers cast them-
selves into a circular Order, upon an appre-
hension of being surrounded. *Cæsar*, in the
fifth Book of his Commentaries, speaks of
this Disposition as very proper in cases of
Danger and Extremity. The *Turris* repre-
sented an oblong Square, after the fashion of
a Tower, with very few Men in a File, and
the Ranks extended to a great length. This
seems of very ancient Original, as being men-
tioned in *Homer*. The last order I shall take
notice of is the *Serra*, or Saw; when the
first Companies in the front of the Army, be-
ginning the Engagement, sometimes proceed-
ed, and sometimes drew back; so that by the
help of a large Fancy, one might find some
resemblance

resemblance between them and the Teeth of C H A P.
that Instrument.

VII.

X. It was usual enough among the *Romans*, to raise great Cries, and to strike their Swords against their Bucklers, as they advanced to charge an Enemy. This Noise, joined to that of the Trumpets, was very proper to impress in them, by a kind of Stupefaction, all fear of Danger, and to inspire them with a Courage and Boldness, that had no view but Victory, and defied Death. But tho' such Shoutings were allowed, nay even encouraged as useful, going towards the Enemy, yet a deep Silence was observed by the Soldiery, when they were about to engage, that the orders of the Officers, and the words of Command, might be clearly heard, and punctually obeyed. 'Tis observed that the *Greeks* went always silently to Battle, alledging for it, that they had more to do than to say to their Enemies. But the Shoutings of which we speak, is in reality a kind of Doing, as it stirs up the Men, and often damps the Enemy. The Troops marched sometimes softly and coolly to the Charge, and sometimes, when they approached the Enemy, they sprung forward with impetuosity as fast as they could move. Great Men have been divided in Opinion upon these different Methods of attacking. It seems however to be generally agreed, that where two Armies engage in a plain Field, a Commander ought never

CHAP. to allow, much less order his Men to receive
VII. the Charge, but still to meet the Enemy in
giving it. *Pompey*, in the decisive Battle of
Pharsalia, by the advice of *Triarius*, com-
manded his Soldiers to receive *Cæsar's* Assault,
and to undergo the Shock of his Army, with-
out removing from the place whereon they
stood, as by this means *Cæsar's* Men would be
disordered in their advance, and *Pompey's*, by
not moving, keep their Order. But *Cæsar*
himself observes upon it, that according to his
Judgment, the Advice was against all Reason;
because there is a certain keenness and alacrity
of Spirit naturally planted in every Man, who
is inflamed with a desire to fight, and therefore
no Commander should repress or restrain it,
but rather increase and set it forward. The
Event justified *Cæsar's* Opinion, and showed
that it was well-grounded.

XI. HITHERTO we have contented ourselves
with general Observations: but as it is im-
possible from these alone, to give any tolerable
Idea of the Address and Ability of a Com-
mander in a Day of Battle, because his Con-
duct must vary according to Circumstances;
I shall now beg leave to lay before the Reader,
an Account of some celebrated Actions of
Antiquity, taken from the Descriptions of
such Historians, as being themselves military
Men, have traced them with the utmost Ex-
actness, and distinctly explained the Reasons
of the several Steps taken. The first Instance
of

of this kind that we meet with in History, is CHAP.
the famous Battle of *Thymbra*, between *Cræsus* VII.
and *Cyrus*, which transferred the Empire of
Asia from the *Affyrians* of *Babylon* to the *Medes*
and *Perians*. Tho' this Action does not so
immediately and strictly regard the Subject we
are upon, as having no Relation to the *Roman*
History, I shall yet give a particular Description
of it here, not only because it is the first
pitched Battle, of which we have any full
and circumstantial Account, but because *Cyrus*
being looked upon as one of the greatest
Captains of Antiquity, those of the Profession
may be glad to trace him in all his Steps, thro'
this important Engagement; and the rather,
as what we shall present them with on this
Subject is taken from *Xenophon*, one of the
greatest Commanders, as well as finest Writers,
of the Age in which he lived.

XII. In *Cyrus's* Army the Companies of
Foot consisted of a hundred Men each, ex-
clusive of the Captain. Each Company was
subdivided into four Parts, which consisted
severally of four and twenty Men, not includ-
ing the Person who commanded the Platoon.
Each of these Subdivisions was again divided
into two Files, consisting in consequence of
twelve Men. Every ten Companies had a
particular superior Officer to command them,
who sufficiently answers to what we call a
Colonel. Over ten of these again was an-
other superior Commander, whom we shall

CHAP. term a Brigadier. When *Cyrus* came at the
VII. Head of the thirty thousand *Perfians*, who had
been sent to the Aid of his Uncle *Cyaxares*,
he made a considerable Change in the arms
of his Troops. 'Till then, two thirds of
them made use only of Javelins and Bows,
and therefore could not fight but at a distance
from the Enemy. Instead of these, *Cyrus*
armed the greatest part of them with Cuirasses,
Bucklers, and Swords or Battle-axes, and left
only a few of his Soldiers in light Armour.
The *Perfians* did not know at that Time what
it was to fight on horse-back. *Cyrus*, who
was convinced that nothing was of so great
Importance towards the gaining of a Battle
as Cavalry, was sensible of the great Incon-
venience he laboured under in that respect,
and therefore took wise and early Precautions
to remedy that Evil. He succeeded in his
Design, and by little and little formed a Body
of *Perfian* Cavalry, which amounted to ten
thousand Men, and were the best Troops in
his Army.

XIII. XENOPHON has not acquainted us with
the precise Number of Troops on both sides,
but as this may be in some sort collected, by
putting together certain scattered Passages of
our Author, we shall endeavour to fix it in
the best manner we can. *Cyrus's* Army
amounted in the whole to an hundred and
ninety-six thousand Men, Horse and Foot. Of
these there were seventy thousand natural born
Perfians,

Perfians, viz. ten thousand Cuirassiers of Horse, twenty thousand Cuirassiers of Foot, twenty thousand Pikemen, and twenty thousand light-armed Soldiers. The rest of the Army, to the number of one hundred and twenty-six thousand men, consisted of an hundred thousand *Median*, *Armenian*, and *Arabian* Foot, and twenty-six thousand Horse of the same Nations. Besides these Troops, *Cyrus* had three hundred Chariots of War, armed with Scythes, each Chariot drawn by four Horses a-breast, covered with Trappings that were shot-proof; as were also the Horses of the *Perfian* Cuirassiers. He had likewise ordered a great Number of Chariots to be made of a larger size, upon each of which was placed a Tower of about eighteen or twenty Foot high, in which were lodged twenty Archers. Each Chariot was drawn upon Wheels by sixteen Oxen yoked in a breast. There was moreover a considerable Number of Camels, upon each of which were two *Arabian* Archers, back to back; so that one looked towards the Head, and the other towards the Tail of the Camel.

XIV. CROESUS's Army was above twice as numerous as that of *Cyrus*, amounting in all to four hundred and twenty thousand Men, of which sixty thousand were Cavalry. The Troops consisted chiefly of *Babylonians*, *Lydians*, *Pbrygians*, *Cappadocians*, of the Nations about the *Hellespont*, and of *Egyptians*, to the number of three hundred and sixty thousand Men.

CHAP. Men. The *Egyptians* alone made a body of
VII. an hundred and twenty thousand. They had
Bucklers that covered them from head to foot,
very long Pikes, and short Swords, but very
broad. The rest of the Army was made up of
Cyprians, Cilicians, Lycaonians, Paplagonians,
Thracians, and Ionians. The Army in Order
of Battle was ranged in one Line, the Infantry
in the Centre, and the Calvary on the two
Wings. All the Troops, both Foot and Horse,
were thirty Men deep: but the *Egyptians*,
who, as we have taken notice, were an hun-
dred and twenty thousand in number, and
who were the principal Strength of *Cræsus's*
Infantry, in the Centre of which they were
posted; were divided into twelve large Bodies
or square Battalions, of ten thousand Men
each, which had an hundred Men in front,
and as many in depth, with an Interval or
Space between every Battalion, that they might
act and fight independent of, and without
interfering with one another. *Cræsus* would
gladly have persuaded them to range them-
selves in less depth, that he might make the
wider Front. For the Armies being in an im-
mense Plain, which gave room for extending
their Wings to right and left, he was in hopes
by this means of surrounding and hemming
in the Enemy. But he could not prevail with
the *Egyptians* to change the Order of Battle
to which they had been accustomed. His
Army, as it was thus drawn out into one Line,
took

took up near forty Stadia, or five Miles in C H A P. VII.

XV. Araspes, who under pretence of Discontent had retired to *Cæsus's* Army, and had received particular Orders from *Cyrus*, to observe well the Manner of that General's ranging his Troops, returned to the *Perfian* Camp the Day before the Battle. *Cyrus* in drawing up his Army, governed himself by the Disposition of the Enemy, of which that young *Median* Nobleman had given him an exact account. The *Perfian* Troops had been generally used to engage four and twenty Men deep, but *Cyrus* thought fit to change that Disposition. It was necessary for him to form as wide a Front as possible, without too much weakening his Phalanx, to prevent his Army's being inclosed and hemmed in. His Infantry was excellent, and most advantageously armed with Cuirasses, Partizans, Battle-axes, and Swords; and provided they could join the Enemy in close Fight, there was but little reason to believe the *Lydian* Phalanx, that were only armed with light Bucklers and Javelins, could support the Charge. *Cyrus* therefore thinned the Files of his Infantry one half, and ranged them only twelve Men deep. The Cavalry was drawn out on the two Wings, the Right commanded by *Chrysantes*, and the Left by *Hystaspes*. The whole Front of the Army took up but thirty-two Stadia, or four Miles in Extent, and consequently was at each

CHAP. end near four Stadia, or half a Mile short of
VII. the Enemy's Front. Behind the first Line at
a little distance, *Cyrus* placed the Spear-men,
and behind them the Archers. Both the one
and the other were covered by the Soldiers
in their front, over whose Heads they could
fling their Javelins, and shoot their Arrows at
the Enemy.

XVI. BEHIND all these he formed another
Line, to serve for the Rear, which consisted
of the Flower of his Army. Their Busines
was to have their Eyes upon those that were
placed before them, to encourage those that
did their Duty, to sustain and threaten those
that gave way, and even to kill those as Trai-
tors that persisted obstinately in flying ; by that
means to keep the Cowards in awe, and make
them have as great a terror of the Troops in
the Rear as they could possibly have of the
Enemy. Behind the Army were placed those
moving Towers which I have already describ-
ed. These formed a Line equal and parallel
to that of the Army, and did not only serve to
annoy the Enemy by the perpetual Discharges
of the Archers that were in them, but might
likewise be looked upon as a kind of moveable
Forts or Redoubts, under which the *Perfian*
Troops might rally, in case they were broken
and pushed by the Enemy. Just behind these
Towers were two other Lines, which also
were parallel and equal to the Front of the
Army : the one was formed of the Baggage,
and

and the other of the Chariots which carried CHAP.
the Women, and such other Persons as were VII.
unfit for Service. To close all these Lines, and
to secure them from the Insults of the Enemy,
Cyrus placed in the Rear of all two thousand In-
fantry, two thousand Horse, and the Troop of
Camels, which was pretty numerous. *Cyrus's*
Design in forming two Lines of the Baggage
was, not only to make his Army appear the
more numerous, but likewise to oblige the
Enemy, in case they were resolved to surround
him, as he knew they intended, to make the
longer Circuit, and consequently to weaken
their Line, by stretching it out so far. We
have still the *Persian* Chariots of War armed
with Scythes to speak of. These were divid-
ed into three Bodies of an hundred each. One
of these Bodies, commanded by *Abradates*,
King of *Sufana*, was placed in the Front of
the Battle, and the other two upon the Flanks
of the Army.

XVII. WHEN the two Armies were in sight
of each other, and the Enemy had observed
how much the Front of theirs exceeded that
of *Cyrus*, they made the Centre of their Army
halt, whilst the two Wings advanced project-
ing to the right and left, with design to inclose
Cyrus's Army, and begin their Attack on every
Side on the same time. This Movement did
not at all alarm *Cyrus*, because he expected it;
but observing that many of his Officers, and
even *Abradates* himself, discovered some uneasy

C H A P. Apprehensions; These Troops disturb you, says
VII. he ; believe me they will be the first routed,
and to you *Abradates* I give that as a Signal,
for the falling upon the Enemy with your
Chariots. When the two detached Bodies of
the *Lydians* were sufficiently extended, *Craesus*
gave the Signal to his main Battle to march up
directly to the Front of the *Perfian* Army,
whilst the two Wings, that were wheeling
round upon their Flanks, advanced on each
Side ; so that *Cyrus's* Army was inclosed on
three Sides ; and, as *Xenophon* expresses it,
looked like a small Square drawn within
a great one. In an Instant, on the first
Signal *Cyrus* gave, his Troops faced about on
every side, keeping a profound silence in ex-
pectation of the Event. The Prince himself
at the head of some Horse, briskly followed
by a Body of Foot, fell upon the Forces that
were marching to attack his right Flank, and
put them in great Disorder. The Chariots
then driving furiously upon the *Lydians* com-
pleted the Defeat. In the same moment the
Troops of the left Flank, knowing by the
Noise that *Cyrus* had begun the Battle on the
Right, advanced to the Enemy ; and im-
mediately the Squadron of Camels was made
to advance likewise, as *Cyrus* had ordered. The
Enemy's Cavalry did not expect this, and their
Horses at a distance, as soon as they were sen-
sible of the Approach of those Animals, whose
Smell they cannot endure, began to snort and
prance, to run foul upon and overturn one
another,

another, throwing their Riders, and treading them under their Feet. Whilst they were in this Confusion, a small Body of Horse, commanded by *Artageses*, pushed them very warmly to prevent their rallying; and the Chariots armed with Scythes falling furiously upon them, they were intirely routed, with a dreadful slaughter.

C H A P.
VII.

XVIII. THIS being the Signal which *Cyrus* had given *Abradates* for attacking the Front of the Enemy's Army, he drove like Lightning upon them with all his Chariots. Their first Ranks were not able to stand so violent a Charge, but gave way and were dispersed. Having broken and overthrown them, *Abradates* came up to the *Egyptian* Battalions, which being covered with their Bucklers, and marching in such close order, that the Chariots had not room to pierce amongst them, gave him much more trouble, and would not have been broken, had it not been for the Violence of the Horses that trod upon them. 'Twas a most dreadful Spectacle to see the Heaps of Men and Horses, overturned Chariots, broken Arms, and all the direful Effects of the sharp Scythes, which cut every thing in pieces that came in their way. But *Abradates*'s Chariot having the Misfortune to be overturned, he and his Men were killed, after they had signalized their Valour in a very extraordinary manner. The *Egyptians* then marching forward in close Order, and covered with their Bucklers, obliged

CHAP. ed the *Perfian* Infantry to give way, and drove
VII. them beyond their fourth Line, as far as to
their Machines. There the *Egyptians* met
with a fresh Storm of Arrows and Javelins,
that were poured upon their Heads from the
rolling Towers : and the Battalions of the *Per-
fians* Rear-guard advancing sword in hand,
hindered their Archers and Spear-men from
retreating any farther, and obliged them to re-
turn to their Charge.

XIX. CYRUS in the mean time having
put both the Horse and Foot to flight on the
left of the *Egyptians*, did not amuse himself
in pursuing the Runaways, but pushing on di-
rectly to the Centre, had the Mortification to
find his *Perfian* Troops had been forced to give
way ; and rightly judging that the only means
to prevent the *Egyptians* from gaining farther
ground, would be to attack them behind, he
did so, and fell upon their Rear. The Cavalry
came up at the same time, and the Enemy was
pushed with great Fury. The *Egyptians* being
attacked on all sides, faced about every way,
and defended themselves with wonderful brave-
ry. Cyrus himself was in great Danger ; his
Horse, which a Solder had stabbed under the
Belly, sinking under him, he fell in the midst
of his Enemies. Here was an Opportunity,
says *Xenophon*, of seeing how important it is
for a Commander to have the Affection of his
Soldiers. Officers and Men, equally alarmed
at the Danger in which they saw their Leader,

ran

ran headlong into the thick forest of Pikes to rescue and save him. He quickly remounted another Horse, and the Battle became more bloody than ever. At length *Cyrus*, admiring the Valour of the *Egyptians*, and being concerned to see such brave Men perish, offered them honourable Conditions, if they would surrender, letting them know at the same time that all their Allies had abandoned them. The *Egyptians* accepted the Conditions, after which the *Perfians* meeting with no farther Opposition, a total Rout of the Enemy ensued.

XX. 'Tis allowed that *Cyrus's* Victory was chiefly owing his *Perfian* Cavalry, which was a new Establishment, and entirely the Fruit of that Prince's Care and Activity in forming his People, and perfecting them in a part of the military Art, of which till his Time they had been utterly ignorant. The Chariots armed with Scythes did good Service, and the use of them was ever after retained among the *Perfians*. The Camels too were not unserviceable in this Battle, tho' *Xenophon* makes no great account of them, and observes, that in his time they made no other use of them, than for carrying the Baggage. I shall not undertake here to enlarge upon *Cyrus's* Merit. 'Tis sufficient to observe, that in this affair we see all the Qualities of a great General shine out in him. Before the Battle, an admirable sagacity and foresight in discovering and disconcerting the Enemy's Measures ; an infinite Ex-
actness

CHAP.actness in the detail of Affairs, in taking care
VII. that his Army should be provided with every
thing necessary, and all his Orders punctually
obeyed at the time prefixed ; a wonderful ap-
plication to gain the Hearts of his Soldiers,
and to inspire them with Confidence and Ar-
dor : in the heat of Action, what a Spirit and
Activity ? what a presence of Mind in giving
Orders as Occasion requires ? what Courage
and Intrepidity, and at the same time what Hu-
manity towards the Enemy, whose Valour he
respects, and whose Blood he is unwilling to
shed ? I have met with but one Objection to
the Manner in which he drew up his Troops
in Order of Battle, namely, his placing no Troops
to cover his Flanks, to sustain his armed Cha-
riots, and to oppose the two Bodies of Troops
which *Cræsus* had detached to fall upon the
Flanks of his Army. But it is very possible
that such a Circumstance might escape *Xeno-*
phon in describing the Battle ; tho' it must be
owned, that the Fall of *Abradates*, which was
immediately followed by the Attack of the
Persian Infantry, hardly leaves room for such
a Conjecture.

XX. I shall now present the Reader with
the Description of two Battles in which the
Romans were concerned, those of *Cannæ* and
Zama, distinguished by the importance of their
Consequences, and the Abilities of the Gene-
rals who commanded in them. *Hannibal* hav-
ing defeated the *Romans* in three successive En-
gagements,

gagements, and desirous of bringing them to another general Action, that by one decisive Blow he might put an end to the War, removed his Camp to the Neighbourhood of *Cannæ*, an open champion Country, and fit for Cavalry to act in, in which he was greatly superior to the Enemy. The *Romans*, headed by the Consuls *Paulus Aemilius* and *Varro*, followed him thither, where after some Disputes *Paulus* was obliged to give way to the Obstinacy of his Colleague, who was resolutely bent upon fighting. The two Armies were very unequal as to number. There was in that of the *Romans*, including the Allies, fourscore thousand Foot, and something more than six thousand Horse ; and in that of the *Carthaginians*, forty thousand Foot, all well disciplined and inured to War, and ten thousand Horse. *Varro*, at day-break, having made the Troops of the great Camp pass the *Aufidus*, drew them up immediately in Battle, after having joined them with those of the little Camp. The whole Infantry were upon one Line, closer and of greater depth than usual. The Cavalry was upon the two Wings : that of the *Romans* on the right, defended by the *Aufidus* ; and that of the Allies on the left Wing. The light-armed Troops were advanced in the Front of the Battle to some distance. *Paulus Aemilius* commanded the right Wing of the *Romans*, *Varro* the left, and *Servilius Geminus*, the Consul of the preceding year, was in the Centre.

CHAP. XXII. HANNIBAL immediately drew up his
VII. Army in one line. He posted his *Spanijs* and
Gallick Cavalry on the left, sustained by the
Aufidus, to oppose the *Roman Horse*; and upon
the same Line, half his heavy-armed *African*
Infantry: then the *Spanish* and *Gallick Infantry*,
which properly formed the Centre; on their
right the other half of the *African Infantry*;
and lastly the *Numidian Horse*, who compos-
ed the right Wing. The light-armed Troops
were in the Front, facing those of the *Romans*.
Afdrubal had the left, *Hanno* the right; *Han-
nabal*, having his Brother with him, reserved
the Command of the Centre to himself. The
African Troops might have been taken for a
Body of *Romans*, so much did they resemble
them by their Arms, which they had gained
in the Battles of *Trebia* and *Thrasymenus*, and
which they now employed against those who
had suffered them to be taken from them. The
Spaniards and *Gauls* had Shields of the same
Form; but their Swords were very different.
Those of the former were equally proper for
cutting and thrusting, whereas those of the
Gauls cut only with the Edge, and at a certain
Distance. The Soldiers of those two Nations,
especially the *Gauls*, had a dreadful aspect, in
consequence of their extraordinary Stature. The
latter were naked from their Belts upwards.
The *Spaniards* wore linen Habits, the extreme
whiteness of which, exalted by a border of a
purple colour, made a surprisingly splendid Ap-
pearance.

pearance. *Hannibal*, who knew how to take his Advantages as a great Captain, forgot nothing that could conduce to the Victory. A Wind peculiar to that Region, called in the Country *Vulturnus*, blew always at a certain Period. He took care to draw up in such a manner, that his Army, facing the North, had it in their Backs, and the Enemy fronting the South, had it in their Faces; so that he was not in the least incommoded with it, whereas the *Romans*, whose Eyes it filled with Dust, scarce saw before them. From hence we may judge how far *Hannibal* carried his Attention, which nothing seems to escape.

XX. THE two Armies marched against each other, and began the Charge. After that of the light-armed Soldiers on both sides, which was only a Prelude, the Action began by the two Wings of the Cavalry on the side of the *Aufidus*. *Hannibal's* left Wing, which was an old Corps, to whose Valour he was principally indebted for his Successes, attacked that of the *Romans* with so much Force and Violence, that they had never experienced the like. This Charge was not made in the usual manner of Attacks of Cavalry, by sometimes falling back, and sometimes returning to the Assault; but in fighting man to man, and very near, because they had not room enough to extend themselves, being pent up on one side by the River, and on the other by the Infantry. The Shock was furious, and equally sustained on both sides;

CHAP. sides ; and whilst it was still doubtful to which
VII. side the Victory would incline, the *Roman*
Horse, according to a Custom usual enough
in their Corps, and which was sometimes suc-
cessful, but was now very ill applied, dismount-
ed and fought on Foot. When *Hannibal* was
informed of this, he cried out : I am as well
pleased with them in that Posture, as I should
be to have them all delivered up to me to be
bound hand and foot. Accordingly, after
having defended themselves with the utmost
Valour, most of them fell upon the Spot.
Afdrubal pursued those that fled, and made a
great slaughter of them.

XXIV. WHILST the Horse were thus en-
gaged, the Infantry of both Armies advanced
also against each other. The Battle began at
first in the Centre. As soon as *Hannibal* per-
ceived that his left Wing began to have the
advantage, he made the *Gauls* and *Spaniards*
move that were in the main Body, and whom
he commanded in Person. In proportion as
he advanced, he rounded his front in form of
a Half-moon, with its convex side towards
the Enemy. At first, the opposite Centre of
the *Romans* charged them. After some re-
sistance the *Spaniards* and *Gauls* began to give
way, and to lose ground. The rest of the
Roman Infantry also moved on in order to take
them in flank. They fell back according to
the Orders they had received, continuing to
fight, and regained the ground where they
had

had at first been drawn up in Battle. The CHAP.
Romans, seeing that the *Spaniards* and *Gauls* VII.
continued to retreat, continued also to pursue them. *Hannibal*, well pleased to see every thing succeed according to his Design, and perceiving the moment was come for acting with all his Forces, gave orders, that his *Africans* should wheel to the right and left upon the *Romans*. Those two Bodies, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, having wheeled about suddenly towards the space or hollow, into which the *Romans* had thrown themselves in disorder and confusion, charged them on both sides with vigour, without giving them time to look about them, or leaving them ground to form themselves.

XXV. In the mean time the *Numidian* Cavalry on the right Wing, was engaged also with the Enemy opposite to them, namely the Cavalry of the Allies of the *Romans*. Tho' they did not distinguish themselves in this Battle, and the advantage was equal on both sides, they were however very useful; for they found the Enemies which they had in their front sufficient employment, to prevent them from having time to assist their own People. But when the left Wing where *Azdrubal* commanded had routed, as we have said, the whole Horse of the right Wing of the *Romans*, and had joined the *Numidians*, the Cavalry of the Allies did not wait to be attacked by them, but fled with the utmost

CHAP. precipitation. It is said, that *Afdrubal* then
VII. did a thing, which no less shews his Prudence,
than it contributed to the success of the Battle.
As the *Numidians* were very numerous, and
never did their Duty better than when an
Enemy fled, he ordered them to pursue the
Romans to prevent their rallying, and led on
the *Spanish* and *Gallick* Horse to the Charge,
to support the *African* Infantry. Accordingly
he fell upon the *Roman* Foot in the Rear,
which being attacked at the same time in the
Flanks, and surrounded on all sides, was in-
tirely cut to pieces, after having acted prodigies
of Valour.

XXVI. THE Battle of *Zama*, between
Hannibal and *Scipio*, is one of the most me-
morable recorded in History ; the disposition
on both sides being the masterpiece of two
of the greatest Generals that ever the World
produced. *Scipio* drew up his Troops in the
following manner. He posted the *Hastati* in
the front Line, leaving intervals between the
Cohorts. In the second Line he placed the
Principes, with their Cohorts not behind the
spaces of the first Line, as was the custom of
the *Romans*, but behind the Cohorts of that
front Line, in order to leave openings for the
Elephants of the Enemy which were very
numerous. The *Triarii* formed the third
Line in the same order, and served as a Body
of reserve. He placed *Lælius* on the left
Wing with the *Italian* Cavalry, and *Masinissa*
on

on the right with his *Numidians*. In the spaces of the first Line he placed the light-armed Soldiers, and ordered them to begin the Battle in such a manner, that if they could not sustain the Charge of the Elephants, they should retire; such of them as were most speedy, behind the whole Army, thro' the spaces that divided it in right Lines; and those who should find themselves too much pressed, thro' the spaces between the Lines on the right and left, in order to leave those Animals a passage, in which they would be exposed to the Darts discharged upon them on all sides. As to *Hannibal*, in order to give the Enemy more Terror, he placed in the front his four-score Elephants, a number which he never had before in any Battle. In the first Line he posted the auxiliary Troops of the *Ligurians* and *Gauls*, with the *Baleareans* and *Moors*, who amounted in all to twelve thousand Men. The second Line, in which the principal force of the Army consisted, was composed of *Africans* and *Carthaginians*. He posted the Troops he had brought with him from *Italy* in the third Line, and placed them above a stadium from the second Line. The *Numidian* Cavalry were upon the left Wing, and the *Carthaginian* upon the right.

XXVII. EVERY thing being ready for the Battle, and the *Numidian* Cavalry on both fides having long skirmished, *Hannibal* gave orders for the Elephants to move against the

CHAP. Enmey. The *Romans* immediately made the
VII. Trumpets sound, and at the same time raised
such great Cries, that the Elephants which
advanced against the right of the *Romans*,
turned back, and put the *Moors* and *Numidi-*
ans that formed *Hannibal*'s left into Disorder.
Masinissa seeing their Confusion, easily put
them intirely to the Rout. The rest of the
Elephants advanced between the two Armies
into the Plain, and fell upon the light-armed
Romans, a great number of whom they crush-
ed to Death, notwithstanding the continual
shower of Darts discharged upon them from
all sides. At length being terrified, some of
them ran thro' the spaces *Scipio* had prudently
left, and others in their flight returned upon
their own right Wing, pursued by the *Roman*
Horse, who with their Spears drove them
quite out of the Field of Battle. *Lælius* took
this instant for charging the *Carthaginian* Ca-
valry, who turned about and fled full speed.
He pursued them warmly, whilst *Masinissa*
did the same on his Side.

XXVIII. THE Army of the *Carthaginians*
was uncovered on the right and left by its
Cavalry. The Infantry then on both fides
advanced slowly and in good order, except
that which *Hannibal* had brought from *Italy*,
which formed the third Line, and continued
in its first Post. When they were near each
other, the *Romans* raising great Cries according
to their Custom, and striking their Swords
upon

upon their Shields, charged the Enemy with vigour. On the side of the *Carthaginians*, the Body of foreign Troops that formed the front Line, also raised great Cries, but confused, and dissonant from each other, because they were of different Nations. As they could use neither Swords nor Javelins; but fought hand to hand, the Strangers at first had some advantage over the *Romans* by their agility and boldness, and wounded a great number. However, the latter having the superiority by their good Order, and the nature of their Arms, gained ground, supported by the second Line who followed, and incessantly encouraged them to fight with Valour; whereas the Strangers being neither followed nor assisted by the *Carthaginians*, whose inaction on the contrary intimidated them, lost courage, gave way, and believing themselves openly abandoned by their own Troops, fell, in retiring, upon their second Line, and attacked it in order to open themselves a passage. The latter found themselves obliged to defend their Lives courageously: so that the *Carthaginians* attacked by the Strangers, contrary to their Expectation, saw they had two Enemies to fight, their own Troops, and the *Romans*. Quite out of their Senses, and in a manner transported with fury, they made a great slaughter of both, and put the *Hastati* into disorder. Those who commanded the *Principes* having made their Troops advance, rallied them without difficulty. The greatest

CHAP. part of the Strangers and *Carthaginians* fell in
VII. this Place, partly cut in pieces by one another,
and partly by the *Romans*. *Hannibal* would
not suffer those that fled to mingle with those
who remained, lest full of Terror as they
were, and covered with Wounds, they might
induce Disorder among those who had re-
ceived no Blow hitherto: he even ordered the
front Rank to present their Pikes, which
obliged them to retire along the Wings into
the Plain.

XXIX. THE Space between the two Armies
being then covered with Blood, and with the
dead, *Scipio* was in Perplexity enough; for
he did not know how to make his Troops
move in good Order, over that confused heap
of Arms and dead Bodies, still bleeding and ly-
ing upon each other. He ordered the wounded
Men to be carried behind the Army; the Re-
treat to be founded for the *Haftati*, who were
pursuing the Enemy; posted them opposite to
the Centre of the *Carthaginians* in expectation of
a new Charge; and made the *Principes* and
Triarii advance on both Wings. When they
were upon the same front with the *Haftati*, a
new Battle began between the two Armies.
The Infantry alternately gave way, and re-
turned to the Charge with great Courage and
Vigour. As Number, Resolution, and Arms
were equal on both sides, and they fought
with such obstinacy that they fell in their Posts
rather than give way, the fate of the Battle
was

was long doubtful, and it could not be conjectured which side would remain masters of the Field. Things being in this state, *Lælius* and *Masinissa*, after having pursued the Enemy's Cavalry a considerable time, returned very opportunely for attacking the Infantry in the rear. This last Charge decided the Victory. A great number of the *Carthaginians* were killed upon the field of Battle, where they were surrounded on all sides. Many of them having dispersed in the Plains round about, were cut off by the *Roman Cavalry* that occupied all the Country. The *Carthaginians* left above twenty thousand dead upon the spot, as well of their own Citizens as Allies. Almost as many were taken, with an hundred and thirty Ensigns and Standards, and eleven Elephants. *Hannibal* escaped with a small number of Horse to *Adrumetum*, after having tried, both before and during the Battle, all possible means for obtaining the Victory. The *Romans* lost only fifteen hundred Men.

XXX. HAVING thus given an Account of some of the most memorable Battles of Antiquity, explained the Conduct of the Generals, and laid open the Reasons of that Conduct; I shall conclude this Chapter with a few general Remarks, tending still farther to illustrate this great Branch of War, and which in some measure offer themselves in consequence of what has been already said. The first is, that tho' most Nations had a certain fixed and par-

CHAP.ticular form of giving Battle, yet they never
VII adhered to it so closely, as not to vary when Circumstances required it. The drawing up an Army to the very best advantage, is doubtless a great furtherance to the gaining of the Victory. But the doing so depends much, not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General, the Nature of the Ground, and the Quality of his own Forces, but also on those of his Enemies, and on the Disposition of him who commands them. Hence the greatest Captains of older times, whose military Knowledge and Practice the Moderns so justly value, always acted herein according to their own Judgment, without confining themselves to any standing Rules. We have seen that *Cyrus* being to fight against *Cræsus* in a large Plain, where he found the Enemy taking measures to surround him, drew up his Men but twelve deep in File, whereas formerly the File was twenty-four deep. By this means he augmented the front of his Army double, prevented his being two much over-winged by *Cræsus*, and won the Victory. It is observable too of *Scipio* at the Battle of *Zama*, that he placed the Battalions of his several Lines directly behind one another, and not facing the Intervals of the Lines before them, as was the common Custom. His Design in this was, to give free issue to the Elephants, whose Shock might otherwise have disordered his Men, and render'd them incapable of making any resistance.

Cæsar,

Cæsar, at the Battle of *Pharsalia* against *Pompey*, CHAP. VII.
quite altered the manner of the Roman Imbat-telling. For having found that *Pompey* exceedingly outnumbered him in Horse, he covered one of his Flanks with a little River, and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank ; among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of this best Infantry, and there began the Battle. By this means, having all his Horse in one Wing, and those accompanied with select legionary Foot, he soon routed that half of *Pompey's* Horse which opposed all his, and then falling into the flanks and rear of his Enemy, gained the Victory.

XXXI. THE drawing up the Army in several Lines, as the nature of the Ground, and the number of the Forces would allow, is what was most peculiar to the *Roman Discipline*, and has been found so consonant to Reason and Experience, that it is established as a standing Maxim of War at this Day. In effect these Lines are so many Armies : and the second Line being intire, tho' the first should be broken, often recovers the Day ; especially if the second Line be at so just a distance from the first, as not to be disordered by it when overthrown ; and also so near, that some Battalions of the second Line can come up timely enough to redress any beginnings of a breach in the first, without too much discomposing itself. It has likewise been often observed, that whoever in a Battle keeps together

CHAP. ^{VII.} gether a Body of Men, that are not led to fight until all the Enemy's Squadrons have fought, rarely misses to carry away the Victory ; and that he who has the last Reserves, is the likeliest in the end to have the Honour of the Day. One signal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance. At the Battle of *Dreux* in *France*, where the Constable *Montmorency*, and *Francis Duke of Guise*, the greatest Captains of that Age, commanded the Royalists ; and *Lewis Prince of Condé*, and the Admiral *Chatillon* the Protestants ; the two last defeated all the Forces they saw, took the Constable Prisoner, past over the Bellies of the *Switzers*, who made almost a miraculous resistance, and concluded they had therefore won the Victory. In the mean while the Duke of *Guise*, who led the left Wing of the French King's Army, either by design, as his Enemies said, or as an Act of high Conduct, so covered his Troops with the Village of *Blainville*, and the Trees and Shrubs about it, that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants ; nor moved from thence, until the Constable was taken Prisoner, the Marshal *de St. André* killed, and all those Forces which were consider'd by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists, intirely routed, and so confusedly flying, that he was in no danger of having his Squadrons disordered by the Runaways of his own Party. But then, advancing with his Troops which were intire, he soon turned.

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. ccxxxv

turned the fortune of the Day, took the Prince CHAP.
of *Condé* Prisoner, and overthrew all that op- VII.
posed him. For 'tis a tedious and difficult, if
not an impossible Task, to put into good Or-
der again an Army that has newly fought, so
as to bring it suddenly to renew the Charge ;
some being busied about the Pillage and Pri-
soners they had taken, or are pursuing ; others
being loth to return to new Dangers ; and all
in effect being so heated and disordered, that
they do not, or will not hear the Commands
of their Superiors.

XXXII. ONE thing among the *Romans* par-
ticularly deserves our Notice, and that is, that
tho' they strove with incredible Emulation to
obtain the first Posts in the Army, yet that
Ambition once gratified, they did not disdain to
accept of inferior Offices after the higher, and
to serve under those over whom they had com-
manded. It is amazing to consider what a mul-
titude of consular Senators fell in the Battle of
Cannæ. We have seen that *Fabius*, who had
been thrice Consul, and Dictator, served as
Lieutenant under his own Son : and that the
great *Scipio* accepted the same Character from
his Brother. Nor are these to be considered as
Instances singular in their kind, for it was in
reality the common Practice. Hence it was
always in the power of a *Roman* General, to
have expert, vigilant, and valiant Commanders,
at the head of those several larger Divisions,
of which an Army is usually composed in a

CHAP. Day of Battle : Men of Judgment, Authority,
VII. and Presence of Mind, to remedy all Disorders,
and to improve all Advantages in the critical
Moment ; than which there is nothing of
greater importance in general Engagements,
as the least Delay or Remissness is but too often
irreparable. I believe it will readily be al-
lowed, that the most able and consummate
General, neither is nor can be of himself suf-
ficient to redress all Disorders, and lay hold of
all Advantages in an instant, when Armies are
once engaged. The utmost he can do is, to
choose well the Field of Battle, to draw up
his Army according thereto to most advantage,
to give his general Orders with Prudence and
Foresight, and to give the best Orders where-
ever he is in person : but he cannot be every
where, nor send his Orders timely enough to
every Place to have them successfully obeyed.
And therefore 'tis indisputably necessary, that
he have under him expert chief Officers, at
the head of all the great Divisions of the
Army, who may supply what is impossible
for him singly to command. For he can be
well obeyed but to the time he sends his
Troops to the Charge : after that, those only who
lead them, and are with them, can actuate them
according to the general Orders, or as the Occa-
sion requires ; which those under him must have
the Judgment to lay hold of as it were in the
twinkling of an Eye, so short are the Mo-
ments to acquire the Victory !

XXXIII. THE placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army, is very ancient, and seldom has been omitted, but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission. The Reason is, that the Troops on the Wings are not wedged in, as the Troops in the main Battle are; but are at liberty to take all Advantages, which Accident, the good Conduct of the Commander in chief, or the ill Conduct of the Enemy, throw in their way: nor can a General so much as rationally hope to fall into the flank and rear of his Enemy, but by attacking one of his Wings; because he cannot overwing him, but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks. Hence an able Commander chooses always to begin the Battle on that side, where he judges himself the strongest, and his Enemy the weakest; advancing with those Troops as expeditiously as he can, whilst the rest of the Army moves as slowly as they may. For if his first Impression be successful, he may fall into the flank and part of the rear of the Enemy, while the residue of the whole Army is marching to attack them in front: but then the motion of the Army must be quicker, as soon as ever they see that the advanced Wing is successful. Such was the Conduct of *Epaminondas*, at the famous Battles of *Leuctra* and *Mantinea*. Such too was the Method followed by *Julius Cæsar*, when he fought against *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*. *Hannibal*, so justly celebrated for his

Skill

ccxxxviii A DISCOURSE CONCERNING

CHAP Skill in drawing up an Army, at the famous
VII. Battle of *Cannæ*, placed, as we have seen, all
his best Men in his two Wings, and his worst
Men in the Centre ; whereby, when the *Romans* came to the Charge, who had placed
their choicest Men in their main Battle, they
soon pierced into the Body of *Hannibal's* Army,
which was the very thing he designed they
should do : for then with his two Wings, in
which were the flower of all his Troops, he
immediately wheeled upon the *Romans*, and
totally defeated them.

XXXIV. AFTER the Battle was fought, and
the Victory apparently won, the great Danger
was, as it still is, to pursue with too much
Ardor, without regard to what passed in the
rest of the Army. Hence that Custom so in-
violably observed among the *Romans*, of never
suffering the Legions to follow the Chace, or
break their Ranks upon any Occasion what-
ever. Only the Horse, the light-armed Men,
and what Soldiers were not of the Legions,
were sent upon this Service ; and the Pursuit
was conducted with so much Caution, that a
certain number of Squadrons always followed
in good Order, ready to fall upon and break
the Enemy anew, should they rally and face
about. How many Victories seemingly won,
have in an instant been lost, for want of care
in these two Particulars of such high Con-
cernment, which therefore ought never to be
omitted. It is certain that nothing more en-
courages

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. ccxxxix'

courages flying Enemies to rally, and fight again, than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them. For in such a Pursuit, all the Advantages of the prevailing Party immediately vanish, if the Chaced do but turn about ; such an Evidence of restored Valour, too often daunting those who are to oppose it : nor can any thing more deter the flying Party from such a Step, than to see several Bodies in good Order following close behind them, and ready to make them repent of their Confidence, should they venture upon any farther Opposition. And tho' brave Officers will not cease preffing, promising, and even threatening their Men that fly, to face about ; yet the private Soldier, who sees those Bodies ready to fall on, concludes it is safer to run than to resist, and therefore is too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that nature : for where once Terror has seized the Minds of the Troops, they hear no Counsels but those which their own Fears suggest.

C H A P.

C H A P. VIII.

Of the Attack and Defence of Places.

I. **W**HAT we have to offer upon this Subject falls naturally under three general Heads. *First*, The manner of fortifying Towns in use among the Ancients. *Secondly*, The Machines of War employed by them in Sieges. *Thirdly*, The Nature and Conduct of an *Attack* and *Defence*. As to the first, how far soever we look back into Antiquity, we find amongst the *Greeks* and *Romans*, Cities fortified in a regular manner, with their Fossés, Curtains and Towers. *Vitruvius*, in treating of the Construction of Places of War in his time, says, that the Towers ought to project beyond the Walls, in order that when the Enemy approaches, the Defenders upon the right and left may take them in flank : that they ought to be round, and faced with many Stones, because such as are square, are soon beat bown by the Machines of War and battering Rams, which easily break their Angles: and that near the Towers the Wall should be cut within-side the breadth of the Towers, and the ways broke in this manner only be joined and continued by Beams laid upon the

two Extremities, without being made fast with Iron, that in case the Enemy should make himself master of any part of the Wall, the Besieged might remove this wooden Bridge, and thereby prevent his passage to the other parts of the Wall, and into the Towers. The best Towns of the Ancients were situated upon Eminences. They inclosed them sometimes within two or three Walls and Ditches. *Berosus*, cited by *Josephus*, informs us that *Nebuchadnezzar* fortified *Babylon* with a triple Inclosure of Brick Walls, of a surprising strength and height. *Polybius*, speaking of *Syringa*, the Capital of *Hyrcania*, which *Antiochus* besieged, says, that City was surrounded with three Ditches, each forty-five Foot broad, and twenty-two deep. Upon each side of these was a double Intrenchment, and behind all a strong Wall. The City of *Jerusalem*, says *Josephus*, was surrounded by a triple Wall, except on the side of the Valleys, where there was but one, because they were inaccessible. To these they had added many other Works, one of which, continues the Historian, had it been compleated, would have rendered the City impregnable. The Stones of which it was built, were thirty Foot long by fifteen broad, which made it so strong, that it was in a manner impossible to sap, or shake it with Machines. The whole was flanked with Towers from Space to Space of extraordinary solidity, and built with wonderful Art.

CHAP. II: THE Ancients did not generally support
VIII. their Walls on the inside with Earth, in the
manner of the *Talus* or Slope, which made
the Attacks more dangerous. For tho' the
Enemy had gained some footing upon
them, he could not assure himself of taking
the City. It was necessary to get down, and
to make use of the Ladder by which he had
mounted; and that descent exposed the Sol-
dier to very great danger. *Vitruvius* how-
ever observes, that there is nothing renders a
Rampart so strong, as when the Walls both
of the Curtain and Towers are supported by
Earth. For then neither Rams, Mines, nor
any other Machines can shake them. The
Places of War of the Ancients were not al-
ways fortified with Stone Walls. They were
sometimes inclosed within good Ramparts of
Earth, of great firmness and solidity. The
manner of coating them with Turf was not
unknown to them, nor the Art of supporting
the Earth with strong Fasernes, made fast by
Stakes, and of arming the top of the Rampart
with a Ruff or Fraise of Palisades, and the
foot of the Parapet, or *Pas de Souris*, with
another. They often planted Palisades also in
the Ditch, to defend themselves against sudden
Attacks. They made Walls also with Beams
crossed over one another, with spaces between
them in manner of a Chequer, the void parts of
which they filled up with Earth and Stones. Such
almost were the Walls of the City of *Bourges*,
which

which *Cæsar*, in the seventh Book of his Wars with the *Gauls*, describes as follows. The Walls of *Bourges*, and almost those of the Country, were made of pieces of Wood forty Foot in length, laid along the Earth at the distance of two Foot from each other, and croſſed over by others of equal length and at equal distance, with their ends to the front of the Wall. The spaces on the inside were filled up with Earth and Fasçines, and on the outside with ſolid Stones. He adds, that the Work by this diſposition was agreeable to the Eye, and very ſtrong; because the Wood was of great force againſt the Ram, and the Stones againſt Fire: beſides which, the thickneſs of the Wall, which was generally forty Foot, or the length of the Beams, made it next to imposſible either to make a breach in it, or throw it down in any manner.

III. WHAT I ſhall ſay in the ſequel, when I come to explain the manner of attacking and defending Places, will ſhew more diſtinctly what kind of Fortifications thoſe of the An- cients were. It is pretended that the Moderns excel them very much in this point. But as the method of *Attack* and *Defence* is intirely different, no juſt Comparison can be made. The uſe of Muskets, Bombs, Cannons, and other Fire-arms ſince the invention of Gun- powder, has occaſioned many alterations in the way of conducting Sieges, the duration of which has been very much abridged of late.

CHAP. But these Changes are not so considerable as
VIII. many imagine, and have added nothing either
to the Merit or Capacity of Generals. The
Modernes have imagined nothing that the An-
cients could use, and have not used. We have
borrowed from them the breadth and depth
of Fossés, the thickness of Walls, the Towers
to flank the Curtains, the Palisades, the In-
trenchments within the Ramparts and Towers,
the advantage of many Flanks, in multiplying
of which consists the chief Improvement of
modern Fortification, and which Fire-arms
make the more easy to execute. These are
the Remarks of Men of Ability and Judg-
ment, who to a profound knowledge of the
manner in which the Ancients made War,
unite a perfect Experience of the modern
Practice of it.

IV. BUT let us now proceed to the Machines
made use of by the Ancients in their Sieges.
The principal of these were, the *Tortoise*, the
Catapulta, the *Balista*; the *Ram*, and *moving*
Towers. The *Tortoise* was a Machine com-
posed of very strong and solid timber-work.
The height of it, to the uppermost Beam,
which sustained the Roof, was twelve Foot.
The Base was square, and each of its fronts
twenty-five Foot. It was covered with a kind
of quilted Mattress made of raw Hides, and
prepared with different Drugs, to prevent its
being set on fire by Combustibles. This heavy
Machine

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. ccxlv

Machine was supported upon four wheels, and C H A P[•] VIII.
had the name of *Tortoise* from its serving as a ✓
very strong covering and defence, against the
enormous weight thrown down on it; those
under it being safe in the same manner as a
Tortoise under her Shell. It was used both
to fill up the Ditch, and for sapping. For
the filling up of the Ditch, it was necessary to
join several of them together in a Line, and
very near one another. *Diodorus Siculus*, speak-
ing of the Siege of *Halicarnassus* by *Alexander
the Great*, says, that he first caused three Tor-
toises to approach, in order to fill up the Ditch,
and that afterwards he planted his Rams upon
the space filled up, to batter the Wall. This
Machine is often mentioned by Authors. There
were, without doubt, Tortoises of different
forms and sizes. Some indeed are of opinion,
that because of its enormous weight, it could
not be moved from place to place on Wheels,
but was pushed forwards on Rollers. Under
these Rollers the way was laid with strong
Planks, to facilitate its motion, and prevent its
sinking into the Ground, from whence it would
have been very difficult to have removed it.
The Ancients have observed, that the Roof had
a thicker covering of Hides, Hurdles, Sea-weed,
&c. than the Sides, as it was exposed to much
greater Shocks from the weight thrown upon
it by the Besieged. It had a Door in front,
which was drawn up by a Chain as far as was
necessary, and covered the Soldiers at work in
filling up the Ditch.

CHAP. V. THE *Musculus*, tho' very little under-
VIII. stood by modern Authors, who have repre-
fented it variously, was undoubtedly a kind of
Tortoise, very low, and with a sharp Roof.
Such was that of *Cæsar* at the Siege of Mar-
seilles. It was sixty Foot in Length, and was
moved forward to the Walls upon Rollers,
where it was fixed over the part of the Ditch
filled up. The Tower of Brick which he
built there, communicated with this *Musculus*
and the Trenches. *Cæsar* says the Planks of
the Roof were covered with Bricks and Mor-
tar, over which Hides were laid, to prevent the
Mortar from dissolving by the Water which the
Besieged might pour down upon it: and to se-
cure it from Stones and Fire, it was again cover-
ed over with thick quilted Mattresses properly
prepared. All this was done under Mantles,
after which it was thrust forward on a sudden
from the Tower to the Walls. Besides this,
there was another kind of *Musculus*, that was
used for levelling the Ground, and laying the
Planks on which the Tortoises and moving
Towers were to advance to the Ditch. They
were like this, of greater length than breadth,
and equal in breadth to the way they were to
level. There were several other Machines in-
tended to cover the Soldiers, called *Crates*, *Pha-*
reis, *Vineæ*, which I shall not undertake to de-
scribe here, to avoid Prolixity. They may be
comprised in general under the Name of Man-
tles, or Sheds.

VI. THE

VI. THE *Catapulta* and *Balista* were intend-
ed for discharging Darts, Arrows, and Stones.
They were of different sizes, and consequently
produced more or less effect. Some were
used in Battles, and might be called Field-
pieces: others were employed in Sieges, which
was the use most commonly made of them. The
Balistæ must have been the heaviest and most
difficult to carry, because there was always a
greater number of *Catapultæ* in the Armies.
Livy, in his Description of the Siege of *Carthage*, says, that there were an hundred and
twenty great, and more than two hundred
small *Catapultæ* taken, with thirty-three great
Balistæ, and fifty-two small ones. *Josephus*
mentions the same difference amongst the *Romans*, who had three hundred *Catapultæ*, and
forty *Balistæ*, at the Siege of *Jerusalem*. These
Machines had a force which it is not easy to
comprehend, but which all good Authors at-
test. *Vegetius* says, that the *Balistæ* discharg-
ed Darts with so much rapidity and violence,
that nothing could resist their Force. *Athe-
neus* tells us, that *Agefistratus* made one of little
more than two Foot in length, which shot
Darts almost five hundred Paces. These Ma-
chines were not unlike our Crofs-bows. There
were others of much greater force, which
threw Stones of three hundred weight, up-
wards of an hundred and twenty-five Paces.
We find surprising effects of them in *Josephus*.
The Darts of the *Catapultæ*, he tells us, de-
stroyed

CHAP. stroyed abundance of People. The Stones
VIII. from the *Balistæ* beat down the Battlements,
and broke the Angles of the Towers ; not was
there any Phalanx so deep, but one of these
Stones would sweep a whole File of it from
one end to the other. *Folard*, in his Com-
mentary upon *Polybius*, says their Force was
very near equal to that of Artillery.

VII. THE *Ram* was composed of a large long Beam, armed at one end with Iron in the form of a Ram's Head, and of the same bigness with the Beam. This piece of Wood was suspended by Chains in *æquilibrio*, in order to be set in motion with the greater ease. An hundred Men, more or less, worked it by main Strength, to strike it against a Wall or Rampart, in order to beat them down after having shaken them by repeated Blows. Care was taken to clothe this Beam with wet Leather, to prevent its being set on fire. It was flung under a kind of moving Tortoise or Gallery, which covered more than half of it, in order to shelter those who worked the Ram from the Stones and Darts of the Besieged. The effects of this Machine were prodigious. As it was one of those that did most hurt, many Methods were contrived to render it useless. Fire was darted upon the Roof that covered, and the Timber that supported it, in order to burn them with the Ram. To deaden its Blows, Sacks of Wool were let down against the Place at which it was levelled. A Machine
was

was also made use of against it, called the *Wolf*, C H A P. by way of opposition to the Ram, with which they endeavoured to grapple it, in order to draw it to themselves, or break it. *Josephus* relates a surprising action of a *Jew*, who, at the Siege of *Totophat*, threw a Stone of an uncommon size upon the Head of the Ram with such Violence, that he loosened it from the Beam, and made it fall down. He leaped afterwards from the top of the Wall to the bottom, took the Head from the midst of the Enemy, and carried it back with him. He received five Arrows in his Body; and notwithstanding those Wounds, boldly kept his Post till through loss of Blood and Strength, he fell from the Wall, and the Ram's Head with him, with which he would never part.

VIII. THE moving Towers were made of an assemblage of Beams and strong Planks, not unlike a House. To secure them against the Fires thrown by the Besieged, they were covered with raw Hides, or with pieces of Cloth made of Hair. Their height was in proportion to their Base. They were sometimes thirty Foot square, and sometimes forty or fifty. They were higher than the Walls or even Towers of the City. They were supported upon several Wheels according to mechanic Principles, by the means of which the Machine was easily made to move, how great soever it might be. The Town was in great danger if this Tower could approach the Walls;

CHAP. Walls : for it had Stairs from one Story to another, and included different methods of attack.

VIII.

At bottom it had a Ram to batter the Wall, and on the middle Story a Draw-bridge, made of two Beams with Rails of Basket-work, which let down easily upon the Wall of the C^ty, when within reach of it. The Besiegers passed upon this Bridge to make themselves masters of the Wall. Upon the higher Stories were Soldiers armed with Partizans, and mis-five weapons, who kept a perpetual discharge upon the Works. When Affairs were in this posture, a Place seldom held out long ; for what could those hope who had nothing to confide in but the height of their Ram-parts, when they saw others suddenly appear which commanded them ? The People of *Namur* demanded to capitulate, when *Cæsar's* Tower, of which they had made a Jest whilst at a distance, was seen to move towards them very fast. They believed this a Prodigy, says *Cæsar*, and were astonished that Men of our size should think of carrying so vast and heavy a Machine to their Walls. Their Deputies observed, that the *Romans* were doubtless assisted by the Gods in their Wars, since they could make Machines of so enormous a size advance so swiftly. It is indeed no wonder they were surprised, as they had neither seen nor heard of any such thing before, and as this Tower seemed to advance by Inchantment and of itself, the mechanic Powers that moved it being imperceptible to those of the Place.

Place. These Towers were sometimes founded with Corridors or Galleries at each Story, to prevent their being set on fire: and indeed nothing better could have been invented for this purpose, as the Galleries were filled with Troops armed with massive Weapons, who made their discharges from behind the Parapets, if we may so term them, and were always ready to pull out the Darts of Fire, and extinguish all other Combustibles thrown against the Tower; so that it was impossible for the Fire to make the least progress, the Remedy being always at hand. These Corridors were built upon Beams that projected five or six Foot beyond the Tower, several of which kind are still to be seen upon *Trajan's Column*.

IX. HAVING thus described the principal Machines made use of by the Ancients in Sieges, I now proceed to the *Attack and Defence of Places*, which I shall treat in as brief a manner as possible, confining myself to the most essential Parts. When Cities were extremely strong and populous, they were surrounded with an Intrenchment on the side next the Town, and another on that towards the Country. These were called Lines of Circumvallation and Contravallation. The Besiegers pitched their Camp between these two Lines. Those of Contravallation were against the besieged City, the others against Attempts from without. When it was foreseen

CHAP. seen that the Siege would be of long duration,
VIII. it was often changed into a Blockade, and then
the two Lines in question were solid Walls of
strong Masonry, flanked with Towers at pro-
per distances. There is a remarkable Exam-
ple of this at the Siege of *Platæa* by the *La-
cedæmonians* and *Thebans*, of which *Thucydides*
has left us a very particular Account. The
two surrounding Lines were composed of two
Walls sixteen Foot distant, and the Soldiers
lay in that Space, which was divided into
Quarters; so that it might have been taken
for only one Wall with high Towers from
distance to distance. These Towers occupied
the whole Interval, in order to enable the Be-
siegers to defend themselves at the same time
against those within and those without. The
Quarters of the Soldiers could not be gone
round without crossing the Towers, and the
top of the Wall was skirted with a Parapet
of Osier. There was a Ditch on each side,
the Earth of which had been used to make
Bricks for the Wall. In this manner *Thucy-
dides* describes these two surrounding Walls,
which were of no great circumference, the
City being very small. This Siege, or rather
Blockade, was very famous among the An-
cients, and the more on account of the sur-
prising escape of the Garrison, notwithstanding
all these Fortifications. For this purpose
they applied Ladders to the inward Wall.
After they had got upon the Platform, and
seized the two adjoining Towers, they drew
up

up the Ladders, and let them down on the other side of the outward Wall, by which they descended to the bottom, drawing up in Line of Battle as fast as they came down. In this manner by the favour of a dark Night, they got safe to *Athens*.

X. THE Camp of the *Roman* Army before *Numantia*, took up a much greater extent of Ground. That City was four and twenty Stadia in circumference, that is to say, a League. *Scipio*, when he invested it, caused a Line of Circumvallation to be drawn, which inclosed more than twice the Ground the City stood upon. When this Work was finished, another Line was thrown up against the Besieged, at a reasonable distance from the first, composed of a Rampart of eight Foot thick by ten high, which was strengthened with strong Palisades. The whole was flanked with Towers of an hundred Foot from each other. It is not easy to comprehend in what manner the *Romans* compleated these immense Works; a Line of Circumvallation of more than two Leagues in compass! but nothing is more certain than the Fact. He also erected four Posts upon the Banks of the River *Duera*, contiguous to the Lines; and contrived a Stoccado or Chain of floating Beams, pierced through cross-wise with long Stakes pointed with Iron, to prevent Barks from entering, and Divers from getting any Intelligence of what was doing in the Camp.

C H A P. XI. CÆSAR's Circumvallation before *Alesia*,
VIII. was formed of Fascines instead of Turf, with its Parapet and Fraise made of large Stakes, whose Branches were cut in points, and burnt at the ends, like Stags Horns. They seemed like Wings at the foot of the Parapet, or like the Oars of a Galley inclining downwards. Of the same nature are the Fraises of the Moderns, that are far from being so well imagined, and are smooth-pointed Palisades, bending downwards to prevent scaling. The Moderns fix them in the same manner at the bottom of the Parapet, where they form a kind of Cincture very agreeable to the Eye. The Battlements mentioned by *Cæsar* were like the modern Embrasures for Cannon. Here the Archers were placed. Upon the Parapet of the Towers, field Balistas were planted to flank the Works. Towers were not always of Wood, but sometimes of Earth covered with Turf, or strengthened with Fascines. They were much higher than the rest of the Intrenchment, and sometimes had Towers of Wood raised upon them for battering the Places that commanded the Camp. Some Authors have believed, that these Intrenchments and Works of the Ancients in the Field, were perpendicular: but that Opinion is very absurd. These had a Platform with its Talus or Slope, and sometimes Banquettes, in the form of Steps for ascending; besides which, at the Towers, there were Ways made to go up.

THE ROMAN ART OF WAR. cclv

up. All this was indispensably necessary in CHAP.
Cæsar's Lines, as they were very high, to prevent the Earth from falling away. VIII.

XII. THUS much for the two Lines of Circumvallation. We proceed now to the Ground inclosed between the two Fossés, which is far the most curious part of this celebrated Blockade, and will be best explained in *Cæsar's own Words*. " As the Soldiers were employed at the same time to fetch Wood and Provisions from a considerable distance, and to work at the Fortifications, and the Enemy often sallied at several Gates to interrupt them ; *Cæsar* found it necessary to make some addition to his Lines, that they might not require so many Men to guard them. He therefore took Trees of no great height, or large Branches, which he caused to be made sharp at the ends, and running a Trench of five Foot deep before the Lines, he ordered them to be put into it, and made fast at bottom, so that they could not be pulled up. This Trench was again filled up in such a manner that nothing but the tops of the Branches appeared, of which the points must have run into those who should have endeavoured to pass them. As there were five Rows of them interwoven in a manner with each other, they were unavoidable. In the front of these he caused Pits of three Foot deep to be dug, in the form of the Quincunx.

" In

CHAP. " In those Pits he fixed strong Stakes, burnt
VIII. " and sharpened at the top, which rose only
" four Inches above the level of the Ground,
" into which they were planted three Foot
" deeper than the Pits, for the sake of firm-
" ness. The Pits were covered over with
" Bushes to deceive the Enemy. There were
" eight Rows of them, at the distance of
" three Foot from each other. In the front
" of all he sowed the whole space between
" the Pits and the advanced Ditch, with
" Crows Feet of an extraordinary size, which
" the Soldiers called *Spurs.*" The other Line,
to prevent Succours from without, was intirely
the same with this.

XIII. THO' Trenches, oblique Lines, Mines, and other the like Inventions, seem neither often nor clearly expressed in Authors, we can hardly suppose with reason, that they were not in use amongst the *Greeks and Romans.* Is it probable, that with the Ancients, whose Generals, among their other excellent Qualities, had in an eminent degree that of taking great care to spare the Blood and Lives of their Soldiers, Approaches were made in besieging without any precautions against the Machines of the Besieged, whose Ramparts were so well provided, and Defence so bloody? Tho' there were no mention of this in any of the Historians, who might possibly in the Description of Sieges omit this Circumstance, as well known

known to all the World ; we should not con- CHAP.
clude that such able Generals either did not VIII.
know, or neglected things, on the one side so
important, and on the other so easy ; and
which must naturally have entered the
thoughts of every Man, ever so little versed
in attacking Places. But several Historians
speak of them ; of which one shall suffice for
all the rest : this is *Polybius*, where he relates
the Siege of the City *Echinna* by *Philip*. He
concludes the Description of it with these
Words : “ To cover from the Arrows of the
“ Besieged, as well those that went from the
“ Camp to the Works, as those who returned
“ from the Works to the Camp, Trenches
“ were drawn from the Camp to the Tor-
“ toises, and those Trenches covered at top.”
Long before *Philip*, *Demetrius Poliocertes* had
used the same method at the Siege of *Rhodes*.
Diodorus Siculus tells us, that famous Warrior
caused Tortoises, and Galleries cut in the
Earth, or covered Mines, to be made, for
communication with the Batteries of Rams; and
ordered a Trench with Blinds over head, to
cover and secure the Troops, in going and
coming from the Towers and Tortoises. The
Seamen and Marines were appointed for this
Service : the Work was four Stadia in length,
that is to say, five hundred Paces.

XIV. BUT tho' their Approaches were not
intirely like those of the Moderns, nor so deep
in the Earth, the Fire from our Works being
of a quite different nature from that of the

CHAP. *Catapultæ* and *Balista*, tho' surprisingly violent ;
VIII. yet it is certain from the above Accounts, and
others that might be produced in great num-
ber, that they went under cover from their
Camp to their Batteries, and used more or less
Precaution, according to the Strength and
Valour of the Besieged, and the number of their
Machines, by which they regulated the form of
their Approaches or Trenches. These were of
two sorts. The first were composed of a Blind
of Hurdles or strong Fascines, placed on the side
of each other, without any space between
them ; so that they formed a kind of Wall of
five or six Foot high, with Loop-holes cut
from space to space, between the Fascines, or
through the Hurdles. To support this Blind,
it is supposed they planted forked pieces of
Wood in the Ground, upon which long Poles
were laid cross-wise, with the Fascines or
Hurdles made fast to them. The other kind
of Approaches was very different from the
former, and consisted of several Trenches or
Galleries of Communication covered at top,
drawn in a right line from the Camp to the
Works, or to the Parallels, not much unlike
ours. The Galleries of Communication were
cut ten or twelve Foot broad in the Earth.
The Workmen threw up the Earth on both
sides, which they supported with Fascines, and
covered the space with Hurdles and Earth laid
upon Poles and Rafters. The whole length
of these Galleries in the Earth, they cut Loop-
holes through the sides and issues to go out at.
On the sides of those covered Trenches or

Com-

THE R O M A N A R T O F W A R . cclix

Communications were Esplanades, or places of Arms, which extended the whole front of the Attack. These Places were spacious, and capable of containing a great Body of Troops in order of Battle : for here they were posted to support their Towers, Tortoises, Batteries of Rams, Balistas, and Catapultas, against the Sallies of the Besieged.

CHAP.
VIII.

XV. THE first parallel Trench, next the Body of the Place, was drawn along the side of the Fossé, and served as a Communication to the battering Towers and Tortoises of the Besiegers. This sort of Communications to the moving Towers were sometimes covered at top by a Blind of Hurdles and Fasernes ; because as they ran along the side of the Counterscarp, they were exposed to the downright discharges of the Towers and Ramparts of the Besieged. Loop-holes were cut in the fides of them, through which the Besiegers battered without intermission the Works. These covered Lines served besides for filling up the Fossés, and had Passages of Communication with the battering Tortoises cut in them, which Tortoises were pushed forward upon the part of the Fossé filled. When the Walls of a Place were not high, these Trenches were not covered with Blinds, either at top or in front, but only with a Parapet of the Earth dug out of them, like those of the Moderns. At some distance from this Parallel another was cut behind it, which left a space

CHAP. between them of the nature of our Esplanades
VIII. or Places of Arms. Here the Batteries of
Balistas and Catapultas were erected, which
differed from ours only in being higher. There
was sometimes a third upon the same parallel
Line. These Places of Arms contained all
the Troops that guarded the Works. The
Lines communicated by the Galleries or
Trenches covered at top.

XVI. IT is certain therefore the use of Trenches was well known to the Ancients, without which they could have formed no Siege. These Trenches are often mentioned in Authors by the *Latin Word Aggeres*, which does not always signify Cavaliers or Platforms. The Cavaliers were Mounts of Earth, on which Machines were planted, and were thrown up in the following manner. The Work was begun at a small distance from that side of the Fossé next the Country. It was carried on under the cover of Mantles or moving Sheds of considerable height, behind which the Soldiers worked in security from the Machines of the Besieged. This sort of Mantles or Galleries were not always composed of Hurdles and Fascines, but of raw Hides, Mattresses, or of a Curtain made of strong Cables, the whole suspended between very high Masts fixed in the Ground, which broke the force of whatever was discharged against it. The Work was continued to the height of these suspended Curtains, which were raised in proportion with it. At the same time the void spaces

spaces of the Platform were filled up with Stones, Earth, and other Materials; whilst some were employed in levelling and beating down the Earth, to make it firm, and capable of sustaining the weight of the Towers and Machines to be planted upon it. From these Towers and Batteries of Balistas and Catapultas, an hail of Stones, Arrows, and large Darts were discharged upon the Ramparts and Works of the Besieged.

C H A P.

VIII.

XVII. THE Terras which *Alexander the Great* caused to be raised against the Rock of *Coriæne* was very surprising. That Rock, which was supposed impregnable, was two thousand five hundred Paces high, and seven or eight hundred round. It was excessively steep on all sides, having only one path hewn out of the rock, by which no more than one Man could ascend without difficulty. It was besides surrounded with a deep Abyfs, which served instead of a Fossé, and which it was necessary to fill up, in order to approach it. All these Difficulties were not capable of discouraging *Alexander*, to whose Valour and Fortune nothing appeared impossible. He began therefore by ordering the high Fir-trees, that surrounded the Place in great numbers, to be cut down, in order to use them as Stairs to descend into the Fossé. His Troops worked night and day in filling it up. Tho' the whole Army were employed in their turns at this Work, they could do no more than thirty Foot a Day, and something less a Night, so difficult

CHAP. was the Work. When it was more advanced,
VIII. and began to come nearer the due height, they
drove Piles into both sides of the Fossé at pro-
per distances from each other, with Beams
laid cross, in order to support the weight to be
laid on it. They then formed a kind of Floor
or Bridge of Wicker and Fascines, which they
covered with Earth to equal the height of the
side of the Fossé, so that the Army could ad-
vance on a Way even with the Rock. 'Till
then the Barbarians had derided the Undertak-
ing, believing it utterly impracticable: but when
they saw themselves expos'd to the Darts of
the Enemy, who worked upon their Terrains
behind the Mantles; they began to lose cou-
rage, demanded to capitulate, and soon after
surrendered the Rock to *Alexander*.

XVIII. THE filling up of the Fossés was
not always so difficult as in this Instance, but
never failed to require great Precautions and
Labour. The Soldiers worked under cover
in the Tortoises, and other the like Machines.
The Fossés were filled up with Stones, the
trunks of Trees, and Fascines, the whole
mingled with Earth. It was necessary that
these Works should be of great solidity, to bear
the prodigious weight of the Machines planted
upon them, which would have made them fall
in, if this kind of Causeway had been composed
only of Fascines. If the Fossés were full of
Water, they began by drawing it off, either
intirely or in part, by different Drains, ^{which} they
cut for that purpose.

XIX. WHILST the Works were carrying CHAP.
on, the Besieged were not idle. They ran ^{VIII.}
many Mines under the Fossé to the part of it
filled up, in order to carry off the Earth,
which they handed from Man to Man into the
City. This hindered the Work from advan-
cing, the Besieged carrying off as fast as the
Besiegers laid on. They used also another
more effectual Stratagem, which was to cut
large Cavities underneath the Works of the
Enemy. After having removed some of the
Earth without its being discovered, they sup-
ported the rest with Props or large Beams,
which they smeared over with Grease and o-
ther Combustibles. They then filled up the
void space between the Props with dry Wood,
and such things as would soonest burn, and set
them on fire. Hence when the Props gave
way, the whole fell into a kind of Gulf, with
the Tortoises, battering Rams, and the Men
employed in working them.

XX. THE Besiegers used the same Artifice
to make the Walls of Places fall down.
When *Darius* besieged *Chalcedon*, the Walls
were so strong, and the Place so well pro-
vided of all Necessaries, that the Inhabitants
were in no pain about the Siege. The King
did not make any Approaches to the Walls,
nor lay waste the Country; he lay still, as if
he expected a considerable Reinforcement.
But whilst the People of *Chalcedon* had no
other thought than that of guarding their
Walls,

CHAP. Walls, he opened at the distance of three
VIII. quarters of a League from the City, a Mine,
which the *Perfians* carried on as far as the
Market-place. They judged themselves di-
rectly under it, from the Roots of the Olive-
Trees which they knew grew there. They
then opened their Mine, and entering by that
Passage, took the Place, whilst the Besieged
were still employed in keeping guard upon the
Walls. In the same manner *A. Servilius* the
Dictator took the City *Fidene*, having caused
several false Attacks to be made on different
sides, whilst a Mine carried on as far as the
Citadel, opened him a passage there for his
Troops. Another Dictator, the celebrated
Camillus, could not terminate the long Siege
of *Veii* but by this Stratagem. He undertook
to run a Mine as far as the Citadel of that
Place; and that the Work might not be dis-
continued, nor the Troops discouraged by the
length of it, he divided them into six Brigades;
who relieved each other every six Hours. The
Work being carried on night and day, it ex-
tended at length to the Citadel, and the City
was taken. At the Siege of *Atbens* by *Sylba*,
it is astonishing to consider the Mines and
Countermines used on both sides. The Mi-
ners were not long before they met and fought
furiously under Ground. The *Romans* having
cut their way as far as the Wall, sapped a great
part of it, and supported it in a manner in the
Air on Props of Wood, to which they set fire
without loss of Time. The Wall fell sud-
denly into the Fosse with an incredible Noise
and Ruins, and all that were upon it perished.

XXI. THE Mines from the Camp to the CHAP.
inside of a Place were long used before the invention of Sapping, and consisted at first in only running the Mine from the Camp to the Wall, and from thence a considerable way into the Place, underneath some large Temple, or other great Building little frequented in the Night. When they came thither they cut a large Space, which they propped up with large Timbers. They then opened a Passage of the whole breadth of this Space, for entering the Place in great numbers, whilst the Soldiers advanced into it through the Mine with the utmost Diligence. The other kind of Mines, for sapping the Foundation of a Wall, were opened very near the Camp to avoid being discovered, and were carried under the Fossé to the foot of the Wall, when they were enlarged to the right and left of the Foundations. This latter part was made very large, to receive the great number of Workmen, and long in proportion to the extent of the Wall to be thrown down. This being done, they began to sap at bottom, and as the Stones were pulled out, and the Work advanced, they propped the Superstructure with Timbers four foot high, which were fixed under the bottom Stones of the Foundation. As soon as the Work was finished, they laid Faggots and other Combustibles between the Props; and after they had set them ~~ne~~ fire they quitted that part of the Mine, and repassed the Fossé to avoid being stifled with the smoke;

CHA P. Smoke ; besides which, there was reason to
VIII. fear, that the Wall in falling would break into
the Mine, and bury all under it in its Ruins.

XXII. THE Ancients used several Methods to defend themselves against the Enemy after the Breach was made. Sometimes, but not so frequently, they made use of Trees cut down, which they extended along the whole front of the Breach very near each other, in order that the Branches might mingle together : they tied the Trunks very firmly to one another, so that it was impossible to separate these Trees, which formed an impenetrable Fence, behind which a multitude of Soldiers were posted, armed with Pikes and long Partizans. Sometimes the Breaches were made so suddenly, either by Saps above, or under Ground, or by the violent Blows of the Rams, that the Besieged often found their Works laid open when they least thought of it. They had recourse on such occasions to a very simple Refuge, in order to gain time to look about them, and to intrench behind the Breach. They threw down upon the ruins of the Wall a prodigious quantity of dry Wood, and other combustible Matter, to which they set fire. This occasioned so violent a Flame, that it was impossible for the Besiegers to pass through it, or approach the Breach. The Garrison of *Haliartus* in *Bœotia* thought of this Remedy against the *Romans*.

XXIII. BUT the most usual Method was ^{CHAP.} VIII. to erect new Walls behind the Breaches, which are now called *Retirades*, or Retrenchments. These Works generally were not parallel with the ruined Walls, but described a kind of Semi-circle towards the Place, of which the two ends joined the two sides of the Wall that remained whole. They did not omit to cut a very large and deep Ditch before this Work, in order that the Besiegers might be under the necessity of attacking it with no less difficulty, and all the Machines employed against the strongest Walls. *Sylla* having beat down great part of the Walls of the Piræum with his battering Rams, caused the Breach to be immediately attacked, where so furious a Battle ensued, that he was obliged to sound a Retreat. The Besieged improving the opportunity this gave them, immediately ran a second Wall behind the Breach. *Sylla* perceiving it made his Machines advance to batter it, rightly judging, that being newly built, it could not resist their Violence. The effect answered with no great difficulty, and he immediately ordered the Assault to be given. The Action was warm and vigorous, but he was at last repulsed with Loss, and obliged to abandon his Design. History abounds with Examples of this kind.

XXIV. HAVING thus given some Account of the Fortifications of the Ancients, described the principal Machines made use of by them in

CHAP. in their Sieges, and explained their Conduct
VIII. in the *Attack and Defence of Places*; I might
here, agreeably to what I have done in the
Chapter upon *Battles*, entertain the Reader
with a Description of some of the most cele-
brated Sieges of Antiquity, in order to give
him the juster Idea of this part of War. But
as this would too much swell the Discourse,
and is besides rather curious than useful, be-
cause of the great Changes that have been in-
troduced by the invention of Artillery and
Gun-powder, I shall content myself with refer-
ring to the Historians themselves, where these
Sieges are related at large. *Thucydides*, *Poly-
bius*, *Livy*, and *Josephus* furnish abundant Ex-
amples of this kind. The most curious and
remarkable are those of *Platea* by the *Lace-
dæmonians* and *Thebans*; of *Syracuse* by the
Athenians; of *Lilybæum*, *Syracuse*, *Carthage*,
and *Numantia* by the *Romans*; but above all
of *Alesia* by *Julius Cæsar*, and of *Jerusalem*
by *Titus Vespasian*. These two last are so
minutely and circumstantially described; the
one by *Cæsar*, who formed and conducted it;
the other by *Josephus*, who was an Eye-wit-
ness of all that passed, that whoever peruses
them attentively, will meet with every thing
that is worth knowing upon this Subject, and
be enabled to form a clear and comprehensive
Judgment of the high degree of Perfection
to which the Ancients, and in particular the
Romans, had carried this important Branch of
the *Art of War*.

C. JULIUS

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK I.

VOL. I.

B

THE A R G U M E N T.

- I. Description and Division of Gaul. II. Design by the Helvetians of invading it. III. Preparations. V. Difficulties. VII. March. VIII. Cæsar's Resolution to binder it. X. He attacks and defeats them at the River Arar. XI. Their Embassy to Cæsar, and his Answer. XIV. Cæsar reduced to great Straits for want of Corn, by the Perfidy of Dumnorix the Eduan; who nevertheless he pardons. XVII. Cæsar defeats the Helvetians in a second Battle. XXI. They surrender, and are obliged to return to their own Country. XXII. The Gauls congratulate Cæsar upon his Victory. XXIII. And complain to him of the Irruption of the Germans into Gaul under Ariovistus. XXIV. Cæsar's Embassy to Ariovistus. XXVII. His Answer. XXVIII. Cæsar leads his Army against Ariovistus. XXX. The Consternation that seizes his Troops. XXXI. He animates them by a Speech. XXXIII. Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus. XXXVII. Breaks off by the Approach of the German Cavalry. XXXVIII. Perfidy and Cruelty of Ariovistus. XXXIX. Cæsar and Ariovistus prepare for Battle. Manner of fighting in use among the German Horse. XLI. Cæsar defeats the Germans with great Slaughter, obliges them to repass the Rhine; and by one Battle puts an end to the War.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR's
COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK I.

TH E whole Country of *Gaul* is divided BOOK into three Parts: of which the *Bel-^{I.}gians* inhabit one; the *Aquitains* another; and a People called in their own Language *Celts*, in ours *Gauls*, the third. These all differ from each other in their Language, Customs, and Laws. The *Gauls* are divided from the *Aquitains* by the River *Garonne*, and by the *Marne* and the *Seine* from the *Belgians*. Of all these Nations the *Belgians* are the most warlike; as being farthest removed from the Culture and Refinements of the Province, and but little resorted to by Merchants, who furnish the Means of Luxury and Voluptuousness. They are also situated next to the *Germans*, who inhabit beyond the *Rhine*, with whom they are continually engaged in War. For this Reason likewise the *Helvetians* are distinguished by their Bravery beyond

4 CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES OF

BOOK yond the rest of the *Gauls*; because they are
I. almost constantly at war with the *Germans*, either
for the Defence of their own Territories, or
acting themselves as the Aggressors. One of these
Divisions, that which we have said was possessed
by the *Gauls*, begins at the River *Rbine*, and is
bounded by the *Garonne*, the Ocean, and the
Territories of the *Belgians*. It touches also, to-
wards the *Helvetians* and *Sequani*, upon the River
Rbine, extending itself northward. The Country
of the *Belgians*, commencing from the remotest
Confines of *Gaul*, stretches as far as the lower
Rbine, running all the way between the North and
East. *Aquitain* extends from the *Garonne* to the
Pyrenean Mountains, and that part of the Ocean
which borders upon *Spain*. Its Situation is North-
West.

II. ORGETORIX was by far the richest and
most illustrious of the *Helvetians*. This Noble-
man, in the Consulship of *M. Messala* and *M. Piso*,
prompted by an aspiring Ambition, formed a
Confederacy of the principal Men of the State ;
and persuaded the People to quit their Country
in a Body, representing : " that as they surpassed
" all the Nations around them in Valour, it
" would be easy for them to gain the intire
" Sovereignty of *Gaul*." He the sooner brought
them into this Design, because the *Helvetians*, by
the Nature of their Situation, are every where
confined within very narrow Territories : On one
side by the *Rbine*, a broad and deep River, which
separates their Country from that of the *Ger-
mans* : On the other by Mount *Jura*, a high Ridge
of Hills, which runs between them and the *Se-
quani* : Lastly, by the Lake *Lemanus*, and
the River *Rbone*, which is the Boundary on
the

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

5

the side of the *Roman* Province. By this B OOK means it happened, that they could not so easily I. enlarge their Territories, or make Conquests on the neighbouring States; which, to Men of a war-like Spirit, and fond of Fighting, was abundant cause of Discontent: For being a numerous People, and of great Fame for their Bravery, they thought themselves much too strained in a Country, which was but two hundred and forty Miles in length, and about one hundred and eighty in breadth.

III. URGED by these Considerations, and still more by the Authority and Persuasions of *Orgetorix*, they resolved to provide every thing necessary for an Expedition; to buy up a great number of Waggons and Carriage-Horses; to form large Magazines of Corn, that they might have sufficient to supply them in their March; to establish Peace and Amity with the neighbouring States. They imagined two Years would be sufficient for these Preparations, and obliged themselves by a Law to begin their March on the third. The whole Management of this Design was committed to *Orgetorix*, who undertook an Embassy to the neighbouring States. On this Occasion he persuaded *Castinus*, the Son of *Catamantales*, of the Nation of the *Sequani*, whose Father had for many Years enjoyed the Sovereignty over that People, and been stiled Friend and Ally by the Senate of *Rome*, to possess himself of the supreme Authority in his own Country, which his Father had held before him. He likewise persuaded *Dumnorix* the *Aduan*, the Brother of *Divitiacus*, who was at that time the leading Man in his own State, and greatly beloved by the People, to attempt the same among the *Aduans*: and the more to secure him to his Interest, gave him his Daughter in Marriage. He told

BOOK told them, " That they might with the greatest
I. " Facility accomplish their Designs ; as he was
himself assured of attaining the supreme Authority in his own State, which was without Dif-
" pute the most powerful and considerable of all
" Gaul ; and would then employ his whole Inter-
" rest and Forces, to establish them in their re-
" spective Sovereignties." Moved by these Considerations, they reciprocally bound themselves by a solemn Oath ; not doubting, when they had once attained the chief Sway in their several States, with the united Forces of three such powerful and mighty Nations, to render themselves Masters of all Gaul. The *Helvetians* having Notice of this Design, obliged *Orgetorix*, according to the Custom of their Country, to answer to the Charge brought against him in Chains : and had he been found guilty, the Law condemned him to be burnt alive. On the Day appointed for his Trial, he assembled all his Slaves and Domesticks, amounting to ten thousand Men ; and all his Clients and Debtors, of which the Number was very great : By their means he rescued himself out of the Hands of his Judges. While the People, provoked at this Contempt of the Laws, were preparing to support their Authority by Force, and the Magistrates had assembled a great Number of Men for that Purpose ; *Orgetorix* died : Nor are the *Helvetians* without Suspicion of his having made away with himself.

V IV. AFTER his Death, the *Helvetians* still continued to prosecute with the same Diligence, the Design they had formed of quitting their Country. When they had completed their Preparations, they set fire to all their Towns, to the Number of twelve ; to their Boroughs and Villages, which amounted to four hundred ; and to their other private

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

7

vate Buildings. They likewise burnt all their BOOK Corn, except what they had resolved to carry I. along with them ; that having no Hope of returning to their own Country, they might be the more disposed to confront all Dangers. Each Man had Orders to carry out with him Provisions for three Months. The *Rauraci*, *Tulingians*, and *Latobrigians*, neighbouring Nations, being persuaded to follow the same Counsel, likewise set fire to their Towns and Villages, and joined with them in the Expedition. The *Boians* too, who had formerly inhabited beyond the *Rbine*, and passing over into *Noricum*, had settled in that Country, and possessed themselves of *Noreia* its Capital City, were associated into the Design.

V. THERE were only two Ways by which they could march out of their own Country : One through the Territories of the *Sequani*, between Mount *Jura* and the *Rhone*, narrow and difficult, insomuch that in some Places a single File of Waggons could hardly pass. The impending Mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of Men was sufficient to stop them. The other lay through our Province, far easier and readier ; because the *Rhone*, which flows between the Confines of the *Helvetians* and *Allobrogians*, a People lately subjected to the *Romans*, was in some Places fordable : And *Geneva*, a frontier Town of the *Allobrogians*, adjoining to the Territories of the *Helvetians*, had a Bridge belonging to this last People. They therefore doubted not, either of persuading the *Allobrogians*, who as yet seemed to bear no great Affection to the People of *Rome*; or at least of obliging them by Force, to grant them a Passage through their Territories. Every thing being now ready for the

B 4 Expedition,

BOOK Expedition, they appointed a Day for their general

I. Rendezvous on the Banks of the *Rhone*. The Day
fixed on was the Twenty-eighth of *March*, in the
Consulship of *L. Piso* and *A. Gabinius*.

VI. CÆSAR having notice of these Proceedings, and that it was the Design of the *Helvetians* to attempt a Passage through the Province, hastened his Departure from *Rome*; and posting by great Journeys into farther *Gaul*, came to *Geneva*. He began with breaking down the Bridge over the *Rhone*; and as there was at that time but one *Roman* Legion in *Transalpine Gaul*, he ordered great Levies to be made throughout the whole Province. The *Helvetians* being informed of his Arrival, deputed several Noblemen of the first Rank, with *Numeius* and *Verodoctius* at their head, to wait upon him in the Name of the State, and represent, "that they meant not to offer the least Injury to the *Roman* Province; that Necessity alone had determined them to the Design of passing through it, because they had no other way by which to direct their March; that they therefore intreated they might have his Permission for that purpose." But *Cæsar* bearing in mind, that *L. Cætius* the Consul had been slain, and his Army routed, and made to pass under the Yoke by the *Helvetians*, did not think proper to grant their Request. Neither could he persuade himself, that Men so ill affected to the People of *Rome*, if permitted to pass through the Province, would abstain from Acts of Hostility and Violence. However, that he might gain time, till the Troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble; he told the Ambassadors he would consider of their Demand, and that if they returned by the Nineteenth of *April*, they should have his final Answer.

Meanwhile

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

9

Meanwhile with the Legion he then had, and BOOK I.
the Soldiers that came in to him from all Parts
of the Province, he ran a Wall sixteen Feet high,
and nineteen Miles in length, with a Ditch, from
the Lake *Lemanus* into which the *Rhone* discharges
itself, to Mount *Jura*, which divides the Territories
of the *Sequani* from the *Helvetians*. This Work
finished, he raised Redoubts from space to space,
and manned them with Troops, that if the Enemy
should attempt to force a Passage, he might be
in a condition to hinder them. When the Day
appointed came, and the Ambassadors returned for
an Answer, he told them; that he could not, con-
sistent with the Usage and Behaviour of the People
of *Rome* on the like Occasions, grant any Troops
a Passage through the Province: and should they
attempt it by Force, he let them see he was pre-
pared to oppose them.

VII. THE *Helvetians* driven from this Hope,
endeavour'd to force the Passage of the River; some
with Boats coupled together, or Floats which they
had prepared in great Numbers; others by the
Fords of the *Rhone*, where was the least Depth of
Water; sometimes by Day, but oftener in the
Night: but being repulsed by the Strength of the
Works, the Concourse of the Troops, and the
Discharge of Darts, they at last abandoned the
Attempt. There was still one Way left through
the Territories of the *Sequani*, by which however,
without the Consent of the Natives, they could
not march, because of the Narrowness of the Pass.
As they were not able to prevail by their own
Application, they sent Ambassadors to *Dumnorix*
the *Æduan*, that thro' his Intercession they might
obtain this Favour of the *Sequani*. *Dumnorix* by
his Popularity and Generosity had great Influence
with

BOOK with the *Sequani*, and was also well affected to the
I. *Helvetians*, because from among them he had married
the Daughter of *Orgetorix*. Besides, urged by
ambitious Views, he was framing to himself Schemes
of Power, and wanted to have as many States as
possible bound to him by Offices of Kindness. He
therefore charged himself with the Negotiation,
obtained for the *Helvetians* the Liberty of passing
through the Territories of the *Sequani*, and en-
gaged the two Nations mutually to give Hostages.
The *Sequani*, not to molest the *Helvetians* in their
March; and the *Helvetians*, to pass without offer-
ing any Insult or Injury to the Country.

VIII. CÆSAR soon had Intelligence of their
March, and that they now designed to pass through
the Country of the *Sequani* and *Aeduans* into the
Territories of the *Santones*, which border upon
those of the *Tolosatians*, a State that makes Part of
the *Roman Province*. Should this happen, he fore-
saw many Inconveniences likely to arise, from the
Neighbourhood of a warlike and disaffected People,
in an open and plentiful Country. For these Re-
asons he gave the Command of the new Works he
had raised to *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant, and he
himself hastened by great Journeys into *Italy*.
There he raised two Legions, and drew three
more, that were cantoned round *Aquileia*, out of
their Winter-quarters; and with these five Legions,
took the nearest way over the *Alps* into farther *Gaul*.
The *Centrones*, *Graioceli*, and *Caturigians*, seizing
the higher Grounds, endeavoured to oppose his
March. But having repulsed them in several
Encounters, he in seven Days after setting out
from *Ocelum*, a City in the extreme Confines of the
nearer Province, arrived among the *Vocentians*, whose
Territories lie within the farther Province. Thence
he

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

ii

he led his Army into the Country of the *Allobrogians*, BOOK
and crossing their Territories, entered upon the Lands I.
of the *Segusians*. These are the first on the other side the Rhone, beyond the Boundaries of the *Roman* Province.

IX. THE *Helvetians* had by this Time marched their Forces through the narrow Pass of Mount *Jura*, and the Territories of the *Sequani*; and were come into the Country of the *Aduans*, plundering their Lands. The *Aduans*, unable to defend themselves and Possessions from the Violence of their Enemies, sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to request Aid. They told him, " That such at all times " had been their Merit with the People of *Rome*, " that they might challenge greater Regard, than to " have their Lands laid waste, their Children led " into Captivity, and their Towns assaulted and " taken, almost in the very Sight of a *Roman* " Army." At the same time also the *Ambarri*, Friends and Allies of the *Aduans*, sent to inform him: " That compelled to abandon the open Coun- " try, they could hardly defend their Towns from " the Rage of the Enemy." The *Allobrogians* like-
wise, who had Dwellings and Possessions beyond the *Rhone*, fled to him for Protection, and assured him: " That there was nothing left them but a " naked and desolate Country." Whereupon *Cæsar*, moved by these Complaints and Remonstrances, resolved not to wait 'till the Fortunes of his Allies should be consumed, and the *Helvetians* arrive in the Territories of the *Santones*.

X. THE River *Arar* flows into the *Rhone*, thro' the Confines of the *Aduans* and *Sequani*, with a Current incredibly smooth and gentle, insomuch that it is impossible to distinguish by the Eye, which way its Waters glide. The *Helvetians* were

at

BOOK at this time employed in passing it on Floats and
I. a Bridge of Boats. When *Cæsar* was informed by
his Spies, that three Parts of their Forces were got
over the River, and that the fourth still remained
on this Side; he left his Camp about midnight
with three Legions, and came up with the Party
of the Enemy that had not yet passed. As he
found them unprepared, and incumbered with their
Baggage, he attacked them immediately, and kill-
ed a great Number on the Spot. The rest fled,
and sheltered themselves in the nearest Woods.
This was called the *Tigurine* Canton, being one of
the four into which the whole Body of the *Helve-
tians* are divided. This very Canton, in the Me-
mory of our Fathers, marching out of their own
Territories, had vanquished and killed the Consul
L. Cæfcius, and obliged his Army to pass under the
Yoke. Thus, whether by Chance or the Direc-
tion of the immortal Gods, that Part of the *Hel-
vetian* State which had brought so signal a Calamity
upon the *Roman* People, were the first to feel the
Weight of their Resentment. In this *Cæsar* aveng-
ed not only the publick, but likewise his own domes-
ticky Injuries; because in the same Battle with
Cæfcius, was slain also *L. Piso* his Lieutenant, the
Grandfather of *L. Piso*, *Cæsar's* Father-in-law.

XI. AFTER this Battle, that he might come
up with the remaining Forces of the *Helvetians*,
he caused a Bridge to be made across the *Arar*,
and carried over his Army. The *Helvetians* dis-
mayed at his sudden Approach, as he had spent
only one Day in passing the River, which they had
with the utmost Difficulty accomplished in twenty,
sent an Embassy to him, at the head of which was
Divico, who had been General of the *Helvetians* in
the War against *Cæfcius*. He addressed *Cæsar* to
this

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

13

this Effect : " That if the People of *Rome* were disposed to conclude a Peace with the *Helvetians*, they would go and settle in whatever Country *Cæsar* should think fit to assign them : but if they persisted in the Design of making War, he would do well to call to mind the ancient Discipline of the *Roman* People, and the Valour of the *Helvetic* Nation : That in having surprised one of the Cantons, while the others, who had passed the River, could not return to succour it, there was no Reason to be much elated on the Advantage, nor to despise his Enemies : That the *Helvetians* had learned of their Ancestors, to depend more on Courage than on Cunning and Ambushes ; and it therefore importeth him to beware, not to render the Place where they were then posted famous and memorable with Posterity, by a new Defeat of the *Roman* People, and the Destruction of their Army."

XII. To this *Cæsar* replied : " That he therefore the less doubted of the Issue, as he well knew all the Circumstances of the Affair to which the *Helvetians* referred; and resented them the more strongly, as they had happened undeservedly to the *Roman* People: That had they been conscious of any Injury on their Side, it would have been easy for them to have kept up on their Guard; but herein were they deceived, that neither did they know of any thing which might give them cause of Fear, nor could they apprehend they had any thing to fear without cause: That supposing him inclined to overlook old Injuries, could they expect he would also forget their late Insults, in attempting, against his Will, to force a Passage through the Province, and laying waste the Territories of the

Aeduans,

BOOK " *Aeduans, Ambarri, and Allobrogians?* That their
I. " boasting so insolently of their Victory, and won-
w " dering that Vengeance had been deferred so
" long, were a new Set of Provocations. But
" they ought to remember, that the immortal
" Gods were sometimes wont to grant long Im-
" punity, and a great run of Prosperity to Men,
" whom they pursued with the Punishment of their
" Crimes, that by the sad Reverse of their Condi-
" tion, Vengeance might fall the heavier. Tho'
" these were just Grounds of Resentment, yet, if
" they would satisfy the *Aeduans* and their Allies
" for the Ravages committed in their Country,
" as likewise the *Allobrogians*, and give Hostages
" for the Performance of their Promises, he was
" ready to conclude a Peace with them." *Divico*
replied : " That such were the Institutions of
" the *Helvetians*, derived from their Ancestors,
" that they had been accustomed to receive, not
" to give Hostages ; and that no body knew it bet-
" ter than the *Romans*." Having returned this
Answer, he departed.

XIII. THE next Day they decamped. *Cæsar*
did the same ; and ordered all the Cavalry, whom,
to the Number of four thousand, he had raised in
the Province, and drawn together from the *A-
eduans* and their Allies, to go before, and observe
the Enemy's March. But pressing too close upon
their Rear, they were obliged to engage in a dis-
advantageous Place, and lost a few Men. The
Helvetians, encouraged by this Success, as having,
wtih no more than five hundred Horse, repulsed so
great a Multitude, began to face us more boldly,
and sometimes to sally from their Rear, and attack
our Van. *Cæsar* kept back his Men from fight-
ing ; thinking it sufficient for the present, to strait-

en the Enemy's Forages, and prevent their ravage- BOOK I.
ing and plundering the Country. In this manner the Armies marched for fifteen Days together; in- somuch that between our Van, and the Rear of the *Helvetians*, the Distance did not exceed five or six Miles.

XIV. In the mean time *Cæsar* daily pressed the *Aeduans* for the Corn which they had promised in the name of the Publick. For by reason of the Coldness of the Climate, (*Gaul*, as we have said, lying considerably to the North,) he was so far from finding the Corn ripe in the Fields, that there was not even sufficient Forage for the Horses. Neither could he make use of those Supplies which came to him by the way of the *Arar*, because the *Helvetians* had turned off from the River, and he was determined not to leave them. The *Aeduans* put him off from day to day with fair Speeches; sometimes pretending that it was bought up, and ready to be sent; sometimes, that it was actually on the way. But when he saw no End of these Delays, and that the Day approached for delivering out Corn to the Army; calling together their Chiefs, of whom he had a great Number in his Camp; among the rest *Divitiacus*, and *Liscus* their supreme Magistrate, who is stiled *Vergobret* in the Language of the Country, and created yearly, with a Power of Life and Death; he severely inveighed against them: " That at a time when
" Corn was neither to be procured for Money, nor
" had out of the Fields, in so urgent a Conjunc-
" ture, and while the Enemy was so near, they
" had not taken care to supply him;" adding,
" that as he had engaged in that War chiefly at
" their Request, he had the greater Reason to
" complain of their abandoning him."

XV. UPON

BOOK XV. UPON this, *Licus*, moved by *Cæsar's*

I. Speech, thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed : " That there were some among them whose Authority with the People was very great ; and who, tho' but private Men, had yet more Power than the Magistrates themselves : That these, by artful and seditious Speeches, alarmed the Multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their Corn ; insinuating, that if their own State could not obtain the Sovereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the Helvetians, Gauls like themselves, than the Romans ; there not being the least Reason to question, but these last, after having subdued the Helvetians, would, along with the rest of Gaul, deprive the *Aduans* also of their Liberty : That the very same Men gave Intelligence to the Enemy of all the Designs of the Romans, and whatsoever was transacted in their Camp ; his Authority not being sufficient to restrain them : Nay, that tho' compelled by necessity, he had now made a Discovery of the whole matter to *Cæsar*, he was not ignorant of the Danger to which he exposed himself by such a Conduct ; and had, for that reason, chosen to be silent, as long as he thought it consistent with the Safety of the State." *Cæsar* perceived, that *Dumnorix*, the Brother of *Divitiacus*, was pointed at by this Speech. But as he was unwilling that these Matters should be debated in the Presence of so many Witnesses, he speedily dismissed the Council, retaining only *Licus*. He then question'd him apart on what he had just said, and was answered with greater Courage and Freedom. He put the same Questions to others also in private, who all confirmed the Truth of what had been told him : " That *Dumnorix* was a Man of an enterprising Spirit,

His WARS IN G A U L.

17

BOOK I.
“ Spirit, fond of Revolutions, and in great favour with the People, because of his Liberality :
“ That he had for many Years farmed the Customs, and other publick Revenues of the *Æduans*, at a very low price ; no one daring to bid against him : That by this means he had considerably increased his Estate, and was enabled to extend his Bounty to all about him : That he constantly kept a great Number of Horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went : That his Interest was not confined merely to his own Country, but extended likewise to the neighbouring States : That the better to support this Interest, he had married his Mother to a Man of principal Rank and Authority among the *Biturigians*, had himself taken a Wife from among the *Helvetians*, and matched his Sister and the rest of his Kindred into other the most powerful States : That he favoured and wished well to the *Helvetians* on the score of that Alliance, and personally hated *Cæsar*, and the *Romans*, because by their Arrival his Power had been diminished, and *Divitiacus* his Brother restored to his former Credit and Authority : That should the *Romans* be overthrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the Sovereignty by means of the *Helvetians*. On the contrary, should they prevail, he must not only give up these Hopes, but even all Expectation of retaining the Influence he had already acquired.” *Cæsar* likewise found upon Inquiry, that in the last Engagement of the Horse, *Dumnorix*, who commanded the *Æduan* Cavalry, was the first that fled, and by that flight struck a Terror into the rest of the Troops.

BOOK XVI. THESE things appearing, and other un-
I. doubted Circumstances concurring to heighten his
Suspicions : That he had procured for the *Helvetians* a Passage through the Territories of the *Sedani* : That he had effected an Exchange of Hostages between the two Nations : That he had done all this not only without Permission from him, or his own State, but even without their Knowledge and Participation : That he was accused by the chief Magistrate of the *Aeduans* : They seemed altogether a sufficient ground to *Cæsar*, why he should either himself take cognizance of the Matter, or order the State to proceed against him. One thing, however, still kept him in suspence ; the Consideration of his Brother *Divitiacus*, a Man of singular Probity, Justice, and Moderation ; a faithful Ally of the *Roman People*, and on the foot of Friendship with *Cæsar*. That he might not therefore give offence to one for whom he had so great a Value : before he took any farther Step in the Affair, he sent for *Divitiacus* ; and having removed the usual Interpreters, addressed him by *C. Valerius Proculus*, a Prince of the Province of *Gaul*, his intimate Friend, in whom he reposed the greatest Confidence. He put him in mind of what had been said of *Dumnorix* in his own presence in the Council of the *Gauls*, and repeated the fresh Complaints made to himself against him in private. He urged, and even requested, that without Offence to him, he might either proceed against him himself, or order the State to take the Matter under Consideration. *Divitiacus* embracing *Cæsar* with many Tears, begged him not to take any severe Resolution against his Brother. "He was "sensible," he told him, "of the Truth of all "that was alledged, and had himself more reason "to

" to be dissatisfied than any Man : That at a time ~~BOOK~~
 " when his Authority was great, both at home I.
 " and in the other Provinces of *Gaul*, and his
 " Brother but little considered on account of his
 " Youth, he had used his Interest to bring him
 " into Credit : That though *Dumnorix* had made
 " use of that Power acquired by his means, to di-
 " minish his Favour with the People, and even to
 " urge on his Ruin, he nevertheless still found
 " himself swayed by his Affection, and a Regard
 " for the Esteem of the Publick : That should
 " his Brother meet with any rigorous Treatment
 " from *Cæsar*, while he himself possessed so large a
 " share of his Favour, all Men would believe it
 " done with his Consent, and the Minds of the
 " Gauls be for ever alienated from him." *Cæsar* ob-
 serving his concern, took him by the Hand, com-
 forted him, desired him to make an end of speaking,
 assured him, that such was his Regard for him, he
 would for his sake overlook not only his own In-
 juries, but even those of the Republick. He then
 sent for *Dumnorix*, call'd him into his Brother's
 Presence, declared the Subjects of Complaint he
 had against him, mentioned what he himself knew,
 what was laid to his Charge by the State, and ad-
 monished him for the future to avoid all cause of
 Suspicion ; adding, that he would forgive what
 was past for the sake of his Brother *Divitiacus*.
 He appointed, however, some to have an Eye
 over him, that he might be informed of his Be-
 haviour, and of those he conversed with.

XVII. THE same Day, having learnt by his Scouts, that the Enemy had posted themselves under a Hill about eight Miles from his Camp, he sent out a Party to view the Ground, and examine the ascent of the Hill. These reporting it to be

BOOK extremely easy, he detached *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant about midnight, with two Legions, and the same Guides who had examined the Ground the Day before; and having acquainted him with his Design, ordered him to get possession of the Top of the Hill. He himself set out three Hours after with the rest of the Army, by the same Rout the *Helvetians* had taken, and sent all the Cavalry before. *P. Considius*, an Officer of Reputation, who had served in the Army of *L. Sylla*, and afterwards that of *M. Crassus*, advanced with a small Party to get Intelligence.

XVIII. AT Day-break, when *Labienus* had got possession of the top of the Hill, and *Cæsar* was within a Mile and a half of the Enemies Camp; while they in the mean time, as he afterwards learnt from his Prisoners, knew nothing either of his, or *Labienus's* Approach: *Considius* came galloping back, and assured *Cæsar*, that the Summit of the Mountain was possessed by the Enemy, and that he had seen the *Gallick* Arms and Ensigns there. *Cæsar* retired to a neighbouring Hill, and drew up his Men in order of Battle. *Labienus*, whose Instructions were, not to engage the Enemy till he saw the rest of the Army approaching their Camp, that the Attack might be made on all Sides at the same time; having gained the Top of the Hill, waited the Arrival of our Men, without stirring from his Post. At length, when the Day was far spent, *Cæsar* understood by his Spies, that *Labienus* was in possession of the Mountain, that the Enemy had decamped, and that *Considius*, blinded by Fear, had reported what he never saw. The rest of that Day he followed the Enemy at the usual Distance, and encamped within three Miles of them.

XIX. THE

HIS WARS IN G A U L.

XIX. THE Day after, as the time drew near ~~BOOK~~
for delivering out Corn to the Army, and as he
was not above eighteen Miles from *Bibracte* the ~~the~~
Capital of the *Aduans*, where he hoped to find
sufficient Supplies for the Subsistence of his Troops;
he quitted the Pursuit of the *Helvetians*, and di-
rected his March thither. The Enemy being in-
formed of this Motion by some Deserters, who
had belonged to the Troop of *L. Emilius*, an Offi-
cer of Horse among the *Gauls*; and either ascrib-
ing it to Fear in the *Romans*, the rather, because
they had not attacked them the Day before, though
possessed of the higher Ground; or flattering them-
selves with the Hopes of intercepting their Provi-
sions: all on a sudden changed their Resolution,
and instead of continuing their former March be-
gan to pursue and harass our Rear. *Cæsar* observ-
ing this, retired to a neighbouring Hill, and sent
his Cavalry to sustain the Charge of the Enemy.
In the mean time he drew up his four veteran Le-
gions in three Lines towards the middle of the
Hill; in such a manner, that the two Legions
newly raised in *Cisalpine Gaul*, and all the Auxilia-
ries, were posted above them; and the whole
Mountain was covered with his Troops. He or-
dered all the Baggage to be brought into one
Place, and committed it to the Charge of those
who stood on the upper Part of the Hill. The
Helvetians following with all their Forces, drew
their Carriages likewise into one Place; and hav-
ing repulsed our Cavalry, and formed themselves
into a Phalanx, advanced in close Order to attack
our Van.

XX. CÆSAR having first sent away his own
Horse, and afterwards those of all his Officers,
that by making the Danger equal, no Hope might
remain

CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES OF

BOOK I: remain but in Victory; encouraged his Men, and began the Charge. The *Romans*, who fought with the Advantage of the higher Ground, pouring their Darts upon the Enemy from above, easily broke their Phalanx; and then fell upon them Sword in Hand. What greatly incumbered the *Gauls* in this Fight, was, that their Targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the Javelins of the *Romans*, they could neither draw out the Javelins, because forked at the Extremity, nor act with Agility in the Battle, because deprived in a manner of the use of their left Arms: so that many, after long tossing their Targets to and fro to no purpose to disengage them, chose rather to throw them away, and expose themselves without Defence to the Weapons of their Enemies. At length however, being overpowered with Wounds, they began to give ground; and observing a Mountain at about a Mile's distance, gradually retreated thither. Having gained the Mountain, and our Men pursuing them; the *Boians* and *Tulingians*, who to the Number of fifteen thousand covered their Retreat, and served as a Guard to their Rear, falling upon the *Romans* in Flank as they advanced, began to surround them. This being perceived by the *Helvetians*, who had retired to the Mountain, they again returned upon us, and renewed the Fight. The *Romans* facing about, charged the Enemy in three Bodies; their first and second Line making head against those who had been forced to retreat, and their third sustaining the Assault of the *Boians* and *Tulingians*. The Battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the Enemy being at last obliged to give way, one Part withdrew towards the Hill whither they had before retreated, and the rest sheltered themselves behind the Carriages. During

ing this whole Action, tho' itla sted from one BOOK o' clock in the Afternoon till Evening, no Man saw the Back of an Enemy. The Fight was renewed with great Obstinacy at the Carriages, and continued till the Night was far spent: for the Gauls making use of their Carts by way of a Rampart, darted their Javelins upon us from above; and some thrusting their Lances through the Wheels of the Waggons, wounded our Men. After a long Dispute, we at last got possession of their Baggage and Camp. A Son and Daughter of *Orgetorix* were found among the Prisoners. Only an hundred and twenty thousand of the Enemy survived this Defeat; who retreating all that Night, and continuing their March without Intermision, arrived on the fourth Day in the Territories of the *Lingones*. The *Romans* mean-while made no Attempt to pursue them; the Care of their Wounded, and of burying their Dead, obliging them to continue upon the Spot three Days. *Cæsar* sent Letters and Messengers to the *Lingones*, not to furnish them with Corn or other Necessaries, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same Treatment with the Fugitives; and after a Repose of three Days, set forward to pursue them with all his Forces.

XXI. THE *Helvetians*, compelled by an extreme Want of all Things, sent Ambassadors to him to treat about a Surrender. These meeting him on the Way, and throwing themselves at his Feet; in suppliant Terms, and with many Tears, begged for Peace. *Cæsar* gave them no express Answer at that time; only ordered the *Helvetians* to wait for him in the Place where they then were, which they did accordingly. Upon his Arrival, he demanded Hostages, their Arms, and the Slaves

BOOK who had deserted to their Camp. As the Execution of all this took up some time; about four thousand Men of the Canton called *Urbigenus*, either fearing Punishment should they deliver up their Arms, or induced by the Hopes of escaping; because in so great a Multitude they fancied their Flight might be concealed, nay perhaps remain altogether unknown; stole out of the Camp in the beginning of the Night, and took the Rout of *Germany* and the *Rhine*. *Cæsar* being informed of it, dispatched Orders to those through whose Territories they must pass, to stop and send them back wherever they should be found, if they meant to acquit themselves of favouring their Escape. He was obeyed, and the fugitive *Urbigenians* were treated as Enemies. All the rest, upon delivering the Hostages that were required of them, their Arms, and the Deserters, were admitted to a Surrender. The *Helvetians*, *Tulingians*, and *Latobrigians*, had Orders to return to their own Country, and rebuild the Towns and Villages they had burnt. And because having lost all their Corn, they were utterly without the means of subsisting themselves, he gave it in charge to the *Allabrogiens* to supply them. *Cæsar*'s Design in this was, that the Lands deserted by the *Helvetians* might not be left vacant, left the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, drawn by the Goodness of the Soil, should be tempted to seize them, and thereby become Neighbours to the *Allabrogiens* and the *Roman* Province in *Gaul*. The *Bocians*, at the Request of the *Aeduans*, who esteemed them highly on account of their Valour, were permitted to settle in their Territories; where they assigned them Lands, and by degrees admitted them to all the Rights and Privileges of Natives. A Roll was found in the *Helvetic* Camp, written in Greek Characters, and brought to *Cæsar*. It contained

a List of all who had set out upon this Expedition B O O K
capable of bearing Arms; likewise of the Children,
Women, and old Men. By this it appeared,
that the Number of the *Helvetians* was two hun-
dred and sixty-three thousand, of the *Tulingians*
thirty-six thousand, of the *Latobrigians* fourteen
thousand, of the *Rauraci* twenty-three thousand,
of the *Boians* thirty-two thousand; in all three
hundred and sixty-eight thousand, of which
ninety-two thousand were fit to bear Arms. A
Review being made by *Cæsar's* Command, of those
that returned to their own Country, the Number
was found to be an hundred and ten thousand.

XXII. THE War with the *Helvetians* being ended,
Ambassadors from all Parts of *Gaul*, Men of prin-
cipal Consideration in their several States, waited
upon *Cæsar* to congratulate his Success. They told
him; " That tho' they were sensible the People
" of *Rome*, in the War against the *Helvetians*,
" meant chiefly to avenge the Injuries formerly
" received from that Nation, yet had the Event of
" it been highly advantageous to all *Gaul*; be-
" cause in a time of full Prosperity, the *Helvetians*
" had left their Territories with design to make War
" upon the other States; that having brought them
" under Subjection, they might choose themselves
" a Habitation at pleasure, and render all the rest
" of the Country tributary." They requested,
" That they might have his Permission to hold by
" a Day prefixed, a general Assembly of all the
" Provinces of *Gaul*; there being some things they
" wanted to discuss and propose to him, which
" concerned the whole Nation in common." Leave being granted accordingly, they fixed the
Day for the Assembly, and bound themselves by
an Oath, not to discover their Deliberations to
any,

BOOK any, unless named for that purpose by genera
I. Consent.

XXIII. UPON the rising of the Council, the same Chiefs of the States as before, returned to *Cæsar*, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, of Matters that regarded their own and the common Safety. Their Desire being granted, they all threw themselves at his Feet, and with Tears represented ; " That it was of no less Importance to them to have their present Deliverances kept secret, than to succeed in the Request they were going to make ; because should any Discovery happen, they were in danger of being exposed to the utmost Cruelties." *Divitiacus* the *Aduan* spoke in the name of the rest. He told him ; " That two Factions divided all *Gaul* ; one headed by the *Aduans*, the other by the *Averni* ; that after a Contention of many Years between these for the Superiority, the *Averni* and *Sequani* came at last to a Resolution of calling in the *Germans* : That at first only fifteen thousand had crossed the *Rhine* ; but being a wild and savage People, and greatly liking the Customs, Manners, and plenteous Country of the *Gauls*, others soon followed ; insomuch that at present there were not less than an hundred and twenty thousand of them in *Gaul* : That the *Aduans*, and their Allies, had frequently tried their Strength against them in Battle ; but by a Succession of Defeats had lost all their Nobility, Senate, and Cavalry : That broken by these Calamities and Losses, tho' formerly they had held the first fway in *Gaul*, both by their own Valour, and the Favour and Friendship of the People of *Rome*, yet now they were reduced to the necessity of sending their principa

“ principal Noblemen as Hostages to the *Sequani*, BOOK
“ and of obliging themselves by an Oath, neither I.
“ to demand their Hostages back, nor implore the
“ Assistance of the *Roman People*, nor refuse a per-
“ petual Submission to the Dominion and Autho-
“ rity of the *Sequani*: That he alone of all the
“ *Aeduans* had refused to take the Oath, or give
“ his Children for Hostages, and on that account
“ had fled his Country, and came to *Rome* to im-
“ plore the Assistance of the Senate; as being the
“ only Man in the State, whom neither Obligation
“ of Oath, nor the Restraint of Hostages, with-
“ held from such a Step: That after all it had
“ fared worse with the victorious *Sequani*, than with
“ the vanquished *Aeduans*; because *Ariovitus* King
“ of the *Germanis* had seated himself in their Terri-
“ tories; had seized a third of their Lands, the
“ most fertile in all *Gaul*, and now ordered them
“ to give up another third in behalf of the *Ha-*
“ *rudes*, who had passed the *Rhine* a few Months
“ before with twenty-four thousand Men, and
“ wanted a Settlement and Habitations: That in a
“ few Years all the native *Gauls* would be driven
“ from their Territories, and all the *Germans* trans-
“ plant themselves over the *Rhine*, the Climate
“ being far superior to that of their own Country,
“ and the way of living not admitting a Com-
“ parison: That *Ariovitus*, ever since the Defeat
“ of the *Gauls* at *Amagetobria*, had behaved with
“ unheard-of Tyranny and Haughtiness, demand-
“ ing the Children of the first Nobility as Hostages,
“ and exercising all manner of Cruelties upon
“ them, if his Orders were not implicitly followed
“ in every thing: That he was a Man of a savage,
“ passionate, and imperious Character, while
“ Government was no longer to be born; and un-
“ less some resource was found in *Cesar* and the
“ People

BOOK " People of *Rome*, the *Gauls* must all follow the
 I. " Example of the *Helvetians*, and like them aban-
 don their Country, in order to find some other
 " Habitation and Settlement, remote from the
 " *Germans*, wherever Fortune should point it
 " out to them : That were these Complaints and
 " Representations to come to the Knowledge of
 " *Ariovistus*, he made no doubt of his inflicting the
 " severest Punishments upon all the Hostages in
 " his Hands : but that it would be easy for
 " *Cæsar*, by his own Authority, and that of the
 " Army he commanded ; by the fame of his late
 " Victory, and the Terror of the *Roman Name* ; to
 " hinder any more *Germans* from passing the *Rhine* ;
 " and to defend *Gaul* from the Insults of *Ariovistus*. "

XXIV. WHEN *Divitiacus* had made an end of speaking; all who were present, with many Tears, began to implore *Cæsar's* Aid. He observed that the *Sequani* alone did nothing of all this ; but pen-
 sive, and with downcast Looks, kept their Eyes fixed upon the Ground. Wondering what might be the Cause, he questioned them upon it. Still they made him no Answer, but continued silent, as before, with the same Air of Dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one Word in return, *Divitiacus* the *Æduan* again resumed the Discourse, and observed : " That the Condition of the *Sequani* was
 " by so much more deplorable and wretched than
 " that of the rest of the *Gauls*; as they alone durst
 " not, even in secret, complain of their Wrongs, or
 " apply any where for Redress ; and no less dreaded
 " the Cruelty of *Ariovistus*, when absent, than if
 " actually present before their Eyes : That other
 " States had it still in their Power to escape by Flight;
 " but the *Sequani*, who had received him into their
 " Territories,

" Territories, and put him in possession of all their BOOK
" Towns, were exposed upon Discovery to every I.
" kind of Torment." *Cæsar* being made acquainted
with these Things, encouraged the *Gauls*, and
promised to have a regard to their Complaints.
He told them: " That he was in great Hopes
" *Ariovistus*, induced by his Intercession, and the
" Authority of the People of *Rome*, would put an
" end to his Oppressions." Having returned this
Answer, he dismissed the Assembly.

XXV. MANY urgent Reasons occurred upon this Occasion to *Cæsar*, why he should consider seriously of the Proposals of the *Gauls*, and redrefs the Injuries of which they complained. He saw the *Aeduans*, Friends and Allies of the People of *Rome*, held in Subjection and Servitude by the *Germans*, and compelled to give Hostages to *Ariovistus* and the *Sequani*; which, in the present flourishing State of the *Roman* Affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the Commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous Consequence, to suffer the *Germans* by little and little to transport themselves over the *Rhine*, and settle in great multitudes in *Gaul*. For that fierce and savage People, having once possessed themselves of the whole Country of *Gaul*, were but too likely, after the Example of the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, to break into the *Roman* Province, and thence advance to *Italy* itself; more especially as the *Rhone* was the only Boundary by which the *Sequani* were divided from the Territories of the Republick. It therefore appeared necessary to provide without Delay against these Evils; and the rather, because *Ariovistus* was become so insolent, and took so much upon him, that his Conduct was no longer to be endured.

BOOK XXVI. FOR these Reasons he thought proper to

I. send Ambassadors to *Ariovitus*, to desire he would appoint a Place for an Interview, that they might discourse together about some publick Affairs of the highest Importance to them both. *Ariovitus* replied :

" That if he had wanted any thing of " *Cæsar*, he would himself have waited on him for " that purpose ; and if *Cæsar* had any thing to " desire of him, he must likewise come in Person " to demand it : That for his own part, he could " neither venture into these Provinces of *Gaul* " where *Cæsar* commanded without an Army, " nor bring an Army into the Field without great " Trouble and Expence : That he besides wondered " extremely, what Busines, either *Cæsar*, or the " People of *Rome*, could have in his Division of " *Gaul*, which belong'd to him by right of Con- " quest." This Answer being reported to *Cæsar*, he again sent an Embassie to him to this effect : " That since, notwithstanding the great Obligations " he lay under both to himself and the People of " *Rome*, in having, during his Consulship, been de- " clared King and Ally by the Senate ; he yet " manifested so little Acknowledgment to either, as " even to refuse an Interview, and decline treating " of Affairs that regarded the common Interest ; " these were the Particulars he required of him : " First, not to bring any more *Germans* over the " Rhine into *Gaul*. Secondly, to restore the Hor- " stages he had taken from the *Aduans*, and per- " mit the *Sequani* likewise to do the same. Lastly, " to forbear all Injuries towards the *Aduans*, and " neither make War upon them nor their Allies. " That his Compliance with these Conditions " would establish a perpetual Friendship and " Amity between him and the People of *Rome*. " But if he refused Conditions so just ; as the " Senate

“ Senate had decreed in the Consulship of *M. Book*
“ *Messala* and *M. Piso*, that whoever had the *I.*
“ charge of the Province of *Gaul*, should, as
“ far as was consistent with the Interest of the
“ Commonwealth, defend the *Aeduans*, and the
“ other Allies of the People of *Rome*; he thought
“ himself bound not to overlook their just Com-
“ plaints.”

XXVII. To this *Ariovitus* replied : “ That
“ by the Laws of War, the Conqueror had a
“ right to impose what Terms he pleased upon the
“ Conquered : That in consequence of this, the
“ People of *Rome* did not govern the vanquished
“ by the Prescriptions of another, but according
“ to their own Pleasure : That if he did not inter-
“ meddle with the *Roman* Conquests, but left them
“ to the free Enjoyment of their Rights, no more
“ ought they to concern themselves in what re-
“ garded him : That the *Aeduans* having tried the
“ Fortune of War, had been overcome and rendered
“ tributary ; and it would be the highest Injustice
“ in *Cæsar* to offer at diminishing his just Re-
“ venues : That he was resolved not to part with the
“ Hostages the *Aeduans* had put into his hands ;
“ but would nevertheless engage, neither to make
“ War upon them nor their Allies, provided they
“ observed the Treaty he had made with them,
“ and regularly paid the Tribute agreed upon ; if
“ otherwise, the Title of Friends and Allies of the
“ People of *Rome* would be found to stand them
“ but in little stead : That as to *Cæsar's* Menace
“ of not overlooking the Complaints of the
“ *Aeduans*, he would have him know, no one had
“ ever entered into a War with *Ariovitus*, but to
“ his own Destruction : That he might when he
“ pleased bring it to a trial, and would, he doubted
“ not,

BOOK“ not, soon be made sensible what the invincible

I. “ *Germans*, trained up from their Infancy in the

Exercize of Arms, and who for fourteen Years
“ together had never slept under a Roof, were
“ capable of atchieving.”

XXVIII. AT the same time that *Cæsar* received this Answer, Ambassadors also arrived from the *Aduans* and *Treviri*. From the *Aduans*, to complain : “ That the *Harudes*, who had lately come over into *Gaul*, were plundering their Territories; “ insomuch, that even by their Submissions and Hostages they were not able to obtain Peace of *Ariovistus*.” From the *Treviri*, to inform him : “ That an hundred Cantons of the *Suevians*, headed by two Brothers, *Nasua* and *Cimberius*, were arrived upon the Banks of the *Rhine*, with design to cross that River.” *Cæsar* deeply affected with this Intelligence, determined to undertake the War without delay, lest this new Band of *Suevians*, joining the old Forces of *Ariovistus*, should enable him to make a greater Resistance. Having therefore with all diligence provided for the Subsistence of his Army, he advanced towards him by great Marches.

XXIX. THE third Day he was informed that *Ariovistus* approached with all his Forces to take possession of *Vesontio*, the Capital of the *Sequani*; and that he had already got three Days March beyond his own Territories. *Cæsar* judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this Design, as the Town itself was not only full of all sorts of warlike Ammunition, but likewise strongly fortified by Nature, and commodiously situated for carrying on the War. For the River *Doux* forming a Circle round it, as if described with a pair of Compasses, leaves

leaves only an Interval of six hundred Feet, which BOOK
is also inaccessible by reason of a very high and steep L.
Mountain, whose Roots are washed on each Side
by the River. This Mountain is shut in with a
Wall, which forming a Citad^el, joins it to the
Town. Hither *Cæsar* marched Day and Night
without intermission ; and having possessed himself
of the Place, put a Garrison into it.

XXX. WHILST he tarried here a few Days, to settle the Order of his Convoys and Supplies, the Curiosity of our Men, and the Talk of the Gauls, (who proclaimed on all Occasions the prodigious Stature of the Germans, their invincible Courage, and great Skill in Arms ; inasmuch that in the frequent Encounters with them, they had found it impossible to withstand their very Looks) spread such a sudden Terror thro' the whole Army, that they were not a little disturbed by the Apprehensions it occasioned. This Fear first began amongst the Military Tribunes, the Officers of the Allies, and others that had voluntarily followed *Cæsar* from *Rome* ; who being but little acquainted with military Affairs, lamented the great Danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. Some of these, upon various Pretences, desired leave to return. Others, out of shame, and unwilling to incur the suspicion of Cowardise, continued in the Camp. But these last, incapable of putting on a cheerful Countenance, and at times even unable to suppress their Tears, sculked in their Tents, either bemoaning their Fate, or discoursing with their Companions upon the common Danger. Wills were made all over the Camp, and the Consternation began to seize even those of more experience, the veteran Soldiers, the Centurions, and the Officers of the Cavalry. Such among them as affected a greater

CÆSAR's COMMENTARIES OF

BOOK shew of Resolution, said it was not the Enemy they

I. feared, but the narrow Passes and vast Forests
 that lay between them and *Ariovistus*, and the
 Difficulty there would be in furnishing the Army
 with Provisions. Some even told *Cæsar*, that
 when he gave Orders for marching, the Army,
 attentive to nothing but their Fears, would refuse
 to obey.

XXXI. CÆSAR observing the general Confer-
 nation, called a Council of War; and having
 summoned all the Centurions of the Army to be
 present, inveighed against them with great severity;
 for presuming to enquire, or at all concern them-
 selves, which way, or on what design they were to
 march. “*Ariovistus*,” he told them, “ during
 “ his Consulship, had earnestly sought the Al-
 “ liance of the *Roman* People. Why therefore
 “ should any one imagine, he would so rashly and
 “ hastily depart from his Engagements? That on
 “ the contrary, he was himself firmly persuaded,
 “ that as soon as he came to know his Demands,
 “ and the equal Conditions he was about to pro-
 “ pose to him, he would be very far from reject-
 “ ing either his Friendship, or that of the People
 “ of *Rome*. But if urged on by Madness and
 “ Rage, he was resolved upon War, what, after
 “ all, had they to be afraid of? Or why should
 “ they distrust either their own Bravery, or his
 “ Care and Conduct? That they were to deal with
 “ Enemies of whom trial had been already made
 “ in the memory of their Fathers, when by the
 “ Victory of *C. Marius* over the *Teutones* and *Cim-*
bri, the Army itself acquired no less Glory than
 “ the General who commanded it: That trial
 “ had likewise been lately made of them in *Italy*
 “ in the servile War, when they had also the Ad-

vantagē of being exercised in the *Roman Disciplinē*; on which Occasion it appeared, how much Resolution and Constancy were able to effect; since they had vanquished in the end those very Enemies armed and flushed with Victory, whom at first they had without Cause dreaded even unarmed. In fine, that they were the very same *Germans*, with whom the *Helvetians* had so often fought, not only in their own Country, but in *Germany* itself, and for the most part come off victorious, tho' they had by no means been a match for our Army: That if the Defeat and Flight of the *Gauls* gave uneasiness to any, these would readily find upon enquiry, that *Ariovitus* confining himself many Months to his Camp and Fastnesses, and declining a general Action, had thereby tired out the *Gauls* with the length of the War; who despairing at last of a Battle, and beginning to disperse, were thereupon attacked and routed, rather by Conduct and Craft, than the superior Valour of the *Germans*. But tho' a Stratagem of this kind might take with rude and uncultivated People, yet could not even the *German* himself hope that it would avail against a *Roman* Army: That as to those who sheltered their Cowardise under the Pretence of narrow Passes, and the Difficulty of procuring Provisions, he thought it argued no small Presumption in them, either to betray such a distrust of their General's Conduct, or offer to prescribe to him what he ought to do: That these things fell properly under his Care: That the *Sequani*, *Leuci*, and *Lingones* were to furnish him with Provisions: That the Corn was now ripe in the Fields; and that themselves would soon be Judges as to what regarded the Ways: That the Report of the Army's refusing to obey

BOOK " him gave him not the least Disturbance; because
I. " he very well knew, that no General had ever
been so far slighted by his Soldiers, whose ill
Success, Avarice, or other Crimes, had not
justly drawn that Misfortune upon him: That
in all these respects he fancied himself secure,
as the whole Course of his Life would witness
for his Integrity, and his good Fortune had
shewn itself in the War against the *Helvetians*:
That he was therefore resolved to execute without delay, what he otherwise intended to have
put off a little longer; and would give Orders
for decamping the very next Night, three
Hours before Day, that he might as soon as
possible know, whether Honour and a Sense of
Duty, or an ignominious Cowardise had the
ascendant in his Army: Nay, that should all the
rest of the Troops abandon him, he would
nevertheless march with the tenth Legion alone,
of whose Fidelity and Courage he had no man-
ner of doubt, and which should serve him for
his *Pretorian Guard*." *Cæsar* had always prin-
cipally favoured this Legion, and placed his chief
Confidence in it, on account of its Valour.

XXXII. THIS Speech made a wonderful Change upon the Minds of all, and begot an uncommon Alacrity and Eagerness for the War. The tenth Legion in particular, returned him thanks by their Tribunes, for the favourable Opinion he had express'd of them, and assured him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other Legions less industrious, by their Tribunes and principal Centurions, to reconcile themselves to *Cæsar*; protest-ing they had never either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the General, to direct in matters of War. Having accepted

accepted of their Submission, and informed himself B O O K I. by means of *Divitiacus*, in whom of all the *Gauls* he most confided, that by taking a Circuit of above forty Miles, he might avoid the narrow Passes, and lead his Army thro' an open Country ; he set forward three Hours after midnight, as he had said ; and after a March of seven Days successively, understood by his Scouts, that he was within four and twenty Miles of *Ariovistus's* Camp.

XXXIII. *Ariovistus* being informed of his Arrival, sent Ambassadors to acquaint him : " That " he was now willing to accept of an Interview, " as they were come nearer one another, and he " believed it might be done without Danger." *Cæsar* did not decline the Proposal, imagining he was now disposed to listen to reason, since he offered that of his own accord, which he had before refused at his request : Neither was he without hope, that in regard of the Benefits he had received, both from himself and the People of *Rome*, he would, upon knowing his Demands, desist from his Obstinacy. The fifth Day after was appointed for the Interview. Mean-time, as Ambassadors were continually passing and repassing, *Ariovistus*, under pretence that he was afraid of an Ambuscade, demanded : " That *Cæsar* should bring no Infantry " with him to the Conference : That they should " both come attended by their Cavalry only : " That otherwise he could not resolve to give him " a meeting." *Cæsar* unwilling to drop the Design of the Interview ; but neither caring to trust his Safety to the *Gauls* ; thought the best way was, to dismount all the Gallick Cavalry, and give their Horses to the Soldiers of the tenth Legion, who had the greatest share of his Confidence ; that in case of Danger, he might have a Guard on which

BOOK he could rely. This being done accordingly, one
I. of the Soldiers of that Legion said pleasantly enough;
~~~~~ “ That *Cæsar* had done even more than he had  
“ promised ; that he had only given them hopes  
“ of becoming his *Pretorian* Guard; and now he  
“ had raised them to the Rank of Horse.”

XXXIV. THERE was a large Plain, and in the midst of it a rising Ground of considerable height, equally distant from both Camps. At this Place, by Appointment, the Conference was held. *Cæsar* stationed the legionary Soldiers, whom he had brought with him on the Horses of the *Gauls*, two hundred Paces from the Mount. *Ariovistus* did the same with the *German* Cavalry. The Conversation was on horseback, each being accompanied by ten Friends or principal Officers, for so *Ariovistus* had desired. When they were come to the Place ; *Cæsar* began by putting him in mind of the Favours he had received both from himself and the People of *Rome*; “ That he had been styled Friend “ and Ally by the Senate; that very consider- “ able Presents had been sent him ; that these “ Honours conferred by the *Romans* on very few, “ and only for signal Services to the State, had “ yet been bestowed on him, not on account of “ any just Claim on his Side, but merely by the “ Favour of *Cæsar*, and the Bounty of the Senate.” He told him likewise, “ of the just and ancient “ Alliance between the *Romans* and the *Aeduans* ; “ of the many honourable Decrees of the Senate “ in their Favour : That they had always held the “ first Rank and Authority in *Gaul*, even before “ their Alliance with *Rome* : That it was the con- “ stant Maxim of the *Roman* People, not only to “ defend their Friends and Allies in the possession “ of their just Rights, but likewise to study the “ Enlargement

“ Enlargement of their Honour, Interest, and BOOK  
 “ Dignity: That it could never therefore be sup- I.  
 “ poed, they would submit to see them stript of those  
 “ Privileges which had belonged to them, before  
 “ they were received into their Friendship.” In  
 fine, he concluded with repeating the same Demands  
 which he had before made by his Ambassadors;  
 “ That he would not make War upon the *Æduans*  
 “ or their Allies; that he would restore their  
 “ Hostages; that if he could not oblige any of  
 “ the *Germans* to repass the *Rhine*, at least he would  
 “ suffer no more of them to come into *Gaul*.”

XXXV. ARIOVISTUS spoke little to *Cæsar's*  
 Demands, but enlarged greatly on his own Virtues:  
 “ That he had crossed the *Rhine*, not of his own  
 “ motion, but invited and intreated by the *Gauls*  
 “ themselves: That the great Hopes and Expec-  
 “ tations they had given him, had been his only  
 “ Inducement to quit his Country and Relations:  
 “ That he had Settlements in *Gaul* assigned by the  
 “ *Gauls* themselves; Hostages voluntarily sent;  
 “ and a Tribute in consequence of the Rights of  
 “ War; it being the constant Practice of Con-  
 “ querors, to impose that Mark of Subjection on  
 “ those they had subdued: That he had not made  
 “ War upon the *Gauls*, but the *Gauls* upon him:  
 “ That though all their several States had united  
 “ against him, and brought up their Forces with  
 “ design to crush him, he had yet found means to  
 “ vanquish and disperse them in one Battle: That  
 “ if they were again resolved to try the Fortune  
 “ of War, he was ready and prepared to receive  
 “ them; but if they rather chose Peace, it was  
 “ unjust in them to refuse a Tribute, which they  
 “ had hitherto voluntarily paid: That the Friend-  
 “ ship of the People of *Rome* ought to be an Ho-

BOOK " honour and Security to him, not a Detriment ;  
I: " nor had he courted it in any other view : but  
" if by their Alliance he must submit to lose his  
" Tributes, and his Right over the People he had  
" subdued, he was no less willing to give it up,  
" than he had been ambitious to obtain it : That  
" he had indeed brought over a Multitude of  
" Germans into Gaul, yet not with any Design of  
" disturbing the Country, but merely for his own  
" Security ; as appeared by his not coming but at  
" the Request of the Natives ; and his not attack-  
" ing them, but defending himself : That his  
" Arrival in Gaul was prior to that of the Romans,  
" whose Army had never till that time passed the  
" Boundaries of their own Province. What could  
" they mean by coming into a Country that be-  
" longed to him ? Or why should they concern  
" themselves with a part of Gaul that was no less  
" his Property, than the Province itself was that  
" of the People of Rome ? If it would not be  
" allowable in him to make any Attempt upon  
" their Possessions, neither could they without In-  
" justice disturb him in the Enjoyment of his  
" Rights. That as to the pretence of Alliance  
" between the Romans and Eduans, he was not so  
" much a Barbarian, nor so wholly a Stranger to the  
" Affairs of the World, as not to know ; that neither  
" had the Eduans assisted the Romans, in the late  
" War against the Allobrogians ; nor received any  
" Assistance from them, in their many Conflicts  
" with himself and the Sequani. That he ought to  
" be jealous of Cæsar's pretended Regard to the  
" Eduans ; and had but too much reason to suspect,  
" that the Continuance of the Roman Army in  
" Gaul could be with no other Design than that of  
" oppressing him. That if he did not therefore  
" depart, and withdraw his Troops out of those

" Parts,

“ Parts, he would no longer look upon him as a BOOK  
 “ Friend, but an Enemy. That he was well af- I.  
 “ fured, should he even slay him in Battle, he  
 “ should do a Pleasure to many of the Nobles  
 “ and great Men at *Rome*, who had explained  
 “ themselves to him by Couriers, and whose Fa-  
 “ vour and Friendship he might procure by his  
 “ Death: but that if he would retire, and leave  
 “ him in the undisturbed Possession of *Gaul*, he  
 “ would not only amply reward him, but engage,  
 “ at his own Cost and Hazard, to put an end to  
 “ any War *Cæsar* should think fit to undertake.”

XXXVI. MANY Reasons were offered by *Cæsar*, in return to this Speech, why he could not depart from his first Demands: “ That neither his own Honour, nor that of the People of *Rome*, would suffer him to abandon Allies, who had deserved so well of the Commonwealth: That it no way appeared to him, wherein *Ariovistus* had a juster Claim to the Possession of *Gaul* than the *Romans*: That the *Averni* and *Ruteni* had been subdued by *Q. Fabius Maximus*; who yet contented with their Submission, had neither reduced their Country into a Province, nor subjected it to a Tribute: That if Antiquity of Title was to decide, the *Romans* had an undoubted Right to the Sovereignty of *Gaul*: If, on the contrary, the Decree of the Senate was to take place, *Gaul* must remain free, and subject only to its own Laws.”

XXXVII. WHILST these things passed at the Interview, *Cæsar* was informed, that *Ariovistus*’s Cavalry were drawing nearer the Mount, and had even assaulted the *Romans* with Stones and Darts. *Cæsar* immediately broke off the Conference, re-treated

BOOK treated to his own Men, and strictly charged them

I. to forbear all Acts of Hostility towards the Enemy. He did not fear the Success of an Action, with that chosen Legion, against the *German* Cavalry ; but he was willing to maintain a Conduct perfectly clear, and not give the Enemy the least handle to assert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an Ambuscade by a pretended Conference. When it was known in the Camp, with what haughtiness *Ariovistus* had behaved at the Interview ; that he had ordered the *Romans* to depart out of *Gaul* ; that his Cavalry had fallen upon *Cæsar's* Guard ; and that an end had thereby been put to the Conference ; a much greater Alacrity and Desire of fighting spread themselves thro' the whole Army.

XXXVIII. Two Days after, *Ariovistus* sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, to propose a renewal of the Negotiation begun ; and that he would either again appoint a Day for a Conference, or depute some one to bring the Treaty to a Conclusion. *Cæsar* saw no reason for granting a second Interview, more especially when he considered, that the time before, the *Germans* could not be restrained from falling upon our Men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal Officers ; it seeming too great a venture, to expose them to the Perfidy of these Barbarians. He therefore cast his Eyes upon *C. Valerius Proculus*, the Son of *C. Valerius Caburus*, a young Man of great Merit and Politeness, whose Father been made free of the City by *C. Valerius Flaccus*. His singular Integrity, and Knowledge of the Language of the *Gauls*, which *Ariovistus*, by reason of long stay in those Parts, spoke readily ; fitted him in a particular manner for this Embassy : and as he was likewise

likewise one towards whom it would no way avail **BOOK I.** the *Germans* to use any treachery, he thought him less liable to an Insult of that kind. *M. Mettius* was joined in Commission with him, who was allied to *Ariovistus* by the rights of Hospitality. Their Instructions were, to hear the *German's* Proposals, and carry back a report of them to *Cæsar*. But no sooner were they arrived in *Ariovistus's* Camp, than in presence of the whole Army, calling out to know their Business, and whether they were come as Spies, he commanded them to be put in Irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

**XXXIX.** The same Day he came forward with all his Forces, and lodged himself under a Hill, about six Miles from our Camp. The Day after he went two Miles beyond it, to cut off *Cæsar's* Communication with the *Æduans* and *Sequani*, from whom he received all his Provisions. *Cæsar*, for five Days continually, drew up his Men in order of Battle before the Camp, that if *Ariovistus* had a mind, he might not be without an Opportunity of coming to an Engagement. The *Germans* kept all that time within their Lines; only we had daily Skirmishes with their Cavalry, whose manner of fighting was this. They had about six thousand Horse, who chose a like number out of the Foot, each his Man, and all remarkable for Strength and Agility. These continually accompanied them in Battle, and served as a Rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire: if the Action became dangerous, they advanced to their relief: if any Horseman was considerably wounded, and fell from his Horse, they gathered round to defend him; if speed was required, either for a hasty Pursuit, or sudden Retreat, they were become so nimble and alert by continual Exercise,

BOOK excise, that laying hold of the Mains of the Horses,  
 I. they could run as fast as they.


XL. CÆSAR finding that *Ariovistus* declined a Battle, thought it necessary to provide for the freedom of his Convoys. With this view he marked out a Place for a Camp, six hundred Paces beyond that of the Enemy, whither he marched with his whole Army drawn up in three Lines. The first and second Line had Orders to continue under Arms, and the third to employ themselves in fortifying the Camp. *Ariovistus* sent sixteen thousand light-armed Foot, and all his Horse, to alarm our Men, and hinder the Work. But *Cæsar* remained firm to his first Design, ordering the two Lines that continued under Arms to keep off the Enemy, and the third to go on with the Intrenchments. The Work being finished, he left two Legions there, with part of the Auxiliaries, and carried back the other four to his former Camp. The next Day he assembled all his Troops from both Camps, drew them up according to Custom, and offered the Enemy Battle: but they still refusing to come to an Engagement, he retired again about Noon. *Ariovistus* then detached part of his Forces to attack the lesser Camp. A sharp Conflict ensued, that lasted 'till Night. At Sun-set *Ariovistus* thought proper to sound a Retreat, after many Wounds given and received. *Cæsar* inquiring of the Prisoners, why *Ariovistus* so obstinately refused an Engagement, found: that it was the Custom among the *Germans*, for the Women to decide by Lots and Divination, when it was proper to hazard a Battle; and that these had declared, the Army could not be victorious, if they fought before the new Moon.

XLI. THE Day after, *Cæsar* having left a sufficient Guard in his two Camps, ranged all the auxiliary Troops before the lesser Camp, placing them directly in view of the Enemy for the greater shew, because the number of legionary Soldiers was but inconsiderable, compared with that of the *Germans*. Then advancing at the head of all his Forces, in three Lines, he marched quite up to the Enemy's Camp. Upon this the *Germans*, compelled by Necessity, appeared before their Intrenchments; and having distributed their Troops by Nations, and disposed them at equal distances one from another, the *Harudes*, *Marcomani*, *Tribocci*, *Vangiones*, *Nemetes*, *Sedusians*, and *Suevians*; encompassed the whole Army with a Line of Carriages, to take away all hopes of Safety by Flight. The Women mounted upon these Carriages, weeping and tearing their Hair, conjured the Soldiers as they advanced to Battle, not to suffer them to become Slaves to the *Romans*. *Cæsar* having appointed a Lieutenant and Questor to each Legion, to serve as Witnesses of every Man's Courage and Behaviour, began the Battle in Person at the Head of the right Wing, observing the Enemy to be weakest on that side. The Signal being given, our Men charged so briskly, and the Enemy advanced so swiftly and suddenly to meet them, that the *Romans* not having time to throw their Darts, betook themselves immediately to their Swords. But the *Germans* quickly casting themselves into a Phalanx, according to the Custom of their Country, sustained the shock with great Firmness. Many of our Soldiers leaped upon the Phalanx, tore up the Bucklers of the Enemy with their Hands, and wounded those that lay under them. Their left Wing was soon routed and put to flight; but on the right they

BOOK they had the Advantage, and were like to over-  
power the *Romans* by their numbers. Young *Cra-  
fus*, who commanded the Cavalry, and was more  
at liberty than those immediately engaged in the  
Fight, observing this, made the third Line advance  
to support them. Upon this the Battle was renew-  
ed, and the Enemy every where put to the rout :  
nor did they cease their Flight 'till they had reach-  
ed the Banks of the *Rbine*, about fifty Miles di-  
stant from the place of Combat. There only a  
few escaped ; some by swimming, others by Boats.  
Of this last number was *Ariovistus*, who embarking  
in a small Vessel he found by the edge of the Ri-  
ver, got safe to the other side. All the rest were  
cut to pieces in the Pursuit by our Cavalry. *Ario-  
vistus* had two Wives ; one a *Suevian*, whom he  
had brought with him from *Germany* ; the other a  
*Norican*, Sister to King *Vocation*, whom he had mar-  
ried in *Gaul*. Both perished in this Flight. Of his  
two Daughters, one was killed, the other taken  
Prisoner. *C. Valerius Proculus*, whom his Keepers  
dragged after them in their Flight, bound with a  
triple Chain, fell in with *Cesar* in Person, as he was  
pursuing the *German* Cavalry. Nor was the Victo-  
ry itself more grateful to that General, than his  
good Fortune in recovering out of the hands of  
the Enemy a Man, the most distinguished for his  
Probity of the whole Province of *Gaul*, his inti-  
mate and familiar Friend ; and to find the Joy and  
Success of that Day no way diminished or clouded,  
by the loss of a Person he so highly esteemed.  
*Proculus* told him, that Lots had been thrice drawn  
in his own presence, to decide whether he should  
be burnt alive upon the Spot, or reserved for an-  
other time ; and that the Lot three times favourable,  
had preserved his Life. *Mettius* was likewise recov-  
ered and brought.

XLII. THIS Battle being reported beyond the <sup>BOOK</sup>  
<sup>I.</sup> *Rbine*, the *Suevians*, who were advanced as far as  
the Banks of that River, thought proper to return  
to their own Country. But retreating in disorder  
and confusion, they were attacked by the *Ubians*,  
a People bordering upon the *Rbine*, and many of  
them cut to pieces. *Cæsar* having in one Cam-  
paign put an end to two very considerable Wars,  
went into Winter-quarters somewhat sooner than  
the Season of the Year required. He distributed  
his Army among the *Sequani*, left *Labienus* to com-  
mand in his absence, and set out himself for *Cisal-  
pine Gaul*, to preside in the Assembly of the States.

C. JULIUS



*C. JULIUS CÆSAR's*  
**COMMENTARIES**

OF HIS  
WARS in *GAUL.*

**BOOK II.**

VOL. I.

E

## THE A R G U M E N T.

- I. *The Confederacy of the Belgians against the People of Rome.* III. *The Rhemi submit upon the Approach of Cæsar.* IV. *And inform him of the Strength and Designs of the Confederates.* VI. *Cæsar passes the Axona with his Army.* VII. *Bibrax, a Town belonging to the Rhemi, assaulted by the Belgians.* VIII. *Cæsar relieves it, and obliges the Belgians to retire.* IX. *The Armies drawn up on both sides, but without coming to an Engagement.* XI. *The Belgians despairing of Success, decamp and return home.* XII. *Cæsar attacks their Rear, and makes great Slaughter.* XIII. *He then marches against the Sueffiones, and obliges them to submit.* XIV. *Advancing next into the Country of the Bellovacis, he pardons them at the Intercession of Divitiacus.* XVI. *The Ambiani surrender, but the Nervians stand on their Defence.* XXIII. *They are defeated however in a long and bloody Engagement, and almost all cut off.* XXIX. *Cæsar prepares to attack the Attuatici.* XXXI. *They submit.* XXXIII. *But falling treacherously upon the Romans during the Night;* XXXIV. *Are many of them cut to pieces, and the rest sold for Slaves.*

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
WARS in GAUL.

## BOOK II.

I N the Winter, whilst *Cæsar* was in Hither *Gaul*, as we have intimated above ; he was alarmed by frequent Reports, which were also confirmed by Letters from *Labienus*, that all the *Belgians*, who, as has been said, possessed one of the three Divisions of *Gaul*, had joined in a League against the People of *Rome*, and ratified it by an Exchange of Hostages. The Causes of this Confederacy were : First, their fear lest the *Romans*, having subdued all the rest of *Gaul*, should next turn their Arms against them : And then the Persuasions and Importunity of some among the *Celtæ* ; many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the Neighbourhood of the *Germans* in *Gaul*, so were they no less displeased to see a *Roman* Army take up Winter-quarters and grow habitual in the Country : Others, from a Lewity and Inconstancy of Temper,

BOOK Temper, were fond of every Project that tended  
II. to a Revolution. In fine, some were influenced  
by ambitious Views, it being usual in *Gaul*, for  
such as were most powerful in their several States,  
and had Men and Money at command, to exercise  
a kind of Sovereignty over their Fellow-subjects,  
which they foresaw would be greatly checked by  
the Authority and Credit of the *Romans* in *Gaul*.

II. CÆSAR, roused by these Messages and Reports, levied two new Legions in Hither *Gaul*; and early in the Spring, sent *Q. Pedius* his Lieutenant to conduct them over the *Alps*. Himself, as soon as there began to be Forage in the Fields, came to the Army. He commissioned the *Senones*, and other *Gauls* who bordered on the *Belgians*, to inform themselves of the Motions and Designs of the Confederates, and send him from time to time an exact Account. They all agree in their Reports; that they were levying Troops, and drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous. Whereupon thinking he ought no longer to delay marching against them, and having settled the necessary Supplies for his Army, he decamped, and in fifteen Days arrived on the Confines of the *Belgians*.

III. As his Approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected; the *Rhemi*, who of all the *Belgians* lay the nearest to *Celtic Gaul*, dispatched *Iccius* and *Autobrigius*, the two principal Men of their State, to represent to *Cæsar*: “ That  
“ they put themselves and Fortunes under the  
“ Power and Protection of the *Romans*, as having  
“ neither approved of the Designs of the rest of  
“ the *Belgians*, nor had any share in their Confe-  
“ deracy against the People of *Rome*: That on  
“ the contrary, they were ready to give Hostages,  
“ to

“ to execute his Commands, to receive him into BOOK  
“ their Towns, and to furnish him with Corn and II.  
“ other Supplies for his Army : That indeed the rest of the Belgians were all in Arms, and that  
“ the Germans on this side the Rhine had asso-  
“ ciated with them : Nay, that so universal and  
“ prevalent was the Infatuation, they had not even  
“ been able to draw off the Sueßones, a People  
“ united to them by the nearest Ties of Blood  
“ and Friendship, who were subject to the same  
“ Laws, lived under the same Form of Govern-  
“ ment, and acknowledged but one common Ma-  
“ gistrate.”

IV. CÆSAR inquiring of the Ambassadors, what States had taken up Arms, of what Name and Consideration, and what Forces they could bring into the Field ; found : That the Belgians were for the most part Germans originally, who having formerly crossed the Rhine, had been drawn by the Fertility of the Country to settle in those Parts, after driving out the ancient Inhabitants : That in the late Irruption of the Teutones and Cimbri, when all the other Provinces of Gaul were over-run, they alone had ventured to stand upon their Defence ; nor suffered the Barbarians to set foot in their Territories ; whence it happened, that presuming on so well-known an Instance of their Bravery, they laid claim to great Authority, and challenged high military Renown. As to their Numbers, the Rheni told him they could give him the most exact Information ; because in consequence of their Affinity and Neighbourhood, they had Opportunities of knowing what Quota of Men each particular State had promised to furnish in the common Council of Belgium. “ That the Bellon-  
“ vaci held the most distinguished Rank, as sur-

BOOK II. " passing all the other States in Prowess, Authority, and Number of Forces: That they were able to muster an hundred thousand fighting Men, and had promised out of that Number sixty thousand chosen Troops, in consideration of which they demanded the whole Administration of the War. That next to them in Dignity were the *Sueffiones*, a People bordering upon their own Territories, and possessed of a very large and fruitful Country, over which even of late Years *Divitiacus* had been King, one of the most powerful Princes of all *Gaul*, and who besides his Dominions in those Parts, reigned also over *Britain*: That their present Sovereign was *Galba*, whose singular Prudence and Justice had procured him, by the consent of all the Confederates, the supreme Command in the War: That these had within their Territories twelve fortified Towns, and promised to bring into the Field fifty thousand Men. That the like Number had been stipulated by the *Nervians*, who inhabiting the remotest Provinces of *Gaul*, were esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the *Belgian* Nations. That the *Atrebatiens* were to furnish fifteen thousand: The *Ambiani* ten thousand: The *Morini* twenty-five thousand: The *Menapians* nine thousand: The *Caletes* ten thousand: The *Velocassians* and *Veromanduans* the like Number: The *Atuatici* twenty-nine thousand: And the *Condruſians*, *Eburones*, *Cereſians*, and *Pæmami*, all comprehended under the common Name of *Germans*, forty thousand.

V. CÆSAR exhorting the Men of *Rheims* to continue firm in their Alliance, and promising amply to reward their Fidelity, ordered the whole Body of their Senate to repair to his Camp, and the Sons

of

of their principal Nobility to be brought him as B.O.O.K Hostages; all which was accordingly performed by the Day appointed. He then addressed himself to *Divitiacus* the *Aduan*, representing in the warmest manner, of what Consequence it was to the commonon Cause, to divide the Forces of the Enemy, that he might not be reduced to the Necessity of encountering so great a Multitude at once. This he told him, might easily be effected, if the *Aduans* would march their Forces into the Territories of the *Bellovaci*, to plunder and lay waste the Country. With these Instructions he dismissed them.

VI. MEAN-TIME, being informed by his Scouts, and the People of *Rheims*, that all the Forces of the *Belgians* were marching towards him in a Body, and that they were even advanccd within a few Miles, he made all the haste he could to pass his Army over the *Axona*, which divides the *Rbemi* from the rest of the *Belgians*, and encamped on the farther side of that River. By this Situation he secured all behind him, covered one side of his Camp with the River, and rendered the Communication with the *Rbemi*, and those other States, whence he expected to be supplied with Provisions, safe and easy. Adjoining to his Camp was a Bridge over the River; there he placed a strong Guard, and left *Q. Titurius Sabinus* his Lieutenant on the other side with six Cohorts. He then drew round his Camp a Ditch eighteen Foot broad, strengthened with a Rampart twelve Foot high.

VII. THE *Belgians* in their March fell furiously upon *Bibrax*, a Town belonging to the *Rbemi*, about eight Miles distant from *Cæsar's* Camp. The Inhabitants with great difficulty held out against that

BOOK Day's Assault. The manner of storming a Town is  
II. the same among the *Belgians* as among the *Gauls*:  
for having surrounded the Walls with the whole  
Body of their Army, and by a continual Discharge  
from their Slings cleared the Ramparts, they ap-  
proach the Gates under covert of their Bucklers, and  
undermine the Walls. This was easy in the present  
Case; because the Multitude employed in throwing  
Stones and Darts was so great, that none of the  
Garrison durst appear upon the Walls. When  
Night had put an end to the Assault, *Iccius*, who  
then commanded in the Town, a Man of prin-  
cipal Rank and Authority among the *Rhemi*, and  
one of those who had come Ambassadors to *Cæsar*  
to treat about a Peace, dispatched Messengers to  
acquaint him, that unless he was speedily relieved,  
it would be impossible for him to hold out any  
longer.

VIII. HEREUPON *Cæsar*, making use of those  
for Guides who had come express to his Camp from  
*Iccius*, detached about midnight a Party of *Cretan*  
and *Numidian* Archers, with some *Balearean* Sling-  
ers, to the assistance of the Garrison. Their Ar-  
rival encouraged the besieged to stand upon their  
defence, and inspired them with hopes of repul-  
sing the Enemy, who now began to despair of Suc-  
cess, when they heard that a Reinforcement had  
entered the Town. Wherefore, after a short stay  
before the Place, having plundered all the Country  
round about, and burnt the Houses and Villages  
wherever they came, they marched in a Body to-  
wards *Cæsar's* Camp, and posted themselves within  
two Miles of his Army, inclosing a space of more  
than eight thousand Paces in Circumference, as  
near as could be computed from the Smoke  
and Fires of their Camp.

IX. CÆSAR at first resolved to avoid coming ~~BOOK~~  
to a Battle, as well on account of the numbers of ~~II.~~  
the Enemy, as the high Opinion entertained of  
their Courage. He suffered the Horse however to  
engage daily in small Skirmishes, that he might  
the better judge of the Valour of the *Belgian*  
Troops, and the Resolution and Bravery of his  
own Men. Finding that the *Romans* were nothing  
inferior to the Enemy in Courage, he resolved to  
wait for them before his Camp; the Ground being  
very commodious, and as it were formed by Na-  
ture for the reception of an Army. For the Hill  
on which the Camp stood, rising with an easy  
ascent from the Plain, was but just of a sufficient  
breadth on the side facing the Enemy, to receive  
the several Lines of the Army drawn up in Order  
of Battle. On the right hand and on the left the  
descent was steep; whereby the Mountain swelling  
in front, but gradually abating its declivity as you  
advanced towards the Bottom, came at last to a  
Plain. Along each Side of the Hill *Cæsar* dug a  
Trench of about four hundred Paces in length,  
and built Forts at the Extremities, where he placed  
Engines to repulse the Enemy, should they offer  
to attack him in flank, or endeavour, during the  
Fight, to surround him with their numbers. These  
Dispositions being made, and having left the two  
new levied Legions in his Camp, as a Body of Re-  
serve in case of Need, he drew up the other six in  
order of Battle. The *Belgians* likewise drew up  
their Troops, and stood fronting our Army.

X. BETWEEN *Cæsar* and the Enemy there was  
a small Morass. The *Belgians* waited to see if we  
would pass it: Our Men on the other hand were  
ready in Arms, that should the Enemy attempt to  
come

BOOK come over, they might fall upon them, and take  
II. advantage of their Confusion. Mean-time the  
Cavalry on both sides engaged ; but as neither  
Army would hazard the passage of the Morass,  
*Cæsar*, who had the better in the Skirmish of the  
Horse, led back his Men to their Camp. The  
*Belgians* marched directly towards the *Axona*, which,  
as we have said, lay behind our Camp ; and having  
found a Ford, endeavoured to pass over part of  
their Army. Their Design was, if possible, to  
make themselves masters of the Fort where *Q. Titurius* commanded, and break down the Bridge ;  
or, should they fail in that Attempt, to ravage and  
lay waste the Territories of the *Rheni*, whence  
our Army was supplied with Provisions.

XI. CÆSAR being informed of these things by *Titurius*, crossed the Bridge with his Cavalry, light-armed *Numidians*, Archers, and Slingers, and marched to attack the Enemy. A very sharp Conflict ensued : for the *Romans* falling upon them while they were yet passing the River, and by reason of their Disorder unable to defend themselves, slew great numbers. The rest, who with undaunted Courage advanced upon the Bodies of their Companions, were repulsed by the Multitude of Darts from our Men ; and the Cavalry surrounding those that were already got over, put them all to the Sword. The *Belgians* being thus disappointed, both in their Design upon *Bibrax*, and the Passage of the *Axona* ; finding too that Provisions began to be scarce, and that our Army could not be drawn to fight them at a disadvantage, called a Council of War. It was there judged most expedient to separate, and return every Man to his own Country ; with a Resolution however to assemble from all Parts, in defence of that State, whose Territories,

Territories should be first invaded by the *Romans*: BOOK  
for they concluded it much safer to carry on the II.  
War at home, where they might have Provisions  
and every thing at command, than venture a Battle  
within the Confines of a foreign State. These  
Reasons were at the same time backed by a still  
more powerful Consideration: for the *Bellovaci*  
having Intelligence that *Dioctiacus* and the *Aduans*  
were advancing towards their Territories, could not  
be restrained from marching directly homewards,  
to defend their own Country.

XII. THIS Resolution being taken; about the second Watch of the Night, they left their Camp with great Noise and Tumult, regarding neither the Order of their March, nor the due Subordination of Command, but each Man pressing for the foremost Rank, that he might get the sooner home, insomuch that their Retreat had all the Appearance of a precipitate Flight. *Cæsar*, who had immediate Notice of this from his Spies, apprehending some Stratagem, because he as yet knew nothing of the Reason of their Departure, would not stir out of his Trenches. But early in the Morning, upon more certain Intelligence of their Retreat, he detached all the Cavalry, under *Q. Pedius* and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*, his Lieutenants, to harass and retard them in their March. *T. Labienus* had Orders to follow with three Legions. These falling upon their Rear, and pursuing them many Miles, made a dreadful slaughter of the flying Troops. Whilst the Rear, upon finding themselves attacked, faced about, and valiantly sustained the Charge of our Men; the Vanguard, as fancying themselves out of danger, were not to be restrained either by Necessity or the Voice of their Commanders, but upon hearing the Alarm behind them, broke their Ranks,

BOOK Ranks, and betook themselves to flight. Thus  
II. the *Romans*, with little or no Loss on their side,  
continued the Slaughter all the remaining part of  
the Day. About Sun-set they gave over the Pur-  
suit, and in obedience to the Orders they had re-  
ceiyed, returned to their Camp.

XIII. THE next Day, before the Enemy had  
time to rally, or recover out of their Consternation,  
*Cæsar* led his Army into the Territories of the  
*Sueffiones*, which join to those of the *Rbemi*; and  
after a long March reached *Noviodunum*. He was  
in hopes of carrying the Town by Assault, because  
he understood it was destitute of a Garrison: but as  
the Ditch was broad, and the Wall very high, the  
Defendants, tho' few in number, withstood all his  
Efforts. Wherefore having fortified his Camp, he  
began to provide Engines, and get every thing in  
readiness for a Siege. Mean-time such of the *Suef-  
fiones* as had escaped the late Slaughter, threw them-  
selves during the Night into the Town. But *Cæsar*  
advancing his Preparations with great Expedition,  
and approaching under cover of his Mantelets to  
the very Walls, where he cast up a Mount, and  
planted his battering Towers; the *Gauls* astonished  
at the Greatness of the Works, as having never  
seen or heard of any such before, and at the Dis-  
patch wherewith they were carried on, sent Depu-  
ties to treat about a Surrender, and by the Media-  
tion of the *Rbemi* obtained Conditions of Peace.

XIV. CÆSAR having received the principal  
Men of their State as Hostages, amongst whom  
were the two Sons of *Galba* their King; and oblig-  
ed them to deliver up all their Arms, admitted the  
*Sueffiones* to a Surrender, and led his Army against  
the *Bellovaci*. These retiring with their Effects  
into

into *Bratuspantium* their capital City, and under-BOOK  
ftanding that *Cæsar* was advanced within five Miles II.  
of the Town, fent a Députation of all their old Men,  
who came forth in venerable Proceſſion to meet  
him, ſignifying by out-stretched Hands, and in  
the moſt ſubmiſſive Terms, that they put them-  
ſelves under his Power and Protection, nor pretend-  
ed to appear in Arms againſt the People of *Rome*:  
and when he approached ſtill nearer the City, and  
encamped within view of the Walls, the Women  
and Children from the Ramparts, with extended  
Arms, according to the Custom of their Country,  
besought the *Romans* for Peace.

XV. HEREUPON *Divitiacus*, who after the Re-  
treat of the *Belgian* Army, had diſmissed the *Æ-  
duans*, and returned to *Cæſar's* Camp, interpoſed  
in their behalf, repreſenting: “ That the *Bellovaci*  
“ had always lived in ſtrict Friendſhip and Alli-  
“ ance with the *Æduans*: That the artful Inſinua-  
“ tions of their Chiefs, who miſreprefented *Cæſar*,  
“ as one that had enſlaved the *Æduan* State, and  
“ held it under an ignominious Tyranny and Op-  
“ preſſion, had alone induc'd them to forſake their  
“ ancient Allies, and take up Arms againſt the  
“ People of *Rome*: That the Authors of this  
“ Advice, ſeeing its pernicious Effects, and the  
“ Ruin they had brought upon their Country,  
“ were retired into *Britain*: That not only the *Bel-  
“ lovaci* themſelves, but the *Æduans* too, in their  
“ behalf, implored his Clemency and Forgiuenefs:  
“ That in granting their Requeſt, he would greatly  
“ enlarge the Credit and Authority of the *Æduans*  
“ among the *Belgian* States; which was of ſo much  
“ the greater moment, as in all their Wars they  
“ were wont to have recourse to them for Afſift-  
“ ance.” *Cæſar*, out of regard to *Divitiacus* and  
the

BOOK the *Aduans*, promised to grant them Pardon and  
II. Protection; but as they were possessed of very ex-  
tensive Territories, and surpassed in Power and  
number of Forces all the other *Belgian* States, he  
demanded six hundred Hostages.

XVI. THESE being accordingly delivered, together with all their Arms, *Cæsar* left their City, and advanced into the Country of the *Ambiani*; who submitted immediately upon his Approach. Adjoining to them were the *Nervians*; of whose Manners and Genius *Cæsar* inquiring, found:  
“ That they suffered no resort of Merchants into  
“ their Cities, nor would allow of the importation  
“ of Wine, or other Commodities tending to  
“ Luxury; as imagining that thereby the Minds of  
“ Men were enfeebled, and their martial Fire and  
“ Courage extinguished: That they were Men of a  
“ warlike Spirit; but altogether unacquainted with  
“ the Refinements of Life: that they continually  
“ inveighed against the rest of the *Belgians*, for ig-  
“ nominously submitting to the *Roman* Yoke, and  
“ abandoning the steady Bravery of their An-  
“ cestors: In fine, that they had openly declared  
“ their Resolution, of neither sending Ambassa-  
“ dors to *Cæsar*, nor accepting any Terms of  
“ Peace.” *Cæsar*, after a March of three Days  
cross their Territories, understood from some Pri-  
soners: “ That he was now advanced within ten  
“ Miles of the *Sambre*, on the other side of which  
“ the Enemy had posted themselves, and there  
“ waited the coming up of the *Romans*: That they  
“ had been joined by the *Atrebatiens* and *Veroman-*  
“ *duans*, neighbouring Nations, whom they had  
“ persuaded to take part in, and share the Fortune  
“ of the War: That they expected also to be rein-  
“ forced by the *Atuatici*, who were already on  
“ their

“ their March : And that all their Women, and BOOK  
“ such as on account of their Age were unfit to II.  
“ bear Arms, had been conveyed to a Place of           
“ safety, inaccessible by reason of the Marshes  
“ that surrounded it.”

XVII. CÆSAR, upon this Intelligence, sent his Scouts and Centurions before, to choose out a convenient Place for his Camp. Mean-time, as many of the *Belgians* who had lately submitted, and also not a few *Gauls*, followed the *Roman Army*; some of these, as was afterwards known from the Prisoners, observing the Order and Disposition of our March, deserted in the Night to the Enemy, and informed them : “ That the several Legions were separated from one another, by a number of Carriages posted between them : that they would therefore have a favourable Opportunity, as soon as the first Legion was arrived in the Camp, and while the rest were yet a great way behind, of falling upon it incumbered with the Baggage, and obtaining an easy Victory ; by which, and the Plunder of the Carriages, they would strike such a terror thro’ the whole Army, as must necessarily draw after it a total Defeat.” This Advice was the more readily listened to, because of old the *Nervians*, being very weak in Horse, (nor even as yet have they greatly increased their Strength this way, placing their whole Confidence in their Foot,) in order to secure themselves against the Inroads of the Cavalry of the neighbouring Nations, had every where fortified the Country with Barricades of young Trees ; which being split in the middle, and bent down on both sides ; the void Spaces were so closely interwoven with Brambles, Thorns, and a multitude of Boughs, issuing

BOOK issuing from the Trees themselves, that they formed  
II. a Fence not only impossible to be passed, but even  
to be seen through. As these therefore must  
greatly impede and perplex the March of the *Roman Army*, they thought the Advice given them  
by the *Belgians* was by no means to be neglected.

XVIII. THE Place chosen by our Men for their Camp was a Hill, running with an even descent from the summit 'till it reached the Banks of the *Sambre*. Directly opposite to this, on the farther side of the River, and at the distance of about two hundred Paces, was another Hill, of a like acclivity with the former, plain and open round the Bottom, but covered on the Top with Woods, so thick that they hindered the Prospect. Among these Woods the Enemy lay concealed, and only a few Squadrons of Horse appeared on the open Ground by the River-side, whose depth in that Place did not exceed three Foot.

XIX CÆSAR having sent the Cavalry before, followed himself with the rest of the Army. But the Order and Disposition of his March differed from the Account given in to the Enemy by the *Belgians*. For knowing that the *Nervians* were near, he led up six Legions in front, ready equipped for Battle, according to his usual Custom. After them followed the Baggage of the whole Army; and then the two new Legions, who closed the March and served as a Guard to the Carriages. Mean-time the *Roman Cavalry*, with the Slingers and Archers, having passed the River, engaged the Enemy's Horse: but as they retired from time to time into the Woods, and again fallied upon our Men, who durst not pursue them beyond

the open Ground ; the six Legions that formed the ~~BOOK~~  
Van coming up during these successive Rencoun-  
ters, began to intrench themselves. When the first  
Line of our Carriages appeared within sight of  
those that lay concealed in the Woods, which was  
the time previously concerted by the Enemy for  
giving the Onset : the *Nervians*, who stood ready  
drawn up within the Thicket, and had mutually  
exhorted one another to a resolute Behaviour, rush-  
ed suddenly forward with all their Forces, and fell  
furiously upon our Cavalry. These being easily  
repulsed and broken ; they ran down with incredi-  
ble speed to the *Sambre*, insomuch that at one and  
the same instant, they seemed to be in the Woods,  
in the River, and charging our Men on the  
other side. Nor were they less expeditious in  
mounting the Hill, and attacking those who were  
employed in fortifying the Camp.

XX. Now had *Cæsar* all the Parts of a General upon his hands at once : to erect the Standard, which was the Signal for the Men to fly to Arms : to proclaim the Battle by sound of Trumpet : to draw off the Soldiers from the Works : to recall those that were gone to fetch Materials for the Rampart : to draw up the Army in Order of Battle : to encourage his Men : and give the Word of Onset : in most of which he was prevented by the shortness of the Time, and the sudden Assault of the Enemy. In this Emergency, two things chiefly contributed to the Preservation of the *Romans* : one, the Ability and Experience of the Soldiers, who practised in former Battles, knew their Duty, and what was expedient in the present Conjunction, no less than the Officers themselves : the other, the Orders given by *Cæsar* to his several Lieutenants, not to quit the Works, and the Legions

BOOK gions where they commanded, 'till the Fortifica-  
II. tions of the Camp were finished. For these, upon  
seeing the Danger, and sudden Approach of the  
Enemy, waited not for new Instructions from the  
General, but gave forth such Orders, as their own  
Prudence, and the present Necessity suggested.

XXI. CÆSAR having made the necessary Dispo-  
sitions, ran to encourage his Men ; and, as Chance  
ordered it, fell in with the tenth Legion. When  
exhorting them in few Words to exert their wonted  
Bravery, and manfully sustain the Assault without  
Terror or Dismay ; as he saw the Enemy within reach  
of Dart, he gave the Signal to engage. Hastening  
thence to another quarter of the Field, he found  
the Battle already begun. So short was the time  
allowed us to prepare ourselves, and such the Re-  
solution and Impetuosity of the *Nervians* in rushing  
to the Encounter, that neither could the Offi-  
cers find leisure to regulate the Ensigns, nor the  
Soldiers to put on their Helmets, or uncase their  
Targets. Each Man, as he arrived from the  
Works, joined himself to the first Standard that  
came in his way, that he might not lose that time  
in looking for his own Company, which was to be  
employed in fighting the Enemy.

XXII. THE Army being drawn up, rather ac-  
cording to the nature of the Place, the declivity of  
the Hill, and the particular necessity of the Time ;  
than agreeable to Order and the Rules of War :  
as the Legions were forced to engage separately,  
some in one Place, some in another ; and the View  
of the Fight was every where interrupted by the  
thick Hedges described above : it was not possi-  
ble in these Circumstances, to distinguish with any  
certainty, where to send the necessary Supplies ;  
how

how to provide against the Exigencies of the Field; BOOK  
nor indeed for one Man to have an Eye to all the II.  
Occurrences that called for Notice and Redress. In such an unequal Situation of Things therefore, much room was left for the various Events and Interposition of Fortune.

XXIII. THE Soldiers of the ninth and tenth Legions, who were upon the left of the Army, having cast their Darts, advanced against the *Atrebatiens*, with whom it was their fortune to engage. These now weary, breathless, and overpowered with Wounds, were quickly driven from the higher Ground quite back to the *Sambre*, where the *Romans* still pressing them Sword in hand, slew great numbers as they endeavoured to pass the River. Nor did our Men decline pursuing them to the other side: but following too far, 'till they were drawn into a Place of disadvantage, the Enemy suddenly faced about, and renewed the Charge; yet were a second time obliged to betake themselves to flight. So likewise, in another quarter of the Field, the eleventh and eighth Legions, having overthrown the *Veromanduans* against whom they fought, drove them from the higher Ground to the very Banks of the River.

XXIV. As by this means the Front, and left side of the *Roman* Camp, lay in a manner quite exposed; for the twelfth Legion, and not far from that the seventh, were posted in the right Wing: the *Nervians* headed by *Boduognatus* their King, advanced thither in a close Body; and whilst one Party endeavoured to surround the Légions by taking them in flank, the rest mounted the Hill in order to get possession of the Camp. At the same time our Cavalry, with the light-armed Infantry,

BOOK try, who in the very beginning of the Engagement had been repulsed and broken, as we have related above ; returning to the Camp, and meeting the Enemy in Front, again betook themselves to flight. The Servants too of the Army, who from the Top of the Hill had beheld our Men victorious, and pursuing the Enemy cross the River ; having fallied out for the sake of Plunder : when they now looked back, and saw the *Nervians* in possession of the Camp, fled with the utmost Precipitation. This Confusion was still more increased by the Clamour and Uproar of those that attended the Carriages ; insomuch that the Panick spreading on all sides, each Man thought of providing for his Safety by Flight. The Cavalry of *Treves*, who were in the highest Esteem among the *Gauls* for their Valour, and had been sent by the State to reinforce *Cæsar's* Army ; alarmed by these several Appearances : when they saw our Camp filled with Multitudes of the Enemy ; the Legions overpowered, and in a manner quite surrounded ; the Horse, Archers, Slingers, and *Numidians*, routed, dispersed, and flying on all hands : imagining all was lost, returned to their own Country, and reported ; that the *Romans* were utterly overthrown, and their Camp and Baggage in possession of the Enemy.

XXV. CÆSAR having encouraged the tenth Legion, hastened to the right Wing of the Army. He there found his Men overpowered by the Enemy ; the Ensigns of the twelfth Legion all crowded into one place, and the Soldiers themselves standing so close together, that they had not room to use their Arms ; all the Centurions of the fourth Cohort slain, the Standard-bearer killed, and the Standard taken ; the Centurions of the other Cohorts

hort almost all either killed or dangerously wound-  
ed ; among these *P. Sextius Baculus*, the first Cen-  
turion of the Legion, a Man of great Courage, so  
weakened by the multitude of his Wounds, that he  
was hardly able to support himself ; the rest discou-  
raged and avoiding the Fight, and some even run-  
ning away, because abandoned by the Troops that  
were to sustain them ; the Enemy pressing vigorously  
in Front from the lower Ground, and at the  
same time flanking the Legions on either side with  
great Fury ; in a word, things reduced to the last  
Extremity, and no Body of Reserve to restore the  
Battle. Whereupon snatching a Buckler from a  
Soldier who stood in the Rear of the Legion, for  
he himself was come thither without one ; and  
pressing to the Front of the Battle ; he called the  
Centurions by Name, encouraged the rest, and com-  
manded the Soldiers to advance the Ensigns, and  
widen their Ranks, that they might be the more at  
liberty to use their Swords. His Arrival inspiring  
the Men with Hope, and reviving their Courage, as  
every one was ambitious of distinguishing himself in  
the presence of his General, and even in his greatest  
Extremity, redoubled his Efforts ; the Progress of  
the Enemy was a little checked.

XXVI. CÆSAR observing that the seventh Le-  
gion, which fought at some distance from the other,  
was likewise very much pressed by the Enemy, com-  
manded the military Tribunes to draw the two  
Legions together by degrees, and joining them  
back to back, oppose the Enemy with a double  
Front. This being done ; as they were now in a  
Condition to support each other, and no longer  
feared being surrounded, they began to make a  
more vigorous Opposition, and fight with greater  
Courage. Mean-time the two new Legions that  
formed the Rear of our Army, and had been ap-

BOOK pointed to guard the Baggage ; hearing of the  
II. Battle, advanced with all possible speed, and were  
seen by the *Nervians* from the top of the Hill :  
and *T. Labienus*, who had made himself Master of  
the Enemy's Camp, observing from the higher  
Ground how matters went on our side, detached  
the tenth Legion to our assistance. These under-  
standing, by the Flight of our Cavalry and Servants,  
the Distress we were in, and the Danger that  
threatned the Camp, the Legions, and the General,  
made all the haste they could to join us.

XXVII. THE Arrival of this Detachment pro-  
duced so great a Change in our Favour, that many  
of the Soldiers, who before lay oppressed with  
Wounds, now resuming Courage, and supporting  
themselves with their Shields, renewed the Fight.  
Nay the very Servants of the Camp observing the  
Consternation of the Enemy, unarmed as they  
were, rushed amongst their armed Battalions. The  
Cavalry too, striving by extraordinary Efforts of  
Valour to wipe away the Ignominy of their late  
Flight, charged the Enemy in all Places where  
the void Spaces between the Legions suffered  
them to advance. Mean-time the *Nervians*, tho'  
now reduced to the last Extremity, exerted them-  
selves with such determined Courage, that their  
front Ranks being cut off, those who stood behind  
mounted the Bodies of the slain, and thence con-  
tinued to maintain the Fight ; and when these too  
by their Fall had raised a Mountain of Carcasses,  
such as remained ascending the Pile, poured their  
Javelins upon us as from a Rampart, and even  
returned the Darts thrown at them by our Men.  
Fame therefore deceived not in proclaiming so  
loudly the Bravery of a People, who thus adven-  
tured to cross a very broad River, climb the steepest

Banks, and rush upon an Enemy possessed of all <sup>BOOK</sup>  
the Advantages of Ground : Difficulties, which  
though seemingly unsurmountable, appeared yet  
as nothing to Men of their Resolution and Mag-  
nanimity.

XXVIII. THE Battle being ended, and the Name and Nation of the *Nervians* in a manner quite extinguished; the old Men, who with the Women and Children, as we have related above, had been conveyed into a Place surrounded with Bogs and Marshes ; hearing of this terrible Overthrow, and judging that nothing would now be able to stop the Progress of the Conquerors, or protect the Conquered from their victorious Arms, resolved, with the Consent of all that survived the late Disaster, to send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, and surrender themselves. These in reciting the Calamities of their Country, represented : That of six hundred Senators, there remained only three ; and that from sixty thousand fighting Men, they were reduced to five hundred. *Cæsar*, as a proof of his Compassion towards this brave and unfortunate People, readily took them under his Protection, allowing them free and full Possession of their Towns and Territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring Nations, to abstain from Injuries and Wrongs.

XXIX. THE *Atuatichi*, of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their Forces to join the *Nervians*, and hearing of their Defeat, immediately returned home : when abandoning all their other Towns and Castles, they conveyed themselves and their Riches into a Place of great Strength, which Nature had fortified with uncommon Care. For it was on every side sur-

BOOK rounded with high Rocks and Precipices, having  
II. only one Avenue of about two hundred Foot  
broad, that approached the Town with a gentle  
rising. Here they raised a double Wall of pro-  
digious height, whereon, as a farther Security, they  
laid great numbers of huge Stones, and strong  
pointed Beams. This People were descended from  
the *Teutones* and *Cimbri*, who in their March to-  
wards the *Alps* and *Italy*, left their heavy Baggage  
on this side the *Rhine*, with a Detachment of six  
thousand Men to guard it. These, after the final  
Overthrow of their Countrymen, being for many  
Years harassed and persecuted by the neighbouring  
States; sometimes invading others, sometimes de-  
fending themselves; at last, with the Consent of  
all the bordering Nations, obtained Peace, and  
chose this Place for a Habitation.

XXX. On the first Arrival of the *Roman* Army, they made frequent Sallies from the Town, and engaged our Men in small Skirmishes. But *Cesar* having drawn a Line of Contravallation, twelve Feet high, fifteen Miles in Circumference, and every where well fortified with Redoubts; they kept themselves within their Walls. When we had now finished our Approaches, cast up a Mount, and were preparing a Tower of Assault behind the Works; they began at first to deride us from the Battlements, and in reproachful Lan-  
guage ask the meaning of that prodigious Engine, raised at such a distance! With what Hands or Strength, Men of our size and make, (for the *Gauls*, who are for the most part very tall, despise the small stature of the *Romans*,) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a Machine against their Walls?

XXXI. BUT when they saw it removed, and B O O K approaching near the Town, astonished at the new and unusual Appearance, they sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace. These being accordingly introduced, told him : " That they doubted not but the *Romans* were aided in their Wars by the Gods themselves ; it seeming to them a more than human Task, to transport with such facility an Engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought upon a level with their Enemies, and enabled to engage them in close Fight. That they therefore put themselves and Fortunes into his Hands, requesting only, that if his Clemency and Goodness, of which they had heard so much from others, had determined him to spare the *Atuatici*, he would not deprive them of their Arms : That the neighbouring Nations were almost all their Enemies, as envying their superior Valour ; nor would it be possible for them to defend themselves from their Attacks, if their Arms were taken away : In fine, that if such must be their Fate, they would rather choose to undergo any Fortune from the Hands of the *Romans*, than expose themselves to be cruelly butchered by those over whom they had been wont to exercise dominion."

XXXII. To this *Cæsar* replied : " That in regard of his usual Conduct on these Occasions, rather than for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant them Terms of Peace, provided they submitted before the Battering-Ram touched their Walls ; but that no Surrender would be accepted unless they agreed to deliver up their Arms : That he would take the same care of them as he had before done of the *Nervians*, and lay

BOOK II. lay his express Commands upon the neighbouring Nations, to abstain from all Injuries towards a People who had put themselves under the Protection of the *Romans.*" The Ambassadors returning with this Answer to their Countrymen, they accepted in Appearance the Conditions offered them by *Cæsar*, and threw so vast a Quantity of Arms into the Ditch before the Town, that the Heap almost reached to the top of the Wall. Nevertheless, as was afterwards known, they retained about a third part, and concealed them privately within the Town. The Gates being thrown open, they enjoyed Peace for the remaining part of that Day.

XXXIII. IN the Evening *Cæsar* ordered the Gates to be shut, and the Soldiers to quit the Town, that no Injury might be offered to the Inhabitants during the Night. Whereupon the *Atuatici*, in consequence of a Design they had before concerted, imagining that the *Romans*, after the Surrender of the Place, would either set no Guard at all, or at least keep watch with less Precaution: partly arming themselves with such Weapons as they had privately retained, partly with Targets made of Bark or Wicker, and covered over hastily with Hides; made a furious Sally about midnight with all their Forces, and charged our Works on that side where they seemed to be of easiest Access.


XXXIV. THE Alarm being immediately given by lighting Fires, as *Cæsar* had before commanded, the Soldiers ran to the Attack from the neighbouring Forts. A very sharp Conflict ensued: for the Enemy now driven to Despair, and having no hope but in their Valour, fought with all possible Bravery, though the *Romans* had the Advantage

of the Ground, and poured their Javelins upon them both from the Towers and the top of the Rampart. About four thousand were slain upon the spot, and the rest obliged to retire into the Town. Next Day the Gates were forced, no one offering to make the least Resistance; and the Army having taken possession of the Place, the Inhabitants, to the Number of fifty-three thousand, were sold for Slaves.

BOOK  
II.

XXXV. About the same time *P. Crassus*, whom *Cæsar* had sent with a Legion against the *Venetians*, *Unellians*, *Osfimians*, *Curiosolitæ*, *Sesuvians*, *Aulerci*, and *Rbedones*, Maritime States inhabiting along the Sea-coast; dispatched Messengers to acquaint him, that all these Nations had submitted to the Dominion and Authority of the *Romans*.

XXXVI. THE Campaign being ended, and all the Provinces of *Gaul* subdued; such was the Opinion conceived of this War amongst all the *Barbarians* round about, that even the Nations beyond the *Rhine* sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, offering to give Hostages, and submit to his Commands. But he being then in haste to return to *Italy* and *Illyricum*, ordered them to attend him the next Spring. Mean-time, having disposed his Army into Winter-quarters in the Territories of the *Andes*, *Turones*, and *Carnutes*, which States lay the nearest to the Provinces that had been the seat of the War, he himself set out for *Italy*. The Senate being informed of these Successes by *Cæsar's* Letters, decreed a Thanksgiving of fifteen Days: a Number never allowed to any General before.



*C. JULIUS CÆSAR's*  
**COMMENTARIES**

OF HIS  
**WARS in GAUL.**

**BOOK III.**

## THE A R G U M E N T.

- I. *The Nantuates, Veragrians, and Seduni, fall unexpectedly upon Ser. Galba, Cæsar's Lieutenant.*  
III. *But are overthrown with great Slaughter.* VI.  
*Galba leads back his Legion into the Country of the Allobrogians.* VII. *At the same time the Venetians and other States bordering upon the Ocean revolt.*  
IX. *Cæsar prepares to attack them, not without great Difficulty.* X. *He divides his Army, and distributes it into the several Provinces of Gaul.*  
XII. *The Advantages of the Venetians, and the manner of their Defence.* XIII. *A Description of their Shipping, and its suitableness to the nature of the Coast.* XIV. *Cæsar finding it in vain to attack them by Land, comes to a naval Engagement with them, and gets the Victory.* XVII. *Meantime Q. Titurius Sabinus his Lieutenant, by an artful Stratagem defeats the Unellians.* XXI. *At the same time P. Crassus in Aquitain, having vanquished the Sotiates, obliges them to submit,* XXIV. *Together with several other States of the same Province.* XXIX. *Cæsar attacks the Morini and Menapians with success; but the Season being far advanced, he is obliged to send his Army into Winter-quarters.*

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK III.

I. **C**ÆSAR, upon his departure for *Italy*, sent *Sergius Galba* with the twelfth Legion, and part of the Cavalry, against the *Nantuates*, *Veragrians*, and *Seduni*, whose Territories extend from the Confines of the *Allobrogians*, the Lake *Lemanus*, and the River *Rhone*, all the way to the top of the *Alps*. His design in this Expedition was to open a free passage over those Mountains to the *Roman* Merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous Exactions. *Galba*, whose Orders also were, to put the Legion into Winter-quarters in those parts, if he saw it necessary; after some successful Encounters, and making himself master of several Forts, was addressed by Ambassadors from all Nations round. Having settled the Terms of Peace, and received Hostages for

BOOK for their Fidelity ; he resolved to quarter two Co-

III. horts among the *Nantuates* ; and himself, with the other Cohorts, to winter in a Town of the *Veragrians*, called *Ostodurus*. This Town, which is situated in the midst of a Valley, upon a Plain of no great extent, is bounded on all sides by very high Mountains. As it was divided into two parts by a River, he left one part to the *Gauls*, and assigned the other to his Legion for their Winter-quarters, commanding it to be fortified with a Ditch and Rampart.

II. AFTER many Days spent here, and that Orders had been given for the bringing in of Corn to supply the Camp ; he was suddenly informed by his Spies, that the *Gauls* had abandoned in the Night that part of the City allotted to them, and that the impending Mountains were covered with great multitudes of the *Veragrians* and *Seduni*. Many Reasons conspired to induce the *Gauls* to this sudden Resolution of renewing the War, and falling upon our Men. First, the small number of the *Roman* Troops, who were therefore despised by the Enemy, as not amounting in all to one Legion ; two entire Cohorts having been detached, and even of those that remained with *Galba*, many being gone out in quest of Provisions : and then their Persuasion, that by reason of the inequality of the Ground, where it would be easy for them to pour upon us from the tops of the Mountains, and overwhelm us with their Darts, our Men would not be able to stand the very first Assault. Add to all this their inward Regret, at seeing their Children torn from them under the name of Hostages ; and that they firmly believed it to be the design of the *Romans*, in seizing the summits of the Mountains, not only to open a free Passage over the *Alps*, but

of

to secure to themselves the perpetual Possession of BOOK  
those Parts, and annex them to the adjoining III.  
Province.

III. UPON this Intelligence *Galba*, who had neither compleated the Fortifications of his Camp, nor laid in sufficient store of Corn and other Provisions; as little apprehending an Insurrection of this kind, among a People that had submitted and given Hostages; having speedily assembled a Council of War, began to ask their Advice in the present Exigence. As the Danger which threatened them was sudden and unexpected, and as they saw the Mountains on every side covered with multitudes of armed Soldiers; insomuch that there was no room to hope, either for Succours, or any Convoy of Provision, because the Enemy were in possession of all the Avenues to the Camp: some believing the Case to be altogether desperate, proposed to abandon the Baggage, and attempt by a Sally the recovery of their old Quarters. But the greater number were for reserving this Expedient to the last extremity, and in the mean time to wait the decision of Fortune, and in the best manner they were able defend the Camp.

IV. AFTER a short Space, and even before there was sufficient time for the putting in execution what had been resolved on; the Enemy, at a Signal given, came rushing upon us from all parts, and begun the Assault by a shower of Stones and Darts. Our Men at first made a brave and vigorous Resistance, plying them with their Javelins from the Ramparts, whence not a single Weapon was discharged in vain: and as any part of the Camp appeared hard pressed for want of Men to defend it, thither they ran, and made head against

BOOK the Affiliants. But in this the *Gauls* had greatly  
III. the Advantage, that when fatigued with the length  
of the Fight, they found themselves under a ne-  
cessity to retire, fresh Men succeeded in their place ;  
whereas on our side, by reason of the small number  
of Troops, no resource of this kind was left : so  
that not only such as were wearied with fighting  
were yet obliged to continue in their Posts ; but  
we could not even permit the wounded to retire,  
or for a Moment abandon the Charge.

V. THE Battle had now lasted upwards of six Hours without Interruption ; insomuch that the *Romans* not only found their Strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of Weapons, wherewith to annoy the Enemy. The *Gauls*, on the other hand, urged the Combat with greater Fury than ever ; and meeting with but a faint Resistance, fell to demolishing the Rampart and filling up the Ditch. All was giving way before them, when *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the first Rank, the same, who as we have related above, received so many Wounds in the Battle against the *Nervians* ; as likewise *C. Volusenus*, a military Tribune, one equally distinguished for his Conduct and Bravery ; came to *Galba*, and represented : That the only Refuge now left, was by a sudden Sally, to put all upon the issue of a bold Attack. Accordingly *Galba*, calling the Centurions together, by them gave immediate Notice to the Soldiers, to keep for some time only on the defensive ; and having provided themselves with the Weapons thrown at them by the Enemy, and a little recovered their Strength, upon a Signal given, to sally out of the Camp, and place all their hopes of Safety in their Valour. These Orders were exactly followed : and the *Romans* rushing furiously upon the Enemy, from

from all parts, neither gave them time to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an Attack, nor to recover out of the Confusion into which it had thrown them. Thus Fortune changing Sides, they every where surrounded and put to the Sword the *Gauls*, who had so lately entertained hopes of mastering our Camp. Of thirty thousand armed Troops, which Number, as appeared afterwards, were present in this Assault, more than ten thousand perished in the Field. The rest fled in great Terror and Confusion, and were even forced to abandon the Summits of the Mountains. The *Romans* seeing the Enemy entirely dispersed, and obliged every where to throw down their Arms, quitted the Pursuit, and retired within their Intrenchments.

VI. AFTER this Battle; *Galba*, unwilling a second time to expose himself to the inconstancy of Fortune, and besides considering, that he had met with an Opposition he little expected, when he first resolved to winter in these Parts: above all, finding himself in great want of Corn and Forage; the next Day set fire to the Town, and began his march back into the Province. As there was no Enemy in the Field to disturb or oppose him in his Retreat, he brought the Legion safe into the Country of the *Nantuates*, and thence into the Territories of the *Allobrogians*, where he put them into Winter-quarters.

VII. THE Insurrection being thus entirely quelled, *Cæsar* for many Reasons believed, that *Gaul* was now restored to a state of Tranquillity. The *Belians* had been overcome, the *Germans* expelled, and the *Seduni*, and other Inhabitants of the *Alps*, forced to submit. He therefore in the beginning of Winter ventured upon a Progress into *Illyricum*,

BOOK from a desire he had to visit those Nations, and  
III. acquaint himself with the Country; when all on a  
sudden a new War broke out in *Gaul*. The  
Occasion of it was as follows: The seventh Le-  
gion, commanded by young *Crassus*, was quartered  
among the *Andes*, a People bordering upon the  
Ocean. As there was great scarcity of Corn in these  
parts, *Crassus* sent some Officers of the Cavalry, and  
military Tribunes, to solicit a Supply from the  
neighbouring States. Of this number were *T. Terrasius*,  
sent to the *Eusubians*; *M. Trebius Gallus*, to  
the *Curiosolitæ*; and *Q. Velanius*, and *T. Silius*, to  
the *Venotians*.

VIII. THIS last State is by far the most power-  
ful and considerable of all the Nations inhabiting  
along the Sea-coast: and that not only on account  
their vast Shipping, wherewith they drive a mighty  
Træffick to *Britain*; and their Skill and Experience  
in naval Affairs, in which they greatly surpass the  
other maritime States: but because lying upon a  
large and open Coast, against which the Sea rages with  
great violence, and where the Havens being few in  
number, are all subject to their Jurisdiction; they  
have most of the Nations that trade in those Seas  
tributaries to their State. Among them the Re-  
volt began by detaining *Silius* and *Velanius*; as by  
this means they hoped to recover the Hostages  
they had put into the Hands of *Crassus*. The  
neighbouring States, moved by their Authority  
and Example, as the *Gauls* are in general very  
sudden and forward in their Resolves, detained for  
the same Reason *Trebius*, and *Terrasius*; and  
speedily dispatching Ambassadors from one to  
another, they by their Princes entered into a Con-  
federacy, of acting in all things with common  
Consent, and alike exposing themselves to the  
same issue of Fortune; earnestly soliciting at the  
same

same time the other Provinces, rather to stand up ~~BOOK~~ III.  
in defence of that Liberty they had received of their Ancestors, than tamely submit to the ignominious Yoke of the *Romans*. All the Nations upon the Sea-coast coming readily into this Alliance, they jointly sent Ambassadors to *Craffus*, to acquaint him ; That if he expected to have his Officers restored, he must first send them back their Hostages.

IX. CÆSAR having Intelligence of these things from *Craffus*, and being then at a great distance from *Gaul*, ordered in the mean-time ; that a number of Galleys should be built upon the *Loire*, a River which runs into the Ocean ; and that Mariners, Rowers, and Pilots, should be drawn together from the Province. These Orders being executed with great dispatch, he himself, as soon as the Season of the Year permitted, came to the Army. The *Venetians*, and other States in Alliance with them, having notice of his Arrival ; and reflecting at the same time upon the greatness of their Crime in detaining and loading with Irons Ambassadors, a Name ever looked upon amongst all Nations as sacred and inviolable ; began to make Preparations proportioned to the Danger that threatened them ; more especially to provide themselves with all kinds of warlike Stores ; and that with so much the greater Alacrity and Confidence, as the Nature and Situation of the Country gave them good hopes of being able to defend themselves. They knew that the Passes by Land were every where cut asunder, by the many Friths and Arms of the Ocean, that run up in those Parts ; and that the Approach by Sea was not less difficult, on account of the small number of Harbours, and the little Knowledge the *Romans* had of the Coast.

BOOK Neither did they imagine it possible for our Army,  
III. to continue long in that Country, by reason of the  
great scarcity of Corn: and should even all these  
Expectations deceive them, they had still a mighty  
Confidence in the strength and number of their  
Shipping. The *Romans*, they were sensible, had  
but a very inconsiderable Fleet; and were besides  
perfect Strangers to the Ports, Islands, and Shal-  
lows of the Coast, where the chief weight of the  
War was like to fall. At the time they foresaw,  
that our Pilots, accustomed only to the Navigation  
of the *Mediterranean*, a Sea bounded and shut in  
on all sides by the Continent, must needs find them-  
selves greatly at a loss, when they came to enter  
the vast and open Spaces of the wide *Atlantick*  
Ocean. In consequence of these Reflections, and  
the Resolutions formed upon them, they set about  
fortifying their Towns, and conveying all their  
Corn into Places of strength, ordering as many  
Ships as could be got together to rendezvous in the  
*Venetian* Ports; it appearing, that *Cæsar* intended  
to begin the War by attacking that State. They  
likewise brought over to their Alliance the *Offsmi-  
ans*, *Lexovians*, *Nannetes*, *Ambiani*, *Morini*, *Dia-  
blines*, and *Menapians*; and dispatched Amba-  
sadors into *Britain*, which lies over-against their  
Coast, to solicit Assistance from thence.

X. ALL these Difficulties before-mentioned at-  
tended the prosecution of this War: but *Cæsar*  
was urged by many Considerations to undertake  
and carry it on with Vigour: The Insult offered  
to the Commonwealth in detaining the *Roman*  
Knights: a Revolt, and Insurrection, after Sub-  
mission, and Hostages given: the Confederacy  
of so many States: above all his Fear, lest by  
neglecting to oppose these first Commotions, he  
should

should give Encouragement to the other Provinces <sup>BOOK</sup> of *Gaul* to follow the Example. Reflecting therefore upon the Genius and Temper of the *Gauls*, fond of Revolutions, and ever forward and ready to engage in new Wars; and considering at the same time, that it was the natural Bent and Disposition of Mankind, to aspire after Liberty, and abhor the Yoke of Servitude; he determined, before the Infection should spread wider, to divide his Army, and distribute it into the several Provinces of *Gaul*.

XI. PURSUANT to this Design, *T. Labienus* his Lieutenant was sent with the Cavalry to *Treves*, whose Territory extends along the Banks of the *Rhine*. To him he gave it in charge, to take a Progress to *Rheims*, and the other *Belgian* States, in order to retain them in Obedience; as likewise to oppose the *Germans*, should they attempt by Force the Passage of the River; a Report then prevailing that they had been invited over by the *Belgians*. *P. Crassus*, with twelve legionary Cohorts, and a great Body of Horse, had Orders to march into *Aquitain*, to prevent the Arrival of any Supplies from that Quarter, and the Junction of the Forces of so many powerful Nations. *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, at the head of three Legions, entered the Country of the *Unellians*, *Curiosolite*, and *Lexovians*, to find Employment for the Troops that had been drawn together in those Parts. To young *Brutus* he gave the Command of the Fleet, and of all the Vessels from *Gaul*, which he had ordered to be fitted out by the *Santones*, *Pictones*, and other Provinces that continued in Obedience; strongly recommending to him at the same time, to use the greatest Dispatch, and sail with all Expedition for the *Venetian* Coast.

BOOKCoast. He himself, at the head of the Land-army,  
III. set out upon his march thither.

XII. THE Situation of most of the Towns in those Parts is such, that standing upon the Edges of Promontories, or upon Points of Land that run out into the Sea, there is no approaching them with an Army at high-water, which happens always twice in twelve Hours. Neither is it possible for a Fleet to draw near: because upon the Recess of the Tide, the Ships would be in danger of being dashed against the Shallows and Banks of Sand. Both these Reasons therefore concurred to secure their Towns from Assault: and if at any time, by the greatness of the Works carried on against them, and huge artificial Mounts that served to prevent the Ingress of the Sea, and were raised to an Height nearly equalling their Walls, they saw themselves reduced to Extremity; then, by bringing up their Ships, of which they had always a great Number in readiness, they easily found means to carry off their Effects, and withdraw into the nearest Towns, where they again defended themselves by the same Advantages of Situation as before. In this manner did they elude all *Cæsar's* Attempts during a great part of the Summer, and that with so much the more Success, because our Fleet was kept back by Tempests, and found the Navigation extremely dangerous in that vast and boundless Ocean, where the Tides are great, and the Havens both few in Number, and at a considerable distance one from another.

XIII. FOR the *Venetian* Ships were built and fitted out in this manner. Their Bottoms were somewhat flatter than ours, the better to adapt themselves to the Shallows, and sustain without Danger  
the

the regres of the Tides. Their Prows were very ~~BOOK~~  
high and erect, as likewise their Sterns, to bear the ~~III.~~  
hugenens of the Billows, and the violence of Tem-  
pests. The Body of the Vessel was entirely of  
Oak, to stand the Shocks and Assaults of that tem-  
pestuous Ocean. The Benches of the Rowers were  
made of strong Beams of about a Foot in breadth,  
and fastened with iron Nails an Inch thick. In-  
stead of Cables they secured their Anchors with  
Chains of Iron ; and made use of Skins, and a  
sort of thin pliant Leather, by way of Sails : either  
because they wanted Canvas, and were ignorant of  
the Art of making Sail-cloth ; or, which is more  
probable, because they imagined that Canvas-sails  
were not so proper to bear the Violence of Tem-  
pests, the Rage and Fury of the Winds, and to  
govern Ships of that Bulk and Burden. Between  
our Fleet, and Vessels of such a make, the nature  
of the Encounter was this ; that in Agility, and a  
ready Command of Oars, we had indeed the Ad-  
vantage ; but in other Respects, regarding the Si-  
tuation of the Coast, and the Assaults of Storms,  
all things ran very much in their Favour : for  
neither could our Ships injure them with their  
Beaks, so great was their Strength and Firmness ;  
nor could we easily throw in our Darts, because of  
their height above us : which also was the Reason,  
that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the  
Enemy, and bring them to close Fight. Add to  
all this, that when the Sea began to rage, and they  
were forced to submit to the Pleasure of the Winds,  
they could both weather the Storm better, and  
more securely trust themselves among the Shallows,  
as fearing nothing from the Rocks and Cliffs, up-  
on the Recess of the Tide. The *Romans*, on the  
other hand, had reason to be under a continual  
dread of these and such like Accidents.

BOOK XIV. CÆSAR having taken many of their  
III. Towns, and finding that he only fatigued his Army  
to no purpose, because he could neither prevent  
the Retreat of the Enemy, nor force their Garri-  
sons to a Surrender ; resolved to wait the Arrival  
of his Fleet. Which being accordingly come up,  
was no sooner descried by the *Venetians*, than about  
two hundred and twenty of their best Ships, well  
equipped for Service, and furnished with all kind  
of Weapons, stood out to Sea, and drew up in  
order of Battle against us. Neither *Brutus* who  
commanded the Fleet, nor the Centurions and mi-  
litary Tribunes who had the Charge of particular  
Vessels, knew what Course to take, or in what  
manner to conduct the Fight. For they were no  
Strangers to the Strength and Firmness of the *Vene-*  
*tian* Shipping, which rendered them proof against  
our Beaks : and when they had even raised Turrets  
upon the Decks, yet being still over-topped by the  
lofty Sterns of the Enemy, the *Romans* could not  
with any Advantage throw in their Darts ; whereas  
those sent by the *Gauls*, coming from above, de-  
scended with great violence on our Men. In this  
Exigence, a particular kind of Instrument used by  
the Mariners, proved of signal Service in giving  
a favourable Issue to the Combat. They had pro-  
vided themselves with long Poles, armed at one  
end with long Scythes, not unlike those made use  
of in attacking the Walls of Towns. With these  
they laid hold of the Enemy's Tackle, and draw-  
ing off the Galley by the extreme Force of Oars,  
cut asunder the Ropes that fastened the Sail-yards  
to the Mast. These giving way, the Sail-yards  
necessarily came down ; insomuch that as all the  
Hopes and Expectations of the *Gauls* depended en-  
tirely on their Sails and Rigging, by depriving them  
of

of this Resource, we at the same time rendered **BOOK**  
their Vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest de-  
pended altogether upon the Valour of the Troops,  
in which the *Romans* had greatly the Advantage ;  
and the rather, because they fought within View  
of *Cæsar* and the whole Army, so that not a single  
A&t of Bravery could pass unobserved : for all the  
adjoining Hills and Eminences, which afforded a  
near Prospect of the Sea, were covered with our  
Men.

XV. THE Enemy's Sail-yards being, as we  
have said, cut down ; and many of their Ships  
singly surrounded by two or three of ours at a  
time ; the *Romans* used their utmost Endeavours to  
board them. Which the *Venetians* observing, and  
that we had already made ourselves Masters of a  
great part of their Fleet ; as they could fall upon  
no Expedient to prevent so great a Misfortune,  
they began to think of providing for their Safety  
by Flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in  
order to have the Advantage of the Wind ; when  
all of a sudden so dead a Calm ensued, that not a  
Vessel could stir out of its Place. Nor could any  
thing have fallen out more opportunely towards  
putting at once a final Period to the War ; for the  
*Romans* attacking their Ships one after another,  
took them with ease ; insomuch that of all that vast  
Number that came out against us, but a very few,  
under favour of the Night, escaped safe to Land,  
after a Conflict that continued from nine in the  
Morning 'till Sun-set.

XVI. THIS Battle put an end to the War with  
the *Venetians*, and all the Nations upon the Sea-  
Coast. For as the entire Body of their Youth, and  
all those also of more advanced Age, who were  
capable

BOOK capable of serving their Country by their Credit and

III. Counsels, were present in the Action; and as they had likewise drawn together their whole naval Strength : such as survived this Defeat, having neither any place of Refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left of defending their Towns, surrendered themselves and their all to *Cæsar's* Mercy. But he thought it necessary to proceed against them with the greater Severity, that he might impress upon the Minds of the *Gauls* for the future, a more inviolable Regard to the sacred Character of Ambassadors. Having therefore caused all their Senators to be put to death, he ordered the rest to be sold for Slaves.

XVII. DURING these Transactions against the *Venetians*, *Q. Titurius Sabinus* entered the Territories of the *Unellians*, at the head of the Troops put under his Command by *Cæsar*. *Viridovix* was invested with the supreme Authority in these Parts, and had been appointed General in chief, by all the States concerned in the Revolt ; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful Army. Nay but a very few Days before, the *Aulerici*, *Eburovices*, and *Lexovians*, having massacred their Senate, because they refused to engage in the War, had shut their Gates against the *Romans*, and joined themselves to *Viridovix*. Besides all this, he had very much strengthened his Army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of *Gaul*; Men of desperate Fortunes, or accustomed to live by Robbery, whom the hopes of Plunder, and love of War, had drawn off from the daily Labours of their Calling and the Cares of Agriculture.

XVIII. SABINUS kept close within his Camp, BOOK  
which was situated in a manner every way advan- III.  
tageous ; while *Viridovix*, who had posted himself  
at the distance of about two Miles, daily drew out  
his Men, and offered him Battle. This Behaviour  
of the *Roman* General, not only drew upon him  
the Contempt of the Enemy, but occasioned also  
some murmuring among his own Troops, and filled  
the *Gauls* with so high a Conceit of his Fear, that  
that they even adventured to come up to his very  
Trenches. The Reason of his acting in this man-  
ner was, that he thought it not justifiable in a  
Lieutenant, in the Absence of the Commander in-  
chief, to hazard a Battle with so superior an Army,  
unless upon Terms of evident Advantage.

XIX. HAVING confirmed them in this Belief,  
that his Reserve was the effect of Fear ; he made  
choice of a certain *Gaul* from among the Auxilia-  
ries, a Man of Address, and every way qualified  
for carrying on his Design. Him he persuaded by  
great Rewards, and still greater Promises, to go  
over to the Enemy, instructing him at the same  
time in the Part he was to act. This *Gaul* coming  
to their Camp as a Deserter, laid before them the  
Fear of the *Romans*, and the Extremities to which  
*Cæsar* was reduced in the War against the *Venetians* :  
nor did he fail to insinuate, that there was great  
Reason to believe *Sabinus* intended the next Night  
privately to draw off his Army, and march to *Cæ-  
sar's* Assistance. No sooner was this heard by the  
*Gauls*, than they all cried out with one Voice, that  
they ought not to lose so fair an Occasion of Suc-  
cess, but go and attack the *Roman* Camp. Many  
Reasons concurred to fix them in this Resolution :  
The Reserve of *Sabinus* for some Days past : the

BOOK Intelligence from the Deserter confirming their belief of his Fear : the want of Provisions, of which they had taken no great Care to lay in a sufficient Stock : the Hopes conceived from the *Venetian War* : and in fine, that readiness with which Men are apt to believe what falls in with their Expectations and Wishes. Urged by these Considerations, they would not suffer *Viridovix* and the rest of the General Officers to dismiss the Council, before they had obtained their Consent for the taking up of Arms, and falling upon the *Roman Camp*. The Proposal being at last agreed to, they provided themselves with Fasernes and Hurdles to fill up the Ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain Victory.

XX. THE *Roman Camp* stood upon an Eminence, which rose with a gentle Ascent, for the space of about a Mile. Hither the *Gauls* advanced with so much haste, in order to come upon our Troops unprepared, that by that time they were arrived, they had run themselves quite out of Breath. *Sabinus* having encouraged his Men, whom he saw eager to engage, gave the Word of Onset. As the Enemy were very much encumbered with the Loads of Fasernes they had brought to fill up the Ditch, he ordered a sudden Sally from the two several Gates of the Camp : and so well did it succeed, by reason of the Advantage of the Ground, the Inexperience and Weariness of the *Gauls*, the Bravery of the *Roman* Troops, and their Ability acquired in former Battles ; that the Enemy could not sustain the very first Charge of our Men, but immediately betook themselves to flight. The *Romans*, who were fresh and vigorous, pursuing them under all these Disadvantages, put great numbers to the Sword ; and the rest being followed by

by the Cavalry, very few escaped the Slaughter. B O O K .  
Thus at one and the same time, *Sabinus* had an III.  
Account of the Defeat of the *Venetians* by Sea, and  
*Cæsar* of the Victory obtained by *Sabinus* at Land.  
All the several States in those Parts readily submitted  
to *Titurius*: for as the *Gauls* are very prompt  
and forward to undertake a War, so are they of a  
Disposition that easily relents and gives way to the  
Strokes of Adversity.

XXI. MUCH about the same time *P. Crassus*  
arrived in *Aquitain*; a Country, which as we have  
before observed, for extent of Territory, and number  
of Inhabitants, is deservedly counted a third  
Part of *Gaul*. This General understanding that he  
was to conduct a War in those Parts, where but a  
few Years before *L. Valerius Präconinus* had been  
slain, and his Army put to the rout; and whence  
*L. Manilius* the Proconsul had been driven with  
the loss of his Baggage: soon became sensible that  
he must act with more than ordinary Circumspection  
and Vigour. Having therefore made Provision  
of Corn, assembled his auxiliary Troops and  
Cavalry, and strengthened his Army with a choice  
Body of Volunteers, drawn together by name from  
*Toulouse*, *Carcaso*, and *Narbone*, which States make  
up that Part of the *Roman* Province that lies the  
nearest to *Aquitain*; he advanced with all his Forces  
into the Territories of the *Sotiates*. These, upon  
the first notice of his Arrival, having levied a great  
Army, and attacking him in his March with the  
whole Body of their Cavalry, in which their chief  
strength consisted; were nevertheless repulsed and  
pursued by our Men. But all on a sudden their  
Infantry appearing in a Valley, where they had been  
designedly placed in Ambush, fell furiously upon  
the

XXII. THE Battle was long and obstinate. For the *Sotiates*, proud of their former Victories, imagined that the Fate of all *Aquitain* depended singly on their Bravery. The *Romans*, on the other hand, were ambitious of shewing what they could atchieve under a young Leader, in the Absence of their General, and unsupported by the rest of the Legions. At length however, the Enemy over-powered with Wounds, betook themselves to flight; and a great Slaughter ensuing, *Craffus* marched immediately and invested their Capital; where meeting with a brave Resistance, he was forced to make his Approaches by Towers and Mantelets. The Enemy sometimes sallying out, sometimes carrying on their Mines to our very Works, (in which kind of Service the *Aquitains* are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a Country that abounds in Veins of Copper;) when they saw that the Diligence of the *Romans* enabled them to surmount all these Difficulties, sent Ambassadors to *Craffus*, and requested they might be admitted to a Surrender. Which being accordingly agreed to, they in Obedience to his Desire delivered up their Arms.

XXIII. But while the *Romans* were wholly intent upon the execution of the Treaty: *Adiatomus*, who commanded in chief, endeavoured to escape on the other side of the Town, with a Body of six hundred sworn Friends, who in the Language of the Country are called *Soldurians*. Their condition and manner of Life is this: To live in a perfect Community of Goods with those to whom they have engaged themselves in Friendship: if any Misfortune befalls them, to share in it, or make away

away with themselves : nor is there a single In-BOOK  
ftance of any one upon Record, who upon the death of him to whom he had vowed a Friendship, refused to submit to the same Fate. *Adiatomus*, as we have said, endeavouring to make his Escape with his Body of Friends, and the Alarm being given on that side of the Works, the Soldiers immediately ran to Arms ; when a furious Combat ensued, in which he was at last repulsed, and driven back into the Town. He obtained however from *Crassus* the same Conditions of Surrender as had been granted to the rest of the Inhabitants.

XXIV. CRASSUS having received their Arms and Hostages, led his Troops into the Territories of the *Vocatians* and *Tarufatians*. But now the *Gauls*, roused by the unexpected Progress of the *Romans*, who had in a few Days after their Arrival made themselves masters of a Town strongly fortified both by Art and Nature ; began to send Ambassadors into all Parts ; to join in a mutual League ; to ratify their Engagements by an exchange of Hostages ; and to levy Troops. Ambassadors were likewise dispatched to all the States of Hither *Spain* that bordered upon *Aquitain*, to solicit a Supply of Troops and Leaders : upon whose Arrival, they immediately took the Field with great Confidence, and a numerous and well appointed Army. None were suffered to command but such as had served under *Sertorius*, and were therefore accounted Men of consummate Ability and Experience in the Art of War. These, according to the Custom of the *Romans*, made it their Study to choose a Camp to Advantage ; to secure themselves by Lines and Intrenchments ; and to intercept our Convoys. *Crassus* perceiving their Design ; as his own Army was not strong enough

BOOK to admit of sending out Detachments ; and as the  
III. *Gauls* could upon all Occasions employ numerous  
Parties, possess themselves of the Passes, and at  
the same time have a sufficient number of Troops  
to guard the Camp ; by which means he forefaw  
he must soon be reduced to great Straits for want  
of Provisions, while the Enemy would be every  
Day growing more powerful : he for all these  
Reasons resolved not to delay coming to an En-  
gagement. Having laid his Design before a  
Council of War, and finding them unanimous in  
their Approbation of it, he appointed the next  
Day for the Engagement.

XXV. EARLY in the Morning he drew all his  
Forces out of the Camp, and disposing them in  
two Lines, with the auxiliary Troops in the Center,  
stood expecting what Resolution the Enemy would  
take. But the *Gauls*, tho' they believed they  
might safely hazard a Battle, on account of their  
Numbers, their former Renown in War, and the  
Handful of Men they were to oppose ; yet thought  
it would be still better, by seizing the Passes, and  
intercepting our Convoys, to secure the Victory  
without Expence of Blood : and should the want  
of Provisions at length force the *Romans* to think  
of a Retreat ; they might then fall upon them  
embarrassed in their March, incumbered with their  
Baggage, and dejected by their Misfortunes. This  
Resolution being approved by all their Leaders,  
they kept within their Camp, tho' our Men ap-  
peared before them in Order of Battle.

XXVI. CRASSUS perceiving their Design, and  
that this Delay served rather to abate the Courage  
of the Enemy, and add fresh Spirits to his own  
Men, among whom an universal Cry arose, that  
he

he ought no longer to put off the Engagement, BOOK  
III. but march directly to their Camp : having encouraged his Troops, he resolved to give way to their present Ardor; and accordingly led them to the Assault. There some were employed in filling up the Ditch ; others in driving the Enemy with their Darts from the Works ; while the Auxiliaries, in whom *Craffus* had no great Confidence, yet that they might appear to have some share at least in the Engagement, were appointed to carry Stones and Darts to them that fought, and to supply Materials for raising the Mount. At the same time the Enemy fought with great Constancy and Resolution, and made no small Havock with their Darts, which came upon us from above. During this warmth of Opposition, the Cavalry having taken a Compass round the Camp, came and told *Craffus*, that the Intrenchments were not fortified with the same Care in all Parts, and that it would be easy to force an Entrance by the postern Gates.

XXVII. *Crassus* having exhorted the Officers of the Cavalry to encourage their Men by great Rewards and Promises, instructed them in the Part they were to act. They, in consequence of the Orders they had received, drawing out four Cohorts, which having been left to guard the Camp, were quite fresh and fit for Action ; and fetching with them a large Compass, that they might not be seen from the Enemy's Camp ; while the Eyes and Minds of all were intent upon the Combat, fell suddenly upon that Part of the Intrenchments of which we have spoken above ; and having forced their way through, were actually got within the Camp before they were so much as seen by the Enemy, or any Apprehension entertained of what they were about. Upon this a great Uproar being


BOOK heard on that side, our Men redoubled their  
III. Efforts, and as always happens to Troops animated  
with the hopes of Victory, began to push the *Gauls*  
with greater Fury than ever. The Enemy thus  
surrounded on all Sides, and without hopes of re-  
trieving their Affairs, endeavoured to make their  
Escape over the Rampart, and save themselves by  
Flight. But being pursued by the Cavalry, who  
soon came up with them in these open and level  
Plains: of fifty thousand Men that had been drawn  
together out of *Spain* and *Aquitain*, scarce a fourth  
Part escaped; nor did the Horse return to the  
Camp 'till very late in the Evening, after they had  
quite tired themselves with the Slaughter.

XXVIII. UPON the Report of this Defeat, the  
greatest part of *Aquitain* immediately submitted to  
*Craffus*, and of their own accord sent him Ho-  
stages. Of this number were the *Tarbelli*, *Biger-*  
*riones*, *Preciani*, *Vocates*, *Tarufates*, *Elufates*, *Garites*,  
*Aufci*, *Garumni*, *Siburzates*, and *Cocafates*. Only  
a few Nations, and those the most remote, relying  
on the Season of the Year, because the Winter  
was at hand, neglected to take this Step.

XXIX. MUCH about the same time *Cæsar*, tho'  
the Summer was now almost spent; yet be-  
cause all the rest of *Gaul* being subdued, the *Morini*  
and *Menapians* were still in Arms, and had not  
sent Ambassadors to treat about a Peace; resolved  
to lead his Army against them, hoping he should  
soon be able to put an end to that War. Their  
manner of opposing him was very different from  
that of the other *Gauls*. For understanding that  
the most powerful Nations, when it came to a  
Battle, had always been overthrown and put to  
rout; and inhabiting themselves in a Country that  
abounded

abounded in Woods and Marshes, they retired BOOK  
thither with all their Effects. *Cæsar* coming to III.  
the Entrance of the Wood, began to intrench himself : and although no Enemy in the mean-time appeared, yet no sooner had our Men dispersed themselves in order to set about fortifying the Camp, than on a sudden they came pouring upon us from all parts of the Wood, and charged with great Briskness. The *Romans* immediately flew to their Arms, and drove them back with considerable Slaughter ; but adventuring a little too far into the Wood, lost some Men.

XXX. CÆSAR spent the remaining Days in cutting down the Wood ; and to screen his Men from any sudden and unexpected Attack, ordered the Trees that had been felled to be placed on each side the Army, that they might serve as a Barricade against the Attempts of the Enemy. Having with incredible Dispatch advanced a great way into the Wood in a few Days, insomuch that all their Cattle and Baggage fell into our Hands ; they themselves retired into the thicker and more covered spaces of the Forest. The Season growing bad, we were forced to intermit the Work ; and the Rains soon became so violent and continual, that the Soldiers could no longer endure to lie in their Tents. Wherefore *Cæsar* having laid waste their Lands, and set fire to their Towns and Houses, led back his Army, and disposed it into Winter-quarters among the *Aulerici*, *Lexovians*, and other States whom he had last subdued.



*C. JULIUS CÆSAR's*  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK IV.

H 4

## THE A R G U M E N T.

I. *The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German Nations, expelled by the Suevians, come over into Gaul.* II. *The Manners and way of Life of the Suevians.* III. *And of the Ubians.* IV. *The Usipetes and Tenchtheri drive the Menapians from their Habitations.* V. *Cæsar knowing the wavering and unsettled Temper of the Gauls, repairs early in the Spring to the Army.* VI. *Embassy of the Germans to Cæsar, and his Answer.* IX. *An Action between the Cavalry, in which the Germans have the advantage.* X. *But are afterwards driven from their Camp with great Slaughter.* XIII. *And pursued by Cæsar, who makes a Bridge over the Rhine for that purpose.* XVI. *Cæsar lays waste the Territories of Sigambri.* XVII. *And having freed the Ubians from the servitude under which they lived, returns into Gaul.* XVIII. *He then passes over into Britain.* XXII. *And lands his Army with great difficulty, the Natives making a vigorous Opposition.* XXIV. *They are defeated at length, and send Ambassadors to sue for Peace.* XXVI. *Cæsar's Fleet almost entirely ruined by a Storm, which induces the Britons to revolt.* XXIX. *Their way of fighting from their Chariots.* XXX. *Which disconcerts the Romans at first.* XXXI. *But being again put to flight, they obtain Peace.* XXXII. *After which Cæsar returns into Gaul.* XXXIII. *And marching against the Morini, whom the hope of Plunder tempted to fall upon some of his detached parties, obliges them to submit.*

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G. JULIUS CÆSAR's  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK IV.

I. **T**H<sup>E</sup> following Winter, being that in which *Cn. Pompey* and *M. Crassus* were Consuls, the *Uspetes* and *Tenctberi*, *German* Nations, passed the *Rhine* in a great Body, not far from its Mouth. The Cause of their taking this Step was, that being much exposed to the Hostilities of the *Suevians*, they had for many Years been harassed with continual Wars and hindered from cultivating their Lands.

II. **T**HE *Suevians* are by far the most warlike and considerable of all the *German* Nations. They are said to be composed of a hundred Cantons, each of which sends yearly into the Field a thousand armed Men. The rest, who continue in their several Districts, employ themselves in cultivating their Lands, that it may furnish a sufficient Supply both

BOOK both for themselves and for the Army. These  
IV. again take up Arms the following Campaign, and  
are succeeded in the care of the Lands by the  
Troops that served the Year before. Thus they  
live in the continual Exercise both of Agriculture  
and War. They allow of no such thing as Prop-  
erty or private Possession in the distribution of  
their Lands; their Residence, for the sake of Til-  
lage, being confined to a single Year. Corn is not  
much in use among them, because they prefer a  
milk or flesh-diet, and are greatly addicted to  
Hunting. Thus the Quality of their Food, their  
perpetual Exercise, and free unconfined manner of  
Life (because being from their Childhood fettered  
by no Rules of Duty or Education, they acknow-  
ledge no Law but Will and Pleasure) contribute to  
make them strong, and of an extraordinary Sta-  
ture. They have likewise accustomed themselves,  
though inhabiting a Climate naturally very cold,  
to bathe in their Rivers, and clothe themselves only  
with Skins, which as they are very small, leave  
great part of their Body quite uncovered. Mer-  
chants indeed resort to them, but rather to purchase  
their Spoils taken in War, than import any Goods  
into the Country: for even Beasts of Carriage, in  
which the Gauls take so much Delight, that they  
are ready to purchase them at any Price, are yet  
very little valued by the Germans when brought  
among them. And though those of their own  
Country are both small and very ill shaped, yet by  
daily Exercise they make them capable of all kinds  
of Service. Their Cavalry often dismount in time  
of Action, to fight on Foot; and their Horses are  
so train'd, that they stir not from the place where  
they are left, but wait the return of their Riders,  
who betake themselves to them again in case of  
Necessity. Nothing is more dishonourable in their  
Account,

Account, or more opposite to their Customs, than BOOK the use of Horse-furniture: and therefore however few themselves, they scruple not to attack any Number of their Enemies whom they see so equipped. They suffer no Wine to be imported into their Territories, as imagining that it both enervates the Mind, and unfits the Body for Exercise and Labour. It is accounted much to the Honour of the Nation, to have the Country for a great way round them waste and uninhabited; for by this they think is intimated, that the united Force of many States has been found insufficient to withstand their single Valour. And hence it is, that on one side, the Country is said to lie desolate for the space of six hundred Miles.

III. On the other side they are bounded by the *Ubians*, heretofore a flourishing and potent People, and somewhat more civilized than the other *German* Nations; because inhabiting along the Banks of the *Rhine*, they are much resorted to by Merchants; and have besides, by bordering upon the States of *Gaul*, given into many of their Customs. The *Suevians* having tried the Strength of this People in many Wars, and finding them too numerous and potent to be driven out of their Territories; prevailed yet so far as to impose a Tribute upon them, and very much reduce and weaken their Power.

IV. THE *Uffiges* and *Tenctheri*, of whom we have spoken above, were likewise engaged in this Quarrel; and after withstanding the Power of the *Suevians* for many Years, were nevertheless at length driven from their Territories. Having wandered over many Regions of *Germany* during the space of three Years, they arrived at last upon the Banks of

BOOK of the *Rbine*, towards those Parts inhabited by the  
IV. *Menapians*, who had Houses, Lands, and Villages  
on both sides the River. But alarmed at the Approach of so prodigious a Multitude, they abandoned all their Habitations beyond the *Rbine*; and having disposed their Troops on this side the River, set themselves to oppose the Passage of the *Germans*. These having tried every Expedient; and finding they could neither force the Passage, because of their want of Shipping; nor steal over privately, by reason of the Guards kept by the *Menapians*; counterfeited a Retreat into their own Country; and after three Days March suddenly turned back: when their Cavalry recovering all this Ground in the space of one Night, easily overpowered the *Menapians*, little expecting or prepared for such a Visit: for having been apprised by their Scouts of the Departure of the *Germans*, they had returned, fearless of Danger, to their Habitations beyond the *Rbine*. These being all put to the Sword, and their Shipping seized; before the *Menapians* on this side had intelligence of their Approach, they passed the River: and seizing all their Towns and Houses, supported themselves the rest of the Winter with the Provisions there found.

V. CÆSAR being informed of these things, and dreading the Levity of the *Gauls*, who are very changeable in their Counsels, and fond of Novelties; determined to trust nothing to their Resolves. For it is the Custom of that People to stop Travellers even against their will, and enquire of them what they have heard or know relating to any Affair: and in their Towns, upon the Arrival of a foreign Merchant, they gather round him in crowds, and oblige him to tell what Country he comes from, and how things stood at his Departure. Moved  
by

by these Reports, they often enter upon the most BOOK important Deliberations, and concert Measures IV. they soon have cause to repent, as being founded wholly on vain Rumours, and Answers feigned for the most part designedly to please them. *Cæsar*, who was aware of this Custom, fearing the War if neglected might become formidable, made all the haste he could to join the Army. Upon his Arrival he found, that things were fallen out exactly as he had foreseen. Some of the States of *Gaul* had sent Ambassadors to the *Germans*, inviting them to leave the Banks of the *Rhine*, and assuring them that all their Demands should be readily complied with. The *Germans*, allured by these Hopes, were already extending their Incursions on all sides, and had penetrated into the Territories of the *Eburones* and *Condruianos*, both which Nations are under the Protection of the *Treviri*. *Cæsar* having assembled the Chiefs of the *Gauls*, dissembled his knowledge of their secret Designs; and endeavouring rather to win them over, and confirm them in their Alliance with the People of *Rome*; demanded a certain number of Cavalry of them, and prepared to march against the *Germans*.

VI. HAVING provided himself with Corn, and drawn together a select Body of Horse, he began his March towards those Parts where he understood the *Germans* then were. When he was come within a few Days journey of their Camp, Ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him to this effect: "That the *Germans* had no Design of beginning the first to begin a War with the People of *Rome*; but neither, if they were attacked, would they decline having recourse to Arms: That it was the Custom of their Nation, handed down " to

BOOK IV. " to them by their Ancestors, rather to oppose the Efforts of their Enemies, than expect Relief from Remonstrances : but thus far they were however willing to own, that it was against their Inclination they were come into those Parts, having been driven from their Habitations : That if the *Romans* were disposed to accept of their Friendship, they might become very useful and serviceable Allies, and would rest satisfied either with such Lands as they should think proper to assign them, or in the quiet Possession of those they had already obtained by force of Arms : That they yielded in Valour to the *Suevians* alone, for whom the immortal Gods themselves were not an equal match ; but knew of no other Nation under Heaven able to resist the Efforts of their Bravery." *Cæsar* made such a Reply as best suited his present Views, but the Conclusion of his Speech was to this purpose : That he could enter into no treaty of Friendship with them so long as they continued in *Gaul* : That Men who had been unable to defend their own Territories were not likely to gain Countries by force from others : That there were no uncultivated Lands in *Gaul*, sufficient to satisfy so great a multitude, without invading the Properties of others : But that, if they pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the *Ubians*, whose Ambassadors were then in his Camp, to complain of the Injuries of the *Suevians*, and request his Aid against their Incroachments : This he promised to obtain for them of the *Ubians*." The Ambassadors replied, they would report this to their Countrymen, and in three Days return with an Answer : requesting in the mean-time, that he would not advance with his Army. But this *Cæsar* refused ; as knowing, that

a few Days before they had sent a great Body of ~~BOOK~~ Cavalry over the *Mense*, to forage and plunder in the Territories of the *Ambivariti*. He therefore concluded, that they only waited the return of this Party, and with that View were for interposing Delays.

IV.

VII. THE *Mense* rises in the Mountains of *Vause*, in the Territories of the *Lingones*, and receiving a certain Branch of the *Rbine*, called the *Vabal*, forms with it the Island of the *Batavians*, about fourscore Miles below which it discharges itself into the Sea. The *Rbine* itself takes its rise in the Territories of the *Lepontians*, who inhabit the *Alps*; and after a long and rapid Course thro' the Country of the *Nantuates*, *Helvetians*, *Sequani*, *Mediomatrici*, *Triboci*, and *Treviri*, divides itself as it approaches nearer the Sea into several Channels, and forming a great number of very large Islands, inhabited for the most part by fierce and savage Nations, some of whom are reported to feed only on Fish and the Eggs of Birds; it at last discharges itself into the Ocean by many different Mouths.

VIII. CÆSAR being now only twelve Miles distant from the Enemy, was met upon his way by the Ambassadors on the Day appointed. They were very earnest in their Requests that he would advance no farther: but not being able to prevail, intreated; that he would send to the Cavalry who made the Advance-Guard, to restrain them from beginning the Fight; and in the mean-time permit them to send Ambassadors to the *Ubians*: from whose Senate and Magistrates if they could obtain the Conditions offered them by *Cæsar*, under the Sanc-  
tion of a solemn Oath, they declared themselves ready to accept them; requiring only that he would allow

BOOK  
IV. Kallow them the Space of three Days to bring  
Proffers to have no other Tendency than the delay  
of a few Days, 'till their Cavalry should arrive,  
told them nevertheless; that he would advance that  
Day only four Miles farther for the sake of Water;  
but desired their Chiefs to attend him the Day after,  
that he might know their Demands. Mean-time  
he sent Orders to the Officers of the Cavalry who  
were gone before, not to attack the Enemy; and  
in case they should be attacked themselves, only to  
maintain their Ground, 'till he should come up  
with the rest of the Army.

IX. BUT the Enemy, upon seeing our Horse  
advance, whose number amounted to five thousand;  
whereas they themselves did not exceed eight hun-  
dred, by reaſon of the Absence of thoſe who had  
been ſent to forage beyond the *Meufe*: yet falling  
ſuddenly upon the *Romans*, who had no Apprehen-  
tion of their Design, because they knew their Am-  
baffadors had been with *Cæſar* a little before, and  
obtained a Day's Truce; they easily put them  
into Disorder. And when our Men recovering a  
little began to make Reſiſtance, they according to  
Custom diſmounted, and ſtabbing our Horses un-  
der the Belly, and by that means overthrowing  
many of the Riders, in a very ſhort time put the  
reſt to flight; and ſo great was the Conſternation,  
that they continued driving them before them, 'till  
at laſt they came within ſight of the Army. In this  
Skirmiſh we loſt fevety-four Men, and among them  
*Piso* of *Aquitain*, a Man of diſtinguiſhed Valour  
and illuſtrious Deſcent, whose Grandfather had  
been ſovereign Magiſtrate in his own State, and  
been hoñoured by the Senate of *Rome* with the  
title of Friend. This brave Officer, ſeeing his  
Brother

Brother surrounded by the Enemy, ran to his BOOK  
Assistance, and rescued him: but his own Horse IV.  
being wounded, and he overthrown, the Enemy  
fell upon him, against whom nevertheless he made  
a brave Resistance; till at last surrounded on all  
sides, he fell overpowered with Wounds. Which  
his Brother perceiving, who was by this time out  
of Danger, and had got to a considerable Distance;  
setting Spurs to his Horse, he rushed among the  
the thickest of the Enemy, and was slain.

X. AFTER this Battle, *Cæsar* resolved neither to give audience to their Ambassadors, nor admit them to Terms of Peace; seeing they had treacherously applied for a Truce, and afterwards of their own accord broke it. He likewise considered, that it would be downright Madness to delay coming to an Action 'till their Army should be augmented, and their Cavalry join them; and the more so, because he was perfectly well acquainted with the Levity of the Gauls, among whom they had already acquired a considerable Reputation by this successful Attack, and to whom it therefore behoved him by no means to allow time to enter into Measures against him. Upon all these Accounts he determined to come to an Engagement with the Enemy as soon as possible, and communicated his Design to his Questor and Lieutenants. A very lucky Accident fell out to bring about *Cæsar's* Purpose; for the Day after, in the Morning, the Germans persisting in their Treachery and Dissimulation, came in great numbers to the Camp; all their Nobility and Princes making part of their Embassy. Their Design was, as they pretended, to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the Day before; because contrary to Engagements made and come under at their own Request, they

BOOK had fallen upon our Men; but their real Motive  
IV. was to obtain if possible another insidious Truce.  
~~Cæsar~~ Cæsar overjoyed to have them thus in his Power,  
ordered them to be secured, and immediately drew  
his Forces out of the Camp. The Cavalry, whom  
he supposed terrified with the late Engagement,  
were commanded to follow in the Rear.

XI. HAVING drawn up his Army in three Lines,  
and made a very expeditious March of eight Miles,  
he appeared before the Enemy's Camp, before they  
had the least Apprehension of his Design. All  
things conspiring to throw them into a sudden  
Confusion, which was not a little increased  
by our unexpected Appearance, and the Absence  
of their own Officers; and hardly any time left  
them, either to take Counsel, or fly to Arms: they  
were utterly at a loss what Course to take, whether  
to draw out their Forces and oppose the Enemy,  
or content themselves with defending the Camp,  
or in fine, to seek for Safety in flight. As this  
Fear was evident from the Tumult and Uproar we  
perceived among them, our Soldiers, instigated by  
the Remembrance of their treacherous Behaviour  
the Day before, broke into the Camp. Such as  
could first provide themselves with Arms made a  
shew of Resistance, and for some time maintained  
the Fight amidst the Baggage and Carriages. But  
the Women and Children (for the Germans had  
brought all their Families and Effects with them  
over the Rhine) betook themselves to flight on all  
sides. Cæsar sent the Cavalry in pursuit of them.

XII. THE Germans hearing the Noise behind  
them, and seeing their Wives and Children put to  
the Sword, threw down their Arms, abandoned  
their Ensigns, and fled out of the Camp. Being  
arrived


arrived at the confluence of the *Rhine* and the ~~BOOK~~  
*Meuse*, and finding it impossible to continue their IV.  
flight any farther ; after a dreadful Slaughter of  
those that pretended to make resistance, the rest  
threw themselves into the River ; where what with  
Fear, Weariness, and the force of the Current,  
they almost all perished. Thus our Army, with-  
out the loss of a Man, and with very few wound-  
ed, returned to their Camp, having put an end to  
this formidable War, in which the number of the  
Enemy amounted to four hundred and thirty  
thousand. *Cæsar* offered those whom he had de-  
tained in his Camp liberty to depart : but they  
dreading the *Resentment* of the *Gauls*, whose  
Lands they had laid waste, chose rather to continue  
with him, and obtained his Consent for that pur-  
pose.

XIII. THE War with the *Germans* being ended,  
*Cæsar* for many Reasons resolved to carry his Army  
over the *Rhine*. But what chiefly swayed with him  
was, that as he found the *Germans* were easily pre-  
vailed upon to transport their Forces into *Gaul*, he  
thought it might be of no small Service to alarm  
them upon their own Account, by letting them see,  
that the *Romans* wanted neither Ability nor Reso-  
lution to pass the *Rhine* with an Army. Add to all  
this, that the Cavalry of the *Uspetes* and *Tenciberi*,  
who, as we have related above, had passed the *Meuse*  
for the sake of Forage and Plunder, and by that  
means escaped the Disaster of the late Fight ; upon  
hearing of the Defeat of their Countrymen, had  
repassed the *Rhine*, retired into the Territories of  
the *Sicambrians*, and joined their Forces to theirs.  
And upon *Cæsar's* sending Deputies to require,  
that these Troops, which had presumed to make War  
upon him and the *Gauls*, might be delivered up,

BOOK he had received for Answer : " That the *Rbine*  
 IV. " was the Boundary of the *Roman Empire* : That  
 if he thought it unjustifiable in the *Germans* to  
 pass over into *Gaul* without his leave, upon  
 what Pretence could he claim any Power or  
 Authority beyond the *Rbine* ? "

XIV. BUT the *Ubians*, who alone of all the Nations beyond the *Rbine* had sent Ambassadors to *Cesar*, entered into an Alliance with him, and given him Hostages, earnestly intreated him to come over to their Assistance, they being very hard pressed by the *Suevians* : " Or, if the Affairs of the Commonwealth would not allow of his being there in Person, that he would only order his Army to cross the *Rbine*, which would both be sufficient for their present Support, and also secure them for the time to come. Because such was the Reputation and Opinion conceived of a *Roman Army*, even amongst the most remote *German Nations*, from their defeating *Ariovitus*, and the Success of the last Battle, that their Friendship and Name would alone be a sufficient Defence. They promised likewise a great number of Ships for the transporting of the Army."

XV. CÆSAR for all these Reasons above-mentioned, determined to cross the *Rbine*. But to make use of Shipping appeared to him neither safe, nor suitable to the Dignity of the *Roman Name*. Wherefore, altho' he understood that the making of a Bridge would be attended with very great Difficulties, on account of the Breadth, Depth, and Rapidity of the River ; yet was he of opinion, that in this manner alone ought he to carry over his Army, or lay aside the Design altogether. The form therefore and contrivance of the Bridge was thus :





- A. The two Beams, each a foot and half  
B. The two Beams opposite to these, joint Stakes.  
C. The Beam two feet thick, inserted between two feet  
to the other, D. The Braces.  
E. The Planks over which the Earth & To  
F. The Buttresses to support the Bridge against for laying of Hurdles on.  
G. The upper Defences against Vessels are

thus: Two Beams, each a Foot and a half thick, B O O K  
sharpened a little towards the lower end, and of a Length proportioned to the Depth of the River,  
were joined together at the distance of about two  
Feet. These were sunk into the River by Engines,  
and afterwards strongly driven with Rammers, not  
perpendicularly, but inclined according to the  
direction of the Stream. Directly opposite to these,  
at the distance of forty Feet lower down, were  
placed two other Beams joined together like the  
former, but sloping against the current of the River.  
These Stakes were kept firm by a large Beam, ex-  
tended from one to the other, and which being  
two Feet in thickness, exactly filled the Interval  
of the two Stakes, and was strongly fastened at  
either end with iron Nails, so contrived, that the  
Violence of the Stream served only to bind the  
Work faster together. This being continued  
through the whole Breadth of the River, he ordered  
Planks to be laid across, which for the greater con-  
venience of passing, were further covered with  
Hurdles. Towards the lower part of the Stream  
other Stakes were sunk in the form of Buttresses,  
which supported the Bridge against the Violence  
of the Current ; and above, at some distance, there  
were others; that if Trunks of Trees or Vessels  
should be sent down the River by the Enemy, to  
destroy the Work, the Shock might be broken by  
these Defences, and the Bridge thereby secured from  
damage.

XVI. THE Bridge being finished within ten Days  
from the time they began to fetch the Materials,  
*Cesar* led over his Army ; and leaving a strong  
Guard on each side of the River, marched directly  
into the Territories of the *Sicambri*. Mean-time  
Ambassadors arriving from several States to desire

BOOK IV. Peace, and court his Alliance, he gave them a very favourable Reception, and appointed them to send Hostages. The *Sicambri*, when they understood that the Bridge was begun, by Advice of the *Ufipetes* and *Tenciberi* who had taken Shelter among them, resolved upon a Retreat : and having abandoned their Territories, and carried off all their Effects, withdrew into the neighbouring Woods and Desarts.

XVII. CÆSAR, after a short stay in their Country, having burnt all their Houses and Villages, and cut down their Corn, marched into the Territories of the *Ubians*. As he had promised these last his Assistance against the Attempts of the *Suevians*, he understood from them : that the *Suevians* being informed by their Spies of the Bridge built upon the *Rbine*, had, according to their Custom, called a Council, and dispatched Orders into all Parts for the People to forsake their Towns, and convey their Wives, Children, and Effects into the Woods ; commanding at the same time, that all such as were able to bear Arms should meet at the Place of general Rendezvous, which they had appointed towards the middle of the Country, resolving there to wait the Arrival of the *Romans*, and give them Battle. *Cæsar*, upon this Intelligence, having accomplished all he intended in carrying his Army over the *Rbine*, by spreading an universal Terror among the *Germans*, taking Vengeance of the *Sicambri*, and setting the *Ubians* at liberty ; after a stay of only eighteen Days beyond the *Rbine*, thinking he had done enough both for his own Reputation and the Service of the Republick, led back his Army into *Gaul*, and broke down the Bridge.

XVIII. THOUGH but a small part of the Summer BOOK now remained ; for in those Regions, *Gaul*, stretching very much to the North, the Winters begin early ; *Cæsar* nevertheless resolved to pass over into *Britain*, having certain Intelligence, that in all his Wars with the *Gauls*, the Enemies of the Commonwealth had ever received Assistance from thence. He indeed foresaw, that the Season of the Year would not permit him to finish the War : yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, if he should but take a View of the Island, learn the Nature of the Inhabitants, and acquaint himself with the Coast, Harbours, and Landing-places, to all which the *Gauls* were perfect Strangers. For almost none but Merchants resort to that Island ; nor have even they any Knowledge of the Country, except the Sea-coast, and the Parts opposite to *Gaul*. Having therefore called together the Merchants from all Parts, they could neither inform him of the largeness of the Island, nor what or how powerful the Nations were that inhabited it, nor of their Customs, Art of War, or the Harbours fit to receive large Ships. For these Reasons, before he embarked himself, he thought proper to send *C. Volusenus* with a Galley, to get some knowledge of these things ; commanding him, as soon as he had informed himself in what he wanted to know, to return with all expedition. He himself marched with his whole Army into the Territories of the *Morini*, because thence was the nearest Passage into *Britain*. Here he ordered a great many Ships from the neighbouring Ports to attend him, and the Fleet he had made use of the Year before in the *Venetian War*.

IV.

BOOK XIX. MEAN-WHILE the *Britons* having notice  
IV. of his Design, by the Merchants that resorted to  
their Island ; Ambassadors from many of their  
States came to *Cæsar*, with an offer of Hostages,  
and Submission to the Authority of the People of  
*Rome*. To these he gave a favourable Audience ;  
and exhorting them to continue in the same mind,  
sent them back into their own Country. Along  
with them he dispatched *Comius*, whom he had  
constituted King of the *Atrebatiens* ; a Man in  
whose Virtue, Wisdom, and Fidelity he greatly  
confided, and whose Authority in the Island was  
very considerable. To him he gave it in charge,  
to visit as many States as he could, and persuade  
them to enter into an Alliance with the *Romans*,  
letting them know at the same time that *Cæsar* de-  
signed as soon as possible to come over in person to  
their Island. *Volusenus* having taken a View of the  
Country, as far as was possible for one who had  
resolved not to quit his Ship, or trust himself in the  
hands of the *Barbarians*, returned on the fifth Day,  
and acquainted *Cæsar* with his Discoveries.

XX. WHILE *Cæsar* continued in those Parts,  
for the sake of getting ready his Fleet, Deputies  
arrived from almost all the Cantons of the *Morini*,  
to excuse their late War with the People of *Rome*,  
as proceeding wholly from a national Fierceness,  
and their Ignorance of the *Roman* Customs ; promis-  
ing likewise an entire Submission for the future.  
This fell out very opportunely for *Cæsar*, who was  
unwilling to leave any Enemies behind him, nor  
would the Season of the Year have even allowed  
him to engage in a War : besides, he judged it by  
no means proper so far to entangle himself in these  
trivial Affairs, as to be obliged to postpone the  
Expedition

Expedition into *Britain*. He therefore ordered **BOOK IV.** them to send him a great Number of Hostages, and upon their being delivered, received them into his Alliance. Having got together about eighty Transports, which he thought would be sufficient for the carrying over two Legions; he distributed the Gallies he had over and above, to the Questor, Lieutenants, and Officers of the Cavalry. There were besides eighteen Transports detained by contrary Winds at a Port about eight Miles off, which he appointed to carry over the Cavalry. The rest of the Army, under the Command of *Q. Titurius Sabinius*, and *L. Arunculeius Cotta*, were sent against the *Menapians*, and those Cantons of the *Morini* which had not submitted. *P. Sulpicius Rufus* had the charge of the Harbour where he embarked, with a strong Garrison to maintain it.

XXI. THINGS being in this manner settled, and the Wind springing up fair, he weighed Anchor about one in the Morning, ordering the Cavalry to embark at the other Port, and follow him. But as these Orders were executed but slowly, he himself about ten in the Morning reached the Coast of *Britain*, where he saw all the Cliffs covered with the Enemy's Forces. The nature of the Place was such, that the Sea being bounded by steep Mountains, the Enemy might easily launch their Javelins upon us from above. Not thinking this therefore a convenient Landing-place, he resolved to lie by 'till three in the Afternoon, and wait the Arrival of the rest of his Fleet. Mean-while having called the Lieutenants and military Tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from *Volusenus*, instructed them in the Part they were to act, and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness and at a Signal given,

BOOK given, agreeable to the Rules of military Discipline, which in Sea Affairs especially required Expedition and Dispatch, because of all others the most changeable and uncertain. Having dismissed them, and finding both the Wind and Tide favourable, he made the Signal for weighing Anchor, and after sailing about eight Miles farther, stopp'd over-against a plain and open Shore.

XXII. BUT the Barbarians perceiving our Design, sent their Cavalry and Chariots before, which they frequently make use of in Battle ; and following with the rest of their Forces, endeavoured to oppose our landing. And indeed we found the Difficulty very great on many accounts : for our Ships being large, required a great depth of Water ; and the Soldiers, who were wholly unacquainted with the Places, and had their Hands embarrassed and loaden with a weight of Armour, were at the same time to leap from the Ships, stand breast-high amidst the Waves, and encounter the Enemy ; while they, fighting upon dry Ground, or advancing only a little way into the Water ; having the free use of all their Limbs, and in places which they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their Darts, and spur on their Horses, well inured to that kind of Service. All these Circumstances serving to spread a Terror among our Men, who were wholly strangers to this way of fighting ; they pushed not the Enemy with the same Vigour and Spirit as was usual for them in Combats upon dry Ground.

XXIII. CÆSAR observing this, ordered some Gallies, a kind of Shipping less common with the Barbarians, and more easily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the Transports towards the Shore, in order to set upon the Enemy.

in flank, and by means of their Engines, Slings, ~~BOOK~~  
and Arrows, drive them to some distance. This proved of considerable service to our Men: for what with the surprise occasioned by the make of our Gallies, the motion of the Oars, and the playing of the Engines, the Enemy were forced to halt, and in a little time began to give back. But our Men still demurring to leap into the Sea, chiefly because of the Depth of the Water in those parts; the Standard-bearer of the tenth Legion; having first invoked the Gods for Success, cried out aloud: 'Follow me, Fellow-Soldiers, unless you will betray the *Roman* Eagle into the Hands of the Enemy; for my part, I am resolved to discharge my Duty to *Cæsar* and the Commonwealth.' Upon this he jumped into the Sea, and advanced with the Eagle against the Enemy: whereat our Men exhorting one another to prevent so signal a Disgrace; all that were in the Ship followed him: which being perceived by those in the nearest Vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the Enemy.

XXIV. THE Battle was obstinate on both Sides: but our Men, as being neither able to keep their Ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their respective Standards; because leaping promiscuously from their Ships, every one joined the first Ensign he met; were thereby thrown into great Confusion. The Enemy on the other hand being well acquainted with the Shallows; when they saw our Men advancing singly from the Ships, spurred on their Horses, and attacked them in that perplexity. In one Place great numbers would gather round a handful of the *Romans*: others falling upon them in flank, galled them mightily with their Darts. Which *Cæsar* observing, ordered some small Boats

to

BOOK to be manned, and ply about with Recruits. By  
 IV. this means the foremost Ranks of our Men having  
 got firm footing, were followed by all the rest ;  
 when falling upon the Enemy briskly, they were  
 soon put to the rout. But as the Cavalry were  
 not yet arrived, we could not pursue or advance  
 far into the Island ; which was the only thing  
 wanting to render the Victory compleat.

XXV. THE Enemy being thus vanquished in Battle, no sooner got together after their Defeat, than they dispatched Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace ; offering Hostages, and an entire Submission to his Commands. Along with these Ambassadors came *Comius* the *Atrebation*, whom *Cæsar*, as we have related above, had sent before him into *Britain*. The Natives seized him as soon as he landed, and tho' he was charged with a Commission from *Cæsar*, threw him into Irons. But upon their late Defeat they thought proper to send him back, throwing the Blame of what had happened upon the Multitude, and begged of *Cæsar* to excuse a Fault proceeding from Ignorance. *Cæsar*, after some Complaints of their Behaviour, in that having of their own accord sent Ambassadors to the Continent to sue for Peace, they had yet without any Reason begun a War against him ; told them at last he would forgive their Fault, and ordered them to send a certain number of Hostages. Part were sent immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to deliver in a few Days. Mean-time they disbanded their Troops, and the several Chiefs came to *Cæsar's* Camp, to manage their own Concerns, and those of the States to which they belonged.

XXVI. A Peace being thus concluded four ~~B~~ OOK Days after *Cæsar's* Arrival in *Britain*, the eighteen ~~IV.~~ <sup>—</sup> Transports appointed to carry the Cavalry, of whom we have spoken above, put to Sea with a gentle Gale. But when they had so near approached the Coast, as to be even within view of the Camp; so violent a Storm all on a sudden arose, that being unable to hold on their Course, some were obliged to return to the Port whence they set out, and others driven to the lower end of the Island westward, not without great Danger. There they cast Anchor: but the Waves rising very high, so as to fill the Ships with Water, they were again in the Night obliged to stand out to Sea, and make for the Continent of *Gaul*. That very Night it happened to be full Moon, when the Tides upon the Sea-coast always rise highest, a thing at that time wholly unknown to the *Romans*. Thus at one and the same time, the Gallies which *Cæsar* made use of to transport his Men, and which he had ordered to be drawn up on the Strand, were filled with the Tide; and the Tempest fell furiously upon the Transports that lay at Anchor in the Road. Nor was it possible for our Men to attempt any thing for their preservation. Many of the Ships being dashed to pieces, and the rest having lost their Anchors, Tackle, and Rigging, which rendered them altogether unfit for sailing, a general Consternation spread itself thro' the Camp. For there were no other Ships to carry back the Troops, nor any Materials to repair those that had been disabled by the Tempest. And as it had been all along *Cæsar's* design to winter in *Gaul*, he was wholly without Corn to subsist the Troops in those parts.

XXVII. ALL this being known to the *British* Chiefs, who after the Battle had repaired to *Cæ-*

BOOK *IV.* *Cæsar's* Camp, to perform the Conditions of the Treaty ; they began to hold Conferences among themselves. And as they plainly saw that the *Romans* were destitute both of Cavalry, Shipping, and Corn ; and easily judged, from the smallness of the Camp, that the number of their Troops was but inconsiderable ; in which Notion they were the more confirmed, because *Cæsar* having brought over the Legions without Baggage, had occasion to inclose but a small spot of Ground : they thought this a convenient Opportunity for taking up Arms, and by intercepting the *Roman* Convoys to protract the Affair 'till Winter ; being confidently persuad-ed, that by defeating these Troops, or cutting off their Return, they should effectually put a stop to all future Attempts upon *Britain*. Having therefore entered into a joint Confederacy, they by degrees left the Camp, and began to draw the Islanders together. But *Cæsar*, tho' he was not yet apprized of their Design, yet guessing in part at their Intentions, by the Disaster which had befallen his Fleet, and the Delays formed in relation to the Ho-stages, determined to provide against all Events. He therefore had Corn daily brought in to his Camp, and ordered the Timber of the Ships that had been most damaged to be made use of in re-pairing the rest, sending to *Gaul* for what other Materials he wanted. As the Soldiers were indefatigable in this Service, his Fleet was soon in a Con-dition to sail, having lost only twelve Ships.

XXVIII. DURING these Transactions, the se-venth Legion being sent out to forage according to Custom ; as part were employed in cutting down the Corn, and part in carrying it to the Camp, without suspicion of attack ; News was brought to *Cæsar*, that a greater Cloud of Dust than ordinary was

was seen on that side where the Legion was. *Cæsar* B O O K suspecting how matters went, marched with the IV. Cohorts that were upon Guard, ordering two others to succeed in their room, and all the Soldiers in the Camp to arm and follow him as soon as possible. When he was advanced a little way from the Camp, he saw his Men overpower'd by the Enemy, and with great difficulty able to sustain the Fight, being driven into a small Compass, and exposed on every side to the Darts of their Adversaries. For as the Harvest was gathered in every where else, and one only Field left; the Enemy suspecting that our Men would come thither to forage, had hid themselves during the Night in the Woods; and waiting 'till our Men had quitted their Arms, and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping; they suddenly attacked them, killed some, put the rest into disorder, and began to surround them with their Horses and Chariots.

XXIX. THEIR way of fighting with their Chariots is this: First they drive their Chariots on all sides, and throw their Darts; insomuch that by the very terror of the Horses, and noise of the Wheels, they often break the Ranks of the Enemy. When they have forced their way into the midst of the Cavalry, they quit their Chariots, and fight on Foot. Mean-time the Drivers retire a little from the Combat, and place themselves in such a manner as to favour the Retreat of their Countrymen, should they be overpower'd by the Enemy. Thus in Action they perform the Part both of nimble Horsemen, and stable Infantry: and by continual Exercise and Use have arrived at that Expertness, that in the most steep and difficult Places, they can stop their Horses upon a full stretch, turn them which way they please, run along the Pole, rest on the Harness, and throw themselves

BOOK themselves back into their Chariots with incredible  
IV. Dexterity.

XXX. OUR Men being astonished and confounded with this new way of fighting, *Cæsar* came very timely to their Relief: for upon his Approach the Enemy made a stand, and the *Romans* began to recover from their Fear. This satisfied *Cæsar* for the present, who not thinking it a proper season to provoke the Enemy, and bring on a general Engagement, stood facing them for some time, and then led back the Legions to the Camp. The continual Rains that followed for some Days after, both kept the *Romans* within their Intrenchments, and withheld the Enemy from attacking us. Meantime the *Britons* dispatched Messengers into all parts, to make known to their Countrymen the small number of the *Roman* Troops, and the favourable Opportunity they had of making immense Spoils, and freeing their Country for ever from all future Invasions, by storming the Enemy's Camp. Having by this means got together a great Body of Infantry and Cavalry, they drew towards our Intrenchments.

XXXI. CÆSAR, tho' he foresaw that the Enemy, if beaten, would in the same manner as before escape the Danger by flight; yet having got about thirty Horse, whom *Comius* the *Atrebation* had brought over with him from *Gaul*; he drew up the Legions in order of Battle before the Camp: and falling upon the *Britons*, who were not able to sustain the shock of our Men, soon put them to flight. The *Romans* pursuing them as long as their strength would permit, made a terrible Slaughter; and setting fire to their Houses and Villages a great way round, returned to the Camp.

XXXI,

XXXII. THE same Day Ambassadors came from the Enemy to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace. *Cæsar* doubled the number of Hostages he had before imposed upon them, and ordered them to be sent over to him into *Gaul*, because the Equinox coming on, and his Ships being leaky, he thought it not prudent to put off his Return 'till Winter. A fair Wind offering, he set sail a little after midnight, and arrived safe in *Gaul*. Two of his Transports not being able to reach the same Port with the rest, were driven into a Haven a little lower in the Country.

XXXIII. In these two Vessels were about three hundred Soldiers, who having landed, and being upon their March to the Camp ; the *Morini*, who had submitted to *Cæsar* upon his setting out for *Britain*, drawn by the hopes of Plunder, surrounded them at first with only a few Men, and ordered them to lay down their Arms under pain of being put to the Sword. But they, casting themselves into an Orb, stood upon their Defence ; when all on a sudden six thousand more of the Enemy appeared, rouzed by the noise of the Combatants. *Cæsar* having notice of what passed, sent all his Cavalry to the assistance of the *Romans*. Meanwhile our Men withstood all the Attacks of the Enemy, and bravely maintained the Fight for upwards of six Hours, having slain great Numbers of the *Morini*, while on their side only a few were wounded. But no sooner did our Cavalry appear, than the Enemy, throwing down their Arms, betook themselves to flight, and were almost all slain in the Pursuit.

XXXIV. THE Day after *Cæsar* sent *T. Labienus*, with the Legions returned out of *Britain*, against  
VOL. I. K the

BOOK the rebellious *Morini*; who being deprived by the  
IV. Drought of the Benefit of their Marshes, which  
had served them for shelter the Year before, almost  
all fell into his Power. Mean-time *Q. Titurius*, and  
*L. Costa*, who had been sent against the *Menapians*,  
having laid waste their Territories with Fire and  
Sword, and plundered their Habitations, returned  
to *Cæsar*, not being able to come up with the *Me-  
napians* themselves, who had retired into impene-  
trable Forests. *Cæsar* quartered all his Troops  
among the *Belgians*. Only two of the *British* States  
sent Hostages into *Gaul*, the rest neglecting to per-  
form the Conditions of the Treaty. For these  
Successes a Thanksgiving of twenty Days was de-  
creed by the Senate.

C. JULIUS

*C. JULIUS CÆSAR's*  
**COMMENTARIES**

OF HIS

**WARS in GAUL.**

**BOOK V.**

## THE A R G U M E N T.

- I. Cæsar leaving Orders with his *Lieutenants* in Gaul to build a Fleet, sets out for Italy and Illyricum, where he puts a stop to the Incursions of the Pirustæ.
- II. Returning thence into Gaul, he marches against the Treviri, and quiets the Disturbances in that Province.
- IV. Dumnorix withdrawing from the Roman Camp with the Æduan Cavalry, is pursued and slain.
- VII. Cæsar passes over into Britain.
- VIII. And forces the Enemy from the Woods in which they had taken shelter.
- IX. But understanding that his Fleet had suffered greatly by a Storm, he quits the pursuit of the Britons, repairs his Fleet, fortifies his Camp, and then returns against the Enemy.
- X. A description of Britain, and its Inhabitants.
- XI. Cæsar defeats the Britons in various Encounters.
- XIV. Passes the Thames.
- XIX. Returns into Gaul.
- XX. And because of the great scarcity of Corn, distributes his Legions among the several States.
- XXI. Tasgetius slain among the Carnutes.
- XXII. Ambiorix and Cativulcus excite several States to a Revolt.
- XXIII. Ambiorix by an artful Speech persuades Titurius to quit his Camp, and attacking him in his March, cuts him off with his whole Party.
- XXX. Being afterwards joined by the Nervians, he falls upon Cicero's Camp.
- XXXVI. The noble Emulation of Pulfio and Varenus.
- XXXVII. Cæsar marches to Cicero's relief.
- XL. The Gauls quit the Siege, and advance to meet him.
- XLII. Cæsar defeats them in Battle.
- XLIV. And to prevent their continual Revolts, resolves to pass the Winter in Gaul.
- XLV. The Senones, Treviri, and other States, bear the Roman Yoke with impatience.
- XLVII. Indutiomarus attacks Labienus's Camp.
- XLIX. But being slain in the Attempt, the Gauls separate, and Tranquillity is in a great measure restored.

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
WARS in GAUL.

BOOK V.

I N the Consulship of *Lucius Domitius*, and *Appius Claudius, Cæsar* leaving his Winter-quarters to go into *Italy*, as was his yearly Custom, gave Orders to his Lieutenants, who had the charge of the Legions, to build as many Ships as possible during the Winter, and to repair such as were old. He prescribed the form and manner of building; ordering them to be somewhat lower than was usual in the *Mediterranean*, for the convenience of embarking and landing his Men; which he judged the more necessary, as he had observed, that by reason of the frequent returns of the Tide, there was less depth of Water upon the *British* Coast. He likewise commanded them to be built broader than ordinary, that they might receive the greater number of Horses and Carriages; and to be contrived for lightness and expedition, to

BOOK which the lowness of their Decks greatly contributed.

V. He sent to Spain for the Materials necessary in building and equipping them ; and having finished the Diet of *Cisalpine Gaul*, set out for *Illyricum*, upon advice that the *Pirustæ* were laying waste the Province by their Incursions. When he arrived there, he ordered the several States to furnish their Contingents, and appointed a Place of general Rendezvous. The Report of this no sooner spread among the *Pirustæ*, than they sent Ambassadors to inform him ; that nothing had been done against the Province by publick Authority, and that they were ready to make what Satisfaction he required. *Cæsar* pleased with their Submission, ordered them to bring him Hostages, and named the Day by which they were to be delivered ; threatening them with a fierce War in case of Disobedience. These being accordingly brought by the Day prefixed, he appointed Arbitrators between the contending States, to estimate the Damages, and determine what Reparation was to be made.

II. HAVING dispatched these Affairs, and held a general Diet of the Province, he returned again into *Cisalpine Gaul*, and thence went to the Army. Upon his Arrival, he visited all the Quarters of the Legions ; and found, that by the singular Diligence of the Soldiers, notwithstanding the greatest scarcity of Materials, no less than six hundred Transports, such as we have described above, and twenty-eight Gallies, were in such forwardness, that in a few Days they would be ready to be launched. Having praised his Soldiers, and those whom he had set over the Works, he gave them what further Instructions he thought necessary, and ordered the whole Fleet to rendezvous at *Port-Itius*, whence he knew lay the most commodious Passage to

to *Britain*; it being there not above thirty Miles BOOK V. distant from the Continent. Leaving what Soldiers he thought necessary for this Purpose, he advanced at the head of four Legions without Baggage, and eight hundred Horse, into the Country of the *Treviri*; because they neither appeared at the general Diets of *Gaul*, nor submitted to the Orders of the Commonwealth; and were besides reported to be soliciting the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*.

III. THIS State is by far the most powerful of all *Gaul* in Horse: they have likewise a very strong and numerous Infantry; and, as we have before observed, border upon the *Rhine*. Two of their principal Men, *Indutiomarus* and *Cingetorix*, were at this time Competitors for the supreme Authority. *Cingetorix*, as soon as he heard of the Arrival of *Cæsar* and the Legions, came to him, and assured him; that he and all his Party would continue firm to their Duty, and never abandon the Interest of the *Romans*: at the same time he informed him of all that had passed among the *Treviri*. But *Indutiomarus*, drawing together great Numbers of Horse and Foot, and securing such as were unable to bear Arms in the Forest of *Arden*, which extends from the *Rhine* quit cross the Country of *Treves*, to the Territories of the *Rheni*; resolved to try the fortune of War. But soon after, as several of the leading Men of the State, partly out of attachment to *Cingetorix*, partly terrified by the Approach of the *Roman Army*, came to *Cæsar* to solicit in their own behalf, since they found themselves incapable of effectually serving their Country: *Indutiomarus* fearing an universal Defection, sent likewise Ambassadors to him to acquaint him: " That he had chosen to stay at home, and forbear coming to the *Roman Camp*, with no other view

BOOK " but to keep the State in its Duty ; lest, in the  
 V. " Absence of the Nobility, the People might have  
 been drawn into some rash Step : That the  
 " whole Country was now at his Command ; and  
 " he ready, with *Cæsar's* Permission, to attend him  
 " in Person, and put his own Concerns, as well  
 " as those of the State, under his Protection." Tho' *Cæsar* well understood the Reason of his present Submission, and by what Considerations he had been deterred from the prosecution of his first Design ; yet unwilling to waste the whole Summer in the Country of *Treves*, when every thing was in readines for his Expedition into *Britain*, he ordered *Indutiomarus* to attend him with two hundred Hostages. These being accordingly brought, and among them the Son, and all the nearest Relations of *Indutiomarus*, whom he had specified by name ; *Cæsar* encouraged and exhorted him to continue firm in his Duty. Nevertheless, assembling all the principal Men of *Treves*, he reconciled them one after another to *Cingetorix*, as well on account of his singular Merit, as because he thought it of the greatest Importance, to establish thoroughly the Authority of a Man, of whose steady and inviolable Attachment he had such convincing Proof. *Indutiomarus* highly resented this Proceeding, which tended so much to the diminution of his Power ; and as he had all along been an Enemy to the *Romans*, this new Affront provoked him still more,

IV. THESE Affairs being settled, *Cæsar* arrived with his Legions at the Port of *Litus*. There he found, that about forty of his Ships, built in the Country of the *Belgians*, having been attacked by a Storm, and disabled from continuing their Voyage, had been obliged to put back. The rest were all equipped and rigged, ready to obey the first Signal.

Signal. All the Cavalry of *Gaul*, about four thousand in number, and the prime Nobility of the several States, met him likewise, by order, at this Place. His Design was, to leave only a few of these Nobles behind him in *Gaul*, on whose Fidelity he could rely ; and to take the rest with him to *Britain* as Hostages, the better to prevent any Commotions during his Absence.

V. DUMNORIX the *Aduan*, of whom we have spoken above, was one of those that attended him on this Occasion. Him in particular he resolved to carry along with him , as he knew him to be a lover of Novelties, ambitious, enterprising, and of great Interest and Authority among the *Gauls*. Besides all this, he had publickly said in an Assembly of the *Aduans*, that *Cæsar* had invested him with the Sovereignty of their State : which Resolution, tho' by no means pleasing to the *Aduans*, they yet durst not send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, either to oppose or get reversed : nor was *Cæsar* otherwise informed of the matter, but by those whom he had placed about *Dumnorix*, to have an Eye over his Conduct. *Dumnorix*, at first, earnestly petitioned to be left in *Gaul*; sometimes pretending he was unused to sailing, and afraid of the Sea ; sometimes urging religious Engagements, which required him to stay at home. But finding all his Endeavours to no purpose, he began to solicit the Chiefs of the *Gauls*, discoursing them apart, and advising them not to leave the Continent. The more to awaken their Fears, he told them : “ That *Cæsar* had his particular Reasons for carrying with him all the Nobility of *Gaul* ; because not daring to dispatch them in their own Country, he was in hopes of finding a favourable Opportunity to execute his cruel Purpose in *Britain*.” He therefore exhorted them to join in

BOOK in a mutual Alliance, and oblige themselves by a  
V. solemn Oath, to pursue with common Consent such  
Measures as should appear necessary for the preser-  
vation of Gaul.

VI. Tho' *Cæsar* was fully informed of these Practices ; yet in consideration of his singular Regard for the *Æduans*, he contented himself with endeavouring to check and traverse his Designs : determined notwithstanding to continue inflexible, and at all hazards prevent any Misfortune to himself and the Commonwealth from a Spirit, which he found every Day growing more hardy and intrepid. Being therefore detained in this Place about five and twenty Days, during which the North-west Wind, very common on that Coast, hindered him from sailing ; he studied by the ways of Gentleness and Persuasion, to keep *Dumnorix* in his Duty, without neglecting however to watch all his Motions. At last, the Wind springing up fair, he ordered the Horse and Foot to embark. As this universally engaged the Attention of the Camp, *Dumnorix*, unknown to *Cæsar*, drew off the *Æduan* Cavalry, and began his March homeward. *Cæsar* being informed of it, immediately put a stop to the Embarkation ; and postponing every other Consideration, ordered out a strong Party of Horse to pursue and bring him back. If he made resistance, or refused to obey, they had Orders to kill him : for he judged, that a Man who had slighted his personal Authority, would not pay any great regard to his Commands in his Absence. When they had overtaken him, he refused to return ; and defending himself Sword in hand, implored the Assistance of his Followers, often calling out, that he was free, and the Subject of a free State. The *Romans*, according to the Orders they had received, surround-  
ed

ed and slew him; upon which all the *Aduan* Cavalry <sup>B O'OK</sup>  
returned to *Cæsar*. V.

VII. THIS Affair concluded; and *Labienus* being left in *Gaul* with three Legions, and two thousand Horse, to defend the Port, provide Corn, have an eye upon the Transactions of the Continent, and take measures accordingly; *Cæsar* weighed Anchor about Sun-set with five Legions, and the same number of Horse he had left with *Labienus*: and advancing with a gentle South-wind, continued his Course till midnight, when he found himself becalmed: but the Tide still driving him on, at day-break he saw *Britain* on his left. When again following the return of the Tide, he rowed with all his might, to reach that part of the Island which he had marked out the Summer before, as most convenient for Landing. And on this occasion the Diligence of the Soldiers cannot be enough commended; who labouring incessantly at the Oar, urged the Transports and Ships of Burden so swiftly, that they equalled the Course of the Gallies. The whole Fleet reached the Coast of *Britain* about Noon: nor did any Enemy appear in view. But as *Cæsar* afterwards understood from the Prisoners; though a great Army of *Britons* had repaired to the Coast; yet terrified by the vast Number of Ships, which, together with those of the last Year's Expedition, and such as had been fitted out by particular Persons for their own use, amounted to upwards of eight hundred; they retired hastily from the Shore, and hid themselves behind the Mountains.

VIII. CÆSAR having landed his Army, and chosen a proper Place for his Camp; as soon as he understood from the Prisoners where the Enemy's Forces

BOOK Forces lay; leaving ten Cohorts upon the Coast,  
V. together with three hundred Horse, to guard his  
Fleet; he set out about midnight in quest of the  
Enemy; being under the less concern for his Ships,  
because he had left them at Anchor upon a smooth  
and open Shore, under the Charge of *Q. Atrius*.  
After a March of twelve Hours during the Night,  
he came within sight of the Enemy; who having  
posted themselves behind a River with their Ca-  
valry and Chariots, attacked us from the higher  
Ground, in order to oppose our Passage: but being  
repulsed by our Horse, they retreated towards the  
Woods, into a Place strongly fenced both by Na-  
ture and Art, and which, in all probability, had  
been fortified before on occasion of some domestick  
War: for all the Avenues were secured by strong  
Barricades of felled Trees. They never sallied out  
of the Wood but in small Parties, thinking it  
enough to defend the Entrance against our Men.  
But the Soldiers of the seventh Legion, advancing  
under cover of their Shields, and having cast up a  
Mount, forced the Intrenchments with little loss,  
and obliged the Enemy to abandon the Wood.  
*Cæsar* forbid all Pursuit; both because he was un-  
acquainted with the nature of the Country; and  
the Day being far spent, he resolved to employ the  
rest of it in fortifying his Camp.

IX. EARLY the next Morning, he divided his  
Troops both Horse and Foot into three Bodies,  
and sent them out in pursuit of the Enemy. They  
were advanced but a little way, and just come with-  
in sight of the Rear of the *Britons*, when a Party  
of Horse from *Atrius* came to *Cæsar*, and informed  
him, “ That a dreadful Storm arising the Night  
“ before, had fallen violently upon the Fleet, and  
“ driven almost all the Ships ashore: That neither  
“ Anchors

" Anchors nor Cables, nor all the Address of the B O O K  
" Mariners and Pilots, had been able to resist the V.  
" Fury of the Tempest ; which had done unispeak-  
" able Damage to the Fleet, by reason of the Ships  
" running foul of one another." *Cæsar*, upon  
this Intelligence, recalls his Legions and Cavalry,  
commanding them to give over the Pursuit. He  
himself returns to his Ships, and finds every thing  
according to the Reports and Letters he had re-  
ceived ; forty of them being entirely destroyed,  
and the rest so damaged that they were hardly re-  
pairable. He therefore set all the Carpenters of  
the Army to work, and wrote for others to *Gaul* ;  
ordering *Labienus* at the same time, with the Le-  
gions under his Command, to build what Ships he  
could. He thought it likewise safest, though a  
Work of great Labour and Difficulty, to draw all  
his Ships on shore, and inclose them within the  
Fortifications of his Camp. Ten Days were spent  
in the Service, during which the Soldiers had no  
intermission of Fatigue, not even in the Night.  
The Ships being in this manner secured, and the  
Camp strongly fortified, he left the same Troops  
to guard it as before, and returned to the Place  
where he had quitted the Pursuit of the Enemy.  
Upon his Arrival he found the Forces of the *Britons*  
considerably increased. The chief Command and  
Administration of the War, was, by common  
Consent, conferred upon *Cassibelanus* ; whose Ter-  
ritories were divided from the Maritime States by  
the *Thames*, a River eighty Miles distant from the  
Sea. This Prince had hitherto been engaged in  
almost continual Wars with his Neighbours : but  
the Terror of our Arrival making the *Britons* unite  
among themselves, they intrusted him with the  
whole Conduct of the War.

BOOK X. THE inland Parts of *Britain* are inhabited  
V. by those, whom *Fame* reports to be the Natives of  
the Soil. The Sea-coast is peopled with *Belgians*,  
drawn thither by the love of War and Plunder.  
These last, passing over from different Parts, and  
settling in the Country, still retain the Names of  
the several States whence they are descended.  
The Island is well peopled, full of Houses built  
after the manner of the *Gauls*, and abounds  
in Cattle. They use brafs Money, and iron  
Rings of a certain weight. The Provinces remote  
from the Sea produce Tin, and those upon  
the Coast Iron; but the latter in no great Quant-  
ity. Their Brafs is all imported. All kinds of  
Wood grow here the same as in *Gaul*, except the  
Fir and Beech-tree. They think it unlawful to  
feed upon Hares, Pullets, or Geese; yet they breed  
them up for their Diversion and Pleasure. The  
Climate is more temperate than in *Gaul*, and the  
Colds less intense. The Island is triangular, one  
of its sides facing *Gaul*. The Extremity towards  
*Kent*, whence is the nearest Passage to *Gaul*, lies  
Eastward: the other stretches South-west. This  
side extends about five hundred Miles. Another  
side looks towards *Spain* westward. Over-against  
this lies *Ireland*, an Island esteemed not above half  
as large as *Britain*, and separated from it by an in-  
terval equal to that between *Britain* and *Gaul*. In  
this interval lies the Isle of *Mona*, besides several  
other lesser Islands, of which some write, that in  
the time of the Winter-solstice, they have Night  
for thirty Days together. We could make out no-  
thing of this upon Enquiry, only discovered by  
means of our Hour-glasses, that the Nights were  
shorter than in *Gaul*. The length of this side is  
computed at seven hundred Miles. The last side  
faces the North-east, and is fronted by no part of  
the

the Continent, only towards one of its Extremities it BOOK  
seems to eye chiefly the *German* Coast. It is thought V.  
to extend in length about eight hundred Miles. Thus  
the whole Island takes in a Circuit of two thou-  
sand Miles. The Inhabitants of *Nex*, which lies  
wholly on the Sea-coast, are the most civilized of  
all the *Britons*, and differ but little in their Man-  
ners from the *Gauls*. The greater part of those  
within the Country never sow their Lands, but live  
on Flesh and Milk, and go clad in Skins. All the  
*Britons* in general paint themselves with Woad,  
which gives a bluish Cast to the Skin, and makes  
them look dreadful in Battle. They are long-  
hair'd ; and shave all the rest of the Body except  
the Head and upper Lip. Ten or twelve of them  
live together, having their Wives in common ;  
especially Brothers, or Parents and Children  
amongst themselves : but the Issue is always ascrib-  
ed to him who first espoused the Mother.

XI. The Enemy's Horse, supported by their Chariots, vigorously charged our Cavalry on their March ; yet we every where had the better, and drove them to their Woods and Hills : but after making great Slaughter, venturing to continue the Pursuit too far, we lost some Men. Some time after, falling unexpectedly from the Woods, and falling suddenly upon our Men while employed in fortifying their Camp, a sharp Conflict ensued between them and the advanced Guard. *Cæsar* sent two Cohorts to their Assistance ; whom the *Britons* charging in separate Parties, so surprised with their new manner of fighting, that they broke through, routed them, and returned without Loss. Q. *La-*  
*berius Durus*, a military Tribune, was slain on this occasion : but some fresh Cohorts coming up, the *Britons* were at last repulsed.

BOOK XII. By this Action which happened within  
V. view of the Camp, and of which the whole Army  
were Spectators, it evidently appeared, that our  
heavy armed Legions, who could neither pursue  
those that retired, nor durst venture to forsake their  
Standards, were by no means a fit match for such  
an Enemy. Nor could even the Cavalry engage  
without great danger ; it being usual for the *Bri-*  
*tans* to counterfeit a Retreat, until they had drawn  
them a considerable way from the Legions ; when  
suddenly quitting their Chariots, they charged them  
on Foot, and by this unequal manner of fighting,  
made it alike dangerous to pursue or retire. Add  
to all this, that they never fought in a Body, but  
in small Parties, and with considerable Intervals  
between. They had likewise their Detachments  
so placed, as easily to protect their flying Troops,  
and send fresh Supplies where needful.

XIII. THE next Day they stationed themselves  
among the Hills, at a distance from our Camp,  
and appeared only in small Bodies, nor seemed so  
forward to skirmish with our Cavalry as the Day  
before. But about Noon, *Cæsar* ordering out three  
Legions to forage, with all the Cavalry, under  
the Command of *C. Trebonius* his Lieutenant ; they  
fell suddenly upon the Foragers on all sides, and  
even attacked the Legions and Standards. Our  
Men vigorously returning the Charge, repulsed  
them ; and the Cavalry finding themselves sup-  
ported by the Foot, continued the Pursuit till they  
had utterly broken them ; insomuch that great  
Numbers being slain, they could neither find an  
opportunity to rally, descend from their Chariots,  
or face about to make Resistance. After this  
Defeat, the auxiliary Troops, which had come in  
from

from all Parts, returned severally to their own BOOK Homes ; nor did the Enemy, from this time, appear any more against us with their whole Forces. V.  
—

XIV. CÆSAR perceiving their Design, marched towards the *Tbames*, to penetrate into the Kingdom of *Cassibelanus*. This River is fordable only in one place, and that not without great difficulty. When he arrived, he saw the Enemy drawn up in great Numbers on the other side. They had likewise secured the Banks with sharp Stakes, and driven many of the same kind into the Bottom of the River, yet so as to be covered by the Water. *Cæsar* having Intelligence of this from the Prisoners and Deserters, sent the Cavalry before, ordering the Legions to follow close after ; which they did with so much Expedition and Briskness, though nothing but their Heads were above the Water, that the Enemy, unable to sustain their Charge, quitted the Banks, and betook themselves to flight.

XV. CASSIBELANUS, as we have before intimated, finding himself unable to keep the Field, disbanded all his other Forces ; and retaining only four thousand Chariots, watched our Motions, always keeping at some distance from us, and sheltering himself in Woods and inaccessible Places, whither he had likewise made such of the Inhabitants with their Cattle retire, as lay upon our Rout : and if at any time our Cavalry ventured upon a freer Excursion into the Fields, to plunder and lay waste the Country ; as he was perfectly acquainted with all the Roads and Defiles, he would sally from the Woods with some of the Chariots, and fall upon our Men dispersed and in disorder. These frequent Alarms obliged us to be much upon our Guard ; nor would *Cæsar* suffer

~~BOOK~~ the Cavalry to remove to any distance from the V. Legions, or to pillage and destroy the Country, unless where the Foot was at hand to sustain them.

XVI. MEAN-TIME the *Trinobantes*, one of the most powerful States in those parts, send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*. Of this State was *Mandubratius*, who had fled for Protection to *Cæsar* in Gaul, that he might avoid the Fate of his Father *Inmanuentius*, whom *Cassibelanus* had put to death. The Ambassadors promised Obedience and Submission in the name of the Province; and withal intreated him to defend *Mandubratius* against the Violence of *Cassibelanus*, and restore him to the Government of their State. *Cæsar* ordered them to deliver forty Hostages, and furnish his Army with Corn; sending back at the same time *Mandubratius*. They yielded to his Demands without delay, sent the appointed number of Hostages, and supplied him with Corn.

XVII. THE Protection granted to the *Trinobantes*, securing them from the Insults of the Soldiers; the *Cenimagni*, *Segontiaci*, *Ancalites*, *Bibroci*, and *Cassi*, send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, and submit. From them he had Intelligence, that he was not far from the Capital of *Cassibelanus*, which was situated amidst Woods and Marshes, and whither great numbers of Men and Cattle were retired. A Town among the *Britons* is nothing more than a thick Wood, fortified with a Ditch and Rampart, to serve as a place of Retreat against the Incursions of their Enemies. Thither he marched with his Legions: and tho' the Place appeared to be extremely strong both by Art and Nature, he nevertheless resolved to attack it in two several Quarters. The Enemy, after a short stand, were obliged at last to give way,

and retire by another part of the Wood. <sup>VASTBOOK</sup> numbers of Cattle were found in the Place; and many of the *Britons* were either made Prisoners, or lost their lives in the Pursuit.

XVIII. WHILE these things passed beyond the *Thames*, *Cassibelanus* dispatched Messengers to *Kent*, which, as we have before observed, was situated along the Sea-coast. This Country was then under the Government of four Kings, *Cingetorix*, *Car-nilius*, *Taximagulus*, and *Segonax*, who had Orders to draw all their Forces together, and fall suddenly upon the naval Camp of the *Romans*. But our Men falling upon them as they approached, made great slaughter of their Troops, took *Cingetorix* one of their Leaders Prisoner, and returned safe to the Camp. *Cassibelanus*, upon the News of this Battle, discouraged by so many Losses, the Devastation of his Territories, and above all the Revolt of the Provinces; sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to sue for Peace, by the Mediation of *Comius* of *Arras*.

XIX. CÆSAR designing to pass the Winter in *Gaul*, because of the frequent Commotions in that Country; and reflecting that but a small part of the Summer remained, during which it would be easy to protract the War; demanded Hostages, and appointed the yearly Tribute which *Britain* was to pay to the *Romans*. At the same time he strictly charged *Cassibelanus* to offer no Injury to *Mandubratius* or the *Trinobantes*. Having received the Hostages, he led his Troops back to the Sea-side, where he found his Fleet repaired. Orders were immediately given to launch it: and because the number of Prisoners was exceeding great, and several Ships had been destroyed by the Tempest, he resolved to carry over his Men at two Embarkations. Happily

BOOK pily it so fell out, notwithstanding the great number  
 V. of Ships, and their frequent passing and repassing,  
 that not one perished either this or the preceding  
 Year, which had any Soldiers on board: whereas  
 those sent empty to him from the Continent, as  
 well the Ships concerned in the first Embarkation,  
 as others built afterwards by *Labienus*, to the num-  
 ber of sixty, were almost all driven back or lost.  
*Cæsar* having waited for them a considerable time  
 to no purpose, and fearing to lose the proper Season  
 for sailing, as the time of the Equinox drew near,  
 chose to stow his Men on board the few Ships he  
 had: and taking the Opportunity of an extraordi-  
 nary Calm, set sail about ten at night, and by day-  
 break brought his whole Fleet safe to the Con-  
 tinent of *Gaul*.

XX. HAVING laid up his Fleet, and held a ge-  
 neral Assembly of the *Gauls* at *Samarobriva*; as the  
 Crop had been very indifferent this Year by reason  
 of the great Droughts, he was obliged to quarter  
 his Legions otherwise than in former Winters, and  
 canton them one by one in the several Provinces of  
*Gaul*. One Legion he quartered on the *Morini*,  
 under the command of *C. Fabius*: another among  
 the *Nervians*, under *Q. Cicero*: a third with the  
*Æduans*, under *L. Roscius*: and a fourth in the  
 Country of the *Rhemi*, on the Borders of the *Tre-  
 viri*, under *Labienus*. Three were sent into *Belgium*,  
 over whom he appointed three Commanders; *M.  
 Crassus* his Questor, *L. Munatius Plancus*, and *C.  
 Trebonius*. The eighth and last, which *Cæsar* had  
 newly raised on the other side of the *Po*, was sent,  
 together with five Cohorts, among the *Eburones*,  
 between the *Rhine* and the *Meuse*, where *Ambiorix*  
 and *Cativulcus* reigned. At the head of this Body  
 were two Commanders; *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and  
 L.

*L. Arunculeius Cotta.* By this distribution of his B O O K Legions, he thought he had found an easy Remedy V. against the scarcity of Corn; and yet they all lay within the Compass of an hundred Miles, except that under *L. Roscius*, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly Country. He resolv'd however not to leave *Gaul* 'till he had received advice from all his Lieutenants, and was assured that their Quarters were establish-ed, fortified, and secured.

XXI. AMONG the *Carnutes* lived *Tasgetius*, a Man of distinguished Birth, and whose Ancestors had been possessed of the Sovereignty in that State. *Cæsar* had restored him to the Dignity of his Fore-fathers, in consideration of his Virtue and Affection to him, and the many signal Services he had done him in all his Wars. It was now the third Year of his Reign, when his Enemies, many of whom were of his own State, conspiring against him, openly assassinat'd him. The Affair was laid before *Cæsar*: who fearing left the great number concerned in the Plot might draw the State into a Re-volt, ordered *L. Plancus*, with a Legion from *Belgium*, to march speedily into the Country of the *Carnutes*, fix his Winter-quarters in that Province, and seizing all who had been concerned in the mur-der of *Tasgetius*, send them Prisoners to him. Mean-time he was informed by his Lieutenants and Questors, to whom he had committed the care of the Legions, that they were severally arrived at their appointed Quarters, and had fortified them-selves in them.

XXII. ABOUT fifteen Days after the Arrival of the Legions in their Winter-quarters, a sudden In-surrection and Revolt broke out among the *Eburones*,

BOOK by the secret Practices of *Ambiorix* and *Catuvacus*.

V. These two Princes had been to meet *Sabinus* and *Cotta* on their Frontiers, and in a friendly manner had supplied them with Corn : but now instigated by *Indutiomarus* of *Treves*, they excited their People to take up Arms ; and having surprised some Soldiers that were gone to cut Wood, came with a great Body of Troops to attack the *Roman* Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms, ascended the Rampart, and sending out a Detachment of *Spanish* Horse, put their Cavalry to rout. Upon this, despairing of Success, they drew off their Men from the Attack ; and, according to their Custom, demanded a Conference ; pretending they had something to say which concerned the common Interest, and might serve to put an end to the present Differences.

XXIII. ACCORDINGLY *C. Arpinius*, a *Roman* Knight, the Friend of *Q. Titurius*; and *Q. Junius* of *Spain*, who had frequently before been sent by *Cæsar* to *Ambiorix*, were deputed to treat. *Ambiorix* addressed them in Words to this effect : " That he  
 " had in no sort forgot the many Obligations he  
 " lay under to *Cæsar* ; who had freed him from the  
 " Tribute he had been wont to pay the *Atuatuci* ;  
 " and who had restored him his Son and Nephew,  
 " whom that People, after receiving them as Ho-  
 " stages, had treated as Slaves : That the Hostilities  
 " he had just committed were not the effect of his  
 " own private Animosity to the *Romans*, but in  
 " consequence of a Resolution of the State ; where  
 " the Government was of such a nature, that the  
 " People had as much Power over him, as he over  
 " the People : That even the State itself had been  
 " in a manner forced into this War, by a sudden  
 " Confederacy of all *Gaul* : That he could appeal  
 " to

“ to his own Weakness for the truth of what he BOOK  
“ said, being not so very unskilled in Affairs as to V.  
“ imagine, that the Forces of the *Eburones* were a  
“ match for the Power of the *Romans*: That it was  
“ a Project formed by all the States of Gaul in com-  
“ mon, who had agreed to storm in one Day, the very  
“ Day on which he spoke, all the Quarters of the  
“ Roman Army; so that no one might be able to  
“ succour another: That it was not easy for Gauls  
“ to resist the Importunity of those of their own  
“ Nation, especially in a Proposal to act in concert  
“ for the recovery of their Liberty: But that,  
“ after having performed what the common Voice  
“ of his Country demanded, he thought he might  
“ now listen to that of Gratitude: That he found  
“ himself compelled by his Attachment to *Cæsar*,  
“ and by his Friendship for *Sabinus*, to give notice  
“ of the extreme Danger to which the Legion was  
“ exposed: That a great Body of *Germans* had  
“ actually passed the *Rhine*, and would be there in  
“ two Days at farthest: That *Sabinus* and *Cotta*  
“ were to consider, whether it would not be proper  
“ to retire with their Troops, before the neighbour-  
“ ing States could be apprized of their Design,  
“ and go and join *Labienus* or *Cicero*, who were  
“ neither of them distant much above fifty Miles:  
“ That as far as regarded himself, he engaged by  
“ all that was sacred to secure their Retreat thro’  
“ his Territories; and undertook it the more  
“ readily, as he should thereby not only discharge  
“ his Duty to his Country, in delivering it from  
“ the Inconvenience of winteting the *Romans*, but  
“ at the same time manifest his Gratitude to *Cæsar*.<sup>”</sup>

Having made this Speech he withdrew.

XXIV. *ARPINIUS* and *Junius* reported what they  
had heard to the Lieutenants; who alarmed at the

L 4                   suddenness

BOOK

V.

suddenness of the thing, thought the Information  
 not to be neglected, tho' it came from an Enemy:  
 nor were they a little moved by this Consideration,  
 that it appeared to them altogether incredible, that  
 the *Eburones*, a weak and inconsiderable State, should  
 of their own accord presume to take up Arms  
 against the *Romans*. They therefore laid the Matter  
 before a Council of War, where a warm Debate  
 arose. *L. Arunculeius*, with a great number of  
 military Tribunes, and Centurions of the first  
 rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily,  
 or quitting their Winter-quarrrters, before they  
 had received Orders to that purpose from *Cæsar*.  
 They alledged : " That having strongly fortified their  
 " Camp, they were able to defend themselves, even  
 " against all the Forces of the *Germans*: That  
 " the late Attempt of the *Gauls* was a sufficient  
 " Proof of this, whom they had not only with-  
 " stood with Courage, but repulsed with Loss :  
 " That they had Provisions in abundance, and  
 " might therefore securely wait the Arrival of Relief  
 " from *Cæsar* and the neighbouring Legions : In  
 " fine, that nothing could be more dishonourable,  
 " or argue greater want of Judgment, than in  
 " Affairs of the highest moment, to take Measures  
 " upon the Information of an Enemy." *Titurius*,  
 on the other hand, exclaimed : " That it would  
 " be then too late to think of retiring, when the  
 " Enemy in greater numbers, and strengthened by  
 " the accession of the *Germans*, should come up  
 " against them ; or when the Quarters next them  
 " should have received some signal Check : That  
 " the time for Deliberation was short: That *Cæsar*,  
 " he made no question, was gone into *Italy*; it not  
 " being likely, that either the *Carnutes* would have  
 " formed the Design of assasinating *Tagetius*, or  
 " the *Eburones* in so contemptuous a manner  
 " assaulted

“ assaulted the *Roman Camp*, had they not been **BOOK**  
“ assured of his Departure : That the Information V.  
“ of an Enemy weighed not with him, but the real  
“ Circumstances of Things. The *Rhine* was not  
“ far off. The *Germans* were much exasperated  
“ by the death of *Ariovistus*, and their late frequent  
“ Defeats. *Gaul* burnt with Impatience to throw  
“ off the *Roman Yoke*, avenge the many Losses  
“ they had sustained, and recover their former  
“ Glory in War, of which now scarce a Shadow  
“ remained. In short, who could imagine that  
“ *Ambiorix*, without a certainty of being supported,  
“ would have embarked in so dangerous an Enter-  
“ prize ? That his Opinion was in all Respects  
“ safe ; because, if no such Confederacy had been  
“ formed, they had nothing to apprehend in  
“ marching to the nearest Legion ; if, on the con-  
“ trary, all *Gaul* and *Germany* were united, Expe-  
“ dition alone could save them from Destruction :  
“ Whereas, by following the Advice of *Cotta*, and  
“ those who were against a Retreat ; tho’ the  
“ Danger perhaps might not prove immediate, yet  
“ were they sure in the end of perishing by Famine.”

The Dispute continued for some time ; *Cotta*, and the principal Officers, strongly opposing the March of the Troops. At last *Sabinus* raising his Voice, that he might be heard by the Soldiers without :

“ Be it so then, (says he,) since you seem so resolv-  
“ ed : I am not he among you who is most afraid of  
“ Death. But if any Misfortune happens, those  
“ who hear me will know whom to blame. In two  
“ Days, did not you oppose it, we might easily  
“ reach the Quarters next us ; and there, in con-  
“ junction with our Fellow-Soldiers, confront  
“ the common Danger : whereas by keeping the  
“ Troops separate and at a distance, you reduce  
“ them

BOOK "them to the Necessity of perishing by Sword or  
 V. " Famine."

XXV. THE Council was then going to rise : but the Officers, surrounding their Generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their Dis-sension and Ob-stinacy. They told them, " That " whatever Resolution was taken, whether to go " or stay, the Danger was by no means great, " provided they acted with union among them-selves ; but their Disagreement threatened the " Troops with inevitable Destruction." The De-bate continued till Midnight : when at length *Cotta*, vanquished by Importunity, yielded to the Opinion of *Sabinus*. Orders were given for marching by break of Day. The remainder of the Night was none of it employed in sleep ; each Man being taken up in chooing what things to carry along with him, and what of his Winter-necessaries to leave behind. In short, they did every thing to make their stay more dangerous ; and by their Fatigue and want of Rest, incapacitate themselves for a vigorous Defence upon their March. At Day-break they left their Camp, not like Men acting by the advice of an Enemy, but as if *Ambiorix* had been their particular Friend ; marching in a very extended Column, and followed by a great Train of Baggage.

XXVI. THE Enemy judging from the Hurry and Motion in the Camp, that the *Romans* intended to leave it, placed themselves in Ambuscade in two Bodies in a Wood ; where, well-sheltered and covered from View, they waited at about two Miles distance their Arrival ; and when the greatest part of the Army had entered a large Valley, sud-denly appearing on both sides of it, they attacked them

them at the same time in Front and Rear, and ~~B.O.R.~~ obliged them to fight in a Place of great disadvantage. V.

XXVII. THEN at length *Titurius*, like one who had neglected all the necessary Precautions, unable to hide his Concern, ran up and down among the Troops, and began to dispose them in order of Battle; but with an Air so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of Success; as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last Moment of Execution. But *Cotta*, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the Departure of the Troops, omitted nothing in his Power for the common Safety; calling to and encouraging the Men like an able General, and at the same time fighting with the Bravery of a common Soldier. And because the great Length of the Column rendered it difficult for the Lieutenants to remedy all Disorders, and repair expeditiously enough to the Places where their Presence was necessary; Orders were given to quit the Defence of the Baggage, and form into an Orb. This Disposition, though not improper in these Circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy Consequences; for being considered as the Effect of Terror and Despair, it discouraged our Men, and augmented the Confidence of the Enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such Occasions, many of the Soldiers quitting their Ensigns, hastened to fetch from the Baggage what they had most of value, and filled all Parts with Uproar and Lamentation.

XXVIII. THE Gauls mean-while conducted themselves with great Prudence; their Officers proclaimed through the Ranks, " That not a Man  
" should

BOOK " should stir from his Post ; that the Booty was  
V. " theirs, and every thing belonging to the *Romans*  
" must certainly fall into their Hands : but that  
" all depended upon securing the Victory." Our  
Men were not inferior to the Enemy either in Va-  
lour, Number, or way of fighting. Though they  
had neither General nor Fortune on their side, they  
hoped still by their Bravery to surmount all Diffi-  
culties ; and whenever any of the Cohorts fellied out,  
so as to join the Enemy, hand to hand, a consider-  
able Slaughter of the *Gauls* ensued. This being  
perceived by *Ambiorix*, he ordered his Men to cast  
their Darts at a distance, to avoid a close Fight,  
retire before the *Romans* whenever they advanced,  
and pursue them as they returned to their Stan-  
dards : in which way of fighting they were become  
so expert, by the lightness of their Arms, and  
daily Exercise, that it was impossible to do them  
any hurt. These Orders were exactly followed ;  
insomuch that when any Cohort left the Orb, and  
came forward to attack the Enemy, they retreated  
and dispersed in a moment : mean-while it unco-  
vered its own Flanks, and exposed them to the  
Darts on either side. The Danger was still greater  
when they returned ; for then not only the Troops  
that stood next them, but those who had retired be-  
fore them, surrounded and charged them on all  
hands. If, on the contrary, they chose to con-  
tinue in their Post ; neither could their Valour any  
thing avail them, nor was it possible for Men stand-  
ing so close together, to avoid the Darts of so great  
a Multitude. And yet notwithstanding all these  
Disadvantages, and the many Wounds they had  
received, they still maintained their Ground ; and  
though much of the Day was now spent, the Fight  
having continued from Sun-rise till two in the Af-  
ternoon, they did nothing in all that time unwor-  
thy

thy the Dignity of the *Roman Name*. At length BOOK  
*T. Balventius*, who the Year before had been made V.  
first Centurion of a Legion, a Man of distinguished  
Courage, and great Authority among the Troops,  
had both his Thighs pierced with a Dart. *Q. Luca-*  
*nius*, an Officer of the same Rank, endeavouring  
to rescue his Son, whom he saw surrounded by the  
Enemy, was killed after a brave Resistance. And  
*L. Cotta* the Lieutenant, encouraging the several  
Cohorts and Companies, received a Blow on the  
Mouth from a Sling.

XXIX. So many Misfortunes quite dispirited  
*Titurius*; who perceiving *Ambiorix* at a distance  
animating his Troops, sent *Cn. Pompey* his Inter-  
preter, to beg Quarters for himself and his Sol-  
diers. *Ambiorix* replied; “ That he was ready to  
“ grant him a Conference if he desired it : That  
“ he hoped to prevail with the Multitude to spare  
“ the *Romans*; and that as to *Sabinus* himself, he  
“ gave his Word no hurt should be done him.”  
*Sabinus* communicated this Answer to *Cotta*, pro-  
posing that they should leave the Battle, and go and  
confer with *Ambiorix*, from whom he was in hopes of  
obtaining Quarter both for themselves and their  
Men. *Cotta* absolutely refused to treat with an  
armed Enemy, and persisted in that Resolution.  
*Sabinus* ordered the military Tribunes and prin-  
cipal Centurions that were about his Person to follow  
him, and when he drew near to *Ambiorix*, being  
commanded to lay down his Arms, obeyed ; charg-  
ing those that were with him to do the same.  
Mean-while, as they were treating about the Con-  
ditions, *Ambiorix* spinning out the Deliberations  
on purpose, he was by degrees surrounded and  
slain. Then the *Gauls*, according to their Custom,  
raising a Shout, and calling out Victory, charged  
our

BOOK our Troops with great Fury, and put them into Disorder. *L. Cotta*, fighting manfully, was slain, V. with the greatest part of the Soldiers. The rest retreated to the Camp they had quitted in the Morning; of whom *L. Petrosius*, the Standard-bearer, finding himself sore pressed by the Enemy, threw the Eagle within the Intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before the Camp. Those that remained, with much ado, sustained the Attack till Night; but finding themselves without Hope, they killed one another to the last Man. A few who escaped out of the Fight, got by different ways to *Labienus's* Camp, and brought him the News of this sad Event.

XXX. AMBIORIX, elated with this Victory, marched immediately at the head of his Cavalry into the Country of the *Atuatici*, which bordered upon his Territories; and travelling Day and Night without intermission, left Orders for the Infantry to follow him. Having informed them of his Success, and roused them to Arms, he the next Day arrived among the *Nervians*, and urged them not to lose the favourable Opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the Yoke of Slavery, and avenging the Injuries they had received from the *Romans*. He told them, " That two of their Lieutenants had been slain, and a great part of their Army cut to pieces : That it would be an easy matter, suddenly to attack and destroy the Legion quartered in their Country under *Cicero* : and that he was himself ready to assist them in the Enterprise." By this Speech he easily drew in the *Nervians*.

XXXI. ACCORDINGLY, having forthwith dispatched Messengers to the *Centrones*, *Grudii*, *Levaci*, *Pleumofians*,

*Plemosians*, and *Gerduni*, who are all subject to BOOK  
their State; they assembled what Forces they could,  
and came, unexpectedly, upon *Cicero's* Quarters,  
who as yet had heard nothing of the Fate of *Titurius*.  
Here likewise it unavoidably fell out, that the Sol-  
diers sent to cut Wood for Firing, and the Fortifi-  
cations of the Camp, were intercepted by the sud-  
den Arrival of their Cavalry. Having put all  
these to the Sword; the *Eburones*, *Atuatuci*, and  
*Nervians*, with their Allies and Tributaries, amount-  
ing to a formidable Army, came and attacked the  
Camp. Our Men immediately flew to Arms,  
ascended the Rampart, and with great difficulty  
sustained that Day's Assault; for the Enemy placed  
all their hopes in Dispatch, and firmly believed  
that if they came off Conquerors on this Occasion,  
they could not fail of Victory every where else.

XXXII: CICERO's first Care was to write to *Cæsar*, promising the Messengers great Rewards if they carried his Letters safe. But as all the ways were beset by the Enemy's Troops, his Couriers were continually intercepted. Mean-while of the Materials brought for fortifying the Camp, an hun-  
dred and twenty Towers were built during the Night with incredible Dispatch, and the Works about the Rampart compleated. Next Day the Enemy, with a much greater Force than before, attacked the Camp, filled the Ditch, but were again repulsed by our Men. This continued for several Days together. The Night was wholly em-  
ployed in repairing the Breaches made by Day, in-  
somuch that neither the sick or wounded were per-  
mitted to rest. Whatever might be of use to resist  
the next Day's Assault, was prepared with great  
diligence during the Night. Stakes were hardened  
in the Fire; Palisades planted in great Number;  
Towers

BOOK Towers raised upon all Parts of the Rampart ; and  
 V. the whole strengthened with a Parapet and Battlements. *Cicero* himself, though much out of order, would take no rest, even during the Night ; so that the Soldiers were obliged to force him from time to time to take some Repose.

XXXIII. MEAN-TIME such of the *Nervian* Chiefs and Leaders, as had any Intimacy or Friendship with *Cicero*, desired a Conference. This being agreed to, they addressed him in the same strain as *Ambiorix* had before used towards *Sabinus* : “ That “ all *Gaul* was in Arms : That the *Germans* had “ passed the *Rhine* : That *Cæsar* and the rest of “ the Troops were besieged in their Winter-quar-“ ters.” They told him likewise of the Fate of *Sabinus* ; and to gain Credit, produced *Ambiorix* ; adding : “ That it was in vain to expect Relief “ from those who were themselves in the utmost “ distress : That they meant not however any In-“ jury to *Cicero* and the People of *Rome*, but mere-“ ly to prevent their wintering in the Country, “ and establishing that Practice into a Custom : “ That he was therefore at liberty to leave his “ Quarters without Molestation, and retire in safe-“ ty where he pleased.” To this *Cicero* only an-swered : “ That it was not usual with the People “ of *Rome* to accept Conditions from an armed “ Enemy : But if they would lay down their Arms, “ he promised to interpose his Mediation, and per-“ mit them to send Ambassadors to *Cæsar*, from “ whose Justice they might reasonably expect Re-“ dress.”

XXXIV. THE *Nervians*, driven from this Hope, surrounded the Camp with a Line, whose Rampart was eleven Foot high, and Ditch fifteen Foot

Foot deep. They had learnt something of this in BOOK  
their former Wars with *Cæsar*, and the Prisoners  
they had made gave them further Instructions.  
But being unprovided of the Tools necessary in  
this kind of Service, they were obliged to cut the  
Turf with their Swords, dig up the Earth with  
their Hands, and carry it in their Cloaks. And  
hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their  
Number : for in less than three Hours they com-  
pleted a Line of fifteen Miles in Circuit. The  
following Days were employed in raising Towers,  
proportioned to the height of our Rampart ; and  
in preparing Scythes, and wooden Galleries, in  
which they were again assisted by the Prisoners.

XXXV. ON the seventh Day of the Attack,  
a very high Wind arising ; they began to throw  
red-hot Balls of Clay, and burning Javelins, upon  
the Barracks of the *Romans*, which after the man-  
ner of the *Gauls* were thatched with Straw. These  
soon took fire ; and the Flames were in a moment  
spread by the Wind into all parts of the Camp.  
The Enemy falling on with a mighty Shout, as if  
already secured of Victory, advanced their Towers  
and Galleries, and prepared to scale the Rampart.  
But such was the Constancy and presence of Mind  
of the Soldiers ; that tho' the Flames surrounded  
them on every side, and they were oppressed with  
the multitude of the Enemy's Darts ; tho' they  
saw their Huts, their Baggage, and their whole  
Fortunes in a blaze ; yet not only did they con-  
tinue firm in their Posts, but scarce a Man offered  
so much as to look behind him ; so intent were  
they on fighting and repelling the Enemy. This  
was much the hardest Day for our Troops ; but  
had nevertheless this fortunate Issue, that far the  
greatest number of the Enemy were on that Day

BOOK wounded or slain : for as they had crowded close  
 V. up to the Rampart, those behind prevented the  
 front Ranks from retiring. The Flames abating  
 by degrees, and the Enemy having brought for-  
 ward one of their Towers to the very foot of the  
 Rampart ; the Centurions of the third Cohort drew  
 off their Men a little, beckoning to the *Gauls*, and  
 challenging them to enter : but as not a Man  
 would run the hazard, they attacked them on all  
 sides with Stones, drove them from the Tower,  
 and set it on fire.

XXXVI. In this Legion were two Centurions  
 of distinguished Valour, *T. Pulfio*, and *L. Varenus*,  
 who stood fair for being raised to the first Rank of  
 their Order. These were perpetually disputing  
 with one another the Pre-eminence in Courage,  
 and at every Year's Promotion contended with  
 great Eagerness for Precedence. In the heat of the  
 Attack before the Rampart, *Pulfio* addressing *Vare-*  
*nus* : " What hinders you now (says he,) or  
 " what more glorious Opportunity would you de-  
 " sign of signalizing your Bravery ? This, this is  
 " the Day for determining the Controversy between  
 " us." At these Words he fellied out of the  
 Camp, and rushed amidst the thickest of the *Gauls*.  
 Nor did *Varenus* decline the Challenge ; but thinking  
 his Honour at stake, followed at some distance.  
*Pulfio* darted his Javelin at the Enemy, and trans-  
 fixed a *Gaul* that was coming forward to engage  
 him : who falling dead of the Wound, the Multi-  
 tude advanced to cover him with their Shields,  
 and all poured their Darts upon *Pulfio*, giving him  
 no time to retire. A Javelin pierced his Shield,  
 and stuck fast in his Belt. This Accident entan-  
 gling his right Hand, prevented him drawing his  
 Sword, and gave the Enemy time to surround him.

*Varenus*

Varenus his Rival flew to his Assistance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Immediately the Multitude quitting Pulfio, as fancying the Dart had dispatched him, all turned upon Varenus. He met them with his Sword drawn, charged them hand to hand; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest: but pursuing with too much eagerness, stept into a Hole, and fell down. Pulfio in his turn hastened to extricate him; and both together, after having slain a Multitude of the Gauls, and acquired infinite Applause, retired unhurt within the Intrenchments. Thus Fortune gave such a turn to the Dispute, that each owed his Life to his Adversary; nor was it possible to decide, to which of them the Prize of Valour was due.

XXXVII. As the Defence every Day became more difficult and hazardous, chiefly by the great Multitude of killed and wounded, which considerably lessened the number of Defendants; Cicero sent Letter upon Letter to inform Cæsar of his Danger. Many of these Couriers falling into the Enemy's Hands, were tortured to death within view of our Soldiers. There was at that time in the Roman Camp a Nervian of Distinction, by name Vertico, who in the beginning of the Siege had fled to Cicero, and given ample Proofs of his Fidelity. This Man, by the hopes of Liberty, and a promise of great Rewards, engaged one of his Slaves to carry a Letter to Cæsar. Having concealed it in his Javelin, and passed thro' the Camp of the Gauls without suspicion, as being himself of that Nation, he arrived safe at Cæsar's Quarters, who by this means was informed of the Danger of Cicero and the Legion.

BOOK XXXVIII. CÆSAR, receiving the Letter about  
V. five in the Afternoon, immediately dispatched a  
Messenger to *M. Crassus*, who was quartered among  
the *Bellovaci*, twenty-five Miles off, ordering him  
to draw out his Legion at midnight, and march  
with all the expedition he could to join him.  
*Crassus*, according to his Orders, came along with  
the Courier. He sent likewise to *C. Fabius*, directing  
him to lead his Legion into the Country of the  
*Atrebatiens*, which lay in the way to *Cicero*. He  
wrote to *Labienus*, if it could be done with safety,  
to meet him upon the Frontiers of the *Nervians*.  
He himself in the mean-time assembled about four  
hundred Horse from the nearest Garrisons, re-  
solving not to wait for the rest of the Army, which  
lay at too great a distance.

XXXIX. At nine in the Morning he had no-  
tice from his Scouts of the Arrival of *Crassus*.  
That Day he marched twenty Miles, leaving *Crassus*  
with a Legion at *Samarobriva*, where he had  
deposited the Baggage, Hostages, publick Papers,  
and all the Provisions which had been laid up for  
the Winter. *Fabius*, in consequence of his In-  
structions, having made all the haste he could, met  
him with his Legion. *Labienus*, who had been  
informed of the Death of *Sabinus*, and the Destru-  
ction of the Troops under his Command, and who  
saw all the Forces of *Treves* advancing against him;  
fearing lest if he should quit his Quarters, the  
Enemy might construe it as a Flight, and that it  
would be impossible for him to sustain their Attack,  
especially as they were flushed with their late Suc-  
cesses; wrote to *Cæsar*, informing him of the Dan-  
ger that would attend the quitting his Camp,  
of the Disaster that happened among the *Eburones*,  
and that all the Forces of the *Treviri*, both Horse  
and

and Foot, were encamped within three Miles of BOOK  
him.

V.

XL. CÆSAR approving his Reasons ; tho' he thereby found himself reduced from three to two Legions, was yet sensible that all depended upon expedition. He makes forced Marches ; and reaching the Territories of the *Nervians*, learnt from some Prisoners the state of the Siege, and the danger the Legion was in. Immediately he engages a *Gaulish* Horseman, by the Promise of great Rewards, to carry a Letter to *Cicero*. It was wrote in *Greek Characters*, that if it fell into the Enemy's Hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The Messenger had Orders, in case he found it impracticable to penetrate himself into the *Roman Camp*, to tie the Letter to a Javelin, and throw it in. In this Letter *Cæsar* sent *Cicero* word that he was already on the March to relieve him, and would be up very soon ; exhorting him in the mean-time, to defend himself with his wonted Bravery. The *Gaul*, dreading a discovery, threw the Letter into the Camp as he had been ordered : but the Javelin by accident sticking in a Tower, remained there two Days unperceived. On the third a Soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to *Cicero* ; who immediately read it in full Assembly, and diffused the common Joy thro' the whole Camp. At the same time they perceived the Smoke of the Villages fired by *Cæsar* in his March, which put the Arrival of the Succours beyond all doubt.

XLI. THE *Gauls* having notice of it also by their Scouts, thought proper to quit the Siege, and go to meet *Cæsar*. Their Army consisted of about sixty thousand Men. *Cicero*, now at liberty, applied again to *Vertico*, for the Slave spoken of

M 3 above ;

BOOK above; and having admonished him to use the ut-  
V. most Diligence and Circumspection, dispatched  
him with a Letter to *Cæsar*, informing him that  
the Enemy had raised the Siege, and were advanc-  
ing against him with all their Forces. *Cæsar* re-  
ceived the Letter about midnight, communicated  
the Contents to his Army, and exhorted them to  
meet the Enemy with Courage. Next Day he de-  
camped early, and after a March of four Miles,  
discovered the *Gauls* on the other side of a large  
Valley, with a River in front. It was dangerous  
to engage so great a Force upon unequal Ground.  
Knowing therefore that the Siege of *Cicero's* Camp  
was raised, and having no longer any Reason to be  
in a hurry, he encamped in the most convenient  
Spot he could find, and compleated his Intrench-  
ments. His Army consisting of no more than  
seven thousand Men without Baggage, required at  
best but a very small Camp; yet he purposely con-  
tracted it as much as possible, to inspire the Enemy  
with the greater Contempt of him. Mean-time  
sending out Scouts on all sides, he endeavoured to  
find where he might cross the Valley with most  
Safety.

XLII. THE rest of the Day passed in slight  
skirmishes between the Cavalry near the Brook;  
but the main Body of the Army on both sides kept  
within their Lines: the *Gauls*, in expectation of  
more Forces, which were not yet come up: *Cæsar*,  
that by pretending Fear, he might draw the Enemy  
on this side the Valley, and engage them before his  
Camp; or, if that could not be effected, that  
having discovered the Passes, he might be enabled  
to cross the Valley and Rivulet with less danger.  
Early next Morning the Enemy's Cavalry coming  
up to our Camp, charged our Horse; who, by *Cæ-  
sar's*

*far's* Orders purposely gave ground, and retired BOOK  
V. behind the Works. At the same time he caused the Ramparts to be raised higher, the Gates to be barreled, and cautioned the Soldiers, in the execution of these Orders, to run up and down tumultuously, and affect an air of Timidity and Concern. The Enemy, invited by all these Appearances, crossed the Valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous Post. Our Men mean-while retiring from the Rampart, they approached still nearer, cast their Darts on all sides within the Trenches, and sent Heralds round the Camp to proclaim, that if any of the *Gauls* or *Romans* had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do 'till nine o' Clock, after which no Quarter would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry their Contempt, that thinking they could not break in by the Gates, (which, to deceive them, were stopt up with single rows of Turf,) some began to scale the Rampart, others to fill up the Ditch. But then *Cæsar* falling by all the Gates at once, and charging them briskly with his Cavalry, put them so precipitately to flight, that not a Man offered to make the least Resistance. Great numbers of them were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down their Arms.

XLIII. Not caring to pursue them far, on account of the Woods and Marshes that lay in his way ; and finding that considerable execution had been done upon the spot, he the same Day joined *Cicero* with all his Forces ; where beholding the Towers, Galleries, and other Works of the *Gauls*, he could not help being struck with Admiration. He then reviewed *Cicero's* Legion, and found that not a tenth Man had escaped without Wounds ; which gave him a just Idea of the greatness of the

BOOK Danger to which they had been exposed, and of  
 V. the vigorous Defence they had made. He bestowed  
 great Commendations on the Legion, and its Com-  
 mander; and addressed himself to the Centurions  
 and military Tribunes by name, of whose Valour  
*Cicero* made honourable mention. He learnt par-  
 ticularly from the Prisoners all the Circumstances  
 of the unhappy Affair of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*: and  
 calling the Soldiers together next Day, gave them  
 an Account of the whole Transaction, comforted  
 them, confirmed their Courage, and told them;  
 that a Disaster occasioned by the Imprudence and  
 Rashness of the Lieutenant, ought to give them  
 the less Disturbance; as by the Favour of the im-  
 mortal Gods, and their Valour, Vengeance had  
 followed so suddenly, that neither had the Joy of  
 the Enemy for the Victory continued any time,  
 nor their Grief for the Loss remained long without  
 allay.

XLIV. MEAN-TIME the Report of *Cæsar's*  
 Victory flew with incredible speed thro' the Coun-  
 try of the *Rbemi* to *Labienus*. For tho' he lay at  
 the distance of fifty Miles from *Cicero's* Camp,  
 whither *Cæsar* did not arrive 'till past three in the  
 Afternoon; yet before midnight a Shout was raised  
 at the Gates of his Camp, by which the *Rbemi*  
 signified to him *Cæsar's* Victory, and their own  
 Congratulation on that Succes. The Report of  
 this being carried to the *Treviri*; *Indutiomarus*, who  
 the next Day had determined to attack *Labienus's*  
 Camp, made off in the Night, and retired with all  
 his Forces into his own Country. *Cæsar* sent back  
*Fabius* with his Legion to his former Quarters, re-  
 solving to winter himself near *Samarobriva* with  
 three Legions, distributed in three different Can-  
 tonments; and as all *Gau!* was in motion, to con-

tinue with the Army in Person. For the defeat BOOK  
and Death of *Sabinus* spreading every where, almost V.  
all the States of *Gaul* were meditating a Revolt; and with this view sent Messengers and Deputies into all Parts, to concert Measures, and contrive where to begin the War. Nay they held Assemblies by Night in desert Places; infomuch that during the whole Winter, scarce a Day passed, but *Cæsar* had Intelligence of some new Resolves or Insurrections of the *Gauls*. Among the rest, *L. Roscius* his Lieutenant, who commanded the thirteenth Legion, sent him word: that great numbers of *Gauls*, from the several States of *Armorica*, had assembled to attack him, and advanced within eight Miles of his Camp; but upon hearing of *Cæsar's* Victory, had separated so hastily, that their Retreat had all the appearance of a Flight.

XLV. BUT *Cæsar* summoning the principal Noblemen of every State to attend him; partly by Menaces, making them sensible he was no Stranger to their Designs; partly by Exhortations, found means to keep the greatest part of *Gaul* in its duty. The *Senones* however, a potent State, and of great Authority among the *Gauls*, formed the Design of publickly assassinating *Cavarinus*, whom *Cæsar* had given them for a King; whose Brother *Moritasgus* had held the Sovereignty at *Cæsar's* Arrival in *Gaul*, and whose Ancestors had long been in possession of the same Dignity. But he having Intelligence of the Plot, thought proper to fly; whereupon pursuing him to the very Frontiers, they drove him from his Palace and Throne: and sending Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to justify their Conduct; upon his ordering their whole Senate to repair to him, they refused to submit. So powerful was this Example amongst the Barbarians, that some at last were found


BOOK found of Courage enough to begin the War ; and  
V. so great a Change did it produce in the Inclinations  
of all : that except the *Aduans* and *Rbemi*, who  
had been always particularly distinguished and fa-  
voured by *Cesar* ; the first, on account of their  
ancient and inviolable Fidelity to the People of  
*Rome* ; the last, for their late Services in the Gallick  
War ; scarce was there a single State in all *Gaul*  
that did not incur Suspicion. Nor is this, in truth,  
so much to be wondered at ; as for many other  
Reasons, so particularly for this : that a People  
famed above all Nations for their military Virtues,  
could not with Patience bear to see themselves so  
far stript of their former Renown, as to be forced  
to submit to the Yoke of the *Romans*.

XLVI. *INDUTIOMARUS* and the *Treviri* ceased  
not, during the whole Winter, to send Ambaffa-  
dors over the *Rbine* ; soliciting the *German*  
States ; offering them Money ; and urging, that a  
great part of our Army having already been cut  
off, much the least considerable remained. But no  
part of that Country could be persuaded to come  
into their Designs : because having twice before  
tried their Fortune with the *Romans*, in the War  
with *Ariovistus*, and in the Defeat of the *Tencibseri* ;  
they were resolved, they told them, to run no more  
Hazards. *Indutiomarus*, disappointed of this Hope,  
was not less active in drawing Forces together, so-  
liciting Recruits from the neighbouring States,  
providing Horses, and encouraging even Out-laws  
and Convicts, by the Promise of great Rewards,  
to engage in his Service. And so great an Autho-  
rity had he by this means acquired in *Gaul*, that  
Ambassadors flocked from all Parts ; some publick-  
ly, others in a private manner, to request his Pro-  
tection and Friendship.

XLVII.

XLVII. FINDING himself thus voluntarily applied to : on one side, by the *Senones* and *Carnutes*, impelled by a consciousness of the Guilt they had incurred ; on the other, by the *Nervians* and *Atuatuci*, who were preparing for a War with the *Romans* ; and that if he once took the Field, Forces would not be wanting : he called an Assembly of the States in Arms. This, according to the Custom of the *Gauls*, implies an actual commencement of War ; and, by a standing Law, obliges all their Youth to appear at the Diet in Arms ; in which they are so extremely strict, that whosoever has the misfortune to come last, is put to death in sight of the Multitude, with all manner of Torments. In this Assembly, *Cingetorix*, the head of the opposite Faction, and Son-in-law of *Indutiomarus* ; who, as we have related above, had declared for *Cæsar*, and still continued firm to him, was proclaimed a publick Enemy, and his Estate confiscated. After which *Indutiomarus* acquainted the Council, that the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and several other States of *Gaul* had solicited his Assistance ; that he accordingly intended to join his Forces with theirs, taking his Rout thro' the Territories of the *Rbemi*, and giving up their Lands to be plundered ; but that before he began his March, he was desirous of mastering the Camp of *Labienus*. To that end he gave the necessary Directions.

XLVIII. LABIENUS, whose Camp, both by the nature of the Ground, and the Fortifications he had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing, either for himself or the Legion ; but nevertheless was intent how he might give the Enemy some considerable Blow. Having therefore been informed by *Cingetorix* and his Adherents, of the Speech



*C. JULIUS CÆSAR's*  
**COMMENTARIES**  
OF HIS  
**WARS in GAUL.**

**BOOK VI.**

## THE ARGUMENT

- I. Cæsar, apprehending greater Commotions in Gaul, augments his Forces. II. He reduces the Nervians by a sudden Invasion. III. And admits the Senones, Carnutes, and Menapians to a Surrender. VI. Labienus pretending Fear, suddenly attacks and routs the Treviri. IX. Cæsar passes the Rhine a second time. X. The Suevians prepare to oppose the Romans. XI. The Manners of the Gauls and Germans described. XII. The Æduans and Sequani at the head of two opposite Factions in Gaul. The Sequani declining in Power, the Remi substitute themselves in their Place. XIII. Description of the Druids. XV. The Religion of the Gauls. XVI. The Gauls and Germans differ much as to their Manners and Customs. XXIII. The Hercynian Forest. XXIV. A Bull with one Horn. XXV. Wild Asses. XXIV. Bufalos. XXVII. Cæsar, fearing the Want of Provisions, repasses the Rhine, and marches against Ambiorix. XXVIII. The great Power of Fortune. XXIX. Ambiorix disbands his Troops, and counsels them to provide for their own Safety. XXX. Cæsar divides his Army, and marches in Person in quest of Ambiorix. XXXI. Is obliged to proceed with great Circumspection in ravaging the Country. XXXII. The Sicambri cross the Rhine, and fall upon Cicero's Camp, XXXV. The astonishing Bravery of Sextius Baculus upon this Occasion. XXXVII. The Romans suffer some Loss. XXXVIII. The Germans at length relinquish the Attack, and return home. XL. Cæsar lays waste the Country of the Eburones. Ambiorix narrowly escapes being taken. XL. Cæsar returns to Italy.

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C. JULIUS CÆSAR's  
COMMENTARIES  
OF HIS  
WARS in GAUL.

## BOOK VI.

I. **C**ÆSAR, for many Reasons, expecting greater Commotions in Gaul, ordered his Lieutenants *M. Silanus*, *C. Antistius Reginus*, and *T. Sextius*, to levy Troops. At the same time he desired of *Cn. Pompey* the Proconsul, that since he was himself detained by publick Affairs at *Rome*, he would set on foot the Legion he had inlisted in *Cisalpine Gaul*, during his Consulship, and send it to him: for he considered it as of the utmost Importance towards securing a proper Respect from the *Gauls* for the time to come, to give them such an Idea of the Power of *Italy*, as might convince them that it was not only able speedily to repair any Losses sustained, but even to bring a greater Force into the Field. Friendship and the good of the Commonwealth equally determined *Pompey* to yield to this Request:

VOL. I. N

and

BOOK and the Levies being compleated with great dili-  
VI. gence by the Lieutenants, three new Legions were  
formed and brought into *Gaul* before the end  
of Winter. Thus, having doubled the Number  
of Cohorts lost under *Titurius*, he soon made the  
Enemy sensible, both by his Expedition and the  
Strength of the Reinforcement, of what they had  
to apprehend from the Power and Discipline of  
the *Romans*.

II. INDUTIOMARUS being slain, as we have re-  
lated above, the *Treviri* conferred the Command  
on his Relations. They persisted likewise in soliciting  
the *Germans*, and making them offers of Money.  
But not being able to prevail with those that lay  
nearest them, they applied to some of the more  
remote States; and finding them inclined to treat,  
entered into a solemn Engagement with them, giving  
Hostages for Security of the Money stipulated,  
and associating *Ambiorix* into the Confederacy.  
*Cæsar* informed of these things, and finding that he  
was threatned with War on all sides; that the *Ner-  
vians*, *Atuatici*, and *Menapians*, with all the *Ger-  
mans* on this side the *Rhine*, were actually in Arms;  
that the *Senones* refused to attend him according to  
Orders, and were tampering with the *Carnutes* and  
other neighbouring States; and that the *Treviri* were  
soliciting the *Germans* by frequent Embassies; he judg-  
ed it would be necessary to open the Campaign  
early. Accordingly, without waiting till the Winter  
was at an end, he drew together the four nearest  
Legions, and fell unexpectedly into the Territories of  
the *Nervians*, before they could either assemble in  
a Body, or find means to save themselves by Flight.  
Having carried off a great Number of Men and  
Cattle, enriched his Soldiers with the Booty, and  
laid waste the Country; he compelled them to sub-  
mit

mit and give Hostages, and then led back his Legions to their Winter-quarters.

BOOK  
VI

III. EARLY in the Spring, having summoned a general Assembly of Gaul, pursuant to his Design : as all the other States but the *Senones*, *Carnutes*, and *Treviri* appeared ; looking upon this as the beginning of a Revolt, and willing to postpone every thing else, he adjourned the Diet to *Paris*. This City was upon the Borders of the *Senones*, and had been united with them about an Age before ; but was thought to have no share in their present Revolt. Having declared the Adjournment to the Assembly, he the same Day set out with his Legions against the *Senones*, and by great Marches reached their Territories. *Acco*, who was at the head of the Confederacy, hearing of his Approach, ordered the Multitude to shelter themselves in the Towns : but before that could be done, the *Romans* appeared. This obliged them to change their Measures, and send Deputies to *Cæsar*, to implore Forgiveness. They were seconded by the *Æduans*, the old and faithful Allies of the *Romans*, at whose Request *Cæsar* readily pardoned them ; and the rather, because the Summer being now come, he had no mind to spend the Season for Action in proceeding formally against the Guilty. He ordered them to send an hundred Hostages, whom he committed to the Custody of the *Æduans*. The *Carnutes* too, at the Intercession of the *Rheni*, under whose Protection they were, having sent Deputies and Hostages, obtained the same Conditions. *Cæsar* then went to the Assembly of the States, put an end to the Diet, and ordered the *Gauls* to provide him Cavalry.

BOOK IV. TRANQUILLITY being restored in these Parts,  
VI. *Cæsar* turned all his Thoughts to the Management  
of the War with *Ambiorix* and the *Treviri*. He  
ordered *Cavarinus* to attend him with the Cavalry  
of the *Senones*, to prevent any new Commotions in  
his Absence, either in consequence of the Resent-  
ment of that Prince, or the Hatred he had incurred  
of the State. And having thus settled all things to  
his mind, as he knew *Ambiorix* was determined not  
to hazard a Battle, he set himself to watch his  
other Designs.

V. THE *Menapians*, whose Territories border  
upon those of the *Eburones*, are secured by Woods  
and Morasses on every side; and were the only  
People of Gaul, who had not sent Ambassadors to  
*Cæsar* to desire a Peace. He knew *Ambiorix* was  
in good Intelligence with them; and that by means  
of the *Treviri*, he had also entered into an Alliance  
with the *Germans*. He therefore thought it best to  
deprive him of these Resources, before he attacked  
him in person; lest despairing of being able to  
defend himself, he should either retire among the  
*Menapians*, or throw himself into the Arms of the  
*Germans* beyond the *Rhine*. This Resolution be-  
ing taken, he sent the Baggage of the whole Army  
to *Labienus* in the Country of the *Treviri*, ordered  
him a Reinforcement of two Legions, and marched  
himself against the *Menapians* with five Legions,  
who carried nothing with them but their Arms.  
That Nation trusting to their Situation, instead of  
assembling Forces, retreated to their Woods and  
Morasses, and carried all their Effects along with  
them. *Cæsar*, dividing his Forces with *C. Fabius*  
his Lieutenant, and *M. Crassus* his Questor; and  
having speedily finished his Bridges; entered their  
Country

Country in three Bodies, set all their Houses and ~~BOOK~~  
Villages on fire, and carried off such Numbers of Men  
and Cattle, that the *Menapians* were at last constrain-  
ed to sue for Peace. He granted it, on Condition they  
sent him Hostages, and engaged not to admit *Ambiorix* or any one from him into their Territories ;  
threatening to treat them as Enemies if they did. These  
things settled, he left *Comius* of *Arras* there with a  
Body of Horse to keep them in Awe, and set out  
himself against the *Treviri*.

VI. WHILST *Cæsar* was thus employed, the *Treviri*, having drawn together a great Number of  
Horse and Foot, were preparing to attack the Legion which had wintered in their Territories under  
*Labienus*. They were now advanced within two  
Days March of the Lieutenant's Camp, when they  
learnt that he had received a Reinforcement of two  
Legions from *Cæsar*. Upon this encamping at  
about fifteen Miles distance, they resolved to wait  
for the Auxiliaries they expected from *Germany*.  
*Labienus* having Intelligence of their Design, and  
hoping their Rashness might furnish him with an  
Opportunity of fighting, left the Baggage under a  
Guard of five Cohorts ; and with the twenty-five  
remaining, and all his Cavalry, marched towards  
the Enemy, and pitched his Camp about a Mile  
from them.

VII. BETWEEN *Labienus* and the Enemy was a  
River, with steep Banks, and difficult to pass. And  
indeed neither was *Labienus* himself minded to  
try the Passage, nor did he expect the Enemy  
would offer at such an Attempt. The hope of  
being joined by the Auxiliaries grew stronger in the  
Camp of the *Gauls* every Day. *Labienus* declared  
publickly in a Council of War ; " That as the

BOOK VI. *Germans* were said to be upon their march, he  
 was determined not to expose himself and the  
 Army to danger, but would decamp early next  
 Morning." This was soon carried to the En-  
 emy; for as our Cavalry consisted mostly of *Gauls*,  
 it was natural for some of them to favour their  
 Countrymen. *Labienus* assembling the military  
 Tribunes and principal Centurions during the night,  
 laid before them his real Design: and the better to  
 betray the Enemy into a suspicion of his being  
 afraid, gave Orders for decamping with more  
 Noise and Tumult than was usual in a *Roman*  
 Army. By this means his March had all the Ap-  
 pearance of a Flight; and the Enemy, whose Camp  
 was so very near, had notice of it before Day-  
 break from their Spies.

VIII. SCARCE had our Rear got without the  
 Trenches, when the *Gauls* encouraging one another  
 not to lose so fair a Prey, or stay in Expectation of  
 the *Germans*, at a time the *Romans* were retreating  
 in such a Panick; and considering it as an Indig-  
 nity, with so great a Superiority of Forces, to for-  
 bear attacking an handful of Men already put to  
 Flight and incumbered with their Baggage; resolv-  
 ed to pass the River, and engage the *Romans*, not-  
 withstanding the Disadvantage of the Ground. *La-  
 bienus*, who had foreseen this; that he might draw  
 them all over the River, continued the Feint of  
 his March, and went on quietly. Then sending  
 the Baggage a little before, and ordering it to be  
 placed upon a rising Ground: "Behold, Fellow-  
 soldiers, says he, the Opportunity you so much  
 desired: you have the Enemy at a disadvantage,  
 and in a Place where they cannot sustain the  
 Onset: shew only under my Command the  
 Valour you have so often manifested to our  
 General;

“ General ; think him present, and that he sees and ~~BOOK~~ <sup>VI</sup> observes you.” At the same time he ordered them to face about, and form in Line of Battle ; and detaching a few Troops of Horse to guard the Baggage, drew up the rest on the two Wings. Our Men gave a sudden Shout, and threw their Javelins, The Enemy, contrary to their Expectation, seeing those whom they imagined put to flight, marching against them with displayed Banners, could not sustain the very first Shock ; but betaking themselves immediately to flight, took Refuge in the nearest Woods. *Labienus* pursuing with his Cavalry, put many of the Enemy to the Sword, and took a great Number of Prisoners ; insomuch that within a few Days the whole State was obliged to submit : for the *Germans*, who were coming to their Assistance, upon hearing of their Defeat, returned home. The Relations of *Indutiomarus*, who had been the Authors of the Revolt, chose likewise to retire with them, and abandon their Country. *Cingetorix*, who had always continued faithful to the *Romans*, was thereupon invested with the supreme Authority.

IX. CÆSAR, after his Arrival in *Treves*, from among the *Menapians*, resolved for two Reasons to pass the *Rhine* : one, because the *Germans* had assisted the *Treviri* against the *Romans* ; the other, to deprive *Ambiorix* of a Retreat into those Parts In consequence of this Resolution, he set about making a Bridge on the River, but somewhat higher up than before. As the Form and Manner was known, the Soldiers, by their extraordinary Diligence, finished the Work in a few Days. Leaving a strong Guard on the side of *Treves*, to prevent any sudden Insurrection in that Country, he carried over the rest of his Army. The *Ubians*, who had before sub-

**BOOK VI.** mitted and given Hostages, sent Ambassadors to him to vindicate their Conduct, and assure him, that they had neither sent Troops to the Assistance of the *Treviri*, nor in any Instance departed from their Engagements. They urged and requested, that he would spare their Territories, and not, out of a general Hatred to the *Germans*, involve the Innocent in the Punishment of the Guilty. If he desired more Hostages, they told him they were ready to send them. *Cæsar* finding upon Inquiry, that the Supplies had been sent by the *Suevians*, accepted the Submission of the *Ubians*: and preparing to march against the *Suevians*, informed himself of the Ways and AccesSES to their Country.

X. A few Days after, he had Intelligence from the *Ubians*, that the *Suevians* were drawing their Forces to a general Rendezvous, and had sent Orders to all the Nations under their Jurisdiction, to furnish their Contingents of Horse and Foot. Upon this having furnished himself with Provisions, and chosen a proper Place for his Camp, he ordered the *Ubians* to retire into their Towns with their Cattle and Effects; hoping that so unskilful and barbarous an Enemy, might easily be drawn by the Want of Provisions, to fight in a Place of Disadvantage. He further enjoined the *Ubians* to send Spies into all Parts, to learn the Designs and Motions of the *Suevians*. They readily complied, and in a few Days brought him back word; " That the *Suevians*, upon certain Information of the Arrival of the *Roman* Army, had retired to the remotest Part of the Country, with all their own Forces, and those of their Allies: that there they had resolved to wait the coming up of the *Romans*, at the Entrance of a Forest

" of

" of immense Extent, called *Bacenis*, which reach-  
" ed a great way into the Country, and served as a  
" Barrier between the *Cberuscis* and *Suevians*, to pre-  
" vent their mutual Incursions."

XI. ON this Occasion it may not be improper to say somewhat of the Manners of the *Gauls* and *Germans*, and the difference of Customs between these two Nations. A spirit of Faction prevails throughout *Gaul*, and that not only in their several States, Districts, and Villages, but almost in every private Family. The Men of greatest Esteem and Consideration among them, are commonly at the head of these Factions, and give what turn they think proper to all publick Deliberations and Counsels. This Custom is of long standing, and seems designed to secure those of lower rank from the Oppression of the powerful : for the Leaders always take care to protect those of their Party, otherwise they would soon lose all their Authority. This equally obtains thro' the whole Continent of *Gaul*, the Provinces being in general divided into two Factions.

XII. WHEN *Cesar* arrived in the Country, the *Aeduans* were at the head of one Faction, and the *Sequani* of the other. These last being the weaker, because the *Aeduans* had long bore the greatest sway, and had a number of considerable States in their dependence ; they united with *Ariovistus* and the *Germans*, whom by great Presents and Promises they drew over the *Rbine* to their Assistance. This Alliance made them so powerful, that having worsted their Adversaries in several Battles, and killed almost all their Nobility ; they forced the States dependent upon the *Aeduans* to have recourse to them for protection ; obliged the *Aeduans* themselves

BOOKSelves to give the Children of their principal No-  
VI. bility as Hostages, swear publickly not to attempt  
any thing against the *Sequani*, and resign up to their  
possession a part of their Territories ; and by this  
means rendered themselves in a manner Sovereigns  
of all *Gaul*. *Divitius*, in this Necessity, applied  
to the Senate of *Rome* for Relief, but without effect.  
*Cæsar's* Arrival soon changed the face of Affairs.  
The *Aeduans* Hostages were sent back, their former  
Clients restored, and new ones procured them by  
*Cæsar's* Interest ; it appearing, that such as were  
under their Protection, enjoyed a more equal and  
milder Lot : by all which their Fortune and Au-  
thority being considerably enlarged, the *Sequani*  
were obliged to resign the Sovereignty. The *Rbemi*  
succeeded in their place : and as they were known  
to be in the same degree of Favour with *Cæsar*,  
such as could not get over their old Animosity to  
the *Aeduans*, put themselves under their Protection.  
The *Rbemi* were extremely attentive to the Interests  
of their Clients, and thereby both preserved their  
old Authority, and that which they had newly ac-  
quired. Such therefore was the then Situation of  
*Gaul*, that the *Aeduans* possessing indisputably the  
first Rank, the *Rbemi* were next in Consideration  
and Dignity.

XIII. OVER all *Gaul*, there are only two Orders  
of Men, in any degree of Honour and Esteem :  
for the common People are little better than Slaves,  
attempt nothing of themselves, and have no share  
in the publick Deliberations. As they are generally  
oppressed with Debt, heavy Tributes, or the Ex-  
actions of their Superiors ; they make themselves  
Vassals to the Great, who exercise over them the  
same Jurisdiction, as Masters do over Slaves. The  
two Orders of Men, with whom, as we have said,  
all

all Authority and Distinctions are lodged, are the B O O K VI. Druids and Nobles. The Druids preside in matters of Religion, have the care of publick and private Sacrifices, and interpret the Will of the Gods. They have the Direction and Education of the Youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all Controversies, whether publick or private, the Decision is left to them : and if any Crime is committed, any Murder perpetrated ; if any Dispute arises touching an Inheritance, or the Limits of adjoining Estates ; in all such Cases, they are the supreme Judges. They decree Rewards and Punishments ; and if any one refuses to submit to their Sentence, whether Magistrate or private Man, they interdict him the Sacrifices. This is the greatest Punishment that can be inflicted among the *Gauls*; because such as are under this Prohibition, are considered as impious and wicked : all Men shun them, and decline their Conversation and Fellowship, lest they should suffer from the Contagion of their Misfortunes. They can neither have recourse to the Law for Justice, nor are capable of any publick Office. The Druids are all under one Chief, who possesses the supreme Authority in that Body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels the rest, he succeeds : but if there are several Candidates of equal Merit, the Affair is determined by plurality of suffrages. Sometimes they even have recourse to Arms before the Election can be brought to an Issue. Once a Year they assemble at a consecrated Place in the Territories of the *Carnutes*, whose Country is supposed to be the middle of *Gaul*. Hither such as have any Suits depending flock from all parts, and submit implicitly to their Decrees. Their Institution is supposed to come originally from *Britain*, whence it passed into *Gaul*, and even at this day, such as are desirous of being perfect

B O O K VI. perfect in it, travel thither for Instruction. The Druids never go to War, are exempted from Taxes and military Service, and enjoy all manner of Immunities. These mighty Encouragements induce multitudes of their own accord to follow that Profession ; and many are sent by their Parents and Relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of Verses by heart, and often spend twenty Years upon this Institution : for it is deemed unlawful to commit their Statutes to Writing ; tho' in other matters, whether publick or private, they make use of *Greek Characters*. They seem to me to follow this Method for two Reasons : to hide their Mysteries from the Knowledge of the Vulgar ; and to exercise the Memory of their Scholars, which would be apt to lie neglected, had they Letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal Maxims that the Soul never dies, but after Death passes from one Body to another ; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt Mens Courage, by disarming Death of its Terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the Stars and their Motions, the Magnitude of the World and our Earth, the Nature of Things, and the Power and Prerogatives of the immortal Gods.

XIV. THE other Order of Men is the Nobles, whose whole Study and Occupation is War. Before *Cæsar's* Arrival in *Gaul*, they were almost every Year at War, either offensive or defensive ; and they judge of the power and quality of their Nobles, by his Vassals, and the number of Men he keeps in his Pay : for these are the only marks of Grandeur they make any account of.

XV. THE whole Nation of the Gauls is extremely BOOK  
addicted to Superstition: whence in threatening  
Distempers, and the imminent Dangers of War,  
they make no scruple to sacrifice Men, or engage  
themselves by Vow to such Sacrifices; in which  
they make use of the Ministry of the Druids: for  
it is a prevalent Opinion among them, that no-  
thing but the life of Man can atone for the life of  
Man; insomuch that they have established even  
publick Sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge  
Colossus's of Osier Twigs, into which they put Men  
alive, and setting fire to them, those within expire  
amidst the Flames. They prefer for Victims such  
as have been convicted of Theft, Robbery, or  
other Crimes; believing them the most acceptable  
to the Gods: but when real Criminals are want-  
ing, the innocent are often made to suffer. *Mer-  
cury* is the chief Deity with them: of him they have  
many Images, account him the Inventor of all  
Arts, their Guide and Conductor in their Journeys,  
and the Patron of Merchandise and Gain. Next  
to him are *Apollo*, and *Mars*, and *Jupiter*, and *Mi-  
nerva*. Their Notions in regard to them are pretty  
much the same with those of other Nations. *Apollo*  
is their God of Physick; *Minerva* of Works and  
Manufactures; *Jove* holds the Empire of Heaven;  
and *Mars* presides in War. To this last, when  
they resolve upon a Battle, they commonly devote  
the Spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up  
all the Cattle taken, and set apart the rest of the  
Plunder in a Place appointed for that purpose: and  
it is common in many Provinces, to see these Mo-  
numents of Offerings piled up in consecrated Places.  
Nay it rarely happens, that any one shews so great  
a Disregard of Religion, as either to conceal the  
Plunder,

B O O K Plunder, or pillage the publick Oblations ; and  
VI. the severest Punishments are inflicted upon such Off-  
enders.

XVI. THE Gauls fancy themselves to be descended from the God *Pluto* ; which, it seems, is an established Tradition among the *Druuids*. For this Reason they compute the Time by Nights, not by Days ; and in the Observance of Birth-days, new Moons, and the beginning of the Year, always commence the Celebration from the preceding Night. In one Custom they differ from almost all other Nations ; that they never suffer their Children to come openly into their presence, until they are of Age to bear Arms : for the Appearance of a Son in publick with his Father, before he has reached the Age of Manhood, is accounted dishonourable.

XVII. WHATEVER Fortune the Woman brings, the Husband is obliged to equal it out of his own Estate. This whole Sum, with its annual Product, is left untouched, and falls always to the share of the Survivor. The Men have Power of Life and Death over their Wives and Children : and when any Father of a Family of illustrious Rank dies, his Relations assemble, and upon the least ground of Suspicion put even his Wives to the Torture like Slaves. If they are found guilty, Iron and Fire are employed to torment and destroy them. Their Funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, according to their Quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even Animals, are thrown into the Pile : and formerly such of their Slaves and Clients as they loved most, sacrificed themselves at the Funeral of their Lord.

XVIII.

XVIII. In their best regulated States they have <sup>BOOK</sup>  
a Law, that whoever hears any thing relating to <sup>VI.</sup>  
the Publick, whether by Rumor or otherwise, shall  
give immediate notice to the Magistrate, without  
imparting it to any one else : for the nature of the  
People is such, that rash and unexperienced Men,  
alarmed by false Reports, are often hurried to the  
greatest Extremities, and take upon them to deter-  
mine in matters of the highest Consequence. The  
Magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and  
only communicate to the Multitude what they  
think needful for the service of the Commonwealth :  
nor do the Laws permit to speak of State Affairs,  
except in publick Council.

XIX. THE *Germans* differ widely in their Man-  
ners from the *Gauls*. For neither have they Druids  
to preside in religious Affairs ; nor do they trouble  
themselves about Sacrifices. They acknowledge  
no Gods but those that are Objects of Sight, and  
by whose Power they are apparently benefited ; the  
Sun, the Moon, Fire. Of others they know no-  
thing ; not even by Report. Their whole Life is  
addicted to Hunting and War ; and from their In-  
fancy they are inured to Fatigue and Hardships.  
They esteem those most, who continue longest  
Strangers to Women ; as imagining nothing con-  
tributes so much to Stature, Strength, and Vigour  
of Body : but to have any Commerce of this kind  
before the age of twenty, is accounted in the highest  
degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal  
any Irregularity this way ; because they bathe pro-  
miscuously in Rivers, and are clothed in Skins, or  
short Mantles of Fur, which leave the greatest part  
of their Bodies naked.

BOOK XX. AGRICULTURE is little regarded among VI. them, as they live mostly on Milk, Cheese, and the Flesh of Animals. Nor has any Man Lands of his own, or distinguished by fixed Boundaries. The Magistrates, and those in Authority, portion out yearly to every Canton and Family, such a quantity of Land, and in what part of the Country they think proper; and the Year following remove them to some other Spot. Many Reasons are assigned for this Practice: lest seduced by Habit and Continuance, they should learn to prefer Tillage to War: lest a desire of enlarging their Possessions should gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel the weaker: lest they should become curious in their Buildings, in order to guard against the extremes of Heat and Cold: lest Avarice should get footing amongst them, whence spring Factions and Discords: in fine, to preserve Contentment and Equanimity among the People, when they find their Possessions nothing inferior to those of the most powerful.

XXI. It is accounted honourable for States to have the Country all around them lie waste and depopulated: for they think it an argument of Valour to expel their Neighbours, and suffer none to settle near them; at the same time that they are themselves also the safer, as having nothing to apprehend from sudden Incursions. When a State is engaged in War, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of Magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm with a Power of Life and Death. In time of Peace there are no publick Magistrates; but the Chiefs of the several Provinces and Clans administer Justice, and decide Differences within their respective Limits. Robbery has nothing

thing infamous in it, when committed without the ~~BOOK~~  
Territories of the State to which they belong: they VI.  
even pretend that it serves to exercise their Youth,  
and prevent the growth of Sloth. When any of their  
Princes in this case offers himself publickly in Council  
as a Leader, such as approve of the Expedition rise  
up, profess themselves ready to follow him, and are  
applauded by the whole Multitude. They who  
go back from their Engagement are looked upon  
as Traytors and Deserters, and lose all Esteem and  
Credit for the time to come. The Laws of Hos-  
pitality are held inviolable among them. All that  
fly to them for Refuge, on whatever account, are  
sure of Protection and Defence; their Houses are  
open to receive them, and they plentifully supply  
their Wants.

XXII. FORMERLY the *Gauls* exceeded the *Germans* in Bravery, often made War upon them, and as they abounded in People beyond what the Country could maintain, sent several Colonies over the *Rhine*. Accordingly the more fertile Places of *Germany*, in the neighbourhood of the *Hercynian Forest*, (which I find mentioned by *Eratosthenes* and other *Greek* Writers under the name of *Orcinia*,) fell to the share of the *Volcae*, who settled in those Parts, and have ever since kept Possession. They are in the highest Reputation for Justice and Bravery, and no less remarkable than the *Germans* for Poverty, Abstinence, and Patience of Fatigue; conforming exactly to their Customs, both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the *Roman Province*, and an acquaintance with Traf-  
fick, has introduced Luxury and Abundance among the *Gauls*; whence becoming by little and little an unequal match for the *Germans*, and being

BOOK worsted in many Battles, they no longer pretend  
 VI. to compare with them in Valour.

XXIII. THE *Hercynian Forest*, of which we have been just speaking, is about nine Days Journey in breadth : for as the *Germans* are ignorant of the use of Measures, there is no other way of computing it. It begins from the Confines of the *Helvetians*, *Nemetes*, and *Rauraci*; and following directly the course of the *Danube*, extends to the Territories of the *Anartes* and *Dacians*. Thence turning from the River to the left, it runs thro' a multitude of different Regions : and tho' there are many in the Country, who have advanced six Days Journey into this Forest ; yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or discovered how far it extends. Many different species of Animals, unknown in other Countries, harbour here ; the most remarkable of which, and that best deserve to be mentioned, are these.

XXIV. THERE is a Bull that nearly resembles a Stag, with only one Horn rising from the middle of his Forehead, taller and straighter than those of our Cattle, and which at top divides into many large Branches. The Males and Females are shaped alike, and have Horns the same in size.

XXV. HERR are likewise a kind of wild Asses, shaped and spotted like Goats, but of a larger size ; without Horns, or Joints in their Legs ; that never lie down to sleep ; nor can raise themselves, if by any accident they are overthrown. They lean against Trees, which serve to support them when they sleep. Hence the Huntsmen, after having discovered their haunts, either loosen the Roots of the Trces, or saw them almost quite off ; so that when

when the Animal, according to Custom, declines BOOK  
against them, they immediately give way, and both VI.  
fall down together.

XXVI. A third species of Animals are the Uri, nearly equalling the Elephant in bulk; but in colour, shape, and kind, resembling a Bull. They are of uncommon strength and swiftness, and spare neither Man nor Beast that comes in their way. They are taken and slain by means of Pits dug on purpose. This way of Hunting is frequent among the Youth, and serves to inure them to Fatigue. They who kill the greatest number, and produce their Horns in publick as a proof, are in high Reputation with their Countrymen. It is found impossible to tame them, or conquer their fierceness, tho' taken never so young. Their Horns, both in largeness, figure, and kind, differ much from those of our Bulls. The Natives preserve them with great care, tip their edges with Silver, and use them instead of Cups on their most solemn Festivals.

XXVII. CÆSAR understanding from the *Ubians* Scouts, that the *Suevians* were retired into their Woods; and fearing the want of Provisions, because, as we have already observed, the *Germans* are but little addicted to Agriculture; resolved not to advance any farther. But to keep the Enemy still under some awe of his Return, and prevent their sending Succours to *Gaul*; having repassed the *Rhine*, he only broke down about two hundred Feet of his Bridge, on the *German* side; and to secure the rest, built at the extremity a Tower of four Stories, where he left a Garrison of twelve Cohorts, and strengthened the Place with all manner of Works. Young *C. Volcatius Tullus* had the charge of the Fort and Garrison. He himself, as

BOOK soon as the Corn began to be ripe, marched against VI. *Ambiorix*; taking his way thro' the Forest of *Arden*, which is much the largest in all *Gaul*, and reaches from the Banks of the *Rbine*, and the Confines of *Treves*, quite to the *Nervians*, thro' a Space of more than five hundred Miles. *L. Minucius Basilius* was sent before with all the Cavalry, in hopes that the quickness of his March, and the opportunity of some lucky Conjunction, might enable him to do something considerable. He had orders to light no Fires in his Camp, the better to conceal his Approach from the Enemy; and *Cæsar* assured him, he would follow with all expedition. *Basilius* exactly followed his Instructions; and coming suddenly and unexpectedly upon the *Gauls*, surprised great numbers of them in the Field. Being informed by them of the Place whither *Ambiorix* had retired with a few Cavalry, he marched directly against him.

XXVIII. BUT as Fortune has a considerable share in all human Concerns, so particularly in those of War. For as it was a very extraordinary Chance, that he should thus come upon *Ambiorix* unprepared, and surprise him with his personal Arrival, before he had the least notice of it from Fame or Report: so was it an equal effect of Fortune, that the *Gaul* himself, after having lost his Arms, Horses, and Chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the situation of his House, which was surrounded with a Wood; it being customary among the *Gauls*, in order to avoid the Heats, to build in the neighbourhood of Woods and Rivers. By this means his Attendants and Friends, possessing themselves of a Defile, sustained for a time the Attack of our Cavalry; during which, one of his Servants having provided him with a Horse, he escaped

escaped into the Woods. Thus Fortune re-BOOK  
markably played her Part, both in bringing him VI.  
into the Danger, and delivering him out of it.

XXIX. AMBIORIX, after his Escape, made no Attempt to draw his Forces together; nor is it known whether he acted in this manner out of Choice, as not thinking it safe to hazard a Battle; or because he thought he should not have sufficient time, being surprised by the sudden Arrival of the Cavalry, and believing that all the rest of the Army followed. Dispatching therefore Messengers privately thro' the Country, he counselled every one to provide for his own Safety; upon which some took refuge in the Forest of *Arden*, and some in the adjoining Morasses. Those who lived upon the Sea-coast, hid themselfes in the Islands formed by the Tide at High Water: and many abandoning their Country altogether, trusted themselves and their all to the Faith of Foreigners. *Catuvulcus*, who jointly with *Ambiorix* was King of the *Eburones*, and had associated with him in all his Designs, being of a very advanced Age, and unable to bear the Fatigues of War or Flight; after many Imprecations against *Ambiorix*, who had been the prime Contriver of the Revolt; poisoned himself with an extract of Yew, a Tree very common in *Gaul* and *Germany*. The *Segni* and *Condruſi*, originally *German* Nations, whose Territories lay between those of *Treves* and the *Eburones*, sent Ambassadors to *Cæsar* to intreat: "That he would "not consider them as Enemies, nor look upon "all the *Germans* on this side the *Rhine* as equally "obnoxious: That they had harboured no "Thoughts of War, nor been any ways aiding "to *Ambiorix*." *Cæsar* finding it to be so by the Answers of the Prisoners, ordered them to deliver

BOOK-up such of the *Eburones* as had fled to them for Re-  
VI. fuge; and promised, upon that Condition, not to  
molest their Territories.

XXX. THEN dividing his Army into three Bodies, he sent all the Baggage to *Atuatuca*, a Castle situated almost in the heart of the Country of the *Eburones*, where *Titurius* and *Arunculeius* had been quartered during the Winter. This Place he chose, as for other Reasons, so likewise because the Fortifications raised the Year before were still entire, which would lessen the Labour of his Soldiers. He left the fourteenth Legion to guard the Baggage, being one of the three lately levied in *Italy*, and brought thence into *Gaul*. *Q. Tullius Cicero* had the Charge both of the Legion and Fort, which was further strengthened with an additional Guard of two hundred Horse. The Army being thus divided; he sent *T. Labienus*, with three Legions, towards the Sea-coast, and the Provinces that border upon the *Menapians*; *C. Trebonius*, with a like number of Legions, to lay waste the Country adjoining to the *Atuatici*; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the *Scheld*, which flows into the *Meuse*, and to the Extremities of the Forest of *Arden*, whither he was informed *Ambiorix* had retired with a few Horse. He promised, at his Departure, to return in seven Days; the Legion he had left in Garrison being provided with Corn only for that time: and exhorted *Labienus* and *Trebonius*, if they found it consistent with the publick Advantage, to return likewise with their Legions within the same Space; that joining counsel together, and taking their Measures from the Conduct of the Enemy, they might resolve where next to carry the War.

XXXI. THERE was, as we have already observed, no formed Body of Troops, no Garrison, no fortified Town to defend by Arms ; but a Multitude dispersed on all sides. Wherever a Cave, or a Thicket, or a Morass offered them Shelter, thither they retired. These Places were well known to the Natives ; and great Care and Caution was required on our part, not for the Security of the whole Army, (which had no danger to fear whilst in a Body, from Enemies dispersed and full of Terror;) but for the Preservation of each Individual. And yet even this regarded not a little the whole Army : for the Desire of Plunder drew many of the Men to a great distance ; and the Woods full of Defiles and hidden Ways, hindered them from keeping together in a Body. If *Cæsar* meant to terminate the War altogether, and extirpate this Race of perfidious Men ; the Soldiers must be divided into small Parties, and detached on all sides. If, on the contrary, he kept his Men together, as the Rules of War, and the *Roman Discipline* required ; the Enemy were sheltered by their Situation, nor wanted Boldness to form Ambuscades, and cut off Stragglers. Amidst these Difficulties, all possible Precautions were taken ; and although the Soldiers were eagerly bent upon Revenge, yet *Cæsar* chose rather not to push the Enemy too far, than expose his Men to danger. He therefore sent Messengers to the neighbouring States, inviting them all by the hopes of Plunder, to join in the Destruction of the *Eburones* ; choosing rather to expose the Lives of the *Gauls* in the Woods, than of the legionary Soldiers ; and hoping by the Multitude employed against them, totally to extirpate the Name and Memory of a State, whose Revolt had rendered them so obnoxious. Accordingly

XXXII. Thus were the *Eburones* attacked on all sides, and the Havock continued till the seventh Day, which *Cæsar* had appointed for returning to his Camp and Baggage. It then evidently appeared what Influence Fortune has over War, and how many Accidents spring from her Interposition. The Enemy being dispersed and full of Terror, as we have related above ; there remained no Body of Troops in the Field, to give any the least ground of Fear. A Report spread among the *Germans* beyond the *Rhine*, that the Territories of the *Eburones* were given up to Plunder, and all without distinction invited to share in the Spoil. The *Sicambri*, who inhabit upon the *Rhine*, and had afforded a Retreat to the *Uxipetes* and *Tenctberi*, as mentioned above ; assembled immediately a Body of two thousand Horse, passed the River in Barks about thirty Miles below *Cæsar's* Bridge and Fort, and advanced directly towards the Territories of the *Eburones*. Many of those that fled, and had dispersed themselves up and down the Country, fell into their Hands ; as likewise abundance of Cattle, of which the Barbarians are extremely covetous. Allured by this Success they advanced farther. Neither Woods nor Morasses proved any Obstacles to Men, trained up from their Infancy to Wars and Incursions. Inquiring of the Prisoners concerning *Cæsar*, they understood that he was a great way off, and had left the Country with his whole Army. One in particular addressing them : “ Why, says he, do you lose time in pur-“ suit of so slight and trifling a Booty, when For-“ tune offers one of so much greater Value. In “ three Hours you may reach *Atuatucia*, where the “ *Romans*

"Romans have deposited all their Wealth. The <sup>BOOK</sup> VI.  
"Garrison is hardly sufficient to line the Rampart,  
"much less to sally out of their Intrenchments."  
Urged by this hope, they left their present Booty  
in a Place of Safety, and marched directly to *Atua-tuca*,  
being conducted by the Captive who had  
given them the Information.

XXXIII. CICERO, who hitherto had kept his Soldiers strictly within the Camp, according to *Cæsar's* Orders, nor suffered so much as a Servant to straggle beyond the Lines; seeing the seventh Day arrive, began to despair of *Cæsar's* Return, who, as he heard, was marched farther into the Country, and had sent him no notice of his Rout. Wherefore tired with the continual Murmurs of the Soldiers, who complained of his Patience, and told him they were kept like Men besieged; and not suspecting that any Accident could befall him, within the small Extent of three Miles; especially as the Enemy, opposed by nine Legions, and a very numerous Cavalry, were in a manner totally dispersed and cut off; he sent out five Cohorts to forage in an adjoining Field, separated from the Camp only by a single Hill. A great many sick Men had been left behind by *Cæsar*, of whom about three hundred, that were now pretty well recovered, joined the Detachment. These were followed by almost all the Servants of the Camp, together with a vast Number of Carts and Carriage-horses.

XXXIV. In that very Instant, as Fortune would have it, the *German* Cavalry arrived; and without discontinuing their Course, endeavoured to force an immediate Entrance by the *Decuman* Gate. As their March had been covered by a Wood, they were not discovered till they were just upon

BOOK upon the Camp ; insomuch that the Sutlers, who  
VI. kept their Booths under the Rampart, had not  
~~time~~ time to retire within the Intrenchments. Our Men  
were so surprised at this sudden and unexpected  
Attack, that the Cohort upon Guard could scarce  
sustain the first Onset. The Enemy spread them-  
selves on all sides to find a Place of Entrance.  
The *Romans* with difficulty defended the Gates ;  
the Rampart securing them every where else. The  
whole Camp was in an Uproar, every one inquir-  
ing of another the Causē of the Confusion ; nor  
could they determine which way to advance the  
Standards, or where to post themselves. Some  
reported the Camp was already taken : others,  
that the *Germans*, having destroyed *Cæsar* and his  
Army, were come victorious to storm their  
Trenches. The greater Number, full of imaginary  
Fears, when they considered the Place in which  
they were encamped, called to mind the Fate of  
*Cotta* and *Titurius*, who perished in that very Fort.  
This universal Conternation being perceived by  
the Barbarians, confirmed them in the Belief of  
what the Prisoners had told them, that there was  
scarce any Garrison within to defend the Camp.  
They renewed their Endeavours to force the In-  
trenchments, and mutually exhorted one another,  
not to let so fair a Prize escape out of their hands.

XXXV. AMONG the sick in Garrison was *P. Sextius Baculus*, a Centurion of the first Rank, of whom mention has been made in former Battles, and who had not tasted Food for five Days. This Officer, anxious for his own Safety, and that of the Legion, rushed unarmed out of his Tent. He saw the Enemy at hand, and the Danger extreme. Snatching the first Arms that offered, he posted himself in the Gate of the Camp. The Centurions

of

of the Cohort upon Guard followed the Example, BOOK  
and for a while sustained the Enemy's Charge. VI.  
*Sextius* expired under a multitude of Wounds, and  
was with difficulty carried off by the Soldiers. This  
short Delay gave the rest time to resume their  
Courage ; so far at least, as to mount the Rampart,  
and make a shew of defending themselves.

XXXVI. MEAN-TIME our Foragers returning,  
heard the Noise at the Camp. The Cavalry ad-  
vancing before, were soon apprized of the Danger.  
Here was no Fortification to shelter the frightened  
Troops. The new Levies, unexperienced in mat-  
ters of War, fixed their Eyes upon the Tribunes  
and Centurions, waiting their Orders. Not a  
Man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be  
disturbed by so unexpected an Accident. The  
*Germans* perceiving our Ensigns at a distance, gave  
over the Attack of the Camp, imagining at first  
it was *Cæsar* and the Legions, which the Prisoners  
had informed them were marched farther into the  
Country. But soon observing how few they were,  
they surrounded and fell upon them on all sides.

XXXVII. THE Servants of the Camp fled to  
the nearest rising Ground ; whence being immedi-  
ately driven, they threw themselves amongst the  
Ranks of the Cohorts, and thereby increased their  
Terror. Some were for drawing up in form of a  
Wedge, and forcing their way thro' the Enemy :  
for as the Camp was so very near, they imagined,  
that if some fell, the rest at least must escape.  
Others were for retiring to an Eminence, and all  
sharing there the same Fate. The veteran Soldiers,  
who had marched out with the Detachment, could  
by no means relish this Proposal : wherefore mutu-  
ally encouraging one another, and being led by

BOOK C. *Trebonius* a Roman Knight, under whose command they were, they broke thro' the midst of the Enemy, and all to a Man arrived safe in the Camp. The Servants and Cavalry following them, and seconding their Retreat, were likewise by their Bravery preserved. But the Troops who had retired to the Hill, being unexperienced in military Affairs, could neither persist in the Resolution they had taken of defending themselves from the higher Ground, nor imitate that brisk and vigorous Effort which they saw had been so serviceable to their Companions : but endeavouring to gain the Camp, quitted the advantage of their Situation. The Centurions, some of whom had been selected from veteran Legions, and on account of their Bravery promoted to higher Stations among the new Levies ; fought resolutely to maintain the Glory they had acquired, and endeavoured to sell their Lives as dear as they could. Their Valour obliging the Enemy to fall back a little, part of the Troops, contrary to Expectation, reached the Camp. The rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the Barbarians.

XXXVIII. THE Germans, despairing to carry the Camp, as they saw our Men now prepared to defend the Works, repassed the Rhine with the Booty they had deposited in the Woods. But so great was the Terror of the Romans even after their Retreat, that *C. Volusenus* arriving in the Camp the same Night with the Cavalry, could not persuade them that *Caesar* and the Army were safe. For Fear had taken so thorough a possession of their Minds, that as if bereft of Understanding, they persisted in believing the Infantry was wholly destroyed, and that the Cavalry alone had escaped : it seeming to them altogether incredible, that the

Germans

Germans would have dared to attack the Camp, had BOOK VI.  
no Misfortune befallen the *Roman Army*. But *Cæsar's Arrival* soon put an end to their Fears.

XXXIX. UPON his Return, being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the sending out the Cohorts to forage ; observing : “ That in War nothing ought to be left to Fortune, whose Power appeared evidently in the sudden Arrival of the Enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very Gates of the Camp.” But nothing in this whole Affair appeared to him more wonderful, than that the Germans having crossed the Rhine with design to plunder the Territories of Ambiorix, should by falling upon the Roman Camp do him a most acceptable Service.

XL. CÆSAR marched a second time to harass the Enemy, and having drawn a great number of Troops together from the neighbouring States, sent them into all Parts upon this Service. All the Houses and Villages were set on fire : the Plunder was universal : the vast number of Men and Horses not only destroyed great Quantities of Corn, but the Rains and advanced Season made Havock of all that was left ; insomuch that if any of the Enemy escaped for the present, it seemed yet likely, that after the Retreat of the Army, they must perish by Famine. As the Cavalry were divided into many Parties, they often came to Places, where the Prisoners not only informed them they had seen Ambiorix flying, but that he could even yet be scarce out of view. The Hope of coming up with him made them leave nothing unattempted, as imagining they would thereby gain the highest Favour with Cæsar, whose good Fortune wanted only this to render it compleat.

**B**OQK compleat. But all their Endeavours were fruitless : VI. for he still found means to hide himself in the Woods and Morasses ; whence removing privately in the Night, he escaped into other Regions, accompanied with only four Horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide.

XLI. CÆSAR having destroyed the whole Country, led back his Army into the Territories of the *Rheni*, with the loss of only two Cohorts. There he summoned a general Assembly of *Gaul*, to examine into the Affair of the *Senones* and *Cernutes* : and having passed a severe Sentence against *Acco*, the Contriver of the Revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some fearing a like fate, fled : whom having banished by a Decree of the Diet, he quartered two Legions in *Treves*, two among the *Lingones*, and the remaining six at *Agendium*, in the Country of the *Senones*. And having provided the Army with Corn, he went; pursuant to his Design, into *Italy*, to hold the Assemblies of *Cisalpine Gaul*.

The END of the FIRST VOLUME.









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